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
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


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ASTOR LENOX TILDEN FOUNDATION



a Mahratta fleet of five vessels off Geriah, on the 7th of April. This fleet was not, it appears, apprized of the peace; and Macleod, full of impatience, temerity, and presumption, instead of attempting an explanation, or submitting to be detained at Geriah for a few days, gave orders to resist. The *Ranger* was taken, after almost every man in the ship was either killed or wounded. Major Shaw was killed, and Macleod and Humberstone wounded; the latter mortally. He died in a few days at Geriah, in the twenty-eighth year of his age, and was lamented as an officer of the most exalted promise; a man, who nourished his spirit with the contemplation of ancient heroes, and devoted his hours to the study of the most abstruse sciences connected with his profession."

The English army was distributed in the conquered provinces without any regard to military science. Tippoo Sahib, well informed of all that had taken place, and having brought his powerful army across from the Carnatic, now entered upon the theatre of British triumph and folly. Mathews still remained in command, in consequence of the misfortune which had befallen Macleod. He was not prepared for an invasion of his newly-acquired conquests by Tippoo Sultan in person. He believed that his highness was in the Carnatic, contesting for its mastery with General Stuart. Mr. Murray thus describes the inroad of Tippoo and the conduct of Mathews:—"Tippoo was greatly annoyed on learning the fall of this important place [Bednore], and the near advance of the enemy towards his capital. Mathews was soon informed that successive corps were throwing themselves on his rear, and surrounding him with a force against which he would be unable to cope. He had by this time obtained permission from the Bombay government to act according to his own discretion; but he was now so elated by his easy victory, that he placed blind confidence in fortune, and even, according to certain statements, believed himself aided by some supernatural power. Thus, reposing in full security, he allowed his communications with the sea to be intercepted, while his troops were surrounded by Tippoo's whole force, aided by the science of Cossigny, a French engineer. The garrison were driven into the citadel, and, after a brave defence, were reduced to the necessity of capitulating, though on favourable terms, receiving a promise that they should be safely conducted to the coast. When the Indian prince obtained admission into Bednore, he proceeded to the treasury; but, to his rage and dismay, found it empty. Orders were then given to search the persons of the English officers, on which unhappily

was found a large sum both in money and jewels, considered always in that country public property. Upon this discovery he considered himself absolved from all that he had stipulated; the prisoners were thrown into irons, and committed to the most rigorous durance in the different fortresses of Mysore."*

To the south, the skill and vigour of a civil servant of the company, named Sullivan, in connection with Colonels Fullarton and Lang, secured great advantages. Caroor and Dindigul, Palgaut and Coimbatore were captured. Fullarton was so successful, that towards the end of the war he thought of marching against Seringapatam, and was preparing to carry that project out when peace was proclaimed. While these events were going on in the west of the peninsula, Stuart remained unwilling to undertake anything in the east. The importunities of Lord Macartney, and the irritation of his own officers, had at last some effect, and in June he began a march which was intended to support the efforts of the forces in Bombay. While Stuart was doing nothing, M. Bussy, who had before distinguished himself so much during the war in the Carnatic between the English and French, arrived from the Isle of France with large reinforcements. By the 13th of June, Stuart took post to the south of Cuddalore; Bussy, confronting him, occupied strong intrenchments defended by formidable redoubts. The English attacked him, stormed a portion of the French works, and captured a number of guns. Stuart, who had proved so incompetent in the general and comprehensive movements of a campaign, showed himself a master of his profession on the actual field of combat. This circumstance confirmed the belief entertained in Madras, that the inactivity of Stuart had arisen from jealousy and dislike of Lord Macartney, and the refusal of that governor to allow the general the extraordinary powers which had been held by Sir Eyre Coote. However this may have been, the general battled bravely and wisely with Bussy and his French army at Cuddalore.

While the English were storming the French lines, the fleet of Admiral Suffrein appeared, and after the battle took on board twelve hundred of Bussy's troops. Soon after the English fleet encountered Suffrein; a long engagement ensued, issuing in a drawn battle, a very common case in those days when the fleets of England and France met off those coasts. Sir Edward Hughes, who commanded the English navy, endeavoured to bring Suffrein to action again on the following day, but

* *History of British India.* By Hugh Murray, Esq., F.R.S.E., p. 379.

that admiral successfully evaded these efforts. Sir Edward then bore away for Madras roads; Suffrein, expecting such a course, cruised about until opportunity was afforded of relanding the 1200 men he had received, and with them he also landed 2400 more.

Bussy was now strong, and, selecting the most efficient portion of his troops, he made a well-planned and desperate sortie against the English lines. The fight raged long and fiercely, but never for a moment did the English give way on a single point. Stuart maintained his position everywhere unflinching, and repulsed the French so decisively, that the flower of their troops were left dead before the English trenches. Certain Hanoverian troops in the English service distinguished themselves on the occasion by coolness and discipline, which effectually supported the more forward and fiery valour of the British, and gave confidence to the passive performance of duty by the sepoys. Colonel Wilks relates an interesting anecdote connected with this battle, in which the Hanoverian commander had an honourable part:—"Among the wounded prisoners was a young French sergeant, who so particularly attracted the notice of Colonel Wangenheim, commandant of the Hanoverian troops in the English service, by his interesting appearance and manners, that he ordered the young man to be conveyed to his own tents, where he was treated with attention and kindness until his recovery and release. Many years afterwards, when the French army, under Bernadotte, entered Hanover, General Wangenheim, among others, attended the levee of the conqueror. 'You have served a great deal,' said Bernadotte, on his being presented, 'and, as I understand, in India.' 'I have served there.' 'At Cuddalore?' 'I was there.' 'Have you any recollection of a wounded sergeant whom you took under your protection in the course of that service?' 'The circumstance was not immediately present to the general's mind; but, on recollection, he resumed: 'I do, indeed, remember the circumstance, and a very fine young man he was. I have entirely lost sight of him ever since; but it would give me pleasure to hear of his welfare.' 'That young sergeant,' said Bernadotte, 'was the person who has now the honour to address you, who is happy in this public opportunity of acknowledging the obligation, and will omit no means within his power of testifying his gratitude to General Wangenheim.' The sergeant had become one of the most distinguished of the generals of France: it is almost unnecessary to remind the reader that he subsequently attained the exercise of sovereign power in Sweden."

Bussy had suffered so much in his sortie for the relief of Cuddalore that he was in no condition to make further efforts, and Stuart would in all probability have destroyed his army, or compelled it to surrender, had not intelligence been received by both commanders of peace in Europe. Previous to the cessation of hostilities between the English and French, Tippoo Sahib continued his conquering career in the west. It is probable he would have overrun all Western India, so incompetent were the council of Bombay, and the commanders-in-chief appointed by them, had not the skill and bravery of some inferior officers, in charge of fortified positions, resisted his progress. This was the case on the coast of Malabar, where several British forts held out, but the most glorious and obstinate resistance he encountered was at Mangalore and Onore. Two British officers of comparatively humble rank, so directed the defence of those cities that Tippoo and his lieutenants were baffled and hindered in their general measures. Finding it impossible to conquer British valour, when directed by competent command, whether in the field or the breach, Tippoo directed the investment of all places having English garrisons, and the cutting off of all supplies, so as to compel the garrisons to surrender from famine. The numerous army of the Mysoreans rendered this strategy safe and expedient.

Soon after Bednore surrendered so ignominiously to Tippoo, he laid siege to Mangalore and Onore. The garrison of the former was commanded by a brave and skilful officer named Campbell; that of the latter by Torriano, whose courage and skill had seldom been surpassed even in the annals of British warfare. During the period which elapsed from the time Tippoo laid siege to Mangalore to the arrival of the news from Europe which stopped hostilities at Cuddalore between Stuart and Bussy, the garrison of Mangalore behaved with the greatest intrepidity, Campbell animating the troops by his wisdom and conduct. At that juncture the garrison was full of hope, although surrounded by vast numbers of the enemy. Tippoo himself by his presence encouraged the besiegers in every way he could devise; but in vain. When the intelligence of peace arrived, it was announced to Tippoo, and an armistice proposed, as one of the articles of the treaty enjoined that the native powers should have four months given to them to adjust differences and fall in with the treaty of concord between the two great European powers. Tippoo was in a situation to refuse any overtures for peace, had not the French in his service immediately prepared for departure on the reception of commands

from Bussy to do so. Tippoo stormed and raved with passion, and even threatened personal indignity to the French; but as they firmly refused co-operation, he was obliged to allow them to depart. Fearing that both French and English would unite against him, if he refused the four months' armistice, he reluctantly consented. The armistice extended also to Onore and the forts of Malabar. According to the terms of the armistice Mangalore, and the other places in the hands of the British, were to be periodically supplied with provisions. Tippoo considered that no faith was to be kept with the English, who had so basely betrayed and broken faith with his father. It is not probable that, under any circumstances, Tippoo would have observed any treaty or armistice longer than superior force constrained. At all events, in this instance he resolved to render the armistice virtually inoperative. He did all in his power to prevent it. His lieutenants at Onore and the other forts were instructed to pursue the same tactics. Works of offence against all these places were carried on, while the English conscientiously, in this and every other particular, observed the agreement into which they had entered. The gallant officer in command at Mangalore besought relief from Bombay; but the incompetent council did nothing for his relief. It was in vain he protested that the sufferings of his troops passed human endurance; the council still remained inactive. There were means which might have been used for his relief, but the council subsequently justified itself for neglecting them, by alleging that they could not send aid in face of the agreement of the armistice. This plea was obviously a mere cover for their supineness, because it was plain they could not be bound by an armistice which was broken by the power with which it was made. Even when the four months of the armistice expired, nothing was performed by the authorities of Bombay to relieve the enduring and noble garrison. It is remarkable that, in the history of British power in India, through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the civil servants of the company generally, and the most favoured admirals and generals, were utterly incompetent to meet the duties and emergencies of their position. A miserable mediocrity characterized the vast majority of those who should have been selected to occupy the posts they held by the tests of high intelligence and practical ability. England always found some few men like Clive, Hastings, Coote, &c., in her moments of peril; and Campbell at Mangalore was a man of the class who, in spite of the mediocrities, gained England her renown.

The history of his achievements, and those of his brave soldiers, with the result of their devotion under circumstances of shameful neglect, has been given by Mill in summary, but yet in terms sufficiently comprehensive and complete for the purpose of a full knowledge of the facts:—"At last a cessation of hostilities, including the garrisons of Onore and Curwar, was concluded on the 2nd of August. Of this agreement one important condition was, that the English garrison should, three times a week, be furnished with a plentiful market of provisions, at the rate of Tippoo's camp. This was evaded, and prices were daily in such a manner increased, that a fowl was sold at eight, and even twelve rupees; and other things in a like proportion. At last the market was wholly cut off; and horse-flesh, frogs, snakes, ravenous birds, kites, rats, and mice, were greedily consumed. Even jackals, devouring the bodies of the dead, were eagerly shot at for food. The garrison had suffered these evils with uncommon perseverance, when a squadron appeared on the 22nd of November, with a considerable army under General Macleod. Instead of landing, the general, by means of his secretary, carried on a tedious negotiation with Tippoo; and having stipulated that provisions for one month should be admitted into the fortress, set sail with the reinforcement, on the 1st of December. Even this supply was drawn from damaged stores bought of a navy agent, and of the beef and pork not one in twenty pieces could be eaten, even by the dogs. Another visit, with a similar result, was made by General Macleod, on the 31st of December. The desertion of the sepoys, and the mutiny of the Europeans, were now daily apprehended; two-thirds of the garrison were sick, and the rest had scarcely strength to sustain their arms; the deaths amounted to twelve or fifteen every day; and at last, having endured these calamities till the 23rd of January, the gallant Campbell, by whom the garrison had been so nobly commanded, offered, on honourable terms, to withdraw the troops. The sultan was too eager to put an end to a siege, which, by desertion and death, had cost him nearly half his army, to brave the constancy of so firm a foe; and they marched to Tellicherry, with arms, accoutrements, and honours of war."

The defence of Onore was, if possible, still more intrepid, and was more fortunate, if fortune be a term to apply to what came to pass in the result of the extraordinary wisdom, perseverance, and heroism of Captain Torriano. The character of this hero may be illustrated by a few preliminary facts connected with his relation to Onore during the

war. When General Mathews commenced his operations in Malabar, while yet Hyder lived, and his army ravaged the Carnatic, Torriano was ordered by the general to attack Onore, then garrisoned by the troops of Mysore. He laid siege to it, and, although it was defended by a powerful garrison, furnished with all the appurtenances of war, he was in six days in a condition to make the assault. This he did with so much skill, that the place was captured with little loss of life on either side. The victor was as humane as he was brave; he set the garrison at liberty, except the principal officers, and treated them and the sick with the kindest consideration and care. This he did while Hyder was loading English officers, his captives, with irons, and consigning them to pestiferous and gloomy dungeons. Mathews appointed the conqueror of Onore its commandant. He soon made it a magazine for the English in that part of the newly-conquered territory, and he besought the council of Bombay, through his general, to strengthen the garrison, provide it with supplies, and furnish such means as he knew were available for increasing its defensive strength. He foresaw that Hyder or his son Tippoo would never allow the English to retain their conquests without a struggle, and would seek to reconquer the shores of Malabar and the west country, even if obliged to sacrifice the Carnatic in the attempt. The Bombay council sent no supplies; very moderate aid in food and men would have enabled Torriano to accomplish his plans; but no notice was taken of his good reasoning or his importunity. His masters were conceited, arrogant, and vulgar men.

Soon after Torriano was installed as commandant of Fort Onore, he discovered that "the killadar" of Hyder had hid his jewels during the siege by the English. He restored them to the owner, and sent him away free. The traders of the place had followed the example of the killadar, and hid their valuable effects deep in the recesses of the neighbouring jungle. He brought them thence, and restored them to their owners. His detractors, envious of his fame, and anxious to please the incompetent rulers of Bombay, afterwards endeavoured to create an impression that he had possessed himself of the jewels and merchandise.* The inhabitants who had fled returned, many of the natives of the surrounding country possessed of property took up their residence in the place, anxious to live under the government of one so equitable and generous.

An island at the mouth of the Onore river, called Fortified Island by the English, was

* *Oriental Memoirs*. By James Forbes, F.R.S. 4 vols., 4to. London, 1813.

still in the hands of the enemy. Torriano laid siege to it, and the garrison capitulated. His acts of generosity and justice there also, were such as have been already related in connection with his occupation of the more important fortress. He continued to govern the city in a manner which obtained the honour and respect of troops and people for the short time the authority of the English remained undisputed. But soon, like the approach of a thunder-cloud, silent and portentous, the army of Tippoo advanced; and then, as the pent-up thunders finding vent, it rolled the terrors of renewed war over all that portion of Western India. Tippoo found little resistance; imbecility, and even cowardice, dishonoured the arms of England. Torriano remonstrated against the military folly of his superiors, especially the surrender of Barcelore, from which the garrison fled in abject terror to Onore, which place they would hardly have been able to reach had he not taken measures to ensure their safe arrival. Yet, with these beaten and cowed soldiers, who, under stupid commanders, were so spiritless and discomfited, he maintained one of the most gallant defences recorded in history, so completely did his own heroism penetrate and inspire all around him. A committee of English civilians at Bednore ordered him, at this juncture, to abandon Onore, spike his guns, and destroy his stores. He replied that his general had ordered him to keep Onore, and he would keep it, and declined obedience to any orders but such as came from his commander-in-chief, informing the committee, in terms at once courteous and firm, that no British general could give such orders in reference to a place of such relative importance. He remained drilling his recruits and feeding the fugitives from Barcelore until the career of Tippoo led him to expect an early visit. He went out upon a reconnaissance with a portion of his troops, attended by one field-piece, and encountered the vanguard of a *corps d'armée* of Tippoo, under the command of Lutoph Ali Bey, a Persian who had served Hyder with distinction. It was then the middle of May. The assailants were ten thousand men. The Persian general sent in a flag of truce, demanding an unconditional surrender, and received a reply brief and defiant. Soon after a skirmish occurred, in which neither party had advantage: the English, however, fell back before the superior force of the enemy. A second flag of truce was sent in, renewing the demand for surrender, to which no reply was returned.

On the 10th of June, a breaching battery began to play upon the fort, which the author of *Oriental Memoirs* describes thus:—"The

rampart was narrow and bad; the high walls not more than three feet thick, generally more a mass of mud than of masonry, and through which an eighteen-pound shot easily passed." By field works and other defences the engineer officer supplied, as far as possible, the deficiencies of the old fortifications, and during the night the garrison and citizens worked hard to repair the damages done by the fire of the enemy during the day.

About the middle of June a sortie was effected, which tended much to increase the heart of the garrison, and to dispirit the enemy. Seven guns were spiked, and a considerable number of the enemy bayoneted, before they could prepare for defence, so sudden was the onslaught. Torriano had only six men wounded. One of these was left behind with both thighs broken. The Persian general, in admiration of the bravery displayed, sent him into the city. Torriano rewarded the bearers, and sent a present to the Persian chief, with thanks for his humanity and courtesy. The troops that effected this gallant sortie were British. A second sally was not so fortunate; the troops led out were sepoy, and they deserted their leaders. Torriano himself, with desperate resolution, but with great difficulty, rallied them in time to save the officers.

The enemy was now daunted, and the anger of the previously polite Persian increased to fury. Three countrymen, who had rendered services to the English foraging parties, were seized, their hands cut off, and, in this mutilated condition, sent within the English lines.

On the 1st of July the breaching batteries, strengthened by a number of very heavy guns, opened with decisive effect. The walls were really shaken; the loss of life was considerable; most of the officers were wounded, and among them Torriano himself. The Persian commander heard by his spies that the English commander was hit mortally, and he sent in an old woman to bring him more authentic tidings on the subject; determining, if her report should prove favourable, to storm the breach which his batteries had already made. The vigilance of Torriano soon detected the old woman. He sent her back with the message, "Should he on any future occasion send female emissaries, they might possess more youth and beauty; that they should be well received, and returned to his camp with as much safety as the antiquated duenna who was then conducted out of the garrison." The sufferings of the garrison from the fire of the besiegers now became great, and the sepoy shirked duty in every possible way. These men were mostly recruits from central India, fine looking, stalwart native soldiers; but they

had no manliness, nor loyalty to the cause which they were there to defend.

The want of provisions, and the appearance of fever, soon produced desertion among these men, which Torriano in vain endeavoured to stop by means of kindness, and by rewards. He at last caught one of the fugitives, and proclaimed that he would spare his life if no further desertions took place. His comrades cared not for his life: that night numerous desertions took place. The next day the native troops were paraded in front of the breach, and the apprehended deserter was blown through it from the mouth of a cannon. All means were taken to make this ceremonial impressive. The troops were marched to the slow measure of funeral military music; the drums rolled to the dead march, and the culprit was conducted with a stern and imposing solemnity to the place of execution. These proceedings produced no effect; the sepoy had no ear for any kind of music, cared little for human life, were inspired by no magnanimous sympathies, and were plotting desertion on a large scale, while the captain was hoping for important results from the appalling scene. That night a number of sepoy, officers and men, went over to the enemy.

Thus matters continued, the enemy trusting to their cannon, the English to their skill in repairing the demolitions effected, and to their gallant sorties; until at last, on the 24th of August, Captain Torriano was officially informed of the armistice by a messenger sent by the British agent from the sultan's camp before Mangalore. So far as Onore was concerned, it contained these stipulations:—

"A guard shall be placed in the fort from the sultan's troops, and one in the trenches, from the fort, to observe that no operations are carried on, nor any works erected on either side.

"A bazaar, or market, shall be daily supplied to the fort, containing all kinds of provisions, which the troops belonging to the garrison shall be allowed to purchase.

"Thirty days' provision may be received monthly from Bombay, but no military stores or ammunition will be allowed to enter the fort."

Lutoph Ali determined to render nugatory the armistice, just as Tippoo himself was prepared to do at Mangalore. The English commander, finding that all the stipulations for the suspension of arms were violated, except that the enemy did not open their batteries or attempt to storm the place, applied to the commander-in-chief of Tippoo's army, to whom Lutoph was second in command. The Persian pretended to send these communications, but retained the letters. Torriano had no means of sending any communications

from the city, but through the harcarrahs of the sultan.

Lutoph Ali effectually prevented the entrance of provisions. To the remonstrances of the English captain he returned the most polite answers, but in no way altered his proceedings. He had obviously resolved to starve the garrison. The Englishman managed, however, by threats of a sortie, to exact some attention to his demands for permission to secure supplies. Matters were in this state when, on the 27th of September, Mr. Cruso, a British military surgeon, arrived at the mouth of the river, and, after some detention in the camp of the besiegers, was permitted to enter the fort. He brought letters from Captain Campbell, the gallant defender of Mangalore, full of admiration of the defence of Onore conducted by its commander. The surgeon also brought letters from General Macleod, which, as might be expected from that officer, were satisfactory in no respect, excepting only that they expressed his esteem for the hero of Onore, and his admiration of the glorious defence that had been made. Torriano had written letters to Macleod, which Lutoph Ali pretended to forward; it now appeared that he had withheld the whole of this correspondence.

After all, there was no great improvement in the conduct of the enemy, or the condition of the besieged. Rumours of treachery also reached the ears of the English commandant, and he was obliged to use the most vigilant precautions, sleeping very close to the chief breach. Lutoph Ali was recalled by the sultan, or the chief commander of the Mysorean armies; and a Mysorean, a bigoted Mohammedan, assumed the command of the blockading force. Torriano immediately addressed this person, General Mow Mirza Khan, expressing the hope that the terms of the armistice would be loyally observed in future. Mirza professed acquiescence in all that the British officer required, and proffered his friendship in terms of lofty adulation. Mirza falsified all these fine professions almost the moment they were made. The blockade was more strict than ever. Mirza also sought, under various pretences, to get a large body of troops within the British lines; and especially insisted upon the necessity of sending four hundred men within the English works, to repair two of the sultan's ships which lay in the river. This was first demanded by his predecessor, and was now pertinaciously urged by Mirza. Torriano satisfied himself with cold refusals; but finding that Mirza persisted in the urgency of his suit, and hearing that force was to be employed, the English captain sent a peremptory refusal. The communication, as described by Forbes, is so characteristic,

that it will interest the reader, who cannot fail to admire the heroic and indomitable man:—"Captain Torriano, justly incensed, desired the second emissary to acquaint his master that, conceiving the request to have been first made in obedience to the sultan's commands, while his own mind reprobated his conduct, he had preserved great moderation in his answer, which he flattered himself would have been ascribed to its true source, a personal delicacy to Mirza. But since a repetition of the demand had been made, he deemed it an insolent puerility, so little becoming the character of Mirza, that he hoped he did not err in imputing it to the shortsighted policy and chicanery of the Brahmins by whom he was surrounded. That the proper time for restoring the ships would be when the sultan's troops were able to take the outworks in which they stood; until that event, the commander was determined not only to keep possession of the vessels, but if wood for fuel was not immediately supplied for the garrison, the ships would be broken up for that purpose."

After this Mirza became exceedingly hostile, and in various ways broke through the armistice in an ostentatious and violent manner. Torriano prepared to renew hostilities, when the Mysore commander alarmed at the possible consequence to himself of having provoked such a result, made apologies, but even while he made them was devising fresh expedients for depriving the garrison of opportunity to procure provisions. Among the various military qualities of Torriano, was the faculty of obtaining information of the purposes and proceedings of the enemy. He carried on communications with Mangalore through the medium of a spy, after he found that letters which the Mysorean general promised to convey were detained. The account given of the agent employed by Torriano for this purpose, by Forbes, is extremely interesting. He thus describes the *modus operandi* of this emissary, and the peculiar personage himself:—"Although the daring spy had to pass through the enemy's camps before Onore and Mangalore, he effected the purpose required by entering through a hole in the wall of the latter fortress, when strictly blockaded by Tippoo Sultan. The messenger returned with Colonel Campbell's answer, and being then desired to take whatever sum he thought proper, from a bag of venetians placed before him, he not only declined this mode of remuneration, but submitted it entirely to the generosity of the commandant; and further requested that he would become his banker, declaring that he would continue to serve him faithfully, and would never re-

ceive any reward until he might conceive that he was suspected by the enemy, when he should avail himself of the fruit of his labours to such an extent as, in his opinion, he could carry off free from molestation. . . . He was a squalid, meagre figure, without the smallest appearance of enterprise, but possessing great acuteness and firmness of character The period at length arrived when he called upon the commandant, and informing him that he had reason to conclude himself suspected by the enemy of holding an intercourse with the fort, he must consult his safety by a precipitate and secret flight. To this no objection could fairly be made. The garrison had essentially benefited in many instances by his firmness and fidelity, and he was entitled to trace out his own line of conduct whenever it seemed most advisable. On parting, Captain Torriano was not without anxiety for his safety; he told him the fate of Onore could not long remain undecided; that, should he survive until that period, it was his resolution to reward his services still further by settling on him a pension, provided he could contrive to join him in any of the company's districts. He was then desired to remunerate himself to the fullest extent of his wishes, and ample means set before him for the purpose. He was, however, satisfied with little, saying that, in the event of his being seized, and much money discovered upon him, the very circumstance would prove his destruction. He then took his leave, and passed the English posts; but whether he succeeded in effecting his escape into the interior part of the country, or was taken in the attempt and put to death, has never been known, no tidings having ever been heard of him since that period."

By some critics the opinion has been entertained that this spy was after all in the interest of the enemy, or that he ultimately became so. The opinions of Forbes are the most reliable, as he was well acquainted with the views of Torriano himself, who was his friend, and he had also the narrative of Surgeon Cruso to guide him in his memoirs, and Cruso was the diplomatist of the little garrison from the time of his arrival, until the war was over. Through the medium of the spy, Captain Campbell sent word from Mangalore that he had reason to believe an attack on the garrison of Onore was contemplated in spite of the armistice. Torriano took effectual measures to prevent its success, but such news much increased his anxieties. The next day a letter and some provisions came from General Macleod, whose conduct was precisely that which Mill, with such terseness,

describes:—"The Mysorean general, finding that all other modes had failed, of causing the garrison to depart during the armistice, adopted plans to seduce the allegiance of the sepoys. In this, he was successful; they were loyal only so long as fortune favoured the brave. The sepoys within had to be watched as vigilantly as the Mysoreans without. Thus the year 1783 closed over the still beleaguered and suffering garrison. Mirza, in defiance of all military honour, and of his own word, received the deserters, who, as the year 1784 began, became still more numerous." In January, pestilence spread rapidly. Mr. Cruso, the surgeon, thus described its effects:—"Disease was now so prevalent, that hardly one man in the fort remained untainted; eight or ten died daily, and so soon became offensive that a number of graves were constantly kept in readiness; but the dogs, savage with hunger, generally tore up the dead bodies at night, and strewed the outworks with their mangled remains."

At this juncture a British officer, an ensign, deserted to the enemy, and a numerous body of native soldiers accompanied him. This was the heaviest blow the suffering garrison had received, and not until then did the head of the noble Torriano droop. Still his gallant heart bore up against all calamities, his courage fell not. It soon became obvious by the proceedings of the enemy, that the English officer who had forsaken his country, and his honour, had given every information which his previous position enabled him to possess. This was a fresh task upon the vigilance of the unslumbering commandant. Before the month of January closed, the condition of the garrison and the town from disease and hunger became truly horrible. Forbes thus describes it, basing his description upon the account of Cruso:—"The fortress exhibited a dreadful scene; the hospitals overflowed with patients in every stage of the horrid disorder already mentioned. The bodies of the diseased were for the most part so distended by putrid air, as scarcely to leave a trace of the human frame; and it was with difficulty a feature could be distinguished in the countenance; while their laborious breathing indicated every appearance of strangulation. The ear could nowhere escape the groans of the dying, nor the eye avoid these shocking spectacles; but why should language attempt to describe distress, which the conduct of the sufferers paints in more vivid colours? These poor wretches, formerly subjects of a sovereign whose soul never knew mercy nor felt for human woe, when the victorious flag of Britain first waved on the ramparts of Onore, fled to it as an

asylum from the sultan's oppressions, and received protection; yet now did these devoted beings, snatching a transient degree of strength from despair, crawl into the public road, and waiting there until the commanding officer went his evening rounds, prostrated themselves at his feet, imploring permission to quit this dreadful scene, and, as a lighter evil, meet the vengeance of an incensed tyrant. Their prayer was granted, and the same principle of national honour, which originally ensured them protection, was now extended for their safety. Proper persons were appointed to see them go out in small parties after it was dark, hoping by this precaution that such as were not too much exhausted to reach the enemy's lines unperceived might, from their deplorable condition, excite the commiseration of the sentinels at the outposts, and ultimately reach the distant villages. The following morning presented a dreadful spectacle. On the preceding evening, eighty-eight of the inhabitants, men, women and children, had been permitted to leave the fort; but were so entirely exhausted that their route to the sultan's trenches was traced by a line of dead bodies, with the more aggravated spectacle of living infants sucking the breast of their dead mothers."

Even the horrors of Kars, during the Russian war of 1855-56, did not surpass in intensity those of Onore during this faithless and terrible blockade. With the increase of sickness came the increase of treason:—"All the sepoys posted in the outworks, headed by their jemautdar, had agreed to desert to the enemy the following night. The guards were directly withdrawn from the outworks, and the guns brought into the fort. The jemautdar, suspected to be the ringleader, was put in irons, and sent into close confinement; where, conscious of his guilt, he committed suicide."

Torriano now addressed General Macleod, who still kept sailing about the coast, effecting no good, and doing much mischief. The letter is a touching memorial of the glorious soldier:—"Regardless of my own fate, I cannot but acutely feel the sufferings of my brave comrades, who, although now greatly reduced in number, a prey to disease, surrounded by death, and deceived by fruitless promises of relief, still adhere to me. Within the short period of six weeks, five hundred persons, soldiers and natives, have fallen victims to a cruel pestilence which rages within these walls. Desertion nearly keeps pace with death; so serious and so incredible is the former, that amongst the number lately gone over to the enemy is a British officer.

"Mirza is daily urging us, in the strongest terms and most threatening manner to capitulate. Every means in my power shall be exerted to defend this place while a grain of rice remains for subsistence; but I trust the British arms will not be so shamefully tarnished, as to admit this fortress unsupported to fall into the enemy's hands. Of my few officers, death has deprived me of one, desertion of another; my garrison is reduced to sixty effective men. The quantity of provisions remaining in the fort is very small, and great part of the rice is much damaged.

"The enemy have received a strong reinforcement, and the buxey informs me they are to be increased by ten additional battalions; on their arrival more hostile measures will be adopted.

"I have great reason to be apprehensive for the safety of Fortified Island.

"I will not relinquish the hope that I shall not be left to a capitulation, even though accompanied by the best terms, and originating in the most absolute necessity."

A form of disease new to the garrison, scurvy, broke out in the beginning of February; but this was checked by the skill of Cruso, and the sanitary measures of the commandant.

On the 4th of March, Fortified Island was attacked and taken by the foe. The sepoys were enlisted in Tippoo's service; they always sympathised with the fortunate. The English officers were robbed. The capture of the island was contrary to the agreement existing; and when Torriano demanded redress and its restoration, the Mysorean commander forged a story which proves in a striking manner the utter faithlessness and falsehood of the native character in India in every grade of life among Mohammedans. Dr. Cruso thus relates the fabrication by which the Mohammedan general accounted for his having possession of the island, and of the British prisoners:—"Extraordinary as it may appear to those unacquainted with the duplicity and chicanery of the Indian character, Mirza positively denied having attacked the island; and gravely replied that the English officer commanding there had for some time given great disgust to his sepoys, by refusing them proper provisions, whilst he luxuriously feasted upon poultry and liquors sent from time to time for the use of the gentlemen at Onore. At the time his people were thus disaffected, this imprudent officer endeavoured to seduce the wife of a naique, who was by caste a Brahmin, and at length had recourse to violence. On this outrage the husband flew to his comrades, interested them and their je-

mautdar in his cause, and they went in a body to the officer's quarters; where, remonstrating with a freedom which he construed into insolence, they were threatened with death. The aggrieved party had immediate recourse to arms, and attacked the officer, who was supported by half his garrison. This occasioned the irregular fire heard at Onore. While these mutual hostilities were pending, one of the sultan's boats, accidentally passing Fortified Island, was hailed by the mutineers, who entreated to be taken on board. This being reported to Mirza, he sent over a messenger to the English officer to represent the folly of continuing at his post with only eleven men, recommending him to leave the island, and offering him every accommodation in his camp, until an opportunity presented itself for proceeding to an English settlement. The officer declined quitting the island, but desired Mirza would send over a sufficient force to take charge of the fort: his request was complied with, and these were the men who had been seen from the ramparts of Onore. All this was related by Mirza in the gravest manner; and the jennautdar, the Brahmin naique and his wife, with five sepoy (tutored for the purpose, at the peril of their lives) were brought into the durbar, to corroborate Mirza's story. It is almost unnecessary to observe that the whole of this tale was a fabrication of the sultan's officer to deceive the commandant."

Famine, pestilence, and desertion within, perfidy and harassing blockade without, continued to afflict the suffering garrison and its heroic chief, when, on March 7th, General Macleod paid one of his flying visits on the coast. As usual, he made proffers of service which he made no attempts to perform. At last, deliverance came. The honour of the garrison and its intrepid commander were saved. Peace was concluded, and the Madras commissioners sent a ship to convey the garrison away, and orders to Torriano to deliver Onore to the nabob's officer. The commissioners, however, neglected to make any provision in the treaty for the protection of the inhabitants who had sided with the English, or for the removal of military stores. Torriano had by boldness and dexterity to secure these objects.

Mirza entertained his former enemy magnificently, and seemed quite unconscious of having merited reprobation by his cruelty and perfidy. Forbes describes the closing scene of this in the following paragraph:—"The guard was now ordered to leave the fort: while they were embarking, the Soubahdar Missauber, having locked the gates on the inside, at a signal made by Captain Torriano,

struck the British colours, and coming through a sally-port, resigned the keys to the sultan's officer ordered to take possession; whose detachment waited without the outworks until this ceremony had taken place. The whole being now safely embarked, Captain Torriano followed with two chests of treasure belonging to the company. Night coming on, they were obliged to anchor under the guns of the fort until daybreak, when the *Wolf* gallivat and all the boats proceeded over the bar; the officers embarked on board the *Hawke* Indiaman, and the whole fleet sailed for Bombay." Torriano exhausted his means and his influence in rewarding his brave followers. As far as his power allowed, he made promotions, and distributed presents which were at all events valuable as coming from him. He was himself neglected. He obtained a brevet majority after considerable delay! The day in which he lived and fought, and served his country so well, was unfavourable to the reward of the meritorious. Interest with the government, not genius or devotion, advanced men in the path of military promotion. On the eastern side of the peninsula, the government of Madras seemed determined to exceed that of Bombay in folly and weakness. They placed reliance on the promises of Tippoo and his generals, who never kept faith themselves nor showed any confidence in the word of others. The English, Tippoo's father had too much reason to distrust; and the sultan himself was not disposed to forget the fact.

The Madras government, in May, 1783, appointed commissioners to treat with Tippoo, and these men acted with credulity and irresolution, betraying extreme ignorance of everything which the task imposed upon them demanded. Colonel Fullarton, who, in the south, had carried all before him, driving Tippoo's commandants from their strongholds, and possessing himself of a country fruitful and well cultivated, was ordered to give up his conquests, in order to appease Tippoo, and make peace (which the commissioners believed was sure) more satisfactory. In vain Fullarton resisted and remonstrated; the ignorant commissioners, worthy representatives of the Madras council, insisted upon obedience. The celebrated missionary, Schwartz, was interpreter to these gentlemen, and he also remonstrated upon the folly of the course pursued. "Is the peace so certain," said the astute and pious interpreter, "that you quit all before the negotiation is ended? The possession of these rich countries would have kept Tippoo in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage the beast?" When, however, Fullarton had reluctantly and tar-

dily surrendered most of his conquests, the impracticable commissioners, in great alarm, ordered him to resume them.

The commissioners, having expended much useless time in preliminary negotiations with Tippoo's lieutenants and vakeels, at last proceeded to the head-quarters of the sultan's army, to arrange with him in person a peace based upon the principle of the *status quo ante bellum*. On their way to the camp of the sultan, they were treated with indignity, and their progress impeded in every way by the sultan's officers. On their arrival there, tents were assigned them and a gallows erected opposite each. Communications with their countrymen were prohibited. The first piece of intelligence they received was of the murder of General Mathews and many other English prisoners, some of them officers of merit and distinction. Mr. Schwartz, the missionary interpreter, was seized and sent away, and the commissioners were not acquainted with any of the languages of India. Colonel Wilks declares that those gentlemen meditated flight. He rests his authority on the testimony of Captain, afterwards Sir Thomas Dallas, who commanded the escort which accompanied them. According to that officer's testimony, their plan was to leave the officer and his escort in the hands of the enemy, who would have murdered them, and, by an ingenious stratagem, they hoped to escape to the ships. A native servant of the captain understood English, and had been employed as interpreter, in consequence of the impossibility of procuring an educated person. This man, while lying outside the tent of one of the commissioners, where they were all assembled, overheard a conversation amongst them and with a surgeon from one of the ships in the roads, who was the chosen agent of the project. The native servant, being attached to his master, revealed the danger to which he was exposed, who took successful measures to prevent the execution of the plot. In England, when this charge was made, such of the commissioners as were then alive denied the truth of the statement; but General Dallas affirmed it. Those who are curious as to the disputed points of Indo-English history in connection with the wars in Mysore, may see the narrative at length in the pages of Colonel Wilks.* Weighing the

evidence as produced by that gallant officer against the defence of Mr. Huddleston, the gallant colonel seems to make out a case too formidable for successful denial.

It was not until the 11th of May, 1784, that the treaty was signed. Probably Tippoo would have prosecuted the war, and placed the bodies of the commissioners on gibbets, had the folly and imbecility of these gentlemen as well as of the councils at Bombay and Madras determined matters; but Hastings, far off in Calcutta, extended his supervision to all the wide field of war and diplomacy in which the English were engaged, and the influence of his intellect and of his name was felt in the camp of the Mysoreans and the durbar of their king. The English prisoners who had been seized contrary to the armistice, received no compensation; nor did the relatives of the men whom Hyder had caused to die by incarceration, or of those who were assassinated by Tippoo's orders. It was characteristic of English politicians that the sufferings and wrongs of their countrymen, however nobly endured, and however serviceable to their country, were overlooked in negotiations when an end was to be accomplished. The diplomatists of the crown and of the company were alike in this respect; the wrongs of individual sufferers and the merit of particular servants were regarded with indifference, if the public object in view at the time could be promoted, or apparently promoted, by that indifference. Often, when a little attention and care would secure public objects, and protect or secure redress for the wrongs of individuals, there was such a want of feeling, sympathy, and justice among the ruling classes of Englishmen, that the claims of their less influential brethren were totally unheeded.

On the whole, Tippoo was a gainer by the treaty and by the war, but the revenues of the English were in such a condition as to make it imperative upon the governor-general to accomplish a peace with Mysore.* The desire of the directors at home for speedy terms of accommodation was, on the same grounds, intensely urgent.† From these causes, the proclamation of peace with Tippoo Sahib was regarded by Hastings as fortunate to his government.

* Stewart's *History of Bengal*, London, 1813.

† *History of the East India Company*, London, 1793.

* Wilks' *Sketches*, vol. ii. pp. 515—517.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN SEAS DURING THE WAR WITH MYSORE, FRANCE, SPAIN, AND HOLLAND—CAPTURE OF NEGAPATAM, TRINCOMALEE, ETC., FROM THE DUTCH—LOSS OF TRINCOMALEE TO THE FRENCH.

DURING a considerable portion of the time in which hostilities were waged with Mysore, it will be seen from the foregoing pages that war existed with France, and that the French were the active and efficient allies of Hyder and his son Tippoo. The war with France greatly complicated the relations of the English with both those sovereigns, and led to various independent actions, especially at sea. The English had the advantage on the ocean, but the battles fought were indecisive. The French for the most part evaded general engagements, and succeeded in landing troops and stores, or in bearing them away from one place to another. They were afraid of the English at sea, yet did not show such a decided inferiority as to justify the extreme respect which they entertained for the naval power of England. The French admirals were, in the Indian waters, far more active, vigilant, and wary than the English. The latter, by their slow movements and want of watchfulness, often allowed French squadrons to effect what they would not have dared to attempt had the English commanders been sufficiently on the alert. It has been already seen that the fleets under the command of the English admiral, Hughes, and the French admiral, Suffrein, had various skirmishes off the Coromandel coast. Suffrein, early in 1781, collected the elements of a maritime force in Brest, and the English at the same time organized a fleet. The supposition in England was, that the expedition was intended for the Spanish Main. The British government, however, intended it for the East: at all events, that was the direction ultimately given to it. It is probable that from the first the acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope, and the assertion of British ascendancy in the East, were the ends designed. "One ship of seventy-four guns, one of sixty-four, three of fifty, several frigates, a bomb-vessel, a fire-ship and some sloops of war composed the squadron; of which Commodore Johnstone, with a reputation for decision and boldness, received the command. A land force, consisting of three new regiments of one thousand men each, was placed under the conduct of General Meadows, who had procured fame in the action at St. Lucia with D'Estaing. On the 13th of March, in company with the grand fleet destined for the relief of Gibraltar, the armament sailed from St. Helen's, and,

including several outward-bound East Indiamen, with store-vessels and transports, amounted to upwards of forty sail. The secret, however, of this expedition had not been so vigilantly guarded as to escape the sagacity of the Dutch and the French. The armament under Suffrein was ultimately destined to reinforce the squadron now at the Isle of France; and to oppose the English fleet in the Indian seas. But the particular instructions of that officer were, in the first instance, to follow, and counteract the expedition of Johnstone, and above all, his designs upon the Cape of Good Hope. For the sake of water and fresh provisions, the English squadron put into Prava Bay in St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verde Islands; and, having no expectation of an enemy, cast their anchors as chance or convenience directed. A considerable proportion both of men and of officers, partly for business, partly for pleasure, were permitted to go on shore; and the decks were speedily crowded with water-casks, live stock, and other incumbrances. On the 16th of April, after nine o'clock in the morning, a strange fleet, suspected to be French, was seen coming round the eastern point of the harbour; and Suffrein, separating from the convoy with his five sail of the line, soon penetrated to the centre of the English fleet. The utmost dispatch was employed in getting the men and officers on board, and preparing the ships for action. The French ship, the *Hannibal*, of seventy-four guns, led the van, and coming as close to the English ships as she was able, dropped her anchors with a resolution which excited a burst of applause from the British tars. She was followed by the ship of Suffrein, of equal force. Another of sixty-four guns anchored at her stern. And the two other ships, of sixty-four guns each, ranged through the fleet, firing on either side as they proceeded along. The ships being extremely near, and the guns being played with unusual fury, much destruction was effected in a little time. After the abatement of the first surprise, several of the Indiamen brought their guns to bear upon the enemy with good effect. Within an hour, the French ships at anchor had suffered so terribly, that the last of the three, having lost her captain, cut her cables and began to withdraw. Thus deserted astern, and despairing of success, Suffrein followed her example, and gave the

signal to retreat; the *Hannibal* alone remained, a mark for every ship the guns of which could be made to bear upon her; and displayed a resolution which may be compared with the noblest examples of naval heroism. She had lost her foremast and bowsprit; her cable was either cut or shot away; in the effort of hoisting more sail to get out of the fire, her main and mizen masts went overboard, and she remained, as it were, a hulk upon the water. Sustaining the weight of a dreadful fire, to which, enfeebled as she was, her returns were slow and ineffectual, she yet joined the rest of the ships at the mouth of the bay; and, being towed off, erected jury-masts, and proceeded with the fleet. An attempt on the part of the English to pursue was totally ineffectual. They sustained not any considerable loss, notwithstanding the closeness of the action, and the crowded situation of the ships. Their own steady and determined bravery counteracted the effects of surprise, and baffled the well-concerted scheme of the enemy. They remained to refit and provide till the 2nd of May, and on approaching the Cape, ascertained that Suffrein had arrived before them. Though previous to the arrival of Suffrein, that settlement, then supposed of great importance, was not in a condition to have offered any considerable resistance to Meadows and Johnstone, it was now accounted vain to make on it any attempt.*

At this juncture, a Dutch fleet of East Indiamen lay in Saldanha bay. The admiral resolved to cut them out, and the enterprise was attended with success. The commodore returned with his own ship and the prizes and frigates to Europe. The rest of the fleet, with the troops, proceeded to India. Suffrein strengthened the garrison at the Cape, so as to resist any attack from the English, and directed his course also to India. After various delays caused by winds and currents, the fleet arrived on the coasts of the peninsula on the 6th of December. The larger ships, with General Meadows and the principal part of the troops, went in quest of Admiral Hughes, then commanding on the Indian station; the smaller vessels, transports, and the remainder of the troops, arrived at Bombay on the 22nd of January, 1782. The troops which landed at Bombay, after refreshing and tarrying a few days, were dispatched for Madras, and arrived while that city and the Carnatic were in terror from the arms of Hyder. The arrival of these timely reinforcements enabled the British officers, in spite of the wrangling of the councils, to make head against the foe.

* Mill, vol. iv. book v. chap. v.

While these events proceeded in connection with the new expeditions from France and England, others were passing which it did not belong to the province of the last chapter to relate, but shall here be recorded.

During the time England was at war with Mysore, the Mahrattas, and the French, Spain and Holland were also her enemies. Fortunately, the contest with the Mahrattas was first closed, as seen in former pages; and peace in Europe soon after occurring, left the company free to direct its whole strength against Mysore, a perception of which made Tippoo Sultan, however reluctantly, come to terms.

Holland being at war with England, Lord Macartney determined to take some action against Dutch interests in India, notwithstanding the numerous demands which were made upon his time and resources as governor of Madras. Soon after his arrival, he drove the Dutch out of Sadras and Pulicat, and in October, 1781, he determined to reduce, if possible, the very important settlement of Negapatam. The command of the troops destined for this task, was given to Sir Hector Munro. The fleet under Sir Edward Hughes was to cover the operations. Colonel Braithwaite and his detachment were ordered to unite themselves to the force under Sir Hector Munro's command, swelling his little army to nearly four thousand men, which was dispatched on the enterprise. On the 21st, the seamen and marines debarked. On the 30th, the lines and redoubts were stormed. On the 3rd of November, trenches were opened to cover an approach against the north face of the fort. On the 6th, batteries for breaching were opened within three hundred yards.

The Dutch governor refused to surrender, it having been contrary to the military law of Holland for any officer to surrender a fortified place until a practicable breach was made. Between the 6th and 12th the breach was effected. The first use made of it was by the Dutch themselves, for the purpose of sorties, which were made with great spirit and determination. The English were prepared for this, and repulsed the attacks upon their trenches with their usual firmness. The governor offered to capitulate if honourable terms were conceded, which, not being refused, Negapatam was taken possession of without storm. The surrender of this place was not very honourable to Dutch courage. The number of prisoners far exceeded the number of assailants. The surrender of such an important place, the chief settlement of the Batavian Company on the Coromandel coast, commanding the southern boundary of Tan-

jore, proved how far Dutch spirit, as well as power, had fallen in India. The English made prize of a large quantity of warlike stores. It so happened that the investments had not been made for two years, so that a very great quantity of valuable merchandise was secured by the victors.

Negapatam was the basis of operations against all the Dutch settlements in Coromandel. They fell almost without a blow. This had an important effect upon the Mysore war, for Hyder Ali immediately evacuated the forts of which he had taken possession in Tanjore. The policy of Lord Macartney, although opposed strenuously by Sir Eyre Coote, answered his expectations, and probably produced an effect upon the war with Mysore, which his lordship did not contemplate.

On the 2nd of January the fleet sailed from Negapatam, taking on board five hundred soldiers, and proceeded against the Dutch settlements in the Island of Ceylon. Trincomalee was the chief of those settlements. On the 4th the fleet arrived off that harbour. Means were taken instantly to reduce the fortifications by which it was protected. On the 11th the last of these forts, and the strongest, was stormed, and Trincomalee fell to the possession of the victors. The Dutch were now completely humbled in India, and when tidings of the peace with that power and its European allies arrived in India, Holland had little to lose in the peninsula. The French fleet arrived on the Coromandel coast in January, and intercepted several English vessels; one British frigate of the largest class, separated from her companions in a fog, was surrounded and captured after a peculiarly gallant defence.

Sir Edward Hughes left Trincomalee on the last day of January, having performed his part in reducing that place. He was in want of stores, and many of his crews were sick. He arrived at Madras on the 11th of February, having had a very narrow escape of encountering a far superior force under Suffrein, a commander superior to any, except the gallant captor of Madras, who had commanded French naval forces in the East. In the open roads of Madras the danger of Hughes continued to be as great as it well could have been anywhere, for his ships were much impaired by long service, and consisted of only six of the line. The next day the squadron which brought General Meadows and his troops also arrived. This consisted of one seventy-four, one sixty-four, and one very large frigate, and had also a very narrow escape of being intercepted by the enemy. Twenty-four hours after, the French admiral

appeared, and passed Madras in line-of-battle. The above dates are given from Mill. Auber gives different dates, and is more particular in basing his information upon a comparison of documents. He relates the arrival of both admirals, and the results, in the following manner:—"On the 8th, Sir Edward Hughes arrived at Madras from Trincomalee, with the *Superb*, *Exeter*, *Monarch*, *Bedford*, *Worcester*, *Eagle*, and the *Sea-horse* frigate. On the 10th he was joined by Commodore Alms with three ships of the line, and one transport containing General Meadows and Colonel Fullarton, with four hundred king's troops. On the 15th the French fleet appeared off Madras, and on the 16th stood to the southward. The English admiral weighed, and followed the enemy till they were separated from their frigates and transports. Sir Edward Hughes made the signal for chasing the latter, on which the *Isis*, being the foremost, came up with and re-took the *Lauriston*, a large transport laden with military stores and three hundred troops, together with several English vessels with grain which had been captured by the enemy on the coast. The enemy's fleet bore down, and having the advantage of the wind, brought eight of their ships to engage five of the English, the other ships on either side not being able to get into action. The engagement lasted from four until half-past six, when the French ceased firing, and hauled their wind. The *Superb* and *Exeter* were much damaged, having many shot between wind and water. Sir Edward Hughes went to Trincomalee to refit, and returned to Madras on the 10th of March to renew the attack on the enemy, whose ships had been dispersed during the action. Their hospital ship, the *Duc de Toscane*, having come to anchor in the roads of Negapatam, in the belief that it was a friendly port, was captured by the *Chapman* Indiaman. On the 8th of April, Sir Edward Hughes came again in sight of the French squadron, then consisting of eighteen sail. On the 12th, the French, having the wind, engaged him; the action commenced at half-past one p.m., and ended at forty minutes past six. Both fleets anchored within five miles of each other until the 19th. In the interval, Sir Edward Hughes had refitted all his fleet, with the exception of the *Monmouth*, which had lost her main and mizen-masts, their places being supplied with good jury-masts. The enemy made a show of renewing the engagement; Sir Edward Hughes waited, with springs on his cables, but the enemy, after approaching within two miles, stood out to sea, and was seen no more. Sir Edward Hughes's force consisted of twelve ships, in

which there were two hundred and forty-seven killed, and three hundred and twenty wounded. The number in the French ship *Hero*, the flag-ship, killed and wounded, was two hundred, the admiral being obliged to shift his flag from her to the *Ajax*.*

Were it not for the jealousy which both Hyder and Tippoo entertained of the French, the latter would have been able to effect much more against the English during that war. Thus, when the French gained Cuddalore, as the ostensible allies of Tippoo, they immediately proceeded to act as if the place were their own, offering indignity to Tippoo's officers. The latter resisted, and Tippoo ordered his governor to turn them out. The French were strong enough to keep possession, but in doing so they would have separated themselves from the Mysore power, and have been beaten in detail by the English, they were, therefore, obliged to leave Cuddalore, and being denied by Tippoo's officers the means of carriage, and draft bullocks, they had to carry their own baggage and drag their own guns.

In July 1782, Hyder Ali having arranged with the French admiral a surprise upon Negapatam, both parties attempted to execute the concerted plan. Suffrein was to land troops close to the place, and their landing was to be supported by Hyder Ali. It was the object of the French admiral to effect his part of the arrangement without fighting, but his fleet having been descried by Admiral Hughes, that officer compelled him to give battle. The conflict was close and severe. Suffrein preferred close warfare, contrary to the general tactics of the French admirals. After maintaining for an hour and a half a fire which appeared to be equal, the French line showed symptoms of disorder, and a speedy victory for the English would have terminated the fight had not the wind suddenly shifted. This enabled Suffrein to cover the line of disabled ships by such as suffered least, and disconcerted the hopes and plans of Sir Edward. The French admiral was the better tactician. Notwithstanding the skill of the French commander, two of his ships struck their colours; he immediately fired into them, and continued to do so, until they again hoisted French colours. The battle was, on the whole, in favour of the British. The English occupied the roads of Negapatam. The French were unable to accomplish their purpose, and sheered off for Cuddalore. This was done, however, with such coolness as to amount to a challenge to renew the battle. This Hughes could not do, having suffered so much in the previous conflict. When Negapatam was secured, he went to Madras to

refit. Suffrein was more active and acute; he refitted at Cuddalore with admirable expedition, and was ready for sea before Sir Edward. Mill gives the following account of the energy and devotion of Suffrein:—"He was a man that when the exigency required, would work for days, like a ship's carpenter, in his shirt. He visited the houses and buildings at Cuddalore, and for want of other timber, had the beams which suited his purpose taken out. To some of his officers, who represented to him the shattered condition of his ships, the alarming deficiency of his stores, the impossibility of supplying his wants in a desolated part of India, and the necessity of repairing to the islands to refit; the whole value, he replied, of the ships was trivial, in comparison with the object which he was commissioned to attain; and the ocean should be his harbour, till he found a place in India to repair them."

On the 1st of August, Suffrein proceeded to sea, and reached Point de Galle, in the Island of Ceylon, where he was reinforced by two ships of the line from Europe, and met also military reinforcements. On the 25th, he anchored in the bay of Trincomalee. He attacked and conquered the English garrison, and on the 31st of August, the French flag waved upon the ramparts of the fort. All this time Hughes was at Madras, and conducting the refitting of his squadron in a very leisurely manner. Lord Macartney remonstrated with him on the 5th of the month, assuring him that the French fleet had steered southwards on the 1st. Hughes, in the spirit which the English admirals generally showed in India, piqued himself on the eminence of his profession, and his distinction as an officer of his majesty's navy, and would not be dictated to, nor advised by a servant of the company, nor by civilians of any sort. He stayed where he was, until, as so often happened with our admirals in the last war with Russia, when their services were urgently required, it was "too late." On the 20th of August he put to sea, three weeks after Suffrein left Cuddalore. The English admiral did not reach Trincomalee for a fortnight, and found the flag of France floating over the battlements. Hughes was then anxious to redeem his reputation by a naval victory. Suffrein, superior in force by the extent of one ship of the line and three frigates, as well as in the total number of guns, sailed out fearlessly. A long, fierce, and sanguinary conflict ensued, in which Suffrein displayed undaunted courage, first-rate seamanship, and an activity such as has seldom been surpassed. His captains neither showed skill nor courage; half their number were deposed

* Auber, vol. i. chap. xi. pp. 618, 619.

by him when the battle was over. Hughes also showed himself brave and skilful in his profession, and his officers and men proved themselves far superior to the enemy. A decisive victory crowned the efforts of the English, but night setting in soon after, and with that suddenness in which it descends so near the line, the enemy escaped. So anxious, however, were the French captains to get away, that several vessels were disabled, and some lost in the attempt. Suffrein brought in his shattered ships all but two, which Hughes neglected to make prizes, so that Suffrein sarcastically said, when he afterwards conducted them into port, "they are presents from the English admiral." Hughes, notwithstanding all the time he had taken to refit in Madras, was short of provisions, water, and ammunition, and was unable in consequence to attack, or even to blockade, Trincomalee, and sailed away to Madras, apparently incapable of forming any definite plan or purpose, for he was no sooner in Madras than he intimated his intention to proceed to Bombay.

At Madras he was urged to join in the expedition against Cuddalore, then projected, and where afterwards, General Stuart so severely chastised the French General Bussy; without assigning any reason, Hughes refused to assist the expedition. He was an admiral holding the king's commission, and was not to give account of his actions to such persons as the council of Madras, servants of the East India Company. He would neither take part in the attack on Cuddalore, nor stay on the coast during the ensuing monsoon, but would go to Bombay:—"If the coast," says Mill, "were left unprotected by a British fleet, while the harbour of Trincomalee enabled the enemy to remain, and while Hyder was nearly undisputed master of the Carnatic, nothing less was threatened than the extirpation of the English from that quarter of India. Beside these important considerations, the council pressed upon the mind of the admiral the situation of the presidency in regard to food; that their entire dependence rested upon the supplies which might arrive by sea; that the stock in the warehouses did not exceed thirty thousand bags; that the quantity afloat in the roads amounted but to as much more, which the number of boats demanded for the daily service of his squadron had deprived them of the means of landing; that the monthly consumption was fifty thousand bags at the least; and that, if the vessels on which they depended for their supply were intercepted (such would be the certain consequence of a French without an English fleet upon the coast), nothing less than

famine was placed before their eyes. The admiral was reminded that he had remained in safety upon the coast during the easterly monsoon of the former year, and might still undoubtedly find some harbour to afford him shelter. A letter too was received express from Bengal, stating that Mr. Ritchie, the marine surveyor, would undertake to conduct his majesty's ships to a safe anchorage in the mouth of the Bengal river. And it was known that Sir Richard Bickerton, with a reinforcement of five sail of the line from England, had already touched at Bombay, and was on his way round for Madras. The admiral remained deaf to all expostulations. In the meantime intelligence was received that the enemy was preparing to attack Negapatam. The president had already prevailed upon Sir Eyre Coote to send a detachment of three hundred men, under Colonel Fullarton, into the southern provinces, which, since the defeat of Colonel Brathwaite, had lain exposed to the ravages of Hyder, and were now visited with scarcity, and the prospect of famine. Within two days of the former intelligence, accounts were received that seventeen sail of the enemy's fleet had arrived at Negapatam, and that the place was already attacked. The most earnest expostulations were still addressed to the admiral in vain; and the morning of the 16th of October exhibiting the appearance of a storm, the fleet set sail, and disappeared. The following morning presented a tremendous spectacle to the wretched inhabitants of Madras; several large vessels driven ashore, others foundered at their anchors, all the small craft, amounting to nearly one hundred in number, either sunk or stranded, and the whole of the thirty thousand bags of rice irretrievably gone. The ravages of Hyder had driven crowds of the inhabitants from all parts of the country to seek refuge at Madras, where multitudes were daily perishing of want. Famine now raged in all its horrors; and the multitude of the dead and the dying threatened to superadd the evils of pestilence. The bodies of those who expired in the streets or the houses, without any one to inter them, were daily collected and piled in carts, to be buried in large trenches made for the purpose out of the town, to the number, for several weeks, of not less, it is said, than twelve or fifteen hundred a-week. What was done to remove the suffering inhabitants to the less exhausted parts of the country, and to prevent unnecessary consumption,—the governor sending away his horses, and even his servants,—could only mitigate, and that to a small degree, the evils which were endured. On the fourth day after the departure of Sir

Edward Hughes and his fleet, Sir Richard Bickerton arrived, with three regiments of one thousand each, Sir John Burgoyne's regiment of light horse, amounting to three hundred and forty, and about one thousand recruits raised by the company, chiefly in Ireland; but as soon as Sir Richard was apprised of the motions of Sir E. Hughes, he immediately put to sea, and proceeded after him to Bombay."

It is mournful to contemplate the representation of ignorance, pride, and obstinacy, on the part of a British naval commander, which is here made without any exaggeration. The terrible consequences are also depicted faithfully. If there were no proba-

bility that like causes in the constitution of our navy would produce like effects, such sad stories might be related without anxiety for the present or the future, if even with shame for the past. The admiral had no further opportunity to do much good or evil. Peace with France, Spain, and Holland, followed by peace with Hyder, left India in tranquillity as to foreign enemies, and the different councils, commanders, and governors, more leisure for those mutual bickerings in which they perpetually indulged. Hastings, having composed these, as far as genius and self-command could compose them, at last, as already related, retired from the scenes of his struggles and his fame.

CHAPTER XC.

HOME AFFAIRS—EFFORTS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO ASSIST THE CROWN IN THE WARS WITH FRANCE, SPAIN, AND HOLLAND—DISCUSSIONS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN REFERENCE TO THE COMPANY'S AFFAIRS—IMPEACHMENT OF HASTINGS—ACQUITTAL—RETIREMENT FROM PUBLIC LIFE—DEATH—THE COMPANY RESOLVE TO ERECT A STATUE TO HIS MEMORY.

FROM 1778 to the termination of the parliamentary prosecution of Hastings, the directors and the company were much engrossed with home matters, while the state of their affairs in India demanded also unremitting and serious attention.

In 1778-9 extraordinary exertions were made to resist the combination of France and Spain against British influence everywhere, but especially in the East. Instructions were sent overland to India for the reduction of Pondicherry, and the governors and councils were urged to prosecute the war with all their energy.

In April, 1779, the general court of proprietors voted unanimous thanks to the secret committee, for the spirited orders they issued for operations against Pondicherry and the French, and presented them with sums of five hundred, and three hundred guineas, for the purchase of plate. Thanks were also voted to Sir Hector Monro and Admiral Sir Edward Vernon, to each of whom was given a sword set with diamonds, valued at seven hundred and fifty guineas. Three guineas bounty to each was voted for the first two thousand able-bodied seamen, two guineas each for the first two thousand ordinary seamen, and a guinea and a half each for the first two thousand landmen who should volunteer to serve on board the fleets of his majesty. Resolutions were passed by the court of directors "to build three 74-gun ships, with masts and

yards, to be delivered over to such officer as his majesty might appoint to receive them."

The following *résumé* of the home events in which the company was interested at that time is as correct as it is brief:—"The affairs of the company at this time engaged much of the attention of parliament. In 1779, an act had been passed declaring that the £1,400,000 borrowed of the public had been repaid by the company, and that as their bond debt was reduced to £1,500,000, they were authorized to declare a dividend of eight per cent. The territorial acquisitions and revenues were also to remain with them for another year, and the persons who at the passing of the act were in the offices of governor-general and councillors in Bengal, were to hold the same during its continuance. In the following session Lord North acquainted the house that the company had not made such proposals for the renewal of their charter as were deemed satisfactory, and he therefore moved that the Speaker should give the three years' notice required by the act, previously to the cessation of their exclusive privileges of trade. Mr. Fox and Mr. Burke strongly opposed the minister, and asked whether he was not content with having lost America? Whether he could point out a single benefit which his motion was capable of producing, and whether he desired to behold those scenes of anarchy, confusion, distress, and ruin, which his idle

and impotent threats might produce in the company's possessions in India."*

Mr. Fox argued that the ministerial measure was impracticable, and that the government and the nation would prove themselves ungrateful to the country, if such a proposition were tolerated. He declared that the disputes between the minister and the company arose from the desire of the former to grasp the patronage of the latter.† In order to give time for deliberation, an act was passed continuing the same privileges to the company as in the preceding year, to be reckoned from the 5th of April, 1780.‡

On the 12th of January, 1781, a select committee of the house was appointed to inquire into the petitions of the company and the inhabitants of Bengal, against the constitution of the supreme court and the action of British law generally.

On the 27th of April, Lord North proposed the appointment of a *secret* committee to inquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic. The celebrated Edmund Burke demanded that the committee should be open; but, as the foreign enemies of England would watch the progress of such inquiry in an open committee, and profit by the information to be obtained, Lord North carried his point. Lord North, throughout the session, displayed an open enmity to the company, the real source of which was, what Charles Fox charged upon him, a desire to grasp the patronage. Edmund Burke was not less an enemy, but he was insidious.

At length the two acts were passed: the one concluding an agreement between the public and the company;§ the other to redress and prevent the recurrence of the complaints against the supreme court at Calcutta.|| By the first-mentioned act the company's exclusive privileges were continued till 1791, with three years' notice; during which time the territorial acquisitions and revenues were to remain in their possession. After a dividend of eight per cent. on the capital of £3,200,000, three-fourths of the surplus profits were to go to the public, and one-fourth to the company. Accounts of the state of the company's affairs were to be laid before the lords of the treasury and the general court. During the war with France, Spain, and Holland, the company were to pay one-fourth of the expense of his majesty's ships in India. After peace, the company were to bear the

whole. The company were allowed to recruit, and to have two thousand men at one time ready for embarkation during war, but only one thousand in peace. The parties filling the offices of governor-general, commander-in-chief, and members of council, were to be removable only by the king on representation of the directors, who might appoint to vacancies on the approbation of the crown. The commander-in-chief, if appointed by the directors a member of council, was to take rank as two members, but was not to succeed to the government unless specially appointed. British subjects were not to reside more than ten miles from the presidency without leave from the government.

Two important provisions were also inserted. In addition to the enactment of 1773, which required the directors to send to his majesty's government copies of all letters from India relating to the political, military, or revenue affairs of the company, a provision was now inserted that copies of all letters proposed to be sent by the directors to India relating to those subjects, should first be submitted for his majesty's approval, and if no disapprobation was expressed within fourteen days to the proposed despatch, the same might be forwarded to India.

The other was a clause suggested by the heavy drafts which had, at a former period, been drawn from India, and nearly ruined the company, being, the minister remarked, "the private fortunes of Asiatic plunderers," who would again seize upon the opportunity of doing so with avidity. Lord North, in alluding to the acceptance of presents, observed that it would be proper to interdict their receipt entirely, for which purpose it would be well to form a court of judicature in this country for the trial of offences committed in India. This suggestion, though not acted upon at that time, was adopted at a later period.

The other act related to the supreme court, and was passed to appease the minds of many persons who dreaded the consequences of the powers assumed by the supreme court of India.

The appointment of Lord Macartney to the governorship of Madras was one of the signs of the times, as it regarded the progress of ministerial and parliamentary opinion respecting the company. The governing class in England became intensely desirous of obtaining such posts as the governorships of presidencies, and more especially the office of governor-general, for members of their class. Lord Macartney was the first governor appointed by the direct intervention of the go-

* Auber's *Rise and Progress of the East India Company*, vol. i. chap. xi. p. 572.

† *Parliamentary History*, 1780, vol. xxi.

‡ 20 Geo. III. cap. 56.

§ 21 Geo. III. cap. 65.

|| 21 Geo. III. cap. 70.

vernment, and he unfortunately went to India in the spirit of one who felt that he did not owe his appointment to the company, and was superior in rank, as well as the origin of his appointment, to the company's servants. He made, therefore, little account of the opinion of Hastings, who was only a company's official, although governor-general of Bengal. Lord Macartney was a polite man, capable of governing his temper, and possessing much suavity of manner to inferiors in station; but he had a high opinion of his order, his office, and the source whence he derived it, and hence all harmony between the governments of Madras and Bengal were from the day of his arrival in India until Hastings left it impossible. At home, his lordship's measures and interests were backed up by the government.

Tidings of the appointment of Sir Elijah Impey, by Governor-general Hastings, to the Suddur Dewanny Adawlut, reached England in October, 1781. The directors doubted the legality of the proceeding, and parliament took up the matter with considerable heat. A committee of inquiry was nominated, and reported in strong terms upon the illegality of the conduct of Hastings and of Impey. An address of the whole house to his majesty demanded the recall of Sir Elijah to answer to the house for his acceptance of the office. The directors passed a resolution, on the 24th of April, removing him.

A report was made by the secret committee appointed to inquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic. Mr. Dundas, the chairman, submitted to the house an enormous series of resolutions, which amounted to no less than one hundred and eleven. The resolutions were divided into three classes, each class containing three distinct heads. The first regarded the general system of government; it censured the conduct of Mr. Hastings as governor-general, and that of Mr. Hornby, governor of Bombay, and declared it to be the duty of the directors to recall them. The second and third classes related to the affairs of the Carnatic. On these a bill of pains and penalties was brought in against Sir Thomas Rumbold, J. Whitehill, and P. Perring, Esqrs., for breaches of public trust, and high crimes and misdemeanours.

On the 28th of May, the house of commons came to the following resolution:—

“Resolved, That Warren Hastings, Esq., governor-general, and William Hornby, Esq., president of the council at Bombay, having in sundry instances acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on India,

and enormous expenses on the company, it is the duty of the directors to pursue all legal and effectual means for the removal of the said governor-general and president from their respective offices, and to recall them to Great Britain.”

These measures violently agitated the courts of directors and proprietors. Various meetings were held, and debates of the fiercest nature took place in them. On the 19th of June, a special grand court was convened by requisition in the usual manner, when the following resolutions were passed:—

“Resolved, That it is the opinion of this court, that the removing of Warren Hastings, Esq., the governor-general of Bengal, or any servants of the company, merely in compliance with a vote of the house of commons,—without being satisfied that the grounds of delinquency against the said Warren Hastings, or such other servants, are sufficient of themselves to vindicate the directors in coming to such a resolution,—would weaken the confidence which the servants of the company ought to entertain of the justice of their employers, and will tend to destroy that independency which the proprietors of East India stock ought to enjoy in the management of their own affairs.”

“Resolved, That it be recommended to the court of directors not to carry into effect any resolution they may come to relative to the removal of Warren Hastings, Esq., till such resolution shall have been approved by a general court.”

From the 20th of June to the 9th of October, the directors, in various meetings, discussed the contradictory conclusions to which the house of commons and the court of proprietary had arrived, and passed resolutions at last in harmony with those of the commons. It being well understood that the directors passed these resolutions under pressure from the government, and seven of the directors having recorded a protest against the recall of Hastings, the court of proprietary again met on the 21st of October, and again passed a resolution by a majority of three hundred and fifty-three votes in a house of five hundred and three persons, forbidding the removal of Hastings, vindicating him from the imputations thrown on him by parliament and a majority of the directors, and attributing to the directors themselves the misfortunes, wars, and debts, which the resolution alleged Hastings by extraordinary fidelity and ability had done much to retrieve. On the 22nd of October the directors rescinded their resolution against Hastings.

There were frequent changes of ministry; but the tone of parliament and of government was adverse to the company. In April, 1783,

Mr. Dundas brought in a bill for the better government of India. It was rejected. The session terminated without any further attack upon the company. During the recess the celebrated India bill of Fox and Burke was framed. Mr. Burke was then in the government. Mr. Fox brought in his bill on the 18th of November. The company petitioned against it. Burke delivered one of his most eloquent and imposing orations in its behalf. His descriptions of the misdeeds of the company were exaggerated; and those of the civilization, and excellent qualities of the people and governments of India, were contrary to fact and philosophy. Against Hastings the speech was virulent. The bill passed the commons, and went up to the lords: the company again petitioned. The lords threw out the bill. The king was known to be opposed to it, and a large popular party in the country was equally so. The commons passed most serious resolutions condemnatory by implication of the course pursued by the crown and the peers. The ministry was dismissed, and William Pitt appointed first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer. Mr. Pitt brought in a bill "for the better government and management of the affairs of the East India Company" on the 10th of January. The commons rejected it. On the 25th of March parliament was dissolved. The court of proprietors of India stock manfully supported Hastings, and resolved that he should not be recalled.

When Hastings reached England, as before related, he proceeded at once to London. In June, 1785, he received in person the thanks of the very same court of directors which censured and sought to remove him, when they supposed the favour of the cabinet would be secured by doing so.

In January, 1786, Major Scott announced in parliament that Mr. Hastings was anxious to defend himself against the aspersions thrown on him by Mr. Edmund Burke, and challenged the great philosopher and orator to bring forward his impeachment. This was imprudent, and rather prejudiced than served the case of Hastings in the house. At length that impeachment was made, so notable for the amazing eloquence displayed in it, especially by Sheridan and Burke. It is generally considered that Hastings did not display his usual ability in managing his defence, and this is attributed to the fact that he had not been accustomed to work with English agencies and in English modes. Nearly his whole life had been spent in India, and his mind had become adapted to Indian intrigues. Lord Macaulay says, "Of all his errors, the most serious was, perhaps, the choice of a cham-

pion. Clive, in similar circumstances, had made a singularly happy selection. He put himself into the hands of Wedderburn, afterwards Lord Loughborough, one of the few great advocates who have been also great in the house of commons. To the defence of Clive, therefore, nothing was wanting, neither learning nor knowledge of the world—neither forensic acuteness nor the eloquence which charms political assemblies. Hastings entrusted his interests to a very different person, a major in the Bengal army named Scott. This gentleman had been sent over from India some time before, as the agent of the governor-general. It was rumoured that his services were rewarded with oriental munificence; and we believe that he received much more than Hastings could conveniently spare. The major obtained a seat in parliament, and was there regarded as the organ of his employer. It was evidently impossible that a gentleman so situated could speak with the authority which belongs to an independent position. Nor had the agent of Hastings the talent necessary for obtaining the ear of an assembly, which, accustomed to listen to great orators, had naturally become fastidious. He was always on his legs; he was very tedious, and he had only one topic, the merits and wrongs of Hastings. Everybody who knows the house of commons will easily guess what followed. The major was considered as the greatest bore of his time. There was hardly a day on which the newspapers did not contain some puff upon Hastings, signed Asiaticus or Bengalensis, but known to be written by the indefatigable Scott; and hardly a month in which some bulky pamphlet on the same subject, and from the same pen, did not pass to the trunk-makers and the pastry-cooks."

Much of what his lordship has said of Major Scott, in the above passage, is correct; but, on various grounds, Scott was an agent well adapted to the purposes for which Hastings had chosen him. His knowledge of all the circumstances, personally and practically, on the ground of which the governor-general expected to be called to account, was perfect. He was well acquainted with all the personages who figured in these transactions. His industry was unwavering, and his personal friendship and admiration for Hastings the warmest. Hastings did not select him as his agent in view of a parliamentary impeachment, but in view of attack in the courts of directors and proprietors. Scott was a far more suitable agent for this purpose than Wedderburn would have been. He knew the ways of the directory, the tone and temper of the proprietors, his *whole time* was given to work among them for Hastings, and

he did so successfully. His entering parliament was an after-thought, and he was there very useful to his friend; he corrected innumerable misstatements, and was "always on his legs" for that purpose during the debates. Many a rhetorical flourish, very captivating to the house of commons was made sheerly ridiculous by a dry, prosy, but true statement from Scott. There was no putting him down, he was proof against all ridicule, reiterating his dry facts, financial, military, political, and personal, until they ceased to be disputed. He *was* a bore in the sense Lord Macaulay proclaims it, and he was so also to the enemies of Hastings, by his unsleeping vigilance, his physical endurance, and his ever-pestering, worrying statements and counter-statements, which were confounding to his antagonists, not one man among whom knew anything of the subjects of debate, except Burke. Burke, Dundas (the Lord Advocate of Scotland), and Sir Philip Francis, were the only men of great mark acquainted with Indian affairs. Burke had read on the subject, with a view to an Indian appointment from the ministry, which he knew he could never receive from the company; and he was embittered, therefore, against the latter and its agents. His mind was inflamed with envy against Hastings as much as was that of Francis. Burke was, from these circumstances, an indefatigable student of Indian affairs. Sheridan spoke with glowing eloquence on subjects of which he knew nothing. Dundas learned much of Indian affairs when he served as chairman of the committee which produced the hundred and eleven resolutions. Francis, of course, knew Calcutta well, and the doings of members of the supreme council; but of the languages, peoples, and mind of India he knew little, almost nothing. A plain, stern, dogged, persevering, matter of fact man, "well up" in Indian affairs, was very useful to Hastings in the house, and absolutely indispensable among the constituency of the company. With these Scott had constant intercourse: there was probably not a director, not a single member of the proprietary, with whom Scott had not talked over the whole question. All the holders of India stock might have had Scott's arguments by heart. Hastings foresaw this, and made his selection judiciously. It is quite true, as Lord Macaulay affirms, that Hastings was destitute of a parliamentary advocate possessing the splendour of eloquence which Burke, Sheridan, or Wedderburn possessed; but that was not, as Lord Macaulay represents, his fault; nor did the circumstance of Wedderburn being Clive's adviser and defender show any superiority of

judgment on the part of that great man to Hastings in the selection of his advocates, for Wedderburn had been the early friend and associate of Clive, and offered his services, which were, of course, thankfully accepted. Had Hastings found a similar friend, he would have gladly made his eloquence, tact, and legal knowledge available; but Hastings had spent many years in India, and had formed few new friendships in England. None of his old schoolfellows and early companions were in a condition to do by him as Wedderburn did by Clive. Yet many men of note, and among them those who believed that he had acted very wrong in several of the proceedings for which he was called in question, were indignant at the malignant persecutions with which Burke and others pursued him, and made themselves his friends. Lords Mansfield, Lansdowne, and Thurlow (the Chancellor) were foremost among them. Pitt was another of the eminent men who doubted the propriety of various parts of the conduct of Hastings, but was scandalized at the virulence of the proceedings against him. He had even privately confessed to Major Scott (for the untiring major had interviews with all the ministers) that Hastings deserved high rewards from his country, which he, as minister, was only prevented from recommending his majesty to confer, by the fact that a vote of censure remained on the journals of the commons. The leading opponents of government were the leading opponents of Hastings in the house; but the king, the holders of Indian stock, and the country, were intensely prejudiced against that party. The whigs in and out of the house opposed him, and a small but powerful section of the tories, especially those who were disappointed of places by the government. One of the most fertile sources of attack against Hastings out of the house was the history of his marriage, and the name of Imhoff, and the guilt of his divorced wife, formed the material of the sarcastic squibs which were flung about in the clubs, coffee-houses, and journals. Lord North and Fox were accused of adding light labours of this kind to their relentless opposition in the house. Hastings did much to provoke all this, by an ostentatious defiance of his enemies. This did not arise, as Lord Macaulay supposes, from indiscretion and an undervaluing of his enemies; it arose from the fact that he was not conscious of guilt in the transactions where his lordship considers his guilt manifest. In some matters where his most ardent friends could not have defended him, he believed himself to have been in the right, and remained in that belief to the end of his days. His conscience was

neither tender nor enlightened: he was not, in any sense of the word, a religious man; but, as a politician, he was convinced that the course he had taken in India was that which his duty to the company and to his country demanded. The consciences of Burke, Francis, Sheridan, North, or Fox seem to have been neither more tender nor more enlightened than that of Hastings. There is no doubt that the defiant attitude which he took also arose from his determined character. He was not a man to quail before any foe. He who could coolly write despatches in reference to negotiations with the Mahrattas, when barred up in a house at Benares, with a few soldiers to defend him against half a million of fanatics, was not to be put down by the force of faction or the eloquence of political adventurers, however vast and dazzling the powers they might bring against him in the contest. It is remarkable that Hastings appeared to feel as little and fear as little the great weight of character and public station which some of his opponents brought against him, as he did the genius and personal hostility of others. The courage and persistence of Hastings were sustained by the openly avowed favour of the court. The king was his friend. Clive had derived much protection from the royal favour, Hastings even more. The ladies of the court scandalized many by their attentions to Mrs. Hastings, and it soon became evident that those who wished to find favour near the throne must not be remembered among the persecutors or prosecutors of Warren Hastings. The first note of war on the part of the opposition was an application for papers, by Edmund Burke. Only some of these were granted. In April, 1786, the impeachment was produced, and Hastings was informed that he might be heard by counsel at the bar of the house. Hastings defended himself in person. He was not an orator. He was a great writer, and relied much on the power of his pen for his defence. It was eloquent, but of vast length, and tired the patience of a house much fonder of exciting logomachies than of business statements.

In the beginning of June, Burke brought forward that part of the impeachment which related to the employment of English troops in Rohilcund, in the service of the vizier, for a stipulated price. Burke affected to believe that he would have the support of Dundas, who formerly, as chairman of a committee of inquiry, condemned the Rohilla invasion. Burke must have known that the versatile Dundas would not be bound by such a circumstance; this was patent to the whole house, and the folly of selecting the least vul-

nerable point of the defence in the hope of catching the support of Dundas, or showing his inconsistency, was apparent to all the members not blinded by envy of Hastings, or pledged to the opposition. Dundas, as military men would say, turned the enemy's flank. He declared that although Hastings did wrong in supporting the aggressive designs of the Nabob of Oude, yet he had atoned for that fault, and won beside the lasting gratitude of his country by subsequent services. The tactics of Burke were indiscreet, and the spirit of his speech not less so. The feeling of the house was strong against him. Many of his expected supporters, finding that his first movement displayed bad generalship, forsook him. Only sixty-seven voted for the motion, in a house of one hundred and eighty-six members. A considerable number of the supposed supporters of the prosecution slunk away. Pitt spoke not, but voted for Hastings. The house of commons, on report of a *secret committee*, had censured the Rohilla war; a majority of the directors had censured it; but since then the *whole* of the facts had become known, they had been discussed with great ability in the court of proprietary by men the first and ablest in connection with Indian affairs, their speeches had been published, the error and the extenuation had been canvassed, and the commons in its final verdict refused to be carried away by the clap-trap of ready speakers, or affected by glowing antitheses of rhetoricians with less claim to principle than Hastings himself, were all the wrong-doing attributed to him chargeable at his door.

It was universally expected by the public that the impeachment would now drop, and even the government seems to have thought so, for Lord Thurlow openly spoke, notwithstanding the reserve of Pitt, of the desirableness of creating Hastings Baron Daylesford.

On the 13th of June, the country, if not the house, was startled by a renewal of the prosecution. Fox brought forward a resolution, condemnatory of what was called the deposition of the Rajah of Benares. Fox was eloquent on the occasion. Francis was learned, epigrammatical, and malignant as a demon. Pitt exposed the party purpose of Fox, the personal hatred of Francis, and eulogised in one of the most statesman-like of his speeches the policy, courage, and justice of Hastings in the transaction for which it was sought to condemn him. After an eloquent justification of Hastings, the house was astonished by the minister's declaration, that he should vote for Fox's motion, because the fine laid upon Cheyte Sing was too heavy, although Hastings did right to fine him! Pitt's vote was clearly

not an honest one. Like Fox himself, he had aims of his own in view, and he would uphold or sacrifice Hastings as best promoted those aims. He deemed it politic to conciliate the opposition, and appear impartial. From the first, he was unwilling to be thought the partizan of Hastings, while he denounced the prosecution in the private circle of his friends with unsparing severity. What made the conduct of Pitt in the house most extraordinary was, that the usual ministerial circular had gone out to his party the day before, requesting their presence in the house to vote against the motion of Fox. The change of opinion was attributed to Mr. Dundas, who, on this subject, influenced the mind of the premier. The persuasives by which Dundas succeeded were appeals to the love of power, and the ambition characteristic of Pitt. Hastings was more a favourite at court than himself, and Pitt was led by the insinuations of Dundas to believe that he would soon become his rival, as either a peerage or dishonour must result from the impeachment. The effect of Pitt's tergiversation upon the success of the motion was decisive. It was carried by one hundred and seventy-five against sixty-eight, many in the majority declaring that they voted against their conscience to support the policy of the minister.

In 1787, the prosecution was renewed. The first charge opened was in connection with the conduct of Hastings to the begums of Oude, a portion of his public life more open to censure than any other. Sheridan introduced the charge in the most brilliant oration ever made by him, and which produced an effect in the house greater than probably any other speech ever delivered. After Sheridan's speech, the debate was adjourned. When the house resumed, it was evident that the eloquence of Sheridan had decided the motion. The house was now as much carried away by eloquence, irrespective of the merits of the question, as upon the first resolution they were coldly insensible to the finest passages of the orator, and looked only to the facts of the case. The influence of Pitt, however, had as much to do in forming the majorities on all the motions, as either eloquence or justice. Pitt supported Sheridan, as he had supported Fox. One hundred and seventy-five against sixty-eight carried the motion.

The party carrying on the impeachment were now sure of victory, and hurried numerous resolutions through the house. The friends of Hastings began to forsake him, as those of Clive had deserted him in the hour of misfortune. The sergeant-at-arms arrested him, and brought him to the bar

of the peers, where Burke was directed by the commons to produce an impeachment founded upon their resolutions. The period for prorogation was too close to allow of proceeding with the case, and Hastings was discharged on bail. At the opening of the following session, the commons proceeded to form a committee to manage the impeachment. The leading members of the opposition were called on to serve, and no name was objected to until that of Francis was read, when a large number of members objected to the injustice and indecency of the most malignant personal enemy Hastings had being placed in that position. It is much to the discredit of the leading men of the opposition, that they fiercely contended for the appointment of Francis. Dundas and Wilberforce, believing that Pitt would sustain the motion for the appointment of Francis, upheld it. Wilberforce was especially ingenious in his argumentative support. Pitt suddenly rose and opposed the appointment of Francis. "The heaven-born minister" had everything his own way; his servile followers voted that Francis was not a fit person to be nominated on the committee.

On the 13th of February, 1788, the sittings commenced, on the result of which the fate of Hastings depended. The scene has been portrayed by the brilliant pen of Macaulay. In one of the happiest, richest, and most fervid outflowings of his eloquence, he has impressed the solemnity, importance, and the whole aspect of the court upon the mind of this generation of readers. The trial, amongst other things, was remarkable for the great number and singular variety of notable persons who were spectators:—"The long galleries were crowded by an audience such as has rarely excited the fears or the emulation of an orator. There were gathered together, from all parts of a great, free, enlightened, and prosperous empire, grace and female loveliness, wit and learning, the representatives of every science and of every art. There were seated round the queen the fair-haired young daughters of the house of Brunswick. There the ambassadors of great kings and commonwealths gazed with admiration on a spectacle which no other country in the world could present. There Siddons, in the prime of her majestic beauty, looked with emotion on a scene surpassing all the imitations of the stage. There the historian of the Roman empire thought of the days when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily against Verres, and when, before a senate which still retained some show of freedom, Tacitus thundered against the oppressor of Africa. There were seen, side by side, the greatest painter and the greatest scholar of the age. The

spectacle had allured Reynolds from that easel which has preserved to us the thoughtful foreheads of so many writers and statesmen, and the sweet smiles of so many noble matrons. It had induced Parr to suspend his labours in that dark and profound mine from which he had extracted a vast treasure of erudition—a treasure too often buried in the earth, too often paraded with injudicious and inelegant ostentation, but still precious, massive, and splendid. There appeared the voluptuous charms of her to whom the heir of the throne had in secret plighted his faith. There, too, was she, the beautiful mother of a beautiful race, the Saint Cecilia, whose delicate features, lighted up by love and music, art has rescued from the common decay. There were the members of that brilliant society, which quoted, criticised, and exchanged repartees under the rich peacock hangings of Mrs. Montague. And there the ladies whose lips, more persuasive than those of Fox himself, had carried the Westminster election against palace and treasury, shone round Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire."

Such were the spectators of the scene, and the audience before which the eloquence of England's best orators was about to be displayed. The descriptions given by Lord Macaulay of the appearance of Hastings on this occasion and his approach to the bar, of his counsel and his accusers, are amongst the most graphic and life-like which his pen has depicted:—"The serjeants made proclamation. Hastings advanced to the bar, and bent his knee. The culprit was indeed not unworthy of that great presence. He had ruled an extensive and populous country, had made laws and treaties, had sent forth armies, had set up and pulled down princes. And in his high place he had so borne himself that all had feared him, that most had loved him, and that hatred itself could deny him no title to glory, except virtue. He looked like a great man, and not like a bad man. A person small and emaciated, yet deriving dignity from a carriage which, while it indicated deference to the court, indicated also habitual self-possession and self-respect; a high and intellectual forehead, a brow pensive, but not gloomy; a mouth of inflexible decision; a face pale and worn, but serene, on which was written as legibly as under the picture in the council-chamber at Calcutta, *Mens æqua in arduis*: such was the aspect with which the great proconsul presented himself to his judges. His counsel accompanied him, men all of whom were afterwards raised by their talents and learning to the highest posts in their profession: the bold and strong-minded Law, afterwards chief-justice of the King's

Bench; the more humane and eloquent Dallas, afterwards chief-justice of the Common Pleas; and Plomer, who, nearly twenty years later, successfully conducted in the same high court the defence of Lord Melville, and subsequently became vice-chancellor and master of the rolls. But neither the culprit nor his advocates attracted so much notice as the accusers. In the midst of the blaze of red drapery, a space had been fitted up with green benches and tables for the commons. The managers, with Burke at their head, appeared in full dress. The collectors of gossip did not fail to remark that even Fox, generally so regardless of his appearance, had paid to the illustrious tribunal the compliment of wearing a bag and sword. Pitt had refused to be one of the conductors of the impeachment; and his commanding, copious, and sonorous eloquence, was wanting to that great muster of various talents. Age and blindness had unfitted Lord North for the duties of a public prosecution, and his friends were left without the help of his excellent sense, his tact, and his urbanity. But in spite of the absence of these two distinguished members of the lower house, the box in which the managers stood contained an array of speakers such as, perhaps, had not appeared together since the great age of Athenian eloquence. There were Fox and Sheridan, the English Demosthenes, and the English Hyperides. There was Burke, ignorant indeed, or negligent of the art of adapting his reasonings and his style to the capacity and taste of his hearers, but in amplitude of comprehension and richness of imagination superior to every orator, ancient or modern. There, with eyes reverentially fixed on Burke, appeared the finest gentleman of the age; his form developed by every manly exercise; his face beaming with intelligence and spirit,—the ingenious, the chivalrous, the high-souled Windham. Nor, though surrounded by such men, did the youngest manager pass unnoticed. At an age when most of those who distinguish themselves in life are still contending for prizes and fellowships at college, he had won for himself a conspicuous place in parliament. No advantage of fortune or connection was wanting that could set off to the height his splendid talents and his unblemished honour. At twenty-three he had been thought worthy to be ranked with the veteran statesmen who appeared as the delegates of the British commons, at the bar of the British nobility." This was the future Earl Grey, the premier under whose government the reform bill was carried.

The reading of the charges and answers of Hastings occupied several days. Burke then opened the impeachment in a speech which

contemporaries describe as producing by the solemnity and manner of the orator, as much effect as by its powers of reasoning and marvellous eloquence. Even Thurlow, the determined abettor of Hastings, uttered exclamations of admiration, and, at the close of the peroration, Hastings himself appeared affected, notwithstanding the dauntless and proud front he bore. Fox, Grey (afterwards Earl Grey), Lord Loughborough (formerly the advocate of Clive), and Sheridan, all betrayed an animus the most hostile to the prisoner at the bar; but the lord-chancellor, a host in himself (considering his abilities, boldness, and the advantages of his situation), indicated from the first a resolution to save him. The trial was so protracted that public curiosity flagged, and the persecutors became less confident. Their great cards had been played, and the game was not won. The defence of Hastings was expected to be brilliant, and to come with telling power when the impressions produced by the orations of his accusers were worn away. Such was the state of matters at the end of June, and when both houses were weary of the session. Only thirty-five days were given to the trial; it was obliged to stand over for another year.

In 1789 other business drew away the attention of the house and the public from the trial; the illness of the king excited the popular sympathy greatly, and still further contributed to cast the interest taken in the trial into the shade. The friends of Hastings grew bolder. Advantage was taken of indecorous expressions used by Burke, to move a vote of censure upon him in the commons, and it was carried. This deeply humiliated the great man, and deprived him of much moral power in his further prosecution of the impeachment.

In 1790 parliament was dissolved, and the temper of the new house towards Hastings was tested by his friends, nearly as soon as it had assembled. It was maintained that the dissolution put an end to the prosecution. Pitt and the opposition united in affirming the contrary. Several of the articles of impeachment were, however, withdrawn, in order to facilitate the more rapid issue of the case.

In 1791 the prosecution on the part of the committee became less bitter, with the exception of Edmund Burke, who clung to it with all the tenacity of hatred which animated Francis, who, although not on the committee, was perpetually in communication with its members, and was, out of the house, the life of the prosecution, which still chased the already severely punished and much suffering Hastings.

In 1795 Hastings appeared before the bar of the lords to hear judgment. The curiosity of the public now returned with full force. His opponent Loughborough was chancellor: his friend Thurlow was in opposition; the committee for managing the impeachment was broken up into various parties, its members at enmity with one another; and out of the body of peers who took so deep an interest in the trial at its commencement, sixty had gone before the great tribunal, to render their own last account. Twenty-nine peers voted. Six voted against Hastings on the charges in connection with Cheyte Sing and the begums, a still smaller number voted against him on the other important articles of impeachment, and on none of the relatively minor charges was there a single voice against him. He was informed from the woolsack that he was acquitted. He bowed with the same air of respectful dignity, firmness, and self-consciousness, as when he approached that bar nearly eight years before.

The decision met with almost universal approval. It was felt by the public that he had been put to an enormous cost—a fortune had been expended in his defence; that his anxieties for so many years were terribly penal; that he had been pursued with bitter personal animosity and jealous political envy; that his errors had been sought out with a vindictiveness such as had never before been directed against a public man, and that his great services had been unrequited by the country for whose greatness and glory he had done so much. All men had come to the conclusion that, but for Warren Hastings, the Asiatic empire of England had vanished from beneath her sceptre.

Hastings returned from the bar of the lords to his seat—the old family seat at Daylesford—a victor, but terribly impoverished by his contest. He had purchased the old manor house and estate, which had three quarters of a century before passed out of the family. The dream of his life's young morning was realized—he *was* "Hastings of Daylesford." But, alas! he took up his abode there when fortune had done much against him, as well as for him; and the remainder of his years were destined to be spent in comparative obscurity. The malignity of his enemies pursued him still. Francis, Burke, and Dundas were as bitter as ever; they lost no opportunity, public or private, not merely to damage his reputation, but to hurt his interests. But for the generosity of the East India Company he must have sunk into poverty.

Like many great men who have a genius for public business and for government, he was a bad manager of his private affairs; and

he who, as governor-general of India, saved an empire from financial anarchy, was more than once on the verge of pecuniary ruin, as "Hastings of Daylesford."

Pitt continued to regard him with envy, because he enjoyed the king's favour; and because, on Eastern affairs, if not in other departments of statesmanship, he would have been a superior authority if permitted to emerge into public life. When Pitt retired from power, Hastings was nearly seventy years old.

In 1813 he was examined as a witness before the commons on the subject of India; on which occasion the whole house rose in respectful homage as he left its bar. Many marks of public respect were paid to him after that time by the Prince Regent, the leading men of the day, and the people generally. He was also made a privy councillor. His private life belongs rather to the biographer, but the closing scene was appropriate to the courage and equanimity of his career. On the 22nd of August, 1818, according to Macaulay—on the 3rd of that month, according to M. Auber and others—he closed his life, having attained his eightieth year. On that day he wrote to Colonel Toone in the following remarkable terms:—"I impose upon myself the last office of communication between you and me, to inform you that a few hours remain, which are to separate us from each other for ever. The infliction that must end me is a total privation of the function of deglutition, which is equivalent to the extremities of hunger, by the inability to take nourishment. I have called you by the only appellation that language can express me, '*Yar Woofadar*,' my profitable friend; for such, with every other quality of friendship, I have ever experienced yours in all our mutual intercourse, and my heart has returned it (unprofitably, I own), but with equal sentiments of the purest affection. My own conscience assuredly attests that I myself have not been wanting in my duty to my respectable employers. I quit the world, and their service, to which I shall conceive myself, to the latest moment that I draw my breath, still devotedly attached, and in the firm belief that in the efficient body of directors I have not one individual ill-affected towards me. I do not

express my full feelings; I believe them all to be kindly, generously disposed towards me; and to the larger and constituent body I can only express a hope, that if there are any of a different sentiment, the number is but few; for they have supported me, when I thought myself abandoned by all other powers, from whom I ever thought myself entitled to any benefit. My latest prayers shall be offered for their service, for that of my beloved country, and for that also whose interest both had so long committed to my partial guardianship, and for which I feel a sentiment in my departing hours, not alien from that which is due from every subject to its own."

Thus tranquilly this serene and heroic man passed away, after a career so eventful and turbulent, in which, amidst all its tremendous storms, he was ever calm, resolute, and great.

As it will not be necessary again to refer to this eminent personage in the progress of this history, except *en passant*, it may be here noticed that, after his death, the most marked tokens of respect for his memory were shown by the East India Company, which he had so long and so faithfully served, and which, during his long retirement from public life, had soothed his sorrows and generously provided for his wants. A court was called, when the chairman, Campbell Majoribanks, Esq., passed a warm eulogy upon his memory. The deputy-chairman, Mr. Robinson, afterwards Sir George Robinson, who had served in India as a civil officer of the company during a portion of the time when Hastings was governor, followed the chairman in terms of high commendation of the personal and official conduct of Hastings. The following resolution was passed:—

"Resolved, That as the last testimony of approbation of the long, zealous, and successful services of the late Right Honourable Warren Hastings, in maintaining without diminution the British possessions in India against the combined efforts of European, Mohammedan, and Mahratta enemies, the statue of that distinguished servant of the East India Company be placed among the statesmen and heroes who have contributed in their several stations to the recovery, preservation, and security of the British power and authority in India."

CHAPTER XCI.

HOME AFFAIRS (*Continued*).

DURING the progress of the events connected with Hastings, which necessarily occupied so large a space in the last chapter, the general affairs of the company occupied the attention of parliament and the country. In 1784, Pitt's bill was introduced. The new parliament met on the 19th of May, and the premier took an early opportunity of bringing forward his measure for the future government of India. In the sketch given of the history of the company's charters and constitutions, Pitt's bill was noticed sufficiently. The bill, after protracted discussions in parliament, and between the government and the company, was carried; but it was necessary in 1786 to introduce another bill to amend it.

During that year Lord Macartney returned from India, and immediately received a challenge from General Stuart, whose strange conduct in command of the Madras army during the war with Tippoo has been already noticed. His lordship was wounded. The circumstance led to the formation by the company of regulations against duelling of a most stringent character.

After the brief service of Mr. Macpherson in the chair of the supreme council of Bengal, and the refusal of Lord Macartney to occupy it, the directors took measures to find an appropriate successor to Hastings. This task was a difficult one, and their choice eventually fell upon Lord Cornwallis. He was appointed governor-general and commander-in-chief, and was the first upon whom the duty devolved of carrying out the act of 1784. General Sloper, who had previously assumed the command in chief of the army, was recalled upon a pension.

In 1787 the company made their first arrangements for an overland mail. In the same year, means were arranged for securing an annual budget of Indian finance to lay before parliament.

In 1788, when the first struggles for liberty were indicated in France, fears were entertained in England that a war between the two countries would arise, from the principles put forth in popular assemblies in that country. The government of France was suspected of being anxious to divert the minds of the people from home topics to foreign conquests; and, as oriental dominion had always been a tempting object to the lovers of glory in France, reasonable fears were entertained in England that projects of fresh Indian wars would be matured. Lord Cornwallis saw,

or fancied he saw, symptoms of revived hope amongst some of the native princes that a coalition with some European power might be formed. He communicated these fears to the directors, and exercised increased vigilance upon the movements of the native chiefs, especially upon those of Tippoo Sultan. At this juncture, differences sprung up between the government at home and the court of directors, which led to intemperate discussions in the house of commons and among the proprietors of Indian stock.

In 1781 it had been decided by parliament that for every thousand men sent out for the defence of India by the government, the company should pay two lacs of rupees. Four regiments had been ordered to be raised for service in India in the latter part of 1787, and discussions arose as to the rank of the officers relative to those in the company's service. Petitions from the latter, as to the way in which they had been superseded and otherwise treated by the royal officers, caused discussions of an unpleasant nature in the court of directors, and a long, angry, and unsatisfactory correspondence between the government and the court resulted. In order to get rid of this difficulty, the directors declined accepting the services of the four regiments. The crown insisted on sending them out. The company refused, in that case, to pay for them. Thus matters stood when, on the 25th of February, 1788, Mr. Pitt brought in a bill to enable the crown to send out troops without the consent of the company, and to hold the company liable for their payment. The bill was opposed, and it ultimately passed both houses, containing clauses which limited the number of king's troops which might be sent to India, and maintained out of the revenue of that country.

In August, 1789, the directors appointed General Meadows to the government of Madras, and Colonel Robert Abercromby commander-in-chief of Bombay.

At the close of that year, the directors made arrangements to reduce their military establishments, no danger such as had been apprehended having arisen from the political state of France. Lord Cornwallis was urged to consult economy in the reduction of the number of troops, native and European. At that very juncture, a new and terrible war in India was imminent. It is remarkable how frequently, when the company were preparing for retrenchment in military expenses, the

political horizon became suddenly darkened and the thunder-cloud of war let loose its fires. Tippoo Sultan was once more preparing to brave the power of England.

The revenue settlements of Bengal occupied the attention of the directors as well as of the governor-general during 1789-90. What has been called the permanent settlement of Lord Cornwallis received the approbation of the directors. The merits of Mr. Shore (the friend of Hastings) as a financier were brought out more fully than previously by the arrangements in connection with the permanent settlement. Mr. Pitt was greatly struck with the ability displayed, and his impressions of Mr. Shore's great talents led to that gentleman's selection as governor-general of Bengal, on the retirement of Lord Cornwallis. The permanent settlement was carried into effect by orders from the court of directors, in March, 1793, fulfilling one of the clauses of the bill of 1784, "That, to prevent future oppression, government were to be requested to fix an unalterable tribute rent." As the correspondence between Lord Cornwallis and the directors was frequent and their views concurrent, the measures taken by his government in civil affairs, although not originating at home, may in this chapter be properly referred to.

In 1793 district courts were established, for the satisfaction of litigants and the ends of justice. The same year his lordship invested the collection of revenue and the administration of justice in separate officers. In 1797 the British parliament substantially incorporated the regulations of Lord Cornwallis, in these and other respects, in an act for the internal government of Bengal. These "regulations" for the administration of law and revenue were mostly suggested by Hastings, in previous provisions of a less perfect order, according as circumstances arose in his day allowing of such.

Matters in India now assumed the aspect of impending war, and Lord Cornwallis prepared himself for the issue. In other chapters, the events of that war will be related; in this place, it will be only necessary to say that English interests were exposed to fresh dangers, and English arms obtained fresh triumphs. The conduct of Lord Cornwallis was approved both by the company and the parliament. Thanks and honours were lavished upon him, and if he received much praise he deserved much. The war which his lordship had conducted to such a successful issue did not receive such cordial support in parliament. The pacific declarations of the act of 1784 were called for in both houses, and read. A motion was made

reaffirming the policy of that clause, in, if possible, stronger terms. Amongst the most ardent supporters of this motion was Lord Rawdon, who afterwards himself, placed in India in circumstances very similar to those of Lord Cornwallis, acted similarly to that nobleman, and had his conduct brought in question in a like way. It may indeed be affirmed that most of the eminent men in the British parliament who were forward to condemn the servants of the crown and company in India, would, in the same circumstances, from motives of patriotism and justice, have felt themselves constrained to have acted an identical part.

On the 21st of September, 1792, the court of directors supposing that Lord Cornwallis would return to England sooner than he did, nominated Mr. Shore as his successor. The revolutionary proceedings in France alarmed the conservative susceptibilities of the English, and war was declared. Instructions to this effect were sent out to Lord Cornwallis, and were acted upon by his lordship with his usual wisdom and valour.

On the 23rd of January, 1793, the East India Company resolved, *nemine contradicente*, that the statue of Lord Cornwallis should be placed in the court-room of the India-house, in order "that his great services might be ever had in remembrance." In June following, another resolution was passed, also without a dissentient voice, granting his lordship an annuity of £5,000 as a reward for his services.

The year 1793 was one of importance to the East India Company, as the period approached when a new agreement must be made with the public. It soon became obvious that the just interests of the company, and those of India, were to be made subservient to political and interested parties at home, if their measures could be carried through parliament. The manufacturers of Manchester were not free-traders in 1793, and they raised a fierce clamour against the importation of piece-goods from India, and the exportation of any machinery to India, by which cotton cloth might be more cheaply produced. These demands were effectually resisted. The China trade of the company, was, however, brought under modifications less in the interest of the company, and more in favour of the public. The company's charter was renewed for twenty years in spite of all opposition, personal, political, and commercial.

Edmund Burke opposed the appointment of Mr. Shore, now made Sir John Shore, on the ground of his friendship for Hastings. It was supposed that the new governor-

general would exercise an influence in India, with the company, and with the government, adverse to the party of which Burke was the head in the matter of the impeachment of Hastings. "The chair" replied to Burke in terms of becoming dignity, maintaining their prerogative, asserting the obligation which rested on them to select such high officials on the ground of personal fitness, and repudiating on their part all party motives. Sir John Shore was in England when this discussion arose. He entered upon the duties of government on the 28th of October, 1793. Major-general Sir Robert Abercromby assumed the office of commander-in-chief, under the court's appointment of September, 1792.

Lord Hobart, who was a nominee of Mr. Dundas, was appointed to the government of Madras on the 23rd of October, 1793. He was also nominated governor-general in case of the removal, from any cause, of Sir John Shore. Sir Charles Oakley, who was superseded by Lord Hobart, was, as a mark of respect, empowered to retain the reins of office for one month after his lordship's arrival at Fort St. George.

The company, having had its attention directed to Birmah, advised a mission from Bengal to the King of Ava. Captain Symes effected the purposes of the mission entrusted to him, which gave great satisfaction to the governor-general in India, and the directors at home.

Mr. Duncan was appointed to the government of Bombay in 1795.

In 1796 important military arrangements took place in London, under the supervision of the directors, by which batta and other extra allowances were fixed, a recruiting depot established, furlough regulations made, and retirement allowances for officers ordained, the entire expense of which amounted to the large annual charge of £308,000. A singular sentence was written at this time in the company's communications with the government in Bengal:—"That in reasoning upon political events in India, all conclusions, from obvious causes, must be liable to great uncertainty."

Lieutenant-general Sir Alured Clarke was appointed second in council, and commander-in-chief at Madras. He was sent out in view of a renewed war with Tippoo.

On the 24th of October, 1797, Sir John Shore was raised to the Irish peerage, in reward of his able services in India. The title bestowed upon Sir John was an odd one in connection with an Irish peerage, as it was connected with an English seaport, his style and title was Baron Teignmouth. His lordship's new honour was hardly needed to sustain his influence in India, where he only for a short time continued after his new rank

was conferred. In March, 1798, he returned to England. Previous to the return of his lordship, the Marquis Cornwallis was again nominated for the governor-generalship in India. Lord Hotham was not expected to remain in India, so that his provisional appointment would be of no avail. There were many questions open which it was supposed the Marquis Cornwallis was especially qualified happily to close. The military arrangements which at so much cost the company had formed were not well received at Bengal. Differences which arose when Hastings was in the chair of supreme government, and Lord Macartney in that of Madras, between the councils of Calcutta and Fort St. George, still continued; the difficulties connected with the debts of the Nabob of Arcot appeared to be interminable. Bengal required a supervision such as it had recently obtained from Sir John Shore, and formerly from Lord Cornwallis. Such were the leading reasons assigned by the directors for wishing to send to India again the statesman and general with whose former administration they had been so well satisfied.

The Marquis Cornwallis did not proceed to Bengal as intended. The public interests in the British Isles required that some statesman of great abilities and amiable disposition should be placed at the head of the Irish government. Thither he went. A terrible insurrection raged in that unhappy country in 1798, followed by another, confined to the capital, in 1803, which was led by the amiable, gifted, brave, and patriotic Thomas Addis Emmet. The followers of Emmet did not partake of his noble spirit and honourable principles. They attacked Lord Cornwallis, unattended and unarmed, dragged him from his carriage, and nearly murdered him. When Emmet learned the event, he no longer hoped for his country. He believed that he had commanded men ambitious of being soldiers, but whose ambition was satisfied with the rank of assassins. It is but just to them, however, to state, that when they learned who their victim was, they cursed their own weapons, and bitterly repented of the deed. The earl survived the attempt upon his life, and was destined at a future period again to govern India.

When the company found it impossible to obtain the services of Lord Cornwallis, their attention was fixed upon the Earl of Morington. This nobleman had formed a taste for the study of Indian history and Indian affairs. When at Eton his education was conducted under the superintendence of Archbishop Cornwallis, who then resided at the palace of Lambeth, where, from 1771 to 1779, he was accustomed to pass the holidays. At the

palace he frequently met the Earl of Cornwallis, and the members of his family, as they passed much of their time with the prelate, their kinsman.

When, in 1786, Earl Cornwallis assumed the governorship of Bengal, young Wellesley was led to conceive the idea that much interest was connected with the study of Indian literature and story. He had no purpose or notion of ever taking part in the affairs of that country, at all events, within the peninsula itself. In 1786, Lord Wellesley (as he then was) received the appointment of lord of the treasury. He then obtained a high reputation for scholarship, eloquence, and wisdom. In 1795 he was made one of the commissioners for the affairs of India. Up to 1797 he held both offices, and a seat in the privy council. The court of directors nominated him governor-general of India, and he accepted the charge. The common impression was that his lordship was unfit for the post, as ignorant altogether of Indian affairs. His able management in India afterwards, led to the impression that he must have been a man of surpassing genius to form, so soon after his arrival, such just conceptions of the great task he had undertaken. These impressions were erroneous, except so far as that the genius of this remarkable man was such that had he gone to India ignorant of its affairs, he would have probably grasped the great subject, and mastered it under every disadvantage.

Every circumstance relating to the connection of such a man with India is interesting. M. Auber gives the following account of the outward voyage, its varied and important incidents, and the unexpected circumstances which furnished the earl with important information:—"Lord Wellesley had been requested to make a short stay in Madras, for the purpose of effecting a modification of the treaty with his highness the Nabob of Arcot, in 1792. But as great importance was attached to an exact observance of treaties with the native powers, a principle so honourably established under the administration of Lord Cornwallis, no exertion of any other power than that of persuasion was to be used for the purpose of inducing the nabob to adopt any alteration of the treaty. Lord Wellesley embarked at Portsmouth on *La Virginie* frigate, on the 9th November, and on the 29th arrived at Madeira, where he was received with every mark of attention by the Portuguese authorities. On the following day the *Niger* frigate, with the *Surat Castle*, having on board Sir John Anstruther, who was proceeding to Bengal as chief-justice, accompanied by the whole of the convoy,

arrived off the island. In the night the ships of the fleet were obliged to slip their cables and put to sea, to avoid the effects of a sudden and tremendous storm. Lord Wellesley arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in February, 1798, where he met with Major Kirkpatrick, the late resident at the court of Hyderabad, which post that officer had been constrained to quit, and to repair to the Cape for the benefit of his health. Lord Wellesley was, in some measure, aware that the increase of the French influence had occasioned considerable apprehension in the mind of Lord Teignmouth before he left India. His lordship, therefore, embraced the opportunity which the meeting with Major Kirkpatrick presented, to frame and submit a series of questions to that officer, whose replies enabled his lordship to form a more correct estimate of the importance to be attached to the subject. The result of his deliberations was communicated in a letter to Mr. Dundas, accompanied by his lordship's opinion on the value of the Cape, and more especially that of the island of Ceylon, to the interests of Great Britain. Ceylon had been placed under the Madras government since its capture in 1796. Accounts having reached Fort George, in January, 1798, that the chief of the insurgents was in communication with the court at Kandy, and that apprehensions were entertained that the rebellious chiefs and the king might unite with the French and Dutch against the British interests, Lord Hobart proceeded to Columbo, in company with Admiral Rainier, on the 7th of July, for the purpose of securing those interests. Having effected the objects of his visit, he returned to Madras, and on the 18th announced his intention to relinquish the government, and to proceed to Europe. General Harris, the commander-in-chief at Fort St. George, succeeded provisionally to the government. In reparation for the disappointment and loss occasioned to Lord Hobart, who it could not be supposed would remain after two successors had been nominated to the office of governor-general since his lordship's appointment as successor to Sir John Shore, in 1793, an unanimous resolution was passed by the directors, on the 8th of August, granting him a pension of £1,500 per annum, to commence from the time of his quitting Madras: which resolution was confirmed by the general court, on the 6th of December, when the thanks of the company were also unanimously voted to his lordship for his able and meritorious conduct in the government of Fort St. George. In the same month, the court of directors appointed Lord Clive (now Earl Powis) his successor. The question regarding the go-

vernment of Ceylon was yet undecided; but there were reasons to believe that it would be assumed by the crown. The Honourable Frederick North, in anticipation of this decision, having arrived at Bombay, addressed a private letter to Lord Wellesley, as he considered his lordship might be called to account 'for the arrival in India of a person unhoused, unappointed, unannealed,' who, with seven or eight more of his majesty's servants, in embryo, like himself, had no security for their employment but the word of ministers."* The island being declared a king's possession, Mr. North was confirmed in the government.

Lord Wellesley landed at Madras in April, 1798. On the 18th of May he reached Calcutta, and assumed his government. Scarcely had the governor-general arrived at his post, when the directors sent out the most rigorous instructions for his conduct. Tippoo was still the bugbear of "their honours," and they advised the noble governor not to wait for a declaration of war on the part of Tippoo, but if they found him engaged in any political coquetry with the French, war was to be declared forthwith. The directors were, no doubt, influenced in giving these directions by the advice of Lord Teignmouth. The company had arrived at the conviction, which was expressed at this period by General Craig—"A defensive war must ever be ruinous to us in India."

The year 1798 is rendered remarkable in Indian history by the fact, that in it the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, left England for Madras at the head of the 33rd regiment, and embarked at Fort St. George on the 15th of August. So active were the measures of Lord Wellesley, that the court of directors were kept in continuous correspondence and in anxious consideration of his despatches, although, at the same time, their confidence never for a moment wavered, however vast the magnitude of the conceptions, the plans, or the undertakings of his lordship. The grand source of alarm to the directors was the French. Often as they had been beaten, they still survived in India, and with wonderful elasticity rose to influence again. With an exceedingly small amount of territory, they yet continued to form connections the most potential with the native courts, and to land stores of war and military forces dangerous exceedingly to the power of England when used to strengthen some great native power at war with her. Mogul, vizier, Maharatta, nabob, sultan, or rajah, whoever possessed French alliance, was formidable to England; and although England always won in the long run, the race of competition was

often close. France nowhere displayed against England an energy so unflagging as in India. Hence, the first care of the directors ever was to provide security against French influence, and by diplomacy to dissuade, or by battle to deter, all native princes from confederacy with France. These principles operated upon the court of directors in 1798-99 with more powerful influence than ever before: hence, every movement of the Earl of Mornington was watched from London with eager anxiety. His lordship's own mind was the reflex of the general mind of the company and of the country; and therefore his policy was popular in Britain, and met with the earnest and confiding support of the directors. The noble earl's government and policy sustained the favour they at first received. Both houses of parliament, the directors, and the proprietary of the company testified repeatedly and enthusiastically their respect for his lordship, and gratitude for his services; and when at length his labours terminated, he was rewarded with a pension of £5,000 a-year as a tribute to his renown, and an acknowledgment of the great advantages he had conferred on the company.

During the year 1800 the services of Colonel Wellesley became highly appreciated by the court of directors and the government, by a variety of independent operations, which, although on a minor scale, were of great difficulty, and required a sound judgment and ready address.

Such were the leading events connected with the home proceedings of the company, and in relation to the company, during the part of the 18th century the home history of which has not been written in previous chapters. It has been thought judicious to place the account of the relation of the government and the company at home during this period before the reader in a connected form, although so many great changes took place in India. The reader, having before his mind the whole outline of the company's affairs at home, the history of the leading official appointments, and the views of the directors, will be prepared to understand more clearly the conduct and policy of public servants in India, and to connect them with the mighty issues of war and peace in the peninsula. When the 18th century closed, English progress in India had made for itself already a grand page in history; British interests there had become vast, complicated, and profound; and a future was opened for the ambition and usefulness of England into which it was possible to look, as through a vista, however obscure the detail of the prospect, and however veiled its remoter forms.

* *Auber's Rise and Progress of the East India Company*, vol. ii. chap. v. p. 163.

CHAPTER XCII.

MR. MACPHERSON SUCCEEDS HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL—HIS FINANCIAL MEASURES—TIPPOO DEFEATS THE MAHRATTAS—LORD MACARTNEY SURRENDERS THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND REFUSES THAT OF BENGAL—AMBITION OF SCINDIAH—THE SIKHS BECOME IMPORTANT—EARL CORNWALLIS ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA—HIS GENERAL MEASURES—TIPPOO INVADES TRAVANCORE.

THE last two chapters related the progress of home events connected with the East India Company, in such a manner as to bring before the reader the principal official personages in India from the period when Hastings retired from Bengal to the close of the century. The domestic policy of the Marquis of Cornwallis was also stated. The outline thus given of the proceedings and policy of the directors renders it unnecessary to dwell upon official changes and contests in India, so that the chapters relating the history of India during the fifteen years which intervened between the retirement of Hastings and the beginning of the nineteenth century, may be occupied with the great political events which influenced so much the progress of the English and the destinies of the native states.

When Mr. Hastings withdrew from the government, Mr. Macpherson, as has been already shown, assumed the presidency of the supreme council. Scarcely had that gentleman taken upon him the onerous charge of governing India, when he found himself surrounded by fresh intrigues and difficulties among the native states. The condition of these states was restless as the sea. Scarcely was one movement quelled than another more disturbed began. No general policy could secure peace. The directions from home, the instructions from government house at Calcutta, were for peace; but the elements of disturbance were susceptible and powerful, and there were always influences to act upon them. The Mahrattas were rapidly rising into supremacy. Madajee Scindiah was the most potent of all the chiefs of that remarkable people, and his office of vakeel-ul-muluck to the Mogul greatly increased his influence. On the 27th of March Agra surrendered to Madajee, which he held in the name of the Mogul emperor. After his conquest of that great capital he marched for Delhi with the Mogul, detained only by the fortress of Allyghur, which had been armed and provisioned for twelvemonths, and which Scindiah could not approach except to reconnoitre.

Mr. Anderson was at this time the company's agent to the Mogul, and was, therefore, at head-quarters in the Mahratta camp. He found Scindiah so exalted by his conquests,

his assumed vicegerency of the Mogul dominions, and the services he had rendered to the English as mediator between them and the Mahratta confederation in the late Mahratta war, that he began to treat the company's officers with disrespect, and bore himself in such way to Mr. Anderson that he prepared to leave the Mahratta camp. Scindiah, alarmed for the moment at the probable consequences of driving away an agent and envoy of England by insult, offered many assurances that he had intended no affront. Mr. Anderson was induced to remain, but charged the Mahratta chief with meditating war against the company. Scindiah, placing his open hand upon his sword, said, "By my sword I swear I have no intention to make war." This, coming from a chief of such warlike and haughty reputation, caused Mr. Anderson to hope that no feud would break out between the company and the Mahratta power. Still Scindiah showed various tokens of hostility to the English. Among them that which excited most suspicion was the resistance which he offered to the residence of an English agent at the court of the Peishwa. This agent, Mr. Mallett, was sent from Bombay to Poonah; Scindiah received him with respect, but objected to his permanent residence at that capital. The comparative proximity of Poonah to Bombay, and the great amount of commercial business between the two places rendered a resident agent essential. A distance of eight hundred miles would be traversed, if Scindiah were the only medium of communication between the company and the Mahrattas. The supreme government determined to insist upon the recognition of the agent sent by them to the court of the Peishwa. The views of Scindiah against Tippoo Sultan tended further to sow dissatisfaction between him and the supreme council. The conduct of Tippoo to the Mahrattas was provocative of war. Hyder Ali had been little more than a nominal Mohammedan; he had little regard to "God or the prophet," if the will of either, as represented to him, stood in the way of his policy. Tippoo's principles were, on the contrary, drawn from the Koran. He believed himself to have been raised up as an avenger of the faithful, and a scourge of the infidels,

and he made all the native states around him feel his wrath. The Mahrattas were heathen, and Tippoo believed that to convert such, under the threat of sword and fire, was a praiseworthy action. He was a Mohammedan fanatic, and infuriated in his fanaticism. He found means of compelling some sixty thousand Mahratta subjects, in one of the outlying provinces of that strange empire, to embrace Mohammedanism; and he put to death some thousands of Brahmins who refused to become followers of the prophet. His fury against native Christians rivalled that of the most terrible persecutors among the Roman emperors. Scindiah was as anxious to unite with the English in the chastisement of Tippoo, as he was to unite with any other power or powers for the humiliation of the English. The indications of the working of these desires in his mind rapidly increased.

In July, 1785, Scindiah made proposals for an alliance between the English, the Nizam of the Deccan, and the Peishwa of the Mahrattas against Tippoo. The supreme government at Calcutta would neither listen to these overtures, nor permit the government of Bombay to do so. Scindiah considered this a breach of treaty; the supreme government thought so too, but were compelled to bow to the new act of parliament. The fierce Mahratta knew nothing of the parliament, but considered the English in India as a power which could not be bound to engagements, as when they became inconvenient or expensive, there were orders from home, from company, king, or parliament, which were made a pretext for violating such agreements. Tippoo and the Mahrattas fought it out, and the former was the conqueror. Scindiah was recalled to Poonah by the Peishwa, but refused obedience, and maintained ambitious wars on his own account. Pleading an especial treaty with the English, they reluctantly entered into an ambiguous agreement, promising aid to him as a Mahratta chief, but refusing to be compromised by his engagements with the Nizam. Thus complicated, during the government of Mr. Macpherson, were the connections of the English with the Mahrattas; while the latter by their own especial complications with the Mogul, the Sikhs, the vizier of Oude, and Tippoo, were involving the English in the meshes of an inextricable entanglement with native states, except so far as the judgment of Mr. Macpherson averted such confusion. This it was not in his power to do wholly, for the force of circumstances was too strong for him; but he showed much good sense and tact, and had considerable success in his measures to preserve peace, and keep the company free from the embroilments from

which none of the native states were long exempt.

The intrigues and activities of Scindiah continued; his quarrels were as widespread as India itself, and his fortunes were chequered:—"The vicissitudes of the different parties disputing for the last fragments of the Mogul empire were so sudden and incessant, that they baffled the keenest political foresight. Scindiah, after holding the power of prime minister for two years, was expelled from his office by a new combination of the Mogul chiefs. His army was defeated, and he himself obliged to fly to his own dominions. He was succeeded by various nobles, amongst whom was the infamous Gholam Kadir, by whom Shah Alem was deposed and blinded. This outrage brought Scindiah again to Delhi; but the consolidated power of the British rendered him less formidable than he had been. The Prince Juwan Bukht, after several vain attempts to engage Nawab Vizir and the British government to aid him, and after one unsuccessful effort, in 1787, to re-establish himself at Delhi by force of arms, returned to Delhi, and died suddenly in 1788."*

Amidst the general confusion and intrigues of native powers, the Sikhs at this time became prominent. While Mr. Anderson was at the camp of Scindiah, a person in the garb of a merchant came to his "Moolavee," and after offering to sell him some cloths, stated that he had rare jewels to show him in private. On withdrawing to examine the precious stones, the pretended merchant disclosed himself as a confidential messenger of Dooljah Singh, the Sikh chief. He stated that his prince was anxious for friendship with the English, as a protection against the ever-spreading encroachments of the Mahrattas. He informed Mr. Anderson that thirty thousand Sikhs were dispersed in various disguises between Pamput and Delhi, and ready to make a powerful demonstration at any well-concerted juncture. Mr. Anderson informed his government, which was anxious to avoid giving offence to the Mahrattas, and yet solicitous to avoid aiding by any indirect measure their progress. Mr. Hastings had foreseen that the great struggle in southern India, and in all India from Delhi to Madras, must ultimately be with them. He objected to any opposition to them, which by being premature, would impair the resources of the company, and consolidate the rival power. His successor was guided by these views, although he had never rendered to Mr. Hastings, an effectual or generous support in that or any other department of his policy. Ultimately a pacific solution of the jealousies

* Franklin's *Shah Aulum*, p. 159.

and differences between the Mahrattas and the Sikhs led to the latter placing five thousand horse at the service of the former, in case of any attack upon them by Tippoo.

Lord Macartney proceeded to Calcutta in June, 1785, on business connected with the pecuniary obligations of the Nabob of the Carnatic. While at Calcutta he learned that he had been nominated by the court of directors as the successor of Mr. Hastings. His lordship declined accepting the honour, although it was one he had long desired; and Mr. Macpherson as senior member of council, *ex-officio*, remained at the head of the government. The resignation of Lord Macartney led to the appointment of Earl Cornwallis, as governor-general, and Mr. Macpherson resigned the post which, as a *locum tenens*, he had so well filled. His administration was marked by the settlement of Penang as an English colony. The British cabinet recommended him to his majesty for a baronetcy. His services have been well summed up by Dr. H. Wilson in the following passage:—"With regard to Scindiah, the only important transaction that took place with him, was his demand on behalf of Shah Aulum, of the tribute due to the Mogul, to the amount of four millions sterling. The demand was civilly, but peremptorily resisted by Sir John Macpherson's government, not, as might be supposed from the loose manner in which it is alluded to in the text, by that of Hastings. The leading feature of Sir John Macpherson's administration, however, was the eminent success which attended his efforts to reduce public expenditure, and re-establish public credit. In a minute in the secret department, dated 15th December, 1785, it is stated that a comparison of the receipts and disbursements of the year ending 30th April, 1786, exhibit a deficit of about £1,300,000. The arrears due to the armies of the three presidencies, were about two millions. The ascertained Bengal debt alone, was about four millions. The troops at Madras and Bombay were in a state of utter destitution, and some of them in open mutiny, from the great amount of their arrears. In this situation, the government of Bengal declared itself responsible for the debts of the three presidencies. All remittances of cash from the collectors' treasuries, were prohibited, until the arrears of troops within or near their districts, had been discharged. All civil servants, civil surgeons, and uncovenanted servants, drawing more than 300 rupees per month, were to be paid their salaries and all their arrears, with certificates bearing interest at 8 per cent. per annum until cashed. All issues of paper, on account of the company,

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except the company's bonds, were ordered to be registered, the registry was to be published, and the paper was to be paid off in the order of its issue. The cash accumulating in the treasuries was to form a fund, by which the certificates and other paper were dischargeable; and under these arrangements, the governor-general and council publicly expressed their expectations, that 'all the paper in currency at the end of 1785, would be paid off in the course of twelve months, through funds derivable from the amount of the reductions made in the established charges of the government, aided by the effects of these regulations, and the additional resources to be derived from the upper provinces.' These measures were made known to the public by advertisement in the *Official Calcutta Gazette*, 29th December, 1785, and 15th January, 1786. The orders were followed up by subsidiary arrangements, which completely altered the aspect of affairs. 'Every man in the settlement,' observed a competent authority on the spot, 'witnessed the magical effects of this measure. It operated like a charm in restoring public confidence, which once secured, this moving fund acquired life and activity. At no remote period from the commencement of the plan, treasury certificates could raise cash in the market at a discount less than the legal interest of the money. I shall ever bear grateful testimony of the salutary relief from ruin, which the measure afforded to me, and to every trader in the settlement.*' In a letter to the governor of Madras, from the governor-general, dated 20th May, 1786, he writes, 'In our reductions of expense, which have been very great (25 lacs), £1,250,000, I shall have cold praise, and a thousand secret enemies.' He received, however, in November, 1786, the unanimous thanks of the court of directors, for his able administration of the affairs of India, and was raised by his majesty to the dignity of a baronet. It was during the government of Sir John Macpherson, that, by an amicable arrangement with the King of Queda, the valuable settlement of Penang, or Prince of Wales' Island, was added to the company's eastern possessions."

On the 12th of September, 1786, Earl Cornwallis landed at Calcutta, and immediately took charge of the government. His investigations of the condition of the revenue were prompt, and his report to the directors was, that the department was worked in a manner the most unsatisfactory. The company's paper was at a discount; the estimated

* Prinsep's *Proposal of a Substitute for Funding*, 1797.

and actual receipts of revenue were utterly discrepant, the former was stated as 92 lacs 59,000 rupees, but the actual receipt into "the khalsa" was calculated as 66 lacs 12,000 rupees. The debt was 6 crore 24 lacs, and bore interest at $8\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. per annum. A month after his assumption of government, his lordship declared that the expenses of the establishments of the presidencies absorbed the whole revenue, and that investments for trading purposes could only be made by issuing paper, which would increase the evil. The native chiefs had heard of the fame of the new governor, and many of them repaired to Calcutta to pay their respects. The vizier sent his minister, Hyder Beg Khan, Mohammed Reza Khan, the nabob Mobarek-ul-Dowlah, and the Shah-zada; each sought a personal interview.

Among the early communications of Lord Cornwallis to the directors, there were severe animadversions upon the condition of the company's army. Physically the natives were superior to the European recruits, according to his representations, and morally they were no worse, perhaps better. His lordship considered the loyalty of the sepoy doubtful.

In February, 1787, Sir Archibald Campbell, entered into a new and especial arrangement with the Nabob of the Carnatic for the defence of his territory. The nabob was to contribute "to the peace establishment," per year, nine lacs of rupees. In time of war, the company was to undertake the defence of the province, the nabob seeing to the payment of revenue. The great advantage of this arrangement was, that it prevented the divided councils and interests, which had previously, especially in time of war, so much embarrassed the relations of the company with the nabob. A treaty similar to the former was made by the same diplomatist with Ameer Singh, the Rajah of Tanjore.

These important treaties were followed by another, in July of the same year, with Asoff-ul-Dowlah, the vizier nabob of Oude. The noble earl at the head of the company's affairs, resolved that no interference with the internal affairs of the nabob's government should take place during his administration. His lordship forgave the vizier certain arrears due to the company, and urged upon him a more just administration of law in his dominions, and a system less oppressive to his people, pointing out, that from the contiguity of the territories, and the peculiar relations of the nabob and the company, oppression and injustice in Oude would endanger the security of that province, and thereby the territory of Bengal. In 1788 a treaty of commerce with

the vizier was effected on principles which both governments regarded as equitable and advantageous.

In 1788 Lord Cornwallis directed the attention of the company to the conduct and disposition of Tippoo, declaring that in case of a war in Europe between England and France, the latter power would be sure to ally itself with Tippoo, and as a consequence the Carnatic would once more be the theatre of a desperate and dangerous struggle. The Earl of Cornwallis felt convinced that a war between England and France was imminent, and his lordship knew that the intense desire of France to found an oriental empire was not diminished by former disappointment, disaster, and defeat. His lordship, on these grounds, intimated to the directors his purpose of watching Tippoo with unremitting vigilance. The governor-general was much engaged during the latter part of 1788, in negotiations with the nizam (or soubahdar) of the Deccan. Territory belonging to the English by treaty, was surrendered by his highness, and dubious passages in existing treaties settled and defined.

In July, 1789, an understanding was come to between the governor-general and the nizam, that a British contingent should be at the service of his highness, on condition that it should not be employed against any native state with which the company was at peace.

In 1788 Tippoo, aware that he was an object of jealousy and suspicion to the English, became peevish and affronted to their agents. He also acted in an aggressive way towards the rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore. He advanced towards the Malabar coast in a manner most menacing to the Travancore rajah, and instigated the Rajah of Cochin to claim the ground upon which "the lines of Travancore" were built. The Rajah of Travancore addressed a requisition for troops to the commander-in-chief of the British forces of Madras, upon hearing which, Tippoo retired upon Seringapatam. It was clear that the period rapidly approached when Tippoo and the English must try their relative strength once more upon the field of battle. Before, however, the trumpet of war summoned him to the scenes of strife, Earl Cornwallis had opportunity to devote his time to the adjustment of the "permanent settlement," in conjunction with the celebrated Mr. Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth. The measures of these two eminent persons required a number of years to mature. The arrangements for civil judicature, magistracy, and police, which ultimately gave an historical interest to the administration of Lord Cornwallis were discussed by him, and

the foundation laid for their execution in the interval of peace, which took place between the first symptoms of a renewed struggle on the part of Tippoo, and the bursting forth of the impetuous torrent of his hostility.

The hour at length arrived when war with Tippoo must be proclaimed, however reluctant the governor-general to proceed to extremities, however desperate the state of Indian finance, and notwithstanding the peaceful resolutions of the English parliament in 1784, in reference to Indian affairs, and the consequent instructions to Earl Cornwallis to avoid by all means complications which would lead to war.

The precise circumstances out of which the war arose are sufficiently set forth in the formal demands of Tippoo upon the Rajah of Travancore, and the reply of the rajah. The demands, however, were only pretexts on the part of Tippoo to cover designs of aggrandizement. He set up pretensions for the sake of blinding the English government as to his real wishes. In this he succeeded, so far as the Madras government was concerned, which recognised the justness of Tippoo's demands, without any investigation of the merits of the case. The supreme council, however, certified themselves of all the particulars, pronounced the demands of Tippoo unjust, and his allegations false. All the native states in Southern India took the same view. The supreme government also pronounced heavy censure upon the want of intelligence and the pusillanimity, indolence, and neglect of duty on the part of the Madras government, several of the members of which it was necessary to displace:—"Towards the end of October, 1789, the army of Tippoo was known to be encamped in the neighbourhood of Palgaut; and the rajah was confirmed in his expectation of an attack. On the 14th of December, Tippoo arrived at a place about twenty-five miles distant from the boundary of Travancore, and the ravages of his cavalry were carried within a mile of the wall. On the following day a *vakel*, a sort of character in which the capacities of a messenger and negotiator were compounded, arrived from the camp of the sultan, bearing a letter to the rajah. It contained the annunciation of Tippoo's demands: that, as the rajah had given protection within his dominions to certain rajahs, and other refractory subjects of the Mysore government, he should deliver them up, and in future abstain from similar offences. 2. That as the Dutch had sold to him that which was not theirs to sell, he should withdraw his troops from Cranganore. 3. That he should demolish that part of his lines which crossed the territory of Cochin, because it be-

longed to the kingdom of Mysore. The rajah replied: 1. That the rajahs of whose protection the sultan complained had obtained an asylum in his country, because they were his relations, at the distance of many years; that no objection to their residence had ever been taken before; that to prove his amicable disposition, they should nevertheless be removed; and that no refractory subject of the Mysore government had ever, with his knowledge, been harboured in Travancore. 2. That the fort and territory which he had purchased from the Dutch belonged to the Dutch, and was in no respect the property of the dependent of Tippoo. 3. That the ground on which he had erected his lines was ceded to him in full sovereignty by the Rajah of Cochin before that rajah became tributary to the sovereign of Mysore; and that the lines, existing at the time when he was included in the late treaty between the English and the sultan, were sanctioned by the silence of that important deed."*

The events which immediately followed are summed up with precision, and with admirable condensation by Mill:—"On the 24th of December Tippoo encamped at not more than four miles' distance from the lines; began to erect batteries on the 25th; early in the morning of the 29th turned by surprise the right flank of the lines, where no passage was supposed to exist; and introduced a portion of his army within the wall. Before he could reach the gate which he intended to open, and at which he expected to admit the rest of his army, his troops were thrown into confusion by some slight resistance, and fled in disorder, with a heavy slaughter, across the ditch. Tippoo himself was present at the attack, and, not without personal danger, made his escape.

"Intelligence of these events was received by the supreme government from Madras on the 26th of January; and on the morrow instructions were despatched to that presidency. The governor-general expressed his expectation that the Madras rulers had considered Tippoo as at war, from the first moment when they heard of the attack; that they had diligently executed the measures which he had formerly prescribed; and in particular, that all payments to the nabob's creditors, and all disbursements on the score of investment, had immediately ceased. He added, that his intention was to employ all the resources which were within his reach 'to exact a full reparation from Tippoo for this wanton and unprovoked violation of treaty.'"

The efforts of the governor-general to form especial alliances with the Mahrattas and with

* Mill; Thornton; Auber.

the Nizam of the Deccan became at once urgent. The Mahrattas were so powerful that it became absolutely necessary to engage them on the side of the English. A junction between the Mahratta states and Tippoo would have compelled the nizam (as the Soubahdar of the Deccan had become universally styled), to join the confederacy. With any amount of French aid, there could be but little hope of the English company, in the low state of its finance, being able to hold its own. The first serious victories gained by such an alliance would cause all the native states in India to make common cause against the British. The Mahrattas had been humiliated so recently by Tippoo in the field—such fanatical outrages in the name of Mohammed had been perpetrated upon Mahratta tribes by the orders, or direct cruelty of Tippoo, and so great had become his power, that the Poonah government was willing to pledge the Peishwa to alliance with the English. The nizam's wishes lay in the same direction; but he feared, such robbers were the Mahrattas, that they would invade his territory as soon as it was denuded of troops in the common cause. This delayed all action on the part of the government of Hyderabad. The nizam was willing to march at once against Tippoo, if Lord Cornwallis would guarantee his territory against Mahratta invasion. His lordship dared not do that, from fear of offending the power against whom the guarantee was demanded. His lordship's diplomacy was surrounded by difficult and delicate conditions, and rare courage and address were required to bring out the company's "raj" safe through elements so conflicting.

The noble earl at the head of the government succeeded in accomplishing all that was necessary in the relations which he established with these rival powers. When the tidings of his measures reached England, the court of directors passed resolutions of satisfaction. The house of commons, having demanded explanations from the board of control, and manifested generally displeasure that war under any circumstances should break out with Tippoo, received with satisfaction the answers given by the president of the board of control, and expressed their approbation by a vote on the 2nd of March, 1791, in the following terms:—

"Resolved, That it appears to this house that the treaties entered into with the nizam on the 1st of June, and with the Mahrattas on the 7th of July, are wisely calculated to add vigour to the operations of war, and to promote the future tranquillity of India, and that the faith of the British nation is pledged to the due performance of engagements contained in the said treaties."

A considerable party in parliament which did not object to the treaties, as contingent upon a war necessary and unavoidable, were of opinion that the war with Tippoo could have been averted, and wished to press parliament to a declaration to that effect. These movements arose from party opposition to the board of control, as a branch of the general government, on the part of some, and from jealousy of the East India Company, which always to a considerable extent existed in the commons. The result of the discussions which ensued were the following declarations:—

"Resolved, That it appears to this house, that the attacks made by Tippoo Sultan on the lines of Travancore on the 29th December, 1789, 6th March, and 15th April, 1790, were unwarranted and unprovoked infractions of the treaty entered into at Mangalore on the 10th March, 1784."

"Resolved, That it appears to this house, that the conduct of the Governor-general of Bengal, in determining to prosecute with vigour the war against Tippoo Sultan, in consequence of the attack on the territories of the Rajah of Travancore, was highly meritorious."

The governments of Madras and Bombay, which were most immediately concerned, were utterly unprepared for war. The council of Madras was full of apprehension, ready to submit to any terms Tippoo might dictate. Had it not been for the firm intervention of the supreme government, the honour and interests of the company would have been irredeemably compromised.

Sir Thomas Munro* thus noticed the helplessness of the Madras government, the feebleness of its measures, and the impolicy of the unpreparedness for war in which the presidencies most concerned then were. Sir Thomas wrote from Amboor in January, 1790:—"A second attack is daily expected, and if the king is left alone, all his exertions against a force so superior can delay but for a very short time his ruin. The English battalions were behind the lines, but not at the place attacked: and it is said they have orders not to act, even on the defensive. If such be the case, the rajah ought to dismiss them with scorn. The distinction made between recent acquisitions and ancient territory appears to be a subterfuge of government to cloak their dread of war under a pretended love of peace, for Cranganore was a fair purchase of the Dutch from the Rajah of Cochin, subject to an annual tribute of thirty-five rupees. Before we can assemble an army to face the enemy, Tippoo may be in possession

* Not to be confounded with Sir Hector Monro.

of Travancore. We have derived but little benefit from experience and misfortune. The year 1790 sees us as little prepared as that of 1780, and before the war. We shall commence the war under the disadvantage of a want of magazines. The distresses and difficulties which we then encountered from them, has not cured us of the narrow policy of preferring a small present saving to a certain, though future, great and essential advantage."*

Upon this letter, as illustrated by the events which followed, M. Auber thus remarks:—"Every word of this letter was almost prophetic. In the following spring Tippoo effected his objects. He subdued Travancore, laid waste the country, and took the fortresses of Cranganore and Jaycottah, possessing himself of all the northern portions of the province of Travancore. The conduct of the Madras government, during these proceedings, excited the strongest indignation in the mind of Lord Cornwallis. His lordship reprobated the supineness which they had manifested in making preparations to support the rajah, and adverting to the general state of the company's affairs on the coast, determined to take temporary charge of the government of Fort St. George, but relinquished his intentions on learning that General Meadows had been appointed to succeed Mr. Holland as governor."

General Meadows arrived on the 20th of February, 1790, and on March 31st, wrote the following despatch to the directors:—"I found things in that state of confusion that is generally attendant on a change of systems. Whether a civil or a military governor is best, I shall not take upon me to determine; but either is certainly better, I conceive, than neither or both. We have a long arrear both from and to us. His highness the nabob is so backward in his payments, so oppressive to his polygars, that at this time it is so necessary to have on our side, that I conceive it will be absolutely necessary, upon his first material delay of payment, to take the management of his country into your own hands: a measure, in spite of the opposition to it, so advantageous to you, the country, and even to his highness himself, when so wisely projected and ably executed by Lord Macartney. I came here at a most critical period, with many things of importance to decide upon in a less time than many prudent people would have thought necessary to decide upon one: but the approaching war with Tippoo was one of the most important. I heard and read all upon the subject a short time would allow of, and then adopted the plan laid down by Colonel Musgrave, which

* Private letters.

I thought the best, and which, from circumstances, it was very probable he would have to execute himself; for, in the present situation of the government, it is impossible I would leave it. I conceive the expense will be six lacs of pagodas a month, and can conceive anything but how or where we shall get the money, even stopping investments, &c. However unfortunate a war is, it should be made if possible short, brilliant, and decisive."

The suspension of the inefficient members of council, and the appointment of others in whom Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows had confidence, enabled the general before his despatch was sent away, to express his intention of leaving the government in the hands of the newly constituted council while he took the field against the enemy.

These letters of Sir Thomas Munro and General Meadows will make sufficiently clear to the reader the state of the English at Madras on the eve of the conflict in which they were once more destined to be conquerors.

The despatch of General Meadows gave great satisfaction to the directors, who entertained the highest confidence in the good sense and manly judgment of the general, as they also did in the statesmanlike qualities of Earl Cornwallis.

The war with Tippoo must occupy a separate chapter. It is in this only necessary to relate, that the preparations for bringing the Mysorean chief to subjection were on a large scale as compared with those attending other Indian wars. General Meadows placed himself at the head of fifteen thousand men, assembled in the Carnatic. His plan of operations was to march to Coimbatore, and afterwards to enter Mysore, while the Marhattas and the army of the Deccan operated upon the north of the Mysorean territory. General Abercromby, at the head of eight thousand men, was concentrated upon the Bombay frontier to invade the possessions of Tippoo in the Ghauts. The council of Madras delegated to General Meadows, as governor of that presidency and commander-in-chief of its armies, the power of directing and conducting the war, and authority to make treaties or stipulations with the polygars of the Carnatic, who upon Tippoo's frontier were disposed to join him, and such as upon the Travancore borders were at least hostile to the rajah. It was supposed that the nairs, especially certain of that order subject to Tippoo, could be induced to render the British an effectual support, and the governor had full authority conceded to him to enter into agreements with them.

The general joined his army on the 7th of May. "The centre army," as the despatches

call a force under Colonel Kelly, was ordered to take the field in July, to preserve the Carnatic itself from marauding and desultory incursions of the irregular Mysorean cavalry. In October, the command of this force devolved upon Colonel Maxwell, on the death

of the commander just named. At that time the arrears of revenue to meet the expenses of the war, amounted to twenty-two lacs of pagodas. Such were the preliminaries of another great war with a great native power in India.

CHAPTER XCIII.

WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN—SUCCESSSES OF COLONEL STUART—INVASION OF MYSORE—REVERSES OF THE BRITISH—INVASION OF THE CARNATIC BY THE SULTAN—SUCCESSSES OF THE BOMBAY ARMY ON THE COAST OF MALABAR—ALARM AT MADRAS AND CALCUTTA—ARRIVAL OF EARL CORNWALLIS AT MADRAS.

THE importance, political and military, of not permitting Travancore to fall under the dominion of Tippoo, must be obvious to the reader who studies its situation on the map of India, and observes its relative position to the territories then held by the Sultan of Mysore, and by the East India Company:—"The territory of the Rajah of Travancore commences near the island of Vipeen, at the mouth of the Chinnamangalum river, about twenty miles to the north of Cochin. From this point it extends to the southern extremity of India, bounded on the west by the sea, and on the east by the celebrated chain of mountains which terminate near the southern cape. The situation of this prince made a connection between him and the English of importance to both: he was placed at so great a distance that he had little to apprehend from the encroachments of the company; his country, which was only separated from their province of Tinnivelly by the ridge of mountains, formed a barrier to the invasion of an enemy into that province, and through that province into the Carnatic itself; the support of the company was necessary to preserve the rajah against the designs of such powerful and rapacious neighbours as Hyder Ali and his son; the productiveness of his dominions enabled him to contribute considerably to the military resources of the English; and, in the last war with Hyder, his co-operation had been sufficiently extensive to entitle him to be inserted in the treaty with Tippoo under the character of an ally. The descent of Tippoo, with an army, into the western country, filled the rajah with apprehensions. He was the only prey on that side of the Ghauts, opposite the dominions of Tippoo, which remained undevoured; and the only obstruction to the extension of his dominions from the Mahratta frontier to Cape Comorin—an extension attended with the highly-coveted advantage of placing him in contact with Tinnivelly, the

most distant and most defenceless part of the English possessions in Coromandel."*

The importance of the territory thus described, and the dangerous policy of Tippoo, having determined the English to make war, it was at once energetically prosecuted. Lord Cornwallis relied much upon his native allies. The Mahrattas had already proved themselves formidable enemies even against English armies, and the Nizam of the Deccan possessed numerous troops, and, as the representative of the Mogul, possessed a certain influence over the religious prejudices of Mussulmen in the south of India. The directors had, however, with more judgment, than their servants in India displayed when courting connection with the government of "the soubah" (as they were accustomed to call the nizam or soubahdar), pronounced the army of his highness a worthless rabble, and expressed astonishment that any reliance should be placed upon his troops. Yet it was well that the Mohammedan influence of the nizam should be on the side of the English, as Tippoo appealed to the fanaticism of the Mohammedans of Southern India in language naturally calculated to inflame it.† He gave himself out to be a descendant of Mohammed, as divinely inspired to restore the religion of that prophet, by destroying or proselyting all heathens and infidels. He was fired with the emulation of the great Saracen conquerors, who by the sword and the koran desired to subjugate all men. His seal had inscribed in Arabic upon its centre. "I am the messenger of the true faith." Round the seal in Persian verse was inscribed:—

"From conquest, and the protection of the Royal Hyder, comes my title of Sultan; and the world, as under the Sun and Moon, is subject to my signet."

Tippoo was the first Mohammedan prince

* Mill.

† Malcolm's *Political History of India*. Penhoen's *Empire Anglais*, vol. iv. p. 54.

in India who formally and openly disclaimed the authority of the great Mogul; and who impressed coin with his own effigy and titles.* This was the more singular as he was a fanatic of Islam, and the Mogul was the Padishaw of all true believers within the bounds of India. Tippoo probably reconciled the inconsistency, by his claim of descent from the prophet, and inspiration from God. Hyder Ali had certainly set his son an example of non-allegiance to the sceptre of Delhi; but the independence of the father, although real was not ostensible, and although avowed was never declared formally. It was fortunate that the English army, both of the company and of the crown, at that period serving in India, was in an excellent condition, and in some degree prepared to cope with emergencies.

The following representation of the state of the British troops by an officer well acquainted with the history of the period is correct:—"There were in India, in 1788, a regiment of British dragoons, nine regiments of British, and two of Hanoverian infantry, in all about eight thousand European troops, in addition to the company's establishments. Several of the first officers in the British service were in command in that country; and a system was established, which, by joining the powers of governor to those of commander-in-chief, united every advantage which could give efficacy to the operations of war. The discipline, which had lately been ordered by the king for establishing uniformity in his army, was now equally practised by his majesty's and the company's forces in India. The field equipment was refitted and enlarged at the several presidencies; and every preparation made to act with the promptitude and effect which unforeseen exigencies might require. Public credit, increasing with the security afforded to the country, and also in consequence of like able arrangements in the conduct of the civil line of the government, the company's funds rose daily in their value; and their affairs, as stated to parliament, by the minister at the head of the India department, were not only retrieved from supposed ruin, but soon appeared to be in a state of decided and increasing prosperity."†

In an army thus constituted and uniform, the commanders might well have confidence even against the well-trained and numerous hosts of the Sultan of Mysore. At no previous period had the company such a military force. For the first time the royal troops and those

of the company met in mutual good feeling and respect. Much of this resulted from the regulations which had been made a short time before, both in parliament and in the court of directors; much more, however, depended upon the impartiality and justice of Lord Cornwallis, who dealt equally by all, whether royal or company's soldiers, excluding all sinister influences, ignoring cliques at Calcutta, and simply doing what in his judgment was best for the army and the government. Lord Macaulay well observes, in reference to a very different man, "No man is fit to govern great societies who hesitates about disobliging the few who have access to him, for the sake of the many whom he will never see." Lord Cornwallis had this quality for governing great societies, as well as many other rare gifts. The neglect previously permitted to prevail in preserving the country in a proper state of defence was at last redeemed:—"The Carnatic, which had been the seat of the former, and would probably soon be the seat of a future war—at least the scene where our army must assemble, and the source whence it must be supplied—required extraordinary exertion of military arrangement, to prepare it for the operations of defensive or offensive war. To protect a weak and extensive frontier; to discipline a detached army; and to provide resources in a lately desolated country, fell to the lot of Sir Archibald Campbell. Skilled in every branch of military science; with knowledge matured by experience in various countries and climates; indefatigable in all public duties, and endued with a degree of worth and benevolence, which attached to him all ranks in the army, and excited voluntary exertion in every officer to second the zeal of his general, he had a task to perform, which, though great and complicated, was not beyond the reach of such distinguished talents. Granaries were established in the frontier and other stations in the Carnatic, containing supplies for near thirty thousand men for twelve months; and furnished in such a manner as to provide against the exigencies of famine or of war without incurring additional expense to the public; a complete train of battering and field artillery was prepared, surpassing what had ever been known upon the coast; a store of camp equipage for twenty thousand men was provided; the principal forts were repaired, and more amply supplied with guns and stores; the cavalry were with infinite difficulty completed to their full establishment; and a general uniformity of discipline and movement was established in the cavalry, infantry, and artillery."*

* Major Rennell's *Memoir of Tippoo Sahib*, p. 71.

† *Narrative of the Campaign in India, which terminated the War with Tippoo Sultan in 1792*. By Major Diroin, deputy-adjutant-general of his majesty's forces in India. London, 1798.

* *Narrative of the Campaign*.

Authorities differ as to whether Tippoo was prepared for the bold measures of the English. Finding, as he did, that the Madras government was timid and temporising—that at Bombay they considered the attack upon the lines of Travancore as not necessarily involving war with the British, he was surprised, it is alleged, when Earl Cornwallis treated that circumstance as tantamount to a declaration of hostilities against the East India Company. Other authorities give Tippoo credit for the nicest discrimination as to the characters of those with whom he had to do, and for having foreseen the course which things would take, for which he amply prepared himself.

The plan of operations by the army of Madras was determined by a report of Colonel Fullarton's, made after the previous war with Tippoo. The colonel averred that the most direct route from the Carnatic through the passes of the Ghauts, or the southern boundary of Mysore, was practicable. General Meadows resolved accordingly to ascend the Ghauts, and march upon Seringapatam. This route was more remote from Madras than that upon the northern boundary, through the Baramahl. The southern road, however, lay through a well-watered, grain-producing country, and where forage and cattle might be procured. General Meadows fixed his point of support at Coimbatore, and directed Colonel Stuart to begin hostile operations by attacking the forts in the low country before ascending the Ghauts. These strongholds could not have been left behind while entering the enemy's territory, and yet to reduce them must cause considerable delay, unless a small corps of the army could effect the purpose.

About thirty miles to the west of the basis of operations chosen by General Meadows, stood the strong post of Palgaut, which was considered as a bulwark opposed to an army advancing against Mysore in that direction. As Stuart marched to Palgaut, he encountered the first burst of the monsoon, which strikes that part of the peninsula with unexpended fury. It smote the British column: the country was laid under such a deluge as defied military operations; while the storm, as if wielded by the hand of a living foe, swept away the tents of the campaigners, dispersed their cattle, and all but utterly disorganized the force. Stuart arrived at Palgaut, and made formal summons for its surrender, which was all he could do at such a season. He returned to Coimbatore, and was thence dispatched to Dindigul in the south-east, a hundred miles distant from Palgaut. These long marches wearied the troops excessively, and many of the baggage animals died *en route*.

He soon found that his appliances for reducing Dindigul were insufficient. It was the custom of the British to neglect the proper means of reducing strong places, and to rely on the courage and physical strength of their men, reckless of the sacrifice of human life thus incurred. A very imperfect breach was made by the time that nearly all Stuart's ammunition was expended. He stormed this breach and was repulsed, notwithstanding the most desperate valour on the part of the troops. This display of daring intimidated the enemy notwithstanding their success, and being ignorant that the English were short of provisions, terms of capitulation were offered, which, of course, Stuart was glad to accept. When he arrived again at head-quarters, he was once more ordered to lay siege to Palgaut. The weather was now mild and radiant, and the earth was cooled by the monsoon; his army, therefore, made a rapid and healthful march against the object of their attack. Some delay was, however, created by the large train of heavy artillery which Meadows ordered to accompany the force, under the belief that a very considerable resistance would be offered. Such belief was unfounded. On the morning of the 21st of September, before all the batteries were opened, those of the fort were silenced after a feeble fire. The garrison surrendered, making only one condition, that they should be protected from the nairs in the British service, who were furious against Hyder for his recent persecutions of them.

While Colonel Stuart was thus occupied, General Meadows prosecuted with ardour and address his ascent of the Ghauts. The campaign conducted by that general has been severely criticised, and warmly defended. Probably the most impartial and clear account, in a brief compass, is that of an officer of engineers, and author of a history of British India—Hugh Murray, Esq. Having described the plan of operations by which the general reached the high table-land of Mysore, Mr. Murray says:—"A chain of posts along the rivers Caverry and Bahvany, namely, Caroor, Erood, Sattimungul, had been successively reduced; and the last of these, commanding the important pass of Gujelhutty, which opened the way into the heart of the country, was occupied by Colonel Floyd, with a force of two thousand men. By this arrangement the different corps were very ill-connected together; for General Meadows at Coimbatore was sixty miles distant from the division of Floyd, and thirty from that of Stuart. The second of these officers pointed out the danger of his situation, and the intelligence he had received that the enemy was collecting a great force to attack

him; but the commander paid no attention to this warning, and ordered the detachment to continue in its present position. The Mysore cavalry, under Seyed Sahab, had indeed, in their attack, been very easily repulsed, and even compelled to retire behind the Ghauts; still, this failure of the advanced guard under a pusillanimous chief afforded no ground to judge of what might be expected when the whole force under the sultan himself should be brought into action. Early in September his horsemen were seen in large bodies descending the Ghauts; and as, when crossing the Bahvany at different points, they endeavoured to surround the handful of English and sepoys, the latter soon felt themselves in a very critical situation. They nevertheless made a gallant defence, and the enemy, having entangled their columns in the thick enclosures which surrounded the British position, were charged very effectually with the bayonet, and several squadrons entirely cut off. The Mysoreans, however, still advanced with increasing numbers, and opened a battery, which did great execution among the native soldiers; yet these mercenaries stood their ground with great bravery, saying—‘We have eaten the company’s salt; our lives are at their disposal.’ They accordingly maintained their position, and Tippoo thought proper to withdraw during the night to the distance of several miles: but the casualties had been so very severe, and the post proved so untenable, that Colonel Floyd considered it necessary in the morning to commence his retreat, leaving on the field three dismounted guns. The sultan, at the same time, having mustered his forces, began the pursuit with about fifteen thousand men, and after mid-day overtook the English as they retired in single column. The latter, repeatedly obliged to halt and form in order of battle, repulsed several charges; yet, as soon as they resumed their march, the Indians hovered round them on all sides. They were compelled to abandon three additional guns, and their situation was becoming more and more critical, when some cavalry being seen on the road from Coimbatore, the cry arose that General Meadows was coming to their aid. This report, being favoured by the commander, was echoed with such confidence through the ranks, that though Tippoo had good information as to the real fact, he was deceived, and withdrew his cavalry. Colonel Floyd was thus enabled to prosecute his retreat towards the main army, which had already marched to meet him, but by a wrong road; so that the two divisions found much difficulty, and suffered many hardships, before they could rejoin each other. The English, in the course of

these untoward events, had lost above four hundred in killed and wounded; their plans for the campaign had been deranged; the stores and magazines formed on the proposed line of march lay open to the enemy, and were therefore to be removed with all speed. General Meadows, notwithstanding, resumed offensive operations, and had nearly come in contact with the army of the sultan; but this ruler, by a series of manœuvres, evaded both him and Colonel Maxwell, then stationed at Barmahl, and by a rapid march descended into the Coromandel territory.”

Tippoo menaced Trichinopoly, but being desirous to make a wide circuit of devastation in a short time, he wheeled to the north, and ravaged the Carnatic. His mode of procedure was similar to that of his father, when the latter marched to Madras, but either being poorer or more politic, instead of wasting all in his course by fire, as Hyder did in a large portion of his progress, levied “black mail,” and so successfully, that he realized a considerable augmentation of his stores and treasury. The opposition which he met was nearly as slight as that which his predecessor experienced, when English power was less, and the Madras presidency not so capable of resisting an invasion. Tippoo approached Pondicherry, and negotiated with the French; but their orders from home at that time were peremptory, to come to no terms with him hostile to the English. This disheartened Tippoo, who had already encountered a desperate resistance at Thiagar, from a British officer of talent named Captain Flint, the same who in the previous war had met him with such gallant warfare at Wandiwash.

General Meadows, who in single actions fought with skill, and was industrious and brave, was not equal to the complicated movements of a campaign on so wide a theatre, and in so difficult a country. He was in fact out-generalled by Tippoo, and was at this juncture reduced to great straits. Neither his courage nor activity failed him, but he still talked of offensive operations when he was not able, with the force left at his command after disasters so numerous and so recent, to defend the Carnatic.

The campaign against Tippoo had proved unsuccessful. The British were compelled to resign their footing in the territory of the sultan, while he, descending from his highlands, negotiated with their rivals under the walls of Pondicherry, reduced the English garrisons of the Carnatic, and caused alarm at Madras itself. Meadows had still a fine body of men under his command, but they were not concentrated, were not strategically well situated, and were, numerically, so

inferior to the forces of Tippoo, that their very existence was in jeopardy.

During the progress of these events General Abercromby, at the head of the Bombay army, effected too little to influence the results of the campaign. When Tippoo was before Pondicherry, engaging a Frenchman to go on a mission to the court of Louis XVI. for troops, whom he was ready liberally to subsidize, Abercromby was busy on the coast of Malabar. His activity there was of importance to the second campaign, so soon about to commence, but was not effectual either in relieving Meadows, retrieving his reverses, or preventing the descent of Tippoo upon the coast of Coromandel.

On the 14th of December Abercromby took Cannanore. His previous delays enabled him to put his army in fine condition, so that the whole coast of Malabar was swept by his troops, every fort and place of arms belonging to the enemy surrendering at discretion, while Tippoo was equally triumphant on the eastern shores of the peninsula. The victories of Abercromby were not so influential upon the war as those of Tippoo. The Malabar coast was not so important a theatre of action as that of Coromandel.

When tidings of these things reached Calcutta, the supreme council and the governor-general were much alarmed. Earl Cornwallis still entertained the highest respect for the gallant Meadows, and for his capacity on a limited sphere of action, or as second in command; but he did not feel justified in any longer entrusting the military

conduct of the war to him. The tidings of occurrences on the Malabar coast did not reach Calcutta until a considerable time after the desperate state of the Carnatic was known there. Lord Cornwallis feared that under the influence of the reverses which had befallen the British, the nizam, or the Mahrattas, perhaps both, might make separate peace, and abandon the alliance. No confidence could be placed in their professions at the outset of the war; and as no prospect seemed to exist of the conquest and dismemberment of the country of Tippoo, it was not unlikely that they would not only give up their English ally, but join the sultan in his invasion of the English territory.

As early as the 29th of January, 1791, Lord Cornwallis arrived at Madras with six battalions of Bengal infantry, under Colonel Campbell, and a large supply of ammunition and military stores, with heavy guns. He immediately assumed the command of the Madras army, and lost no time in preparing everything for a new campaign. After consultation with the Madras council and his officers, he resolved upon a plan of campaign different from the former, except in the main purpose of somewhere ascending the Ghauts with the chief force at his disposal, and carrying the war into the Mysorean country. He ordered General Meadows to join him, and so energetic and prompt was his lordship's conduct of affairs, that within a week after he landed in Madras, he took the field. The second campaign will form the subject of a separate chapter.

CHAPTER XCIV.

SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIPPOO SULTAN—LORD CORNWALLIS ASSUMES THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY—HE ENTERS MYSORE—FORCES THE LINES OF SERINGAPATAM—LAYS SIEGE TO THE CITY AND FORTRESS—IS OBLIGED TO RAISE THE SIEGE—GENERAL ABERCROMBY COMPELLED TO RETIRE—SUFFERINGS OF LORD CORNWALLIS'S ARMY.

THE policy of Tippoo towards the English was supposed by the governor-general to depend upon the aid which he received from the French. It was presumed by the British commander that, at all events, Tippoo's mode of conducting the war would depend upon the prospect of the co-operation of a French force in the Carnatic. The sultan was determined, with or without the French, to sustain a war, in which he had been so far successful; for he believed that the defensive power of Mysore was such as to baffle all the efforts and sacrifices which the East India Company could make to conquer it, while its

geographical position and character were such as would enable an energetic sultan, with military talent, at any time to invade and plunder the low-lying lands of the English on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts. He believed that a very moderate amount of French aid in officers and men, especially in the engineer department, would enable him to conquer Madras, which he felt confident would be followed the next season by the conquest of Bombay. The sultan even boasted, that with ten thousand auxiliary French he would march across the country, and burn or retain Calcutta.

The first purpose of the general was to elude Tippoo, leaving him in the Carnatic to do his worst there, and ascend the Ghauts before the sultan could either intercept him or perceive his plan. For this end his lordship marched to Vellore, and made as though pressing for Amboor, *en route* to the passes nearest and opposite to Madras. Tippoo, astonished and alarmed by tidings to this effect, which the English took care to have conveyed to him, disposed his resources to prevent the accomplishment of what he presumed must be the intention of the British chief. Had Lord Cornwallis purposed to adopt that plan, the rapidity of his movements, and the suddenness of his departure from Madras, would probably have enabled him to do so in spite of Tippoo; but in that case the sultan would have hung upon his rear, and he would have been embarrassed in his march. Tippoo was very unwilling to leave the vicinity of Pondicherry, until he had secured the co-operation of the French, and was thus led to make delay which he was unable afterwards to redeem. He was also less prompt to move, because he had a large force of light cavalry, in which he knew the English were deficient, and he concluded that he could easily outmarch them, and intercept them at a moment sufficiently opportune to prevent their marching through the passes, towards which he supposed they would proceed from Amboor. The English commander, however, by a sudden detour to the right, and marching with great celerity for four days, came upon the northern pass of Moogler. There a body of the enemy was posted as a guard, but they were without any suspicion that an English force was near them, and were surprised, many were slain or captured, and the remnant were routed. By another rapid march of four days, the English general placed his army on the high plains of Mysore. The suddenness of his appearance there struck terror to the foe. Messengers arrived at the head-quarters of the sultan, informing him of these feats of generalship, which filled him with greater consternation than even the presence of an English army in the centre of his patrimonial territory.

Tippoo, leaving all his conquests in the Carnatic, hurried with so much rapidity as to throw his army into disorder, and ascended the Ghauts by the passes of Changana, and Policode. He seemed bewildered, acting on no plan, his rapidity was that of panic, not of generalship. Notwithstanding his celerity of march, he expended time on matters of inferior motive, and personally attended to the removal of his harem from Bangalore, when he ought, at the head of his army, to

have hung upon the flanks of his invading enemy. The English laid siege to the fortress of Bangalore on the 5th March. Thus, in one month, by marches and manœuvres worthy of a general, Tippoo was obliged to evacuate the Carnatic, his country, guarded so strongly by nature, was penetrated without resistance, and a powerful British force sat down before the second city in his dominions.

The English began their operations against the place with the utmost vigour, but various misadventures on the part of Lord Cornwallis's officers against the army of Tippoo, which harassed the English flanks, caused serious loss in men, and very great loss of horses, many of which were captured or stabbed by the irregular troops attending the sultan's army:—"Another enterprise, which proved somewhat hazardous, was the carrying of the fortified town of Bangalore, a place of very considerable extent and importance. It was surrounded with an indifferent wall, but the ditch was good, and the gate was covered by a very close thicket of Indian thorns. The attack was made, too, without any due knowledge of the ground; and the soldiers, both in advancing and in endeavouring to force an entrance, were exposed to a destructive fire from turrets lined with musketry. Colonel Moorhouse, one of the most accomplished soldiers in the service, received four wounds, which proved fatal. At length, when the gate was almost torn in pieces, Lieutenant Ayre, a man of diminutive stature, forced his way through it, and Meadows, who preserved an inspiring gaiety in the midst of battle, called out, 'Well done! now, whiskers, try if you can follow and support the little gentleman!' On this animating call, the troops dashed into the town; though its great extent rendered the occupation difficult. Tippoo likewise threw in a strong corps, which renewed the contest, opening a heavy fire with small arms; but when the English betook themselves to the bayonet, they drove the enemy with irresistible fury through the streets and lanes, and soon compelled them to evacuate the pettah. Our loss, however, amounted to one hundred and thirty-one."

The fortress was breached on the 21st. It was not in a condition to be stormed, but the energy of Tippoo seemed to have returned, and he was making such prodigious exertions for the relief of the place, that it was deemed necessary, even at a great sacrifice, to capture the stronghold as speedily as possible. The commander-in-chief, after consulting with his officers, ordered the assault to be made that night. This was good generalship. The enemy had no expectation that the night following the day on which an im-

perfect breach appeared, an assault would be attempted; not a man in the fortress entertained such an idea. The night was bright with all the beautiful clearness of tropical moonlight, so that the breach could be distinctly seen from the lines, and the dusky sentinels of the sultan pacing to and fro on the battlements. The signal for attack was a whisper along the ranks from the front of the assaulting column to the rear. They were ordered then to advance in silence, and with rapidity. At eleven o'clock the column advanced, treading lightly along the covered way, and then emerging with a rush, they planted the ladders, and the forlorn hope was within the place before the enemy were aroused to their danger. The drums of the sultan beat to arms, the killidar leading his troops rushed to the post of danger, but the English had already driven in troops posted near the breach, and spreading to the right and left around the wall, penetrated the place. A fierce hand to hand encounter ensued, but the English had learned from their chief the advantage in war of promptitude and celerity, and poured in, charging with the bayonet, and strewing their way with slaughtered enemies. The governor and the defenders fought bravely but vainly, the bayonets of the English like a torrent of steel swept all before them, and in a very short time the place was mastered.

Tippoo received the intelligence with despair, and even with stupor. He had expected the assault some days later, and was prepared with a stratagem to raise the siege at the period when his spies should announce to him that the storm was to take place. The suddenness of Lord Cornwallis's movements perpetually disconcerted his plans, and rendered useless his superior numbers and great resources.

The capture of Bangalore strengthened the governor-general every way, but he did not find there such supplies of provisions and forage as the exigencies of his army required, and the deficiency of his supplies of this nature from all sources now became serious. Instead of advancing upon Seringapatam, the sultan's capital, he was obliged to proceed northward on a gigantic foraging expedition, and also in the hope that the rear-guard of what the nizam called his army might arrive, which, as it was sure to plunder the country in its course, would be well supplied, and part freely with those supplies for money. Ten thousand horse made their appearance, as was expected. The astonishment and disappointment of the English general could not be suppressed when he beheld this force. Unacquainted with Indian warfare, and with the natives of

Southern India, his excellency had formed no conception of the sight which now met his eyes. Wilks, the historian of the Mahrattas, amusingly describes them thus:—"It is probable that no national or private collection of ancient armour in Europe contains any arms or articles of personal equipment which might not be traced in this motley crowd. The Parthian bow and arrow, the iron club of Scythia, sabres of every age and nation, lances of every length and description, matchlocks of every form, and metallic helmets of every pattern. The total absence of every symptom of order and obedience, excepting groups collected round their respective flags, every individual an independent warrior, self-impelled, affecting to be the champion whose single arm was to achieve victory." These wild heroes had neither provender nor provisions. The governor-general ordered them to relieve the harassed light horsemen of his army on the outposts, but they took no notice of the duties imposed on them, and engaged themselves altogether in plundering the enemy, when on outpost duty, and stealing from their allies when in camp.

The condition of the English now became truly alarming. Tippoo had laid waste the country. No supplies could be obtained. The governor-general determined to advance upon the capital, and by one bold stroke, if possible, frustrate his enemy and end the war. He had no carriage, and from this circumstance the march assumed a singular aspect. The troops, officers, and men, suttlers, followers, women, and even children, carried the ammunition. Swarms of camp followers, and nairs, each carrying a cannon-ball, exhibited an aspect of earnestness and oddity such as no army before probably ever displayed. "The British army marched over the barren heights above the valley of Millgotah, and there commanded a view of the mighty fortress of Seringapatam,—the nest of hewn stone, formidable even in the eyes of the British soldier, where Tippoo had brooded over his ambitious designs, and indulged his dreams of hatred in visionary triumphs over the strangers who had so lately imposed a yoke on Asia. Nature and art combined to render its defences strong. An immense extended camp without the walls, held the flower of the sultan's troops."*

Tippoo prepared to abandon his capital, or at all events, to remove his treasures and his harem to Chittledroog, a place built upon a towering rock supposed to be impregnable. The mother of the sultan, and some of his wives, upbraided him for his want of spirit,

* *History of British Conquests in India*, vol. i. p. 185. By Horace St. John.

reminded him that such a movement would alarm his people, and with stinging reproaches urged him for once to give battle to the English upon the open field, and by his resolution and numbers overwhelm them. He selected a position with good military judgment, and prepared to occupy it with obstinacy. Drawing up his fine army on a range of heights above the Cavery, upon an island in which Seringapatam stood, he thus placed himself between his capital and his hitherto conquering enemy, and dared the issue. Lord Cornwallis made a skilful movement against the left flank of his opponent. Tippoo threw up redoubts on precipitous hills, which covered that part of his position, and as his army was numerous, he could spare men to occupy all those outposts in strength. The guns of the sultan commanded in every direction the approaches of the English, while the nature of the ground over which they must march to storm the heights was so broken by natural and artificial inequalities, that the English could not silence the fire of the Mysoreans, nor adequately cover their own advance. Through all difficulties, in spite of the most terrible cannonade, midst showers of rockets, and confronted by deadly ranges of small arms, the English reached their enemies, steel to steel, and dislodged them from every eminence. Every rocky elevation was the scene of a separate conflict. With the same steady advance over crag and ravine, up the steep acclivity, and through the fiery flight of the enemy's missiles, the English pressed their unremitting way, occupying each post only when clashing bayonets and sabres had, with brief and decisive execution, closed the mortal strife. The enemy fled at last for shelter under the walls of the strong city. Five hundred British lay upon the slopes and summits of the contested ridges. The enemy perished in far greater numbers. This was accounted for by the mode in which the British fought. As the lines of flashing bayonets crested the well defended hills, they were lowered with quick precision, and searched with sure and sanguinary aim the over-crowded masses of the enemy. Then from the summits so well won, the English musketry poured a deadly fire upon the fugitives, who fell fast until pursuit could add no victims to vengeance, or glory to victory.

The deficiency of food for the men, and of any kind of fodder for the cattle, rendered it impossible for the British commander to remain long enough before Seringapatam to capture it. To retreat seemed almost as difficult. It was only possible by the sacrifice of all his baggage and stores, and of his splendid battering-train. His lordship

has been criticised severely by some for advancing at all against the capital, where he knew the resources of Tippoo were concentrated, in the state of destitution as to supplies of his army. It has been explained by some on the ground of the reasonable alarm entertained by his lordship of the immediate action of the French on the side of Tippoo. Intelligence of the French revolution had reached the governor-general, he apprehended that war between France and England would once more involve India in its vortex, and that the Carnatic would be, as before, the necessary theatre of battle. Under these exciting apprehensions, it has been said that his lordship acted with a precipitancy in beginning his march upon Seringapatam from Bangalore, out of keeping with his usual coolness of judgment. At all events, the hour for retracing his steps arrived. The fine material of his army was abandoned or destroyed, and a retreat commenced, in which his men, wearied and hungry, fell back reluctantly from before a foe they had vanquished, and just when the prize appeared within reach.

His lordship was not only obliged to retreat himself, but to countermand those forces which were hastening with all speed to his support. In the last chapter the successes of General Abercromby, on the Malabar coast, were noticed as contemporaneous with the campaign of General Meadows, and a part of the latter's plan of operations. When Lord Cornwallis began his march from Madras, Abercromby was directed to operate from the low lands of Malabar, and, if possible, ascend the Mysore country, so that it would be taken, as might be said of an army, on both flanks at once. Abercromby met with an ally who facilitated his enterprise. The people of Coorg were the enthusiastic enemies of Tippoo, on account of his civil oppressions and religious persecutions. Their youthful rajah, after a long captivity, had lately contrived to effect his return. The greater part of his subjects were groaning in exile; but in the depth of the woody recesses there was still a band of freemen, who rallied round him with enthusiastic ardour. By a series of exploits, that might have adorned a tale of romance, the young prince recalled his people from the distant quarters to which they had been driven, organized them into a regular military body, drove the oppressors from post after post, and finally became undisputed ruler of Coorg, expelling the Mohammedan settlers who had been forcibly introduced. A common interest soon united him in strict alliance with General Abercromby, who thus obtained a route by which he could transport his army, without opposition, into the elevated plain.

The conveyance of the heavy cannon, however, was a most laborious task, as it was often necessary to drag them by ropes and pulleys up the tremendous steeps, which form on this side the declivity of the Ghauts. At length the general had overcome every difficulty, and was in full march to join Lord Cornwallis, when he received orders to retreat, which, in this case too, could be effected only by the sacrifice of all the heavy artillery.

At this juncture the Mahrattas were advancing in another direction. Purseram Bhow and Hurry Punt, two of the chiefs of that strange people, were very earnest in the war. They took the field early in the campaign, but were impeded by obstacles which delayed their course in a manner honourable to themselves. The strong fortress of Durwar, garrisoned by some of the best soldiers of Tippoo, lay in the line of the Mahratta march. There were two battalions of the company's sepoys with this force, and with their aid the Mahrattas believed that they could take the fortress—an operation most unsuitable to the military tactics of those tribes. The siege was conducted in a manner so absurd and dilatory that protracted operations were necessary. The fortress held out from December 1790 to June, 1791, and then only surrendered because the Mahratta cavalry made the blockade so strict that the besieged could obtain no provisions. The terms of surrender were not observed by the Mahrattas, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the English officers who accompanied them.

While Lord Cornwallis's army was in full retreat, the men dropping down dead from sickness, fatigue, or hunger, a body of cavalry appeared, and beyond them, in the distance, vast clouds of dust arose, as if a numerous army were on its march. The English had just made their formation for encountering the supposed enemy, when a grotesque horseman advanced slowly, and with confidence. He was identified as a Mahratta. He was one of the advanced guard of the army of Purseram Bhow and Hurry Punt. Great was the joy of the wearied, and famished soldiery, and of their brave and skilful, but sorely afflicted chief. On came the Mahrattas, as clouds drifting upwards from the horizon before the rising storm. Squadron after squadron of wild cavalry—hardy, seasoned-looking warriors—swept on over the devastated and trampled plain; and at last the British sepoys, in their compact infantry order, thoroughly officered, and appearing in the finest state of efficiency, defiled before the governor-general. The British met one another with cheers, for which even the faint and the famishing in the army of Madras found a

voice. The singular looking hosts of troopers brandished their swords, shook their lances, and curvetted their well-fed steeds. Had the governor-general but known that such an army—well supplied, as a Mahratta army always was—was hastening to his aid along the steeps from the north, he would have held his position before Seringapatam, and the glory of Mysore had sunk suddenly as the eastern sun sinks at evening. Tippoo's irregular horse had intercepted all communication, and the governor was ignorant that the Mahrattas had pierced the passes of the Mysorean Ghauts. Had he known so much, he would not have countermanded the advance of General Abercromby; had that general received intelligence which might have been communicated to him seaward of Madras, if at that presidency pains had been taken to organize a system of procuring and communicating intelligence, he would have continued his march. The English, notwithstanding the frequent failures of their plans from similar deficiencies, were still characterised by their want of alert and active vigilance. The arrival of the Mahrattas was a means of relief only to those who had money to buy what these allies possessed in abundance, but his lordship made such arrangements as procured supplies of necessaries for his whole camp. "As soon as these auxiliaries arrived, the scarcity in the cantonments of the English, which previously amounted almost to famine, ceased, so far as they were willing to pay the enormous prices that were extorted from their necessities. Every article abounded in that predatory host: it exhibited 'the spoils of the East, and the industry of the West,—from a web of English broad-cloth to a Birmingham penknife; from the shawls of Cashmere to the second-hand garment of the Hindoo; from diamonds of the first water to the silver ear-ring of a poor plundered village maiden;' while 'the tables of the money-changers, overspread with the coins of every country of the East, gave evidence of an extent of mercantile activity utterly inconceivable in any camp, excepting that of systematic plunderers by wholesale and retail.' These allies, moreover, introduced the commander to a most useful class of men, the brinjaries or grain-merchants, who, travelling in large armed bodies with their wives and children, made it their business to supply all the militant powers of Hindostan. They distributed their corn with the strictest impartiality to all who could pay for it; and the general, now amply supplied with funds, was no longer exposed to want, and easily obtained a preference over Tippoo, whose pecuniary resources were beginning to fail."

Notwithstanding the relief thus opportunely obtained, the governor-general did not deem it practicable to retrace his steps to the scenes of his recent conquests. His battering train having been lost, a fresh one had to be procured from Madras before he could hope to besiege Seringapatam. Other necessary supplies of military material were also necessary, in place of those which had been destroyed preliminary to the retreat.

Rest was now absolutely necessary for the army of Lord Cornwallis. Nearly all the cattle had died, either from overwork, or an epidemic disease which quickly destroyed them, and caused them to putrefy almost immediately after death. This caused sickness in the camp, which was much increased by the starved followers eating the putrid flesh. Small-pox, so common and so fatal in the East, made great havoc. The store of rice was to a considerable extent wasted, or embezzled by the native drivers and servants. The supplies which the Mahrattas sold at so high a price were rapidly vanishing. Safe communications were opened with Madras, and the wearied army, as it rested, awaited with zeal, as well as obedience, the day when, with recruited force, it might again march against the boasted capital of Mysore. While these events were passing, and indeed as soon as the junction with the Mahrattas was formed, Tippoo became anxious to negotiate. On the 27th of May he sent a flag of truce, accompanied by numerous servants and a bushel of fruit, and a letter in Persian soliciting peace. The flag and the fruit were returned the next morning, much to the gratification of the troops. An answer to Tippoo's letter was also sent, "acquainting him that the English nation would agree to no peace which did not include their allies; and if he meant to negotiate, he must in the first instance deliver up all the British subjects who were prisoners in his dominions, and consent that a truce should take place, until his proposals could be considered and the terms adjusted. The fruit was returned in the same manner as it had been sent; not as an insult, but merely to show that his lordship declined even the appearance of friendly intercourse with the sultan. In the army it was understood that Tippoo, finding he could not treat separately with the English, and seeing that he had another season to try his expedients for disuniting the confederacy, as well as to prepare for his defence, replied to his lordship, by asserting that he had no British subjects detained prisoners in his country since the former war, and that he would not agree to a truce."*

* *Review of Lord Cornwallis' Second Campaign against Tippoo.* By Major Dirom.

It was of great consequence to the success of another campaign that a good understanding should be established with the Mahrattas. This Lord Cornwallis succeeded in accomplishing before he dispatched General Meadows, Colonel Stuart, and others of his superior officers, on different expeditions. The Mahrattas were a people of great military pride and quick sensibilities; they were also vindictive, and, like most oriental people, fickle in their policy. Any ill-will springing up between them and the British troops would perhaps have been productive of irremediable mischief. A want of respect to their chiefs on the part of the governor-general would have sent the whole host away, or have caused them to make separate terms with Tippoo. Yet, if the governor-general had paid their chiefs any undue deference, or appeared to depend upon the alliance as a *sine quid non* for conducting the war with Tippoo, they would have at once assumed the air of conquerors or superiors, and become as troublesome as Tippoo himself. Lord Cornwallis had but little experience of oriental peoples, and that which he knew of the natives of India was confined to the neighbourhood of Calcutta previous to this campaign. He had, however, the mind of a statesman, with such superior natural taste and judgment as qualified him in an eminent degree for intercourse with orientals, especially in the transaction of political business. When the Mahrattas formed their junction with the British, they pitched their tents at some distance; and Lord Cornwallis had to consider with what ceremonial his interview with the leaders of this army should be associated. The following graphic picture was given by an eye-witness, the deputy adjutant-general of Lord Cornwallis's army, Major Dirom:—

"On the 28th May, the army fell back towards Milgottah, where the Mahratta armies were to encamp; and, to prevent discussion and delay on points of ceremony, Lord Cornwallis proposed to meet the Mahratta chiefs at tents pitched midway between the Mahratta and the British camps.

"Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by General Meadows, their staff, and some of the principal officers of the army, went to the tents at the hour appointed, which was one o'clock; but the chiefs, who consider precision as inconsistent with power and dignity, did not even leave their own camp till three, though repeated messages were sent that his lordship waited for them. They at length mounted their elephants, and, proceeding as slow and dignified in their pace as they had been dilatory in their preparation, approached the place of appointment at four o'clock, escorted by

several corps of their infantry, a retinue of horse, and all the pagentry of Eastern state. The chiefs, on descending from their elephants, were met at the door of the tent by Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows, who embraced them, and, after some general conversation, retired to a private conference in another tent.

"Hurry Punt, about sixty years of age, a Brahmin of the first order, and the personage of greatest consequence, is said to be the third in the senate of the Mahratta state. His figure is venerable, of middle stature, and not corpulent; he is remarkably fair, his eyes grey, and his countenance, of Roman form, full of thought and character.

"Purseram Bhow, aged about forty, stands high in military fame among the Mahrattas. He is an active man, of small stature, rather dark in his complexion, with black eyes, and an open animated countenance, in which, and his mien, he seemed desirous to show his character of an intrepid warrior. His antipathy to Tippoo is said to be extreme; for the sultan had put one of his brothers to death in a most cruel manner, and Hyder's conquests to the northward fell chiefly upon the possessions of his family, which he lately recovered by the reduction of Darwar. Hurry Punt was destined to be the chief negotiator on the part of his nation; each commanded a separate army, but the Bhow was to be employed more immediately in the active operations of the field.

"The chiefs themselves, and all the Mahrattas in their suite, and indeed all their people, were remarkably plain, but neat, in their appearance. Mild in their aspect, humane in their disposition, polite and unaffected in their address, they are distinguished by obedience to their chiefs, and attachment to their country. There were not to be seen among them those fantastic figures in armour so common among the Mohammedans, in the nizam's, or, as they style themselves, the Mogul army; adventurers collected from every quarter of the East, who, priding themselves on individual valour, think it beneath them to be useful but on the day of battle, and, when that comes, prove only the inefficiency of numbers, unconnected by any general principle of union or discipline.

"The Mahrattas of every rank seemed greatly rejoiced in having effected this junction, and considered it a happy omen, that this event should have taken place at Milgotah, a spot so renowned in their annals for the signal victory gained by Madharow in 1772, in which he completely routed and dispersed Hyder's army, and took all his cannon. Many of the chiefs and people who had

served with that general were now in these armies; but they had since felt the superiority of the forces of Mysore, and were impressed with such an idea of Tippoo's discipline, and his abilities in the field, that they were not a little pleased in having joined the British army, without having occasion to try their fortune singly with the sultan. They all showed great eagerness to hear the news, and to know the reason of our having burst our great guns. On being told of the victory of the 15th of May, and of the subsequent necessity of destroying the battering train, from want of provisions, and not knowing of their approach, they partook in the joy and grief we had experienced on those events; and seeing that we considered the late defeat of Tippoo as a matter of course, and that we looked forward with confidence to the capture of the capital, they expressed themselves to the following effect:—"We have brought plenty—do you get more guns—we will feed you, and you shall fight." The conference between the generals and the chiefs broke up between five and six o'clock, apparently much to the satisfaction of both parties."

The officer, who gave the description just quoted, presents also an animated picture of the military habits of our ally. It has been already related that two sepoy battalions were attached to the Mahratta forces. These regiments belonged to the Bombay army. The chiefs always placed the British infantry in front, so that they served as a picket to the Mahratta camp. Indeed, the only measure taken specifically to guard against surprise, was that those infantry regiments were thrown out in advance, encamping always in that advanced position. Cavalry was spread in detachments far on the rear and flanks of the army, to secure plunder or cover the arrival of supplies. These, without exercising any especial vigilance, would be soon able to detect an advancing enemy. Major Dirom expresses great surprise at the artillery appointments of our ally:—

"The gun carriages, in which they trust to the solidity of the timber, and use but little iron in their construction, are clumsy beyond belief; particularly the wheels, which are low, and formed of large solid pieces of wood united. The guns are of all sorts and dimensions; and, having the names of their gods given to them, are painted in the most fantastic manner; and many of them, held in esteem for the services they are said to have already performed for the state, cannot now be dispensed with, although in every respect unfit for use. Were the guns even serviceable, the small supply of ammunition with which they are provided has always effectually

prevented the Mahratta artillery from being formidable to their enemies.

"The Mahratta infantry, which formed part of the retinue that attended the chiefs at the conference, is composed of black Christians, and despicable poor wretches of the lowest caste, uniform in nothing but the bad state of their muskets, none of which are either clean or complete; and few are provided with either ammunition or accoutrements. They are commanded by half-caste people of Portuguese and French extraction, who draw off the attention of spectators from the bad clothing of their men, by the profusion of antiquated lace bestowed on their own; and if there happens to be a few Europeans among the officers and men, which is sometimes the case, they execrate the service, and deplore their fate.

"The Mahrattas do not appear to treat their infantry with more respect than they deserve, as they ride through them without any ceremony on the march, and on all occasions evidently consider them as foreigners, and a very inferior class of people and troops. Indeed the attention of the Mahrattas is directed entirely to their horses and bazars, those being the only objects which immediately affect their interest. On a marching day, the guns and the infantry move off soon after daylight, but rarely together; the bazars and baggage move nearly about the same time, as soon as they can be packed up and got ready. The guns and tumbrils, sufficiently unwieldy without farther burden, are so heaped with stores and baggage, that there does not seem to be any idea of its ever being necessary to unlimber, and prepare for action on the march. As there are no pioneers attached to the Mahratta artillery to repair the roads, this deficiency is compensated by an additional number of cattle, there being sometimes a hundred, or a hundred and fifty bullocks, in a string of pairs, to one gun: the drivers, who are very expert, sit on the yokes, and pass over every impediment, commonly at a trot. The chiefs remain upon the ground, without tents, smoking their hookahs, till the artillery and baggage have got on some miles; they then follow, each pursuing his own route, attended by his principal people; while the inferiors disperse, to forage and plunder over the country.

"A few days after the junction of the Mahratta armies, an irregular fire of cannon and musketry was heard in their camp between nine and ten at night. The troops immediately turned out in our camp, and stood to their arms, thinking that Tippoo had certainly attacked the Mahrattas; but it proved to be only the celebration of one of their ceremonies,

in which they salute the new moon, on its first appearance."

Another circumstance occurred soon after, also characteristic of their customs and discipline:—"The ground on which our army had encamped at the junction, being bare of grass, and extremely dirty, Lord Cornwallis was desirous of marching; and sent to the Mahratta chiefs, to request they would move next morning, as their camp lay directly in our route. They returned for answer, 'that they should be happy to obey his lordship's commands; but, as they had halted eight days, it was not lucky, nor could they, according to the custom of their religion, march on the ninth day.' His lordship gave way to their superstitious prejudice, and deferred his march."

The allies moved on the 6th of June to the north of the Mysore, towards Nagamangala. Purseram Blow had established a post and depot there. From thence they marched eastward to Bangalore. The objects of these marches were to enable the Mahrattas to withdraw in safety the posts they had established on their line of march; to subsist the allies at the expense of the enemy; to cause Tippoo to consume the provisions which he had laid up for the defence of the capital.

The Mahrattas marched tumultuously, and seemed to depend upon the vigilance and discipline of the English against surprise, the very service which the English had expected from the numerous Mahratta irregular horse. Those horsemen were most active, but not so much as the eyes of the grand army, as independent corps, conducting all sorts of irregular and eccentric expeditions on their own account. They captured some of Tippoo's elephants, and minor convoys. They waylaid his cavalry scouts, and boldly fell upon them when a chance of success was opened. This was of importance to the English, whose horses were much reduced by travel and insufficient fodder.

Earl Cornwallis had much difficulty in keeping the Mahratta chiefs in good humour, each affecting the bearing of a sovereign prince. It was also most difficult for him to form plans of military co-operation with them. New battering trains were soon sent from Madras and Bombay, money came from Calcutta, provisions were found by the Mahrattas, but horses and oxen to draw the guns and stores could not be procured by any amount of payment. By ingenious arrangements with officers, especially those in command of battalions, Lord Cornwallis "relieved the bullock department," as the deputy-adjutant-general of the army expressed it. Camels were purchased by individual officers in their

zeal for the public service; and the whole army was animated by an enthusiastic desire to make up somehow every deficiency of equipment. The only supplies issued to the British sepoy were rice, salt, and arrack; the European soldiers had cattle and sheep for slaughter, in addition to rice and small rations of corn. The British commander, like the great Duke of Wellington many years afterwards in the Spanish peninsula, became a sort of grain merchant to supply his troops, and with equal success. Captain Read, an officer well versed in the languages of Southern India, and possessing a remarkable talent for organization, made arrangements with the grain merchants on a gigantic scale, and by trusting to them in fair and open market, treating them justly, and paying the value for their commodities, the English army received regular supplies. The Mahrattas by plunder barely provided for themselves, while the nizam's forces could neither supply their wants by purchase or plunder.

After the reduction of various forts, the army came in sight of Bangalore. Captain Read succeeded in meeting it with a convoy of brinjarries (or corn merchants), having ten thousand, or as some writers of the time affirmed, twelve thousand bullock-loads of rice and grain. Here Lord Cornwallis received intelligence of the favourable views which were entertained in England of his conduct in waging and conducting this war. He also received despatches informing him that half a million sterling was voted by the company to replenish his exchequer, and that large reinforcements of troops, especially artillery, were on their way out. From Cal-

cutta, he heard that bullock draught was preparing for his service, and a despatch from Vellore informed him of the arrival there, from Bengal, of one hundred elephants and twenty-five bullocks. Thousands of coolies arrived with provisions on their own speculation, so that supplies became abundant. The army was thus encouraged and their noble commander, confident of victory, communicated by sympathy his confidence to his troops.

A new disposition of forces occurred in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, with a view to protect the arrival of supplies to the allies, cut off supplies from Tippoo, and secure sufficient support for such vast bodies of men, troops, and camp-followers. Colonel Duff, whose name became afterwards so much identified with the peoples and countries of Southern India, took charge of the artillery, and prepared a battering train for service once more at Seringapatam. He had rendered invaluable aid to the army in the same way on its previous advance to the Mysorean capital.

The approaching period of the monsoons rendered an advance upon Seringapatam impossible. The grand army, under Lord Cornwallis, kept open its communications with the Carnatic, to secure the arrival of guns, ammunition, and stores. To ensure this important end, it was necessary to secure the pass of Palicodé, and that could only be accomplished by the capture of Ousoor, a fortified place which commanded it. This was the first operation of the army of any magnitude after the junction of the triune forces, and, as it may be considered as the beginning of the third campaign, is reserved for a separate chapter.

CHAPTER XCV.

WAR WITH TIPPOO: THIRD CAMPAIGN—EARL CORNWALLIS CONQUERS OUSSOOR—REDUCES THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF MYSORE, AND ADVANCES TO THE FORTIFIED LINES OF SERINGAPATAM.

ON the 15th of July the army moved from the cantonments of Bangalore towards Ousoor. This part of the country had not as yet been made the theatre of war, and the inhabitants were engaged in attention to their fields. The landscape was beautiful in its variety of aspect, fertility, and careful cultivation. Rich foliage crowned the knolls and hill-tops, as the ground undulated or rose in bolder eminences. The elevation of the region gave coolness, yet it basked in all the glorious light of the Indian sun.

The seventh brigade reached Ousoor under Major Gowdie. On the appearance of the British the enemy abandoned the place, attempting unsuccessfully to blow it up before commencing their flight. A large store of grain and powder rewarded the march of the British brigade. The fall of Ousoor was very dispiriting to Tippoo; he regarded it as strategically of great importance, and his orders were to strengthen and defend it to the uttermost. Previous to the arrival of Major Gowdie, the English prisoners were murdered

by express order of Tippoo, notwithstanding remonstrances by the governor, and solicitations for mercy from the inhabitants. Like his father, the sultan delighted to shed the blood of defenceless enemies. The various hill-forts in the neighbourhood surrendered, or were taken, and the English held the important pass, by which their stores and convoys were chiefly to arrive during the remainder of the campaign.

About the middle of August, Tippoo, having consented to treat with the allies jointly, instead of separately, as was his policy, sent a vakeel to Ousoor. This person, Apogy Row, was well known to the English, having in the previous war also acted the part of a negotiator. He would not open his credentials without certain ceremonies, which were evidently designed for delay, and he was, therefore, not permitted to enter the camp.

By the end of the month of September twenty-eight thousand bullocks were provided in the Carnatic for the use of the army. The laborious and expensive preparations in cattle, material, and carriage equipment, of which Tippoo had ample information by his spies, alarmed him more than the actual presence of numerous armies on the high table-land of Mysore. He was convinced that the English were in earnest, and had ample means to sustain a new and protracted campaign. Yet such was his hatred to the British, a feeling inherited from his father, and provoked by their shameless violation of treaty, that he preferred risking his all in conflict with them, to opportune concession.

During the remainder of the autumn the British were engaged in various directions, but chiefly to the north-east of Bangalore, in reducing forts, and cutting off communications with the country from the sultan's headquarters. His lordship in this way found means of employing the army honourably, and with great detriment to the enemy.

The country of Tippoo was studded with "droogs," fortified hills, or rocks. Some of these were exceedingly precipitous. Nature had provided Mysore with bulwarks of defence, and Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan knew how to make them available. Among these Nundroog was one of the chief, and was held by one of Tippoo's most trusted officers. There was only one of the faces of the rock which was accessible, and that only under circumstances of difficulty almost constituting the impossible. This portion of the crag was defended near the summit by a double wall. An English detachment commanded by Major Gowdie, under the direction of General Meadows, formed approaches on the steeps, built batteries, and dragged up cannon. In twenty-

one days two breaches were opened. General Meadows himself led the assault. A night of soft clear moonlight, such as guided the forlorn hope so swiftly through the newly-formed breach at Bangalore, favoured the English. The assailants suffered hardly any loss from the fire of the enemy; the steepness of the ascent brought them inside the range, but huge masses of granite were rolled down, which hurled away many of the English in their descent, so that ninety men were lost before the breaches were attained. Then sword to sword, high up on that moonlit summit, a fierce encounter took place in the gaping chasms made by the English guns. Thirty English fell in the breaches; these once carried, the enemy struggled no more, and Meadows, sword in hand, like a volunteer subaltern, entered at the head of the stormers. It was one of the most gallant feats ever performed by Englishmen, and by an English general.

Colonel Stuart attacked Savendroog, which had been of equal importance with Nundroog, but which, during the siege of the latter, was so strengthened, that Tippoo's officers considered it impregnable. It was battered, breached, and stormed in twelve days without a man being lost on the side of the conquerors. Outdroog was surrendered after a feeble resistance, so great was the panic created by what were considered, previous to their accomplishment by the English, impossible feats. Kistnagherry town was burned; the droog of that place was attempted by a *coup-de-main*, but the attack failed. Tippoo, perceiving the moral effect of these exploits, determined upon a bold attempt to countervail them. He led an expedition southward, and suddenly attacked Coimbatore. The garrison capitulated on terms which respected their liberty; Tippoo violated the capitulation, and sent the whole garrison prisoners to Seringapatam with every conceivable indignity, and many cruelties. Tippoo probably considered that even if ultimately defeated, he might execute vengeance upon such men as he could get into his power, the English in the former war having shown such indifference to the fate of the prisoners he had murdered, when they came to terms of peace. Tippoo was not able to effect much more than the reduction of Coimbatore.

Before the month of October had far advanced, the supplies of men and money arrived from England, including two companies of Royal Artillery, under Major Scott. Three hundred seasoned troops also arrived from St. Helena. These troops endured the climate of India better than those which came directly from England. While from the presidencies

of Bengal and Madras reinforcements and supplies were poured in on one side of Mysore, the reinforcements which arrived from England at Bombay were organized, and ready to ascend the Ghauts on the other side.

While these events occurred, Tippoo sent a strong force into the Baramaul, which endangered the British convoys. Lord Cornwallis ordered Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell, at the head of a strong infantry brigade, to co-operate with some Mahratta irregular cavalry to clear that country. The chief work of this brigade was the reduction of forts, which the enemy feebly defended; but in every case where opportunity was afforded, they acted with treachery and cruelty. By the end of November, Colonel Maxwell performed his mission, but not without having sustained one serious repulse and heavy loss in officers and men.

While these events were transpiring, the Bombay army, under General Abercromby, was engaged in active operations. That officer, as seen in the last chapter, had been ordered by Lord Cornwallis to retreat. He returned to Tellicherry from Bombay early in November, bringing with him drafts on service, recruits, and a battering train. On the 23rd of the month this force marched from its cantonments, and assembled at Cannanore. Earl Cornwallis ordered General Abercromby to proceed upon the same plan as in the previous campaign. That officer accordingly marched on the 5th of December to the Pondicherrim Ghaut, and on the 7th crossed the river at Illiacore, this river being navigable to within two miles of the place which the general selected for the passage of his army, so that the heavy guns and stores were brought up to that point. From Illiacore the ascent of the ghaut was steep and rugged. Deep ruts had been formed by torrents during the previous monsoon. It was necessary to repair the road, that the guns and baggage might be brought up in safety, and thus considerable delay was occasioned. The English officers and soldiers were much impressed by the grandeur of the route, the bold mountain towering to the heavens, its steeps clothed thickly with forest, the views of the country beneath, and of the distant sea, presenting the richness and variety peculiar to oriental scenery. Having surmounted the difficulties of the ascent near Illiacore, the army had a long march of twenty-six miles through a wooded, partly undulated, and partly abrupt country to Pondicherrim, where the ascent of the great hill offers the grand impediment to an army. The number and strength of the trees peculiar to the Indian forest furnished means for affixing ropes to pull up the heavy guns and the store carriages.

Leaving the Pondicherrim Ghaut, the army pursued its toilsome way over thirty miles of wooded, rocky, picturesque, and most difficult country, to the foot of the Sedaseer Ghaut. At this point the services of the Rajah of Coorg became available, as in the previous advance, and much facilitated the march of the army, not only by supplies of food, but by the warlike and vigilant co-operation of a brave people. Having penetrated the range of successive ghauts, the Bombay army encamped on the plains of Mysore, where it awaited the period for co-operation with the grand army. General Abercromby's force consisted of four European regiments, eight battalions of sepoys, four companies of artillery in four brigades, amounting to nearly nine thousand good soldiers. Here it is necessary to leave the army of Abercromby until other events are related.

When, in July, the necessity of procuring subsistence compelled the allied armies to separate, the Mahrattas, with a Bombay contingent, under Captain Little, proceeded from the neighbourhood of Bangalore in the direction of Sera and Chittledroog. The country being fertile, the Mahratta commander, Purseram Bhow, selected it for his sphere of operations. Captain Little, at the head of the Bombay native contingent serving with his army, made for himself much distinction. One of the most sanguinary pitched battles of the war was won by him, and siege was laid to Scooly-Onore by the end of December. On the second of January the place capitulated.

Purseram Bhow was elated with his successes, which were chiefly due to Captain Little and his Bombay sepoys. The Mahratta, therefore, instead of joining General Abercromby's army, went in an opposite direction, disarranging the comprehensive plan of the campaign, and hazarding the success of the war. When "the blow" ought to have been with Abercromby, so as to make the Bombay army unassailable, and secure the safety of his own, he was at Bidenore, unable to effect anything bearing upon the grand scope of the campaign.

Tippoo, alarmed by the rapidity of the Mahratta movements, and the enterprises which Captain Little had directed, detached Cummer-ud-deen Khan in the direction of Bidenore. The bhow became alarmed in turn, and, desisting from his designs on Bidenore and other cities in its vicinity, retired from before the corps of the khan, and, yielding to the stern letters of Lord Cornwallis and Hurry Punt, directed his course towards Seringapatam, to take his place in the military array formed against that city.

The khan, emboldened by the retirement of the blow, from terror, as he supposed, of his superior prowess, performed various exploits with his cavalry, making long marches and effecting several surprises. A strong body of Mysorean horse penetrated into the Carnatic, committed extensive devastation, reached the neighbourhood of Madras, exciting much alarm, and were only repelled after all the Europeans had volunteered to go out against them. The council, always timid, although often rash, was of course panic-struck. The agriculturists all around Madras deserted their fields.

While these military movements were taking place, the English navy inflicted much injury upon the enemy's strong places on the coast of Malabar. Commodore Cornwallis, Captains Byron, Sutton, Troubridge, and Osborne attacked various coast fortifications belonging to Tippoo, assisted in the conquest of Cannanore, and captured Fortified Island, at the mouth of the Onore river. The French had sent out store-ships from their settlements for Tippoo's service, under protection of their own frigates, although the two nations were then at peace. The English commodore stopped one of these convoys. The French commodore fired two broadsides without any previous declaration or warning of hostile intent; the result was an action, in which the French were severely punished, and their frigate captured.

On the 14th of January, 1792, the various bodies of the grand army, with the exception of that belonging to the nizam, formed a junction in the neighbourhood of Outredroog. On the 25th of January, the advanced guard of the nizam's army was seen approaching, and Lord Cornwallis proceeded out to meet it. The allied armies marched next day, and on the 27th reached Hooleadroog. In the previous June that place had been conquered by the British. After the retreat of Lord Cornwallis, the Mysoreans again took possession of it, and strongly fortified it. The town was small, but the fort was considered inaccessible to assault; nevertheless, the killidar (governor) surrendered to Colonel Maxwell upon summons.

Lord Cornwallis posted a garrison at this place, and assembled all his forces in its vicinity. After such preparation as was necessary, his army moved forward towards the capital. Tippoo had no well-founded hope of defending his provinces; but in his obstinacy and determination he had resolved to defend the city to which his father had given so much fame as the seat of his government. Tippoo believed that it was strong enough to resist the allied arms of Hyderabad, Poonah, and Madras, and he counted upon

the exhaustion of their resources in the siege, which would necessitate a disastrous retreat, lead to dissension among the allies, another invasion of the Carnatic by himself, and the siege—perhaps capture—of Madras. With aid from the French and from the Sultan of Turkey, he believed he could expel the English from the shores both of Malabar and Coromandel; that the nizam and peishwa would be glad to make separate terms, and that his supremacy would be recognised in the peninsular portion of India. As the Emperor Nicholas of Russia, at a much later period, believed that Sebastopol would exhaust the resources of the great powers of Western Europe which besieged it, so Tippoo concluded that the allied powers of Southern India would pour out fruitlessly their blood and treasure before Seringapatam, so as to ensure him an ultimate and complete conquest.

Lord Cornwallis had succeeded in gaining the confidence of the governments of Hyderabad and Poonah, and in uniting in his plans the generalissimos of the armies of these states. He exercised, therefore, virtually, the supreme direction of the armies, and was enabled to carry out his plans of action without opposition. His resolution was to march at once upon Seringapatam. Hooleadroog was established as an advanced post, being ten miles nearer the grand object than Outredroog, and from which the allied armies, now finally assembled, were to commence their march, for the second attempt upon the enemy's capital.

Before proceeding upon the final struggle and grand issue of his enterprise, Lord Cornwallis was desirous of affording the nizam and the Mahratta chiefs, a view of his army in its full strength and array of war. Those personages appeared highly pleased with the compliment which his lordship proposed to confer, but did not seem to contemplate the utility of forming an intimate acquaintance with the discipline, equipment, arrangement, and component peculiarities of an ally's troops. They thought it a fine opportunity for displaying their own elephants, their personal pomp and glory, and for impressing upon the minds of the English troops, ideas of the greatness of the native sovereigns and commanders associated with them in the field.

On the 31st of January, the British troops were ordered under arms, for review by the nizam and the Mahratta chiefs. The noble earl, and General Meadows, proceeded to meet the princes and generals of the allies to the right of the English line.

The following graphic description of what followed, was given by the only officer present, who, acquainted with all the facts, thought proper to describe their occurrence:—

"The camp was pitched in a valley close to Hooleadroog, and, from the nature of the ground, could not be in one straight line, but was formed on three sides of a square, with a considerable interval, on account of broken ground, between the divisions, which were thus encamped each with a different front. The reserve, consisting of the cavalry, with a brigade of infantry in the centre, formed the division on the right of the line, and the two wings of the infantry formed the two other divisions of the encampment; the battering train being in the centre of the left wing fronting Hooleadroog. The extent of the line, including the breaks between the divisions, was above four miles. The prince, the minister, Hurry Punt, and the tributary Nabobs of Cuddapu and Canoul, who had accompanied Secunder Jau from Hyderabad, were on elephants richly caparisoned, attended by a numerous suite of their best horse, and preceded by their chubbars, who call out their titles; surrounded, in short, by an immense noisy multitude. The prince was in front, attended by Sir John Kennaway, on an howdered elephant, near enough to answer such questions as might be asked by his highness respecting the troops. On his reaching the right of the line, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired from the park, while the cavalry, with drawn swords and trumpets sounding, received him with due honours as he passed their front. He returned the officers' salute, and looked attentively at the troops. The 19th dragoons, of which they had all heard, attracted their particular notice as they passed the corps of the reserve. Having seen a regiment of Europeans, besides the dragoons in the first division, the chiefs were not a little surprised to find a brigade of three regiments, on proceeding a little farther, in the centre of the second division. They had passed the sepoys at rather a quick pace, but went very slow opposite to the European corps, and seemed much struck with their appearance. The troops all in new clothing, their arms and accoutrements bright and glittering in the sun, and themselves as well dressed as they could have been for a review in time of peace: all order and silence, nothing heard or seen but the uniform sound and motion in presenting their arms, accompanied by the drums and music of the corps, chequered and separated by the parties of artillery extended at the drag-ropes of their guns. The sight was beautiful even to those accustomed to military parade; while the contrast was no less striking between the good sense of our generals on horseback, and the absurd state of the chiefs looking down from their elephants, than between the silence

and order of our troops, and the noise and irregularity of the mob that accompanied the Eastern potentates. After passing the right wing, the road leading through some wood and broken ground, the chiefs, on ascending a height, were not a little astonished to discover a still longer line than the two they had passed, and which, in this situation, they could see at once through its whole extent. But for the battering train, which occupied a mile in the centre of this division, at which they looked with wonder; but for the difference of the dress and music of the Highland regiments in the second European brigade, and the striking difference of size and dress between the Bengal sepoys in the right, and the coast sepoys which they now saw in the left wing; but for these distinctions which they remarked, such was the extent of ground which the army covered, and the apparent magnitude of its numbers, that the chiefs might have imagined a part of the same troops were only shown again upon other ground, an expedient not unusual among themselves, whenever they have it in view to impress strangers with a false idea of the strength of their forces. It was five o'clock before the chiefs reached the left of the line, when, having expressed themselves highly gratified with all they had seen, they accompanied Lord Cornwallis to his tents. After a short visit, and fixing the time and order of their march for the following day, they returned about sunset to their own camps."

The same author, from his official knowledge, gives the following account of the march:—

"On the 1st of February, the allied armies commenced their march from Hooleadroog in the following order:—The English army moved off as usual, at daybreak, in three columns. Firstly, the battering guns, tumbrils, and heavy carriages on the great road, formed the centre column. Secondly, the line of infantry and field-pieces, on a road made for them at a distance of a hundred yards or more, as the ground required, marched parallel to the battering train, and on its right, that being the flank next to the enemy. Thirdly, the smaller store carts and private baggage carts marched in like manner, on a road to the left of the battering train, beyond which was the great mass of baggage, carried on elephants, camels, bullocks, and coolies, all the servants of the army, and families of the sepoys. This immense multitude on the baggage flanks, was prevented from going ahead of the columns by the baggage-master and his guard, and was flanked, giving it a space of several miles which it required, by the part of the cavalry not on other duties,

and the infantry of the reserve. The advanced guard was formed of a regiment of cavalry, the body guards, and the detail of infantry for the pickets of the new camp. The rear-guard was formed of a regiment of cavalry, and the pickets of the old camp, and did not move till they saw the baggage and all stores off the old ground of encampment.

"In this manner the line of march was shortened to one-third of what would be its extent if confined to one road; and, from the component parts of the army being thus classed and divided, the whole moved on with as much ease as if the battering train only had been upon the march. The heavy equipment of the army, great guns, store carts, provision and baggage, thus formed a mass of immense breadth and depth, guarded in such manner on all sides, that on no quarter could the enemy approach the stores or baggage without opposition from some part of the troops on the march. The armies of the allies, which were not mixed in our details, followed, as is their custom, at a later hour, and without any disposition for their defence."

The army, after successive marches, arrived before Seringapatam. The enemy's horse hovered upon the flanks, and offered considerable opposition to the advanced guard. Tippoo appeared disposed to dispute the passage of the river Madoor, but Lord Cornwallis having reinforced the advanced guard with a brigade of infantry, the enemy, after a show of resistance, dispersed, laying waste the country, and retiring upon the main army. Ascending high ground on the opposite banks of the Madoor, the British had a magnificent landscape, rich alike in fertility and variety, spread before them; far away on every side patrols of the enemy's horse were in observation, and the flame and smoke of burning villages and homesteads appeared along the whole horizon. The route now taken was different from that along which the army had advanced to the first attack of Seringapatam, and it was also different to that upon which Lord Cornwallis had retired; the troops were thus enabled to form a more extensive acquaintance with the country, which afforded the Europeans a lively pleasure; as compared with the low country beneath the Ghauts, it was alike beautiful and temperate.

The last march of the allies was made on the 5th of February, and lay over the barren hills to the north-east of the capital. From the line of route, the valley beneath was frequently spread out to view in all its extent; the proud city, with its cupolas, palaces, and fortifications, was distinctly seen; and beneath the walls in numerous lines were ranged the tents of the sultan's troops. Every step

the army advanced, the irregular cavalry of Tippoo harassed it; regular troops appeared on the flanks, and threw fiery showers of rockets. The advanced guard was obliged frequently to halt and draw up in line of battle. As the allies advanced, the impediments offered by the enemy increased, and when at last it reached the place of encampment, the quartermaster-general, his assistants and guards, were placed in imminent danger while marking out the ground. The line chosen for the encampment lay across the valley of Milgotah, and was parallel to that of the sultan, at a distance of six miles. The encampment of the allied armies was divided by a small stream, called the Lockany river, which, taking its rise from the lake below Milgotah, runs through the valley into the Cavery. The British army, forming the front line, its right wing reached from the river along the rear of the French rocks to a large tank which covered that flank of the line. The park and the left wing extended from the other side of the river to the verge of the hills which the army had crossed on their last march. The reserve, encamped about a mile in the rear, facing outwards, left a sufficient space between it and the line, for the stores and baggage. The Mahratta and the nizam's armies were also in the rear, somewhat farther removed, to prevent interference with our camp. The encampment of the confederate army was judiciously pitched at such distance from Seringapatam, and so covered by the French rocks in front of its right, as to prevent immediate alarm to the enemy, either from its proximity or apparent magnitude. The first night in which the allies lay before Seringapatam, they were disquieted by the activity of the enemy's cavalry, and the Deccan troops were much alarmed by flights of rockets which came perpetually among their tents. This alarm continued long after it was proved that more confusion than danger ensued from these missiles. The English took no notice of them, but their scouts stealing out and concealing themselves behind the crags which were scattered round, brought down with musket shots many of their foes.

On the 6th of February reconnoitering parties were out to examine the enemy's lines. From the left, Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell and his attendants had a clear although rather remote view of the sultan's camp. The following description of it was given by one of the staff of the British army:—"On both sides of the river, opposite to the island of Seringapatam, a large space is inclosed by a bound hedge, which marks the limits of the capital, and is intended as a place of refuge to the people of the neighbouring country from the

incursions of horse. On the south side of the river this inclosure was filled with inhabitants, but that on the north side was occupied only by Tippoo's army. The bound hedge on the north side of the river includes an oblong space of about three miles in length, and in breadth from half a mile to a mile, extending from nearly opposite to the west end of the island to where the Lockany river falls into the Cavery. Within this inclosure the most commanding ground is situated on the north side of the fort; and, besides the hedge, it is covered in front by a large canal, by rice fields, which it waters, and partly by the winding of the Lockany river. Six large redoubts, constructed on commanding ground, added to the strength of this position, one of which, on an eminence, at an ead-gah or mosque, within the north-west angle of the hedge, advanced beyond the line of the other redoubts, was a post of great strength, and covered the left of the encampment. The right of Tippoo's position was not only covered by the Lockany river, but beyond it by the great Carrighaut Hill, which he had lately fortified more strongly, and opposite to the lower part of the island, defends the ford. The eastern part of the island was fortified towards the river by various redoubts and batteries, connected by a strong intrenchment with a deep ditch, so that the fort and island formed a second line, which supported the defences of the first beyond the river; and when the posts there should be no longer tenable, promised a secure retreat, as from the outworks to the body of a place. Tippoo's front line or fortified camp, was defended by heavy cannon in the redoubts, and by his field train and armystationed to the best advantage. In this line there were one hundred pieces, and in the fort and island, which formed his second line, there were at least three times that number of cannon. The defence of the redoubts on the left of Tippoo's position was intrusted to Syed Hummeed and Syed Guffar, two of his best officers, supported by his corps of Europeans and Lally's brigade, commanded by Monsieur Vigie. Sheik Anser, a sipadar or brigadier of established reputation, was on the great Carrighaut Hill. The sultan himself commanded the centre and right of his line within the bound hedge, and had his tent pitched near the Sultan's Redoubt, so called from being under his own immediate orders. The officer is not known who commanded the troops in the island; but the garrison in the fort was under the orders of Syed Sahib. The

sultan's army certainly amounted to above five thousand cavalry, and between forty and fifty thousand infantry. Ever since the junction of the Mahratta armies, Tippoo, seeing he could not continue to keep the field, had employed his chief attention, and the exertions of the main body of his army, in fortifying this camp, and improving his defences in the fort and island."

The hostile armies were now in presence of one another on the grand theatre of action. The stake for which they contended was high. The defeat of the allies must result in a disastrous retreat, in which they would be obliged to separate, and would be attacked and beaten in detail; or, if the British succeeded by their skill and boldness in forcing their way against all attempts to cut them off, they would reach Madras with terribly diminished numbers. General Abercromby's army might be unable to make good its retreat, and would be exposed to the chance of attack unsupported by the army of Mysore. On the other hand, if the sultan suffered defeat, all was lost. He had but two chances left; one was in the great strength of his fortified camp, the other in that of the city and fortress of Seringapatam. He reasonably calculated that the only portions of the allies who would dare to storm his fortified camp would be the British, and that even if they succeeded, their army must be so reduced in numbers by the conflict as to render it impossible for them to prosecute a siege of the fortress, and he would then assail and defeat the native armies in the open field. Should the French render him assistance, he would then be enabled to conquer the Carnatic, and carry his arms also along the western coast. He expected that a great battle of artillery would take place before his fortified lines, which would lessen the numbers of the English, while his cavalry harassed and wearied out the Mahrattas and the troops of the nizam. His hopes were that the lines of his fortified camp would prove too strong for his enemies, and that the campaign would terminate in his favour without siege being laid to the capital itself. Thus both parties looked forward to the struggle as one of vast magnitude and consequence, and awaited with eager and anxious suspense the moment when the terrible tournament of the nations and powers of Southern India should meet in the concussion of deadly conflict which must one way or the other terminate the war. Another chapter must reveal the incidents and issue of the struggle.

CHAPTER XCVI.

THIRD CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIPPOO SULTAN (*Continued*)—STORMING OF THE FORTIFIED CAMP BEFORE SERINGAPATAM—PASSAGE OF THE CAVERY, AND OCCUPATION OF THE ISLAND.

THE rival armies now confronted one another with concentrated strength. Tippoo waited for the attack dogged and resolute. The Earl of Cornwallis determined upon bold and prompt measures. Having carefully reconnoitred the enemy's position, he issued the orders for attack in the evening of the 8th of February. As this was one of the most memorable and interesting actions ever fought by the British in India, it will interest the reader to peruse his lordship's own description of the plan of battle, as made known in his order of the day :—

The army marches in three divisions at seven this evening to attack the enemy's camp and lines; pickets to join, field-pieces, quarter and rearguards, and camp-guards, to stand fast.

Right Division. Major-general Meadows.

Centre. Lord Cornwallis; Lieut.-colonel Stuart.

Left Division. Lieut.-colonel Maxwell.

If the right attack is made to the westward of the Somarpett, the troops of that attack should, after entering the enemy's lines, turn to the left. But if the attack is made to the eastward of Somarpett, the troops should turn to the right to dislodge the enemy from all the posts on the left of their position.

The troops of the centre attack, after entering the enemy's lines, should turn to the left; the front divisions, however, of both the right and centre attacks should, after entering, advance nearly to the extent of the depth of the enemy's camp before they turn to either side, in order to make room for those that follow; and such parts of both divisions, as well as of the left division, as the commanding officers shall not think it necessary to keep in a compact body, will endeavour to mix with the fugitives, and pass over into the island with them.

The reserve, leaving quarter and rearguards, will form in front of the line at nine this night, and Colonel Duff will receive the commander-in-chief's orders concerning the heavy park, the encampment, and the reserve.

Young soldiers to be put on the quarter and rearguards at gun firing, and the pickets to join when the troops march off.

A careful officer from each corps to be left in charge of the camp and regimental baggage.

Colonel Duff to send immediately three divisions of gun lascars of fifty men each to the chief engineer, to carry the scaling ladders, and the chief engineer is to send them to the divisions, respectively, along with the officers of his corps.

The officers of engineers and pioneers to be responsible that the ladders, after having been made use of by the soldiers, are not left carelessly in the enemy's works.

Surgeons and doolies to attend the troops, and arrack and biscuit to be held in readiness for the Europeans.

The divisions to form, as follow, after dark :—

The right in front of the left of the right wing.

The centre in front of the right of the left wing.

The left in front of the left of the left wing.

“In addition to the troops detailed in the orders, Major Montague of the Bengal, and

Captain Ross of the royal artillery, with a detachment of two subalterns and fifty European artillerymen with spikes and hammers from the park, accompanied the centre, and smaller parties the two other columns.

“The troops had just been dismissed from the evening parade at six o'clock, when the above orders were communicated; upon which they were directed to fall in again with their arms and ammunition.

“By eight o'clock the divisions were formed, and marched out in front of the camp; each in a column by half companies with intervals, in the order directed for their march.

“The number of fighting men was at the utmost 2800 Europeans and 5900 natives.

“The officers commanding divisions, on finding that their guides and scaling ladders had arrived, and that every corps was in its proper place, proceeded as appointed at half an hour past eight o'clock.

“The evening was calm and serene; the troops moved on in determined silence, and the full moon, which had just risen, promised to light them to success.

“The right column was conducted by Captain Beatson, of the guides, the centre column by Captain Allen, of the guides, and Lieutenant Macleod of the intelligence department; and harcarrahs (native guides or spies), who had been within the enemy's lines, were sent both to these and the left column.

“Tippoo's pickets having made no attempt to interrupt the reconnoitering parties in the forenoon, he probably did not expect so early a visit. The distance of our camp seemed a circumstance favourable to his security, and he did not, perhaps, imagine, that Lord Cornwallis would attack his lines till strengthened by the armies commanded by General Abercromby and Purseram Bhow.”

Tippoo was wholly unprepared for an attack by infantry alone on a fortified camp, protected by guns of every calibre, in every direction. When the columns of attack moved on, the tents of the camp were struck, and preparations made for its defence in case of sudden attack. The cavalry were drawn up in the rear in support of it. Great was the anxiety of the camp guards as they stood to their arms, prepared for every casualty, and awaiting the issue of the terrible crisis in which the army was placed. Lord Cornwallis very

judiciously withheld from his allies any knowledge of the contemplated assault, until the army was actually in motion. Had they been made acquainted with the plan, they would have raised all sorts of objections, and, finally, refused co-operation. When they heard of the enterprise consternation seized them. The idea of a body of infantry, so small in number, without artillery or cavalry, advancing upon so strong a place, garrisoned so numerously, bristling with cannon, and held by a determined ruler, totally appalled them. When they learned that Lord Cornwallis himself commanded the column by which it was intended to penetrate the enemy's defences, their astonishment and alarm rose even higher. They could not conceive of a great English lord fighting as a common soldier, and voluntarily placing himself in a position so imminent of peril. The chiefs immediately prepared for the only issue of the conflict which they could comprehend as possible—the total defeat of the British, and the consequent dangers of destruction to the allied armies.

Onward marched the assailing columns. Between ten and eleven o'clock, the centre came upon a body of cavalry, with a strong detachment of the enemy's rocket brigade. The cavalry, astonished at being confronted by the head of a battalion of British infantry, galloped away, but left the rocketmen to make feint of attack. These did little harm to the English, who, amidst showers of innoxious fire flashing over their ranks like meteors, prosecuted the advance with rapid but steady step.

At this juncture the left column of the assailants were ascending the Carrighaut Hill, and the scene presented to head-quarters was grand and imposing, for instantly the hill was topped with a circle of flame, from continuous flashes of musketry. The centre column was quickened by the discovery of their approach made by Tippoo's cavalry, and, animated by the fusillade from the Carrighaut, they pressed on with extraordinary vigour, so that the retreating cavalry had scarcely reached the camp fifteen minutes before them. The English broke through the bound hedge which surrounded the camp, and penetrated at once the enemy's lines. The right column, from the nature of the ground, had been compelled to make a considerable detour, and unfortunately did not reach the hedge until half-past eleven o'clock. Lord Cornwallis had foreseen the probability of such a mishap, and had halted his troops half-an-hour in the early period of the march. Nevertheless the right column had wound its intricate way so much farther to the right than his lordship's plan contemplated, that after

all, the proposed approach to the boundary line was far from simultaneous. When this column did penetrate the hedge, it was at a spot too near that where the division under the commander-in-chief in person had already entered, but diverging to the right within the hedge, made directly against the chief redoubt upon which the defence relied on its left. The moon shone out brilliantly upon the cupola of the large white mosque which, crowning a hill, was as a beacon to the English. The mosque became the object towards which their march was directed. When diverging to the right this column proceeded in part without the hedge, and diverted the attention of the enemy, while the remainder of the division pushed on to the redoubt. It was not the intention of Lord Cornwallis that this redoubt should be attacked, because its situation was so far in advance of the enemy's proper lines of defence. The battle having already raged from the left to the centre, and thence to the right, the troops at the White Mosque Redoubt were thoroughly prepared, and a heavy fire of cannon loaded with grape and of musketballs, smote the head of the assailing column. This terrible volley also revealed in vivid distinctness the full outline of the defence.

The English of the 36th and 76th regiments gallantly charged the "covert way," opening a steady and deadly fire on the defenders, who were swiftly driven within the inner works of the redoubt. The English, in essaying to pass the ditch, found themselves in the condition in which English troops have generally found themselves when similar duties were imposed on them—most of the ladders were missing, and those possessed were too short. The arrangements by which human life might be spared had been neglected, and the men had consequently to make fruitless efforts of valour to accomplish that which was physically impracticable. In this critical juncture a pathway across the ditch was discovered; over this the officers dashed, sword in hand, followed impetuously by the men. The pathway terminated against a small gate, which was the sortie; this the assailants forced in a moment, and entered a large traverse between the gateway and the redoubt. The enemy retired reluctantly and slowly before the bayonets of the assailing force. Reaching the inner circle of defence, whence retreat was impossible, the defenders turned a gun upon the traverse, which, if properly directed, must have swept it of the crowds whose eager valour urged them so madly on. From the circular rampart the soldiers of the sultan fired desultorily, but with close range, upon the thronging invaders,

who now filled the gorge and traverse. An irregular and less effective fire responded from the English. Several officers mounted a banquette to the right of the gorge, while a group of soldiers found their way up another to the left, and from both a dropping fire of musketry was directed into the redoubt. The fire of the enemy was still superior, and the officers resolved upon a charge with the bayonet. The men, as in the Redan at Sebastopol, during the storming of that place, were unwilling to give up the musketade, but were at last brought into order by their officers, and, headed by Major Dirom and Captain Wight, charged in at the gorge of the redoubt. A close fire of grape and musketry caused a sanguinary repulse. Captain Gage opened such a fire of musketry from the banquette to the right as to deter the enemy from taking such advantage of their success as was open to them. The British were rallied, and again led by the same officers, whose escape in the previous attempt was almost miraculous. The enemy had not reloaded the gun by which the gorge had been raked, and their musketry fire was insufficient to check the advance. Captains Gage and Burne, with Major Close, scrambled in at the same time, and, supported by a few followers, dashed sword in hand upon the flanks of the defenders, who broke away, and perished beneath the bayonets of their pursuers, or were shot as they leaped into the ditch below. Some fugitives, breaking through all dangers, were upon the point of escape, but fell into the hands of the troops composing the supporting column. The redoubt was won before the supporting column had arrived. While yet the battle raged in the redoubt, Tippoo sent a large body to the rescue. They advanced with drums beating and colours flying. Fortunately Lieutenant-colonel Nesbit, after routing another body of the enemy, had his attention called by the noisy advance of this reinforcement from the sultan. The officer who led was challenged by Nesbit,* who felt uncertain who they were; he replied, "We belong to the *Advance*," the title of Lally's brigade. The Mysorean officer supposed the English to be part of his own brigade, but his reception soon altering his opinion, he set his men the example of ignominious flight, which was effectually followed. Had this corps arrived in time, and been commanded with spirit, it might have been impossible for the English

to hold the redoubt. To the left of the conquered defence was another work, which was stormed quickly, but with great slaughter; the commandant and four hundred men were slain, with the heavy loss of eleven officers and eighty men on the part of the British. A deserter from our army, who belonged to Lally's corps, gave himself up at this post. From his account, it appeared that Monsieur Vigie, with his Europeans, about three hundred and sixty, were stationed in the angle of the hedge in front of the redoubt. Captain Oram's battalion, upon which they fired, had attracted their attention, till finding themselves surrounded, they broke, and endeavoured to make their escape, some along the hedge to the left, but chiefly by passing through the intervals of our column as it continued advancing to the redoubt. The colour of their uniform contributed essentially to the effecting of their escape, and to the same circumstance Monsieur Vigie himself owed his safety; he was seen to go through the column mounted on a small white horse, but, being mistaken for one of our own officers, was suffered to pass unmolested. The deserter was of great use, he guided the English through various intricate ways, by which danger was avoided, and important objects accomplished at little loss. The general having established posts, wheeled his men to the left in the direction of the centre column. In attempting this he passed across the track of that body, and found himself to the left of the attack at Carrighant Hill. No firing was heard, and no reliable intelligence of the operations of the centre or left columns was attainable. After a considerable pause a heavy firing began between Carrighant and the fort, when General Meadows advanced to support the forces which he supposed to be engaged in the direction whence the sound of firing came. At this juncture the day broke, and General Meadows perceived what had taken place upon the centre and right attacks.

While the right column of the assailants were thus occupied, that of the centre, under Lord Cornwallis, was engaged in important operations. His lordship had divided his corps into three divisions. The first, or advance, had been ordered to force its way through the enemy's line, and, if successful, to follow the retreat of the defenders into the island. The second, or centre division, was to move to the right of the first, to sweep the camp in that direction, and ultimately attempt the capture of the island, which it was hoped might be facilitated by the first division entering with the fugitives whom they might drive from the lines. The third

* Some accounts represent this as having been done by Lieutenant John Campbell, of the grenadier company, 36th regiment, who, although wounded in the redoubt, rushed forth and seized the standards of this detachment of the foe.

division was the reserve, with which Lord Cornwallis posted himself, so as, if possible, to afford and receive co-operation as it regarded the column of right attack under Meadows, and of left attack under Maxwell. The first division of the centre column, under the command of the Hon. Lieutenant-colonel Knox, was composed of six European flank companies, the 52nd regiment of the line, and the 14th battalion of Bengal sepoy.

The captains of the advanced companies were ordered to push on, attacking only whatever they met in front, until they reached the great ford near the north-east angle of the fort, and then, if possible, to cross it and enter the island. Rapidity was the chief element of success in this movement, and this was urged by Earl Cornwallis himself upon the captains in terms exceedingly imperative. The 52nd regiment and the 14th Bengal sepoy were to follow, with more solid order, the rapid movement and more open formation of the flank companies, and all were to avoid firing unless in case of indispensable necessity.

At eleven o'clock the advanced companies reached "the bound hedge," and found the enemy ready to receive them with cannon and musketry. Without a shot the British dashed through the line, the astonished defenders fleeing panic-struck before a movement so unexpected and unaccountable. The sultan's tent occupied a particular spot in the line of the advance, but he had fled from it, leaving obvious signs of the precipitation of his departure. The ground between that point and the river was almost a swamp, being under the cultivation of rice; this circumstance, with the darkness and the tumult of the fugitives, caused the advanced companies to miss their way and separate. They reached the ford in two separate bodies. The first dashed across close behind the fugitives, with whom they were nearly entering the place, but the enemy secured every point of ingress opportunely. Captain Lindsay, at the head of a company of the 71st regiment, rushed into the sortie, which led through the glacis into the fort, thence he proceeded along the glacis, through the principal bazaar, which stretched away to the south branch of the river, over the north branch of which the British had passed. The enemy having no conception of the possibility of the English finding their way there, fled in terror; many were bayoneted in the attempt to escape. There was an encampment of cavalry on the island, who immediately dispersed, not knowing what force of English had penetrated the place. Lindsay and his gallant men of the 71st took post on a bridge over a nullah which lay across the island, and placed a

party at a redoubt which commanded the southern ford.

The second body of the advanced companies reached the northern ford at this juncture, and found it nearly choked with bullocks, bullock waggons, guns, and Mysorean soldiers. So great was the terror of the fugitives, that they made no resistance, and were bayoneted in great numbers as they struggled to pass the ford. Some of the guns of the fort opened upon the supposed situation of the English on the main-land, but none were directed against the ford, as the fugitives as well as the pursuers must in that case have been at least equal sufferers. The deputy-adjutant-general of the British army afterwards remarked upon this episode of the defence—"It is no incurious circumstance here to observe, what was afterwards learned from some French deserters, that, at the time of the firing of these guns, the sultan was at the Mysore or southern gate of the fort, which he refused to enter: he was much enraged that the guns had opened without his orders, and sent immediately directions to cease firing, lest it might be imagined in his camp that the fort itself was attacked, and the panic among his troops in consequence become universal. To this order, wise as perhaps it was in its principle, may be attributed the little damage sustained by the troops, who crossed into the island, within reach of grape from the bastions of the fort."

Knox and the companies under his command gained the glacis, where Captain Russell and some of the grenadiers of the 52nd awaited his arrival, the captain being of opinion that Lord Cornwallis intended the operations to be conducted against the northern face of the fort,—along that bank of the Cavery, rather than in the direction taken by Captain Lindsay. Knox turned to the left, in the direction opposite to that taken by Lindsay, until he arrived at "the Dowlat Baug," where he seized a moorman of distinction. Two Frenchmen were also captured, and all acted as guides to conduct the party to the "pettah"* of Shaher Ganjam. Arrived at that place, the British found the gate shut, but no garrison, the troops having moved to the lines to resist the attack there, and were unable to regain their post. The gate was forced. The French prisoners conducted the English to the gate, which led to the batteries. There also the guard had left. The gate being open, Knox, having only one hundred men with him, took post in the street, and ordered the drums to beat the grenadiers' march, as a signal to the other troops of the first division to come to his

* *Pettah*: a suburb generally adjoining a fort, and surrounded with "a bound hedge," wall, and ditch.

assistance. At this moment firing commenced from the lines and batteries along the river, on the right of the enemy's camp, opposite the advance of the left column of attack. Knox had a large number of officers with him, and he directed them, with detachments of his small force, to take in reverse the enemy's batteries, from which the firing had been heard. The enemy were terrified by a series of movements, which appeared to them so complicated and ingenious. Wherever they turned they met some English, and in the places least likely to meet them: and instead of opening a fire of musketry, the English parties silently and with celerity charged with the bayonet, giving no time for formation, or any suitable plan of resistance. Many of the Mysoreans, driven from the batteries, fled to the gate of the pettah. There Knox, with thirty soldiers, seized the fugitives, or slew them as they came up. Large parties threw away their arms, and turned in other directions, on meeting this small party of English, which they magnified to twenty times the number. One of the soldiers captured by Knox, in order to save his life, informed that officer that a number of Europeans were enduring a miserable incarceration in a neighbouring house. Knox released these; one of them was a midshipman, whom the French admiral, Suffrein, had captured ten years before, and with other prisoners inhumanly handed over to the sultan, with the full knowledge that they would be thus treated. Most of the liberated men were common soldiers, and some deserters, who were treated as barbarously as the rest. The main body of the troops of the first division followed in close order to the river. Missing the ford, about one thousand men of the 52nd, and the Bengal sepoy, crossed the Cavery opposite the Dowlat Baug or rajah's garden, which they entered by forcing open the river gate. Captain Hunter, who was in command of this force, was here joined by several officers and men of the flank companies who had been separated from their own parties, and who were ignorant of the route taken by their comrades. The captain took post in the garden, and awaited the development of events. In Indian warfare nothing is so dangerous as a pause; while victory shines upon the banner of the soldier, he must bear it onward; on the slightest hesitation, that sun becomes clouded, and the career of triumph is rapidly turned. While Hunter hesitated, the enemy rallied, and bringing guns to bear upon the garden, opened a severe fire. In this situation the captain remained until the first streak of morning appeared, when he descried a fresh party of the enemy with cannon on the opposite bank of the river. He

plunged into the Cavery, led his men across, dispersed the party, spiked the guns, and joined head-quarters, having suffered some loss from grape and musketry in crossing the river. The remaining portion of the first division failed to enter the island, and after a severe conflict, fell back upon Capt. Russell's brigade. The 71st regiment having charged and cleared the way for the Bengalees, they rallied and resumed their advance. The 2nd or centre division of the centre column, under Lieutenant-colonel Stuart, swept to the right of the 1st division, joined by the detachment of the 14th Bengal sepoy, which were separated from the first. Their march was directed against "the Sultan's Redoubt." This was a post of some strength, planned by the sultan himself, who gave a close personal superintendence to the work of the French engineers whom he employed. Major Dirom, describing the dispersed articles found at dawn around the sultan's abandoned tent in the camp, thus observed:—"Many pikes, ornamented with plates of silver, belonging to the sultan's sewary or state equipage, were seen scattered round the tent, in which, among other articles, was found a case of mathematical instruments of London make; which gives probability to the accounts we had received that the sultan had turned his attention to the science of fortification, and that he had been his own engineer."

Major Dalrymple, who commanded the advance, was obliged to disobey the orders against firing, for a large body of cavalry opposed his progress. He formed the 71st regiment in line, believing that a full volley would prevent the cavalry from charging. His opinion was correct, every shot emptied a saddle; by the time the line reloaded and shouldered, the smoke had dispersed, and the horsemen were seen scattered in all directions. The redoubt was immediately abandoned, the 71st regiment entering unopposed. Having garrisoned the place, Colonel Stuart directed the course of his division against the left of Tippoos right wing, so as to meet the column under Maxwell, by which the right of the defence was assailed, and the left flank of which Maxwell had already turned. The rear or reserve division of the centre column, commanded by Earl Cornwallis himself, drew up by the Sultan's Redoubt after its capture by Major Dalrymple, and there his lordship anxiously awaited the co-operation of General Meadows from the right, while that officer, as has been shown, was anxiously in quest of him. His lordship remained in that position until near dawn, when the seven companies of the 52nd, and the three companies of the Bengal sepoy, which had occupied the garden and charged through the Cavery to

escape the peril of their position, arrived at the spot where his lordship awaited in suspense intelligence of the progress of affairs. The ammunition of these troops had been damaged in passing the river; this was fortunately discovered and the cartridges replaced, when Tippoo, who had learned the position of Lord Cornwallis, directed his left and centre to rally, concentrate, and fall upon the English commander-in-chief. These orders were obeyed with celerity and address, so that the English general found himself attacked by a powerful force. The unexpected arrival of the body which had retreated from the garden so swelled the numbers of Lord Cornwallis, that he felt himself in a position to receive the enemy with animation and decision. Here a fierce battle ensued. The English repulsed the Mysoreans by deadly volleys of musketry repeatedly, and on every occasion followed up the repulse by charges of the bayonet; but still the enemy rallied, relying on superiority of numbers. At daylight a well directed charge by the British finally repelled the attack. The position which his lordship occupied exposed him to the danger of being surrounded by the enemy, or of retiring under fire of his batteries. He skilfully withdrew round the Carrighaut, where, as described, he met General Meadows. Had that general occupied the time in boldly advancing, and had his lordship himself advanced to the support of his first and second divisions, the island would have been carried by a *coup de main*. The plan of Earl Cornwallis was bold, but he and most of his chief officers carried it out with disproportionate caution.

While the right and centre of the British were thus engaged, the left was also engrossed in the efforts and anxieties of complicated battle. Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell was ordered to storm the Carrighaut, and descending its slopes, force his way across the river into the island. The column, like that of the centre, was divided into several divisions. The front division of this column, under Lieutenant-colonel Baird, consisted of the flank companies of the 72nd regiment, commanded by Captain Drummond, and Lieutenant James Stuart, and the 1st battalion of Madras sepoy, commanded by Captain Archibald Brown. The main body of this column, consisting of the battalion companies of the 72nd regiment, and the 6th battalion of Madras sepoy, commanded by Captain Macpherson, was, as detailed in the orders, led by Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell. He was accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain Agnew and Lieutenant Wallace; and also by Lieutenant Capper, of the Madras establishment, who, with great zeal, had served as a volunteer with the army

during the two last campaigns, and attended Colonel Maxwell in this attack.

The Carrighaut was defended by infantry without artillery, but a strong rocket brigade* assisted the infantry. The enemy was surprised, and with little resistance deprived of an important post. The ascent was defended by a "double headed work," which was taken before the enemy could do anything but cast a few rockets, and offer a desultory fire of musketry. The hill commanded one of the principal fords, and the right wing of the sultan's lines. The flank companies of the 72nd scaled the defences and occupied them, the sepadar (brigadier) in command of the defence was mortally wounded in the escalade of the British. Descending from the high post of Carrighaut to a shoulder of the same hill, but having the separate name of Pagoda Hill, Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell possessed himself of that post also. Around the bottom of the hill ran a watercourse, in which a strong party of the enemy lay concealed; and as Maxwell moved down towards Tippoo's lines, they opened fire upon him with close range from their sheltered position. At the same time the fire from Tippoo's line within the bound hedge was directed upon them, but not with much effect, as there was not light enough to direct the guns with steady aim. Near the foot of the hill the Lockany river formed an obstacle, it was defended by infantry, and several officers were killed and wounded in approaching its banks. Nevertheless, Maxwell broke through every barrier, drove the Mysoreans from their concealed positions, forded the Lockany, cut through the bound hedge, stormed several posts, and found himself on the banks of the Cavery, meeting, as before named, the centre division of the British central column on the way. The passage of the Cavery was difficult, the river was deep, rocky, and commanded by the enemy's batteries on the island. Lieutenant-colonel Baird was the first to reach the opposite bank, followed by about twenty soldiers. Other detachments rapidly followed, but the ammunition of all was saturated with water. At this juncture the

* *Rocket* : a missile weapon, consisting of an iron tube of about a foot long, and an inch in diameter, fixed to a bamboo rod of ten or twelve feet long. The tube being filled with combustible composition, is set fire to, and, directed by the hand, flies like an arrow, to the distance of upwards of a thousand yards. Some of the rockets have a chamber, and burst like a shell; others, called the ground rockets, have a serpentine motion, and on striking the ground, rise again, and bound along till their force be spent. The rockets make a great noise, and exceedingly annoy the native cavalry in India, who move in great bodies; but are easily avoided, or seldom take effect against our troops, who are formed in lines of great extent, and no great depth.

events took place (already described), where Colonel Knox was so successful. Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell, a cool and skilful officer, perceiving the effects of Lieutenant-colonel Baird's passage, sought and found a safer ford, which he passed with the remainder of his men. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart also crossing, both officers and the detachments under their command joined Colonel Knox at the pettah, where, the reader will remember, he posted himself with a few men, while his officers attacked the batteries which fired upon Maxwell's column. Colonel Stuart, in order to ascertain the position of the pettah in reference to the island generally, moved round the outside of the walls, and coming upon open ground, encountered a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, who appeared to be without orders, and to have remained idle during the night. The colonel attacked them in line, presuming upon their cowardice, and dispersed them, slaying many. He had scarcely performed this feat, when the English who had first landed, and marched round to the south side of the island, came in view. Finding themselves unsupported, they were retiring, in hopes of forming such a junction as actually took place. At this moment officers were dispatched to inform Earl Cornwallis of the position of affairs.

When daylight fully revealed the true aspect of events, it presented these results of the night's conflict,—nearly all Tippoo's redoubts in front of his lines had been captured; the lines themselves stormed; the Cavery forded by a portion of Lord Cornwallis's and the whole of Colonel Maxwell's columns; and posts taken and occupied on the island. Strategically, the situation of Tippoo was critical, and he had lost many men. The loss of Lord Cornwallis was also heavy, but bore a small proportion to that of the enemy, and the advantages obtained.

Earl Cornwallis and General Meadows looked with exultation from the Carrigant Hill upon the whole theatre of the night's performances, and his lordship immediately took measures to reinforce the troops on the island. The enemy had already begun an attack there. Batteries and redoubts, advantageously situated, opened upon the English, and the scattered crowds of Mysoreans rapidly re-collected, and assumed form and order.

The command of the troops on the island devolved on Colonel Stuart. He retired from the pettah, and drew up his men across the island in front of the Laul Baug, covering the ford leading towards the Pagoda Hill with his right, and he occupied lines and batteries which had been constructed by the enemy for the defence of that part of the

island. The colonel's troops had expended all their ammunition that was not damaged. This exposed them to some danger, but the arrival of the reinforcements with a plentiful supply of ammunition, reassured Stuart, and disheartened the enemy. Leaving for a time Colonel Stuart unmolested, Tippoo passed the Cavery, and stealing forward large bodies of men under cover of the unequal ground, he prepared an attack upon "the Sultan's Redoubt," which General Meadows had taken the night before by a *coup de main*. Earl Cornwallis perceived this from the Pagoda Hill. The Sultan's Redoubt was within range of the guns of the fort which now opened against it. The gorge was covered by no traverse or outwork, and was left open to the fort, and exposed to the fire thence, so that the redoubt, if taken by the English, might be untenable. It was garrisoned by eighty men of the 71st, fifty Bengal sepoy, and twenty men, European engineers, and artillery. Some twenty wounded Europeans, men and officers, and perhaps an equal number of stragglers, had also entered the place. There was no water, and but a small quantity of ammunition. Against this poor defence the attacks of the enemy were unremitting all the morning. Repeated assaults were driven back with heavy slaughter. No assistance could be rendered from head-quarters, because all approach to the point of contest must be under the fire of the enemy's guns. Before noon, the commanding officers and nearly all the senior officers were killed or wounded. There was fortunately in the redoubt an officer sent thither by Earl Cornwallis the night before with a message; he found it difficult, if not impossible to return, and he took the command. This officer was Major Skelly. When he assumed the direction of the defence, the ammunition was within a few rounds of being expended. At that moment an officer saw two loaded bullocks in the ditch, such as were generally attached to regiments for carrying ammunition. Their burdens were secured, and found to be as was supposed. The discovery was of the utmost importance, and diffused joy and confidence throughout the little garrison. As soon as the men had filled their cartridge boxes, a body of cavalry numbering more than two thousand men were seen advancing towards the redoubt. It was supposed that they would charge through the open gorge. Before coming within musket-shot they halted, and about four hundred men dismounted, and, sword in hand, attempted to gain an entrance. They were received with a fire so close and precise, that a large number were slain in the opening of the gorge, and

the rest fled broken and panic-struck, covered by the discharge of cannon and rockets. It was one o'clock in the afternoon when this repulse took place. For a time the enemy seemed in doubt what course to pursue, except to direct a fire of field-pieces and musketry against the gorge. Matters so continued until two o'clock. Another assault was then made, led by the remnant of the brigade of Lally, commanded by Monsieur Vigue. The original soldiers of the brigade had either died, fallen in battle, or were invalided, and it was now almost wholly composed of natives, Mahrattas, and other non-Mussulman peoples. They advanced steadily, until the defenders discharged a well-directed volley into their column, when the native soldiers refusing to advance, broke from their ranks and turned. This was the last effort of the enemy, who at four o'clock began to retire from behind the rocks where they had taken post. One fourth of the little garrison was now killed and wounded, and the latter were dying of thirst. A party volunteered to procure water from a neighbouring ditch and pond, and not only found a supply, but discovered that the enemy had retired, leaving only a few scouts in the vicinity of the rocks.

Earl Cornwallis made arrangements to relieve the garrison in the evening, as well as the troops at some other posts where harassing duty was performed, and directed supplies to be sent to the detachments which had so gallantly established themselves in the island. The desperate defence of the Sultan's Redoubt had drawn off the attention of the enemy from the troops in the island. At five o'clock in the evening after Tippoo withdrew his forces from the rocks, the cavalry dismounting, assisted by "rocket-boys," attacked the pettah. The English were seldom vigilant, and their native adherents were engaged in plunder when the attack began. Many of them consequently fell under the scimitars of the Moslem troopers, and the rest were driven out. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart ordered the 71st and a native battalion to retake the place. This was done after an obstinate combat, the British pursuing the enemy from street to street, whither they retired fighting. A prisoner taken in this conflict gave valuable information. He stated that Tippoo had convened his principal sirdars, and had exhorted them to make a bold effort to drive the English from the island, and to recover the tomb of Hyder; that the chiefs had thrown their turbans on the ground, and had sworn to succeed or perish in the attempt. The attack, the prisoner said, was to be made in the night, and the march of the assailants was to be

directed along the bank of the northern branch of the river, to turn the right flank of our line, and to cut off the communication with the camp. This account, so circumstantial, seemed to deserve credit, and Colonel Stuart made his arrangements to repulse the expected attack.

Major Dalrymple, with the 71st regiment, and Captain Brown's battalion, was directed to keep possession of the pettah, and two field-pieces were sent in order to strengthen their position. Lieutenant-colonel Knox had charge of the right wing, in which was posted the 72nd regiment; Lieutenant-colonel Baird was stationed on the left, with the six companies of the 36th regiment; and a proportionable number of sepoys were posted according to the space to be defended by each wing. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart himself, with Major Petrie, took post in the centre in the rear of Shaher Ganjam, with a small body as a reserve. The regimental field-pieces were posted in the most convenient stations, and the guns of the batteries were turned towards the fort. Small parties were also detached, as pickets, to the front, and Major Dalrymple was directed to seize the most favourable opportunity of sallying upon the flank or rear of the enemy, as they passed Shaher Ganjam to the attack of the lines. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart having reported this intelligence to the commander-in-chief, he immediately ordered four field-pieces into the island, which arrived in the course of the night; and Major Gowdie with his brigade, after furnishing the detail for the relief of the sultan's ead-gah redoubts, was directed to take post at the foot of the Pagoda Hill, to be in readiness to pass the ford into the island on the first alarm. Every possible precaution having been taken to insure success, the troops lay upon their arms anxiously expecting the approach of the enemy; but the night passed in silence, and day broke without an alarm. That an attack was intended could not be doubted; but the repulse in the Pettah had either slackened the ardour of the chiefs, or the soldiery dispirited by the fatal events of the last twenty-four hours, could not be brought to second the zeal and enthusiasm of their commanders.

On the evening of the 7th of February Earl Cornwallis was pleased to issue the following orders:—"The conduct and valour of the officers and soldiers of this army have often merited Lord Cornwallis's encomiums; but the zeal and gallantry which were so successfully displayed last night in the attack of the enemy's whole army, in a position that had cost him so much time and labour to fortify, can never be sufficiently praised; and his

satisfaction on an occasion which promises to be attended with the most substantial advantages, has been greatly heightened by learning from the commanding officers of divisions, that this meritorious behaviour was universal through all ranks, to a degree that has rarely been equalled. Lord Cornwallis, therefore, requests that the army in general will accept of his most cordial thanks for the noble and gallant manner in which they have executed the plan of the attack. It covers themselves with honour, and will ever command his warmest sentiments of admiration."

During the night Tippoo abandoned his few remaining posts on the north of the Caverry, and the island remained the next morning the only theatre of contest. The English found the pettah a defensible place, and their other positions were also good; they had likewise obtained great stores of forage by driving the enemy from the mainland. The pettah was also rich in grain stores, and a pulse wholesome for cattle. The Laul Bang, as the magnificent garden of Tippoo was called, supplied material for the siege, and the palace connected with it, as well as the buildings of the Fakeers, erected by Tippoo round the tomb of his father, furnished suitable habitations for the officers, the wounded, and the sick.

The city of Seringapatam was invested on its two principal sides; from the camp, and more especially from the pickets of the British, its fine outline, with its bold defences, were distinctly visible. The conflicts during the night of the 6th of February, and the day and night of the 7th, constituted a great and continuous battle, one of the grandest and severest which the English had fought in India. The arms, standards, and munitions of war already captured were immense. Eighty pieces of cannon, thirty-six of them brass, were taken. Tippoo had also suffered from desertion, many of his soldiers having fled on both nights, especially that of the 7th, and on the morning of the 8th, before day.* Many deserted to the English, and, according to the reports of the most intelligent among those who had remained longest with him, his loss up to the 11th of February amounted to probably twenty-five thousand men.†

* The nairs, and others whom he had oppressed, or persecuted on religious grounds, and who served with the English, cut off many of the fugitives.

† Tippoo's army was recruited from every part of Southern India. Mohammedans, from religious zeal, volunteering to serve him from every district across the peninsula, from Malabar to Coromandel. Numbers also volunteered from Central India from the same cause.

Major Dymock thus refers to these desertions:—"His sepoy's threw down their arms in great numbers, and, taking advantage of the night, went off in every direction to the countries where they had been impressed, or enlisted: many came into our camp; and that continued to be the case during the siege. From their reports it appeared that, on a muster taken of the sultan's army, some days after the battle, his killed, wounded, and missing, were found to amount to twenty thousand. Fifty-seven of the foreigners in Tippoo's service took advantage of the battle of the 6th and 7th of February, to quit his service and come over to our army. Among them were Monsieur Blevette, an old man, who was his chief artificer, or rather chief engineer, and Monsieur Lafolie, his French interpreter, both of whom had been long in his and his father's service. Monsieur Heron, who was taken at Bangalore, and released on his parole, to enable him to bring away his family, also took this opportunity to fulfil his promises: several other people of some note were likewise of the number; some of them of the artificers sent to Tippoo from France, when his ambassadors returned in 1789. Thirty of these foreigners, headed by Joseph Pedro, a Portuguese, who held the rank of captain in Tippoo's service, engaged immediately with the Mahrattas. Some requested to go to the French settlements in India, others to return to Europe; a few might, perhaps, be taken into our service, and the remainder have probably engaged in the Mahratta or nizami's armies. The remains of the sultan's army, which had withdrawn in the course of the day and night of the 7th, were collected on the morning of the 8th; his infantry on the glacis, and within the outworks of the fort; his baggage and cavalry on the south side of the river towards Mysore. The crowd in and about the fort was very great; but his army never again encamped in order, or made any formidable appearance." Active preparations were now made for the siege. The magnificent garden was soon desolate, the rich fruit-trees and far-shading cypresses affording gabions for the engineers. Fascines and pickets were procured from the material of the garden palace, where the lascars and English pioneers spared nothing which their requirements demanded. An account of the remaining events must be reserved for another chapter.

Even Mahrattas, who, as a nation hated him, served in his ranks.

CHAPTER XXVII.

WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN (*Continued*)—SIEGE OF SERINGAPATAM—NIGHT ATTACK ON THE TENT OF EARL CORNWALLIS—GENERAL ABERCROMBY REACHES THE ALLIED CAMPS—SURRENDER OF TIPPOO'S SONS AS HOSTAGES—SECESSION OF HALF HIS TERRITORY AS A CONDITION OF PEACE.

ON the 9th of February the siege of Seringapatam commenced in due form. The island which now appeared likely to be the sphere of a fierce and sanguinary struggle was but four English miles in length, and one mile and a half in breadth. The centre being the highest ground, thence sloping in every direction to the river Cavery, the waters of which surrounded it. The following account of it, and the condition of Seringapatam at the period of the siege, was given by an official person on the staff of his excellency the governor-general and commander-in-chief:—"The west end of the island, on which the fort is built, slopes more, especially towards the north; the ground rising on the opposite side of the river commands a distinct view of every part of the fort. The fort and outworks occupy about a mile of the west end of the island, and the Laul Baug, or great garden, about the same portion of the east end. The whole space between the fort and the Laul Baug, except a small enclosure, called the Dowlat Baug, or rajah's garden, on the north bank near the fort, was filled, before the war, with houses, and formed an extensive suburb, of which the pettah of Shaher Ganjam is the only remaining part, the rest having been destroyed by Tippoo to make room for batteries to defend the island, and to form an esplanade to the fort.

"This pettah, or town, of modern structure, built on the middle and highest part of the island, is about half a mile square, divided into regular cross streets, all wide, and shaded on each side by trees, and full of good houses. It is surrounded by a strong mud wall, and seemed to have been preserved for the accommodation of the bazaar people and merchants, and for the convenience of the troops stationed on that part of the island for its defence. A little way to the eastward of the pettah, is the entrance into the great garden, or Laul Baug. It was laid out in regular shady walks of large cypress trees, and full of fruit-trees, flowers, and vegetables of every description.

"The island of Seringapatam is watered not only by a river, but also by a canal cut from it, at a considerable distance, where its bed is higher than the island, and brought from thence in an aqueduct across the south

branch opposite to that face of the fort. This stream, conducted in various canals to all the lower parts of the island on the south side, afforded great convenience to the inhabitants in that quarter, and was the means of keeping the gardens in constant beauty and abundance.

"The fort, thus situated on the west end of the island, is distinguished by its white walls, regular outworks, magnificent buildings, and ancient Hindoo pagodas, contrasted with the more lofty and splendid monuments lately raised in honour of the Mohammedan faith. The Laul Baug, which occupies the east end of the island, possessing all the beauty and convenience of a country retirement, is dignified by the mausoleum of Hyder, and a superb new palace built by Tippoo. To these add the idea of an extensive suburb or town, which filled the middle space between the fort and the garden, full of wealthy, industrious inhabitants, and it will readily be allowed that this insulated metropolis must have been the richest, most convenient, and beautiful spot possessed in the present age by any native prince in India.

"The sultan's proud mind could not be tranquil, in seeing his beautiful garden, and all his improvements, in the possession of his enemies, who were also preparing to deprive him of his last citadel, and all that remained of his power. His anger was expressed in a continual discharge of cannon from the fort, directed to the island, to the redoubts, and to every post or party of ours within his reach. Some of his shot even ranged to the camp, and seemed aimed at head-quarters; but the distance on every side was considerable, and his ineffectual cannonade served rather to proclaim the wrath of the sovereign, than to disturb or materially annoy his enemies."

Tippoo saw that he had no hope of repelling the English, and as a means of conciliation, as well as of obtaining terms of peace, he determined to release Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, whom, in violation of the terms of capitulation, he carried captives from Coimbatore.

"On the evening of the 8th of February, Tippoo sent for these officers. They found him sitting under the fly of a small tent (the roof without the walls), pitched on the south

glacis of the fort, apparently much dejected, very plainly dressed, and with only a few attendants. After giving them the welcome tidings of their intended release, he asked Lieutenant Chalmers, who had commanded in Coimbatore, whether he was not related to Lord Cornwallis, and an officer of considerable rank in our army. On being answered in the negative, he then asked whether he should see his lordship on going to camp; and being told he probably should have that honour, requested him to take charge of two letters on the subject of peace, which he said he had been very anxious to obtain ever since the commencement of the war, as it was not his intention to break with the English; and requested his assistance in effecting that important object. He further expressed his wish that Mr. Chalmers would return with the answer; told him their baggage should be sent after them; gave him a present of two shawls and five hundred rupees, and ordered horses and attendants to go with them to the camp."

Such was the hypocrisy and treachery of Tippoo, that while suing for peace, and although really anxious to procure it, he was meditating fresh schemes for retrieving by arms the disasters which had befallen him. On the forenoon of the day on which he liberated the British officers, his cavalry passed from their encampment and moved down the south side of the river Cavery. Notice was given of their movement from the island to head-quarters, but no one supposed that they had any intention of crossing to the north side of the river. This, however, they accomplished at a ford six miles distant from Seringapatam; and on the morning of the 10th, at dawn, moved to the rear of the left wing of the British camp, undiscovered, and passed between the camps of the nizam and that of Earl Cornwallis. The nizam's army seldom threw out pickets, or appointed posts of observation, yet the English sepoy sentinels mistook the enemy for horsemen of the Deccan. An officer who was in the English camp on the night of the transaction thus describes what followed, and accounts for the failure of the enterprise:—"The head-quarters were in the rear of the right wing, and so near to the right flank of the line, that the party of the enemy on passing the park of artillery, which was posted between the wings, asked some of the camp followers for the Burra Sahib, or commander. Not suspecting them to be enemies, and supposing these horsemen wanted Colonel Duff, the commanding officer of artillery, they pointed to his tent. The horsemen then drew their swords, and galloped towards the tent, cutting some lascars and people as they

advanced, till being fired upon by a party of Bombay sepoy drafts and recruits, encamped in the rear of the park, who had turned out with great alacrity; they were dispersed before they could do any further mischief. Some shot were afterwards fired at them from the park as they went off, but they got away across the hills again with very little loss.

"This scheme was one of those daring projects that have been so frequently practised by the native powers against each other in effecting revolutions in the East; and had those assassins been conducted by a guide, or their judgment been equal to their spirit in the attempt, it is possible they might have effected their murderous purpose. But the Mohammedan horsemen in the service of the native powers in India are generally intoxicated with bang, a plant mixed with their tobacco in smoking, or with opium, of which they take a large dose before they enter upon any dangerous enterprise; this inebriation renders their exertions so wild and disunited, that it is almost impossible for them ever to prove successful against a vigilant enemy. This incursion, though soon over, created a general alarm in the army; the safety of Lord Cornwallis was not less the object of the public than the private concern."

Increased vigilance was adopted by the English; and the commander-in-chief, who was careless of having his tent guarded, was induced to order a captain's guard to do duty there in future.

Immediately after this event, and while the work of making pickets, fascines, and gabions, proceeded vigorously on the island and in the British camp, another series of operations went forward which were of deep interest to all the armies concerned. These were connected with the march of the Bombay army under General Abercromby to join that under Lord Cornwallis. When last the march of the Bombay army was noticed, it had ascended the Ghauts, and appeared on the enemy's frontier. Various circumstances hindered its progress, and Tippoo dextrously impeded it by complicated and skilful movements of troops in that direction. On the 8th of February, while the army of Lord Cornwallis was operating so successfully before Seringapatam, Abercromby began a rapid movement to form a junction with his chief. On the 11th he crossed the Cavery at Eratore, not more than thirty miles from Lord Cornwallis's camp. On the 13th he had to ford a small river, which emptied itself into the Cavery, between his army and the object of their advance. At that place, suddenly, a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, which had been watching for the opportunity, swept between

the army and the baggage, destroying and capturing a considerable portion. They also repeatedly charged the rearguard, and cut off a few stragglers and camp followers. On the 14th, a powerful corps of Mysorean horse harassed both flanks, and repeatedly appeared ready to charge; it was at last necessary for the British to halt, and stand in order of battle. Just as the formation of the line was completed, a British officer contrived to reach Abercromby with intelligence that Colonel Floyd, with the cavalry of Lord Cornwallis, four thousand allied horsemen, and a battalion of sepoys, were on their way to cover his advance.

Tippoo was observant of all these movements, and set the whole cavalry of Mysore in motion to cut off some of those bodies of troops. On the morning of the 14th, when Colonel Floyd marched with the British horse, the allies lingered on the ground, and refused to follow when the importunities of Major Scott urged the necessity of the whole force keeping together. When at last they did move, Tippoo's troopers passed between them and the British, attacked and routed them, and had not Floyd and his British dragoons hastened back, the Deccan and Mahratta horsemen would have been altogether dispersed. The enemy took to flight on the appearance of the British. On the 16th, the Bombay force arrived in the camp of the commander-in-chief. It consisted, after its losses, and the deduction of garrisons and posts formed *en route*, of three brigades; and when the sick and wounded were sent to hospital tents, the force numbered six thousand bayonets. One-third of the men were Europeans: with the exception of a few topasses the rest were sepoys.

The time had now arrived for commencing the siege, and orders were issued to open the trenches. Major Dirom thus described the bulwark against which the energy and skill of the assailing armies were to be directed, and the mode of attack contemplated:—

"The fort of Seringapatam, of a triangular figure, constructed on the west end of the island, is embraced by the branches of the river on its two longest sides; the third side, or base of the triangle towards the island, being the face most liable to attack, is covered by strong outworks, and is defended by two very broad and massy ramparts, the second at a considerable distance within the first, both having good flank defences, a deep ditch, with drawbridges, and every advantage of modern fortification.

"The two other sides of the fort being protected by the river, it was intended that the main attack should have been carried on from

the island, by making a lodgment in the Dowlat Baug, or rajah's garden, and from thence to run regular approaches against the north-east angle of the fort, which would also be subject to a powerful enfilade attack from batteries on the north bank of the river. Much time and many lives must probably have been lost in this attack; the undertaking was arduous; but there being no impediment, besides those of art to encounter, the superior power of our troops and artillery could not fail of success.

"Lieutenant-colonel Ross, the chief engineer, had in the meantime been able to reconnoitre the north face of the fort very closely, and from what he saw, and the information he received from Monsieur Blevette, the head artificer, and others of Tippoo's Europeans, who had come over to us, it was judged more advisable to make the principal attack across the river against the north face of the fort. The curtain there was evidently very weak, and extending close along the bank of the river, left no room for outworks, and the flank defences were few and of little consequence. The ditch, excavated from the rock, was dry, and said to be inconsiderable; and it appeared to be so from what could be observed in looking into it from the Pagoda Hill. The stone glacis which, built into the river, covers that face, was broken, or had been left incomplete, in two places, including several hundred yards of the curtain; the walls might therefore be breached to the bottom, and would probably fill up great part of the ditch. The fort built on the declivity of the island on the north was there exposed in its whole extent, and every shot fired from that quarter must take effect, while the slope the island has also to the west end, exposed that part of the fort to a very powerful enfilade attack from the ground by which it is commanded on the south side of the river, opposite to the south-western face of the fort.

"The north branch of the river, which would intervene between the main attack, and the fort, was the only objection. It seemed possible, by repairing an old dam or embankment, to throw the water entirely into the other branch; at all events the channel, though rugged, was not deep or impassable, and the embarrassment of such an obstacle was in some measure compensated by the security it gave against sallies, and the cover it would afford in breaking ground at once within breaching distance of the fort. The fire, too, from that side, could not be very considerable, and there was a certainty of carrying on the approaches rapidly, and breaching the place with little loss. It might not be necessary to storm,

and if it should, an extraordinary exertion must be made at the general assault.

"Such were understood to be the principal reasons which determined Lord Cornwallis to relinquish the attack from the island against the east face, and adopt, in preference, that across the river against the north face of the fort."

On the 19th of February orders were given to open the trenches. At the same time, Lord Cornwallis commanded that the British troops on the island should cross to the south side, and disturb the cavalry encampment there, so as to divert the attention of the enemy from the proceedings directed against the north face of the fort. The 71st regiment and the 13th battalion of Bengal sepoy were ordered for this service. Night, soon after sunset, was chosen for this expedition. The troops crossed the river, made a detour among paddy fields, and about midnight arrived at the enemy's camp. Captain Robertson, at the head of a few companies, was sent forward, while the rest of the detachment remained in support. The captain ordered that the men should advance in close order, yet stealthily, and not fire. He entered the camp undetected, and fell upon the troopers with the bayonet, killing above one hundred. The men fled in confusion, leaving their horses, about two hundred of which the English bayoneted. The enemy now began to assemble as the alarm was given. Robertson then fired several volleys at random into the camp, so as to keep up the confusion already created while he retired. The effect of this manœuvre on the fort was instantaneous; rockets were thrown up, blue lights ignited, the bastions illuminated, so that the whole fort seemed to be a blaze of fire—the enemy expected a general assault. A single shot was fired in the direction of the muskade, but it was impossible to open a cannonade without destructive effects upon the cavalry. Captain Robertson bravely and skilfully accomplished the task assigned to him, without losing a man. There was no breach of discipline, no plunder, although many horses might have been taken away; had the men left their ranks to make prizes of the horses, the whole party might have been endangered.

Major Dalrymple, to whom the expedition had been entrusted, brought off his troops safely:—

"He returned with his detachment to the island, at four o'clock in the morning, and proceeded from thence to the head-quarters of the army, with the 71st regiment, which was one of the corps ordered up from the island, in consequence of the plan of attack being changed from thence to the north side of the fort.

"Lieutenant-colonel Ross, the chief engineer, and the Honourable Lieutenant-colonel Knox, who was to command the guard for the trenches, had, in the afternoon, visited the outposts, and looked at the general situation of the ground opposite to the north face of the fort, as directed in the general orders. The large redoubt, called Mahomed's, which was constructed for the defence of the centre of the sultan's camp, is nearly opposite to the middle of the fort on the north side, and at the distance of about fifteen hundred yards from that face. The approaches were to connect with that redoubt; but in order to take full advantage of an attack so unexpected on that side, it was determined to break ground within breaching distance of the fort, and, having formed a sufficient parallel, to work back from thence to the redoubt. A deep ravine, in which there is a stream of water on the right of the redoubt, turns along its front, and is branched into several nullahs, or canals, for the cultivation of the rice fields between the redoubt and the river. One of these nullahs, running nearly parallel to the north face of the fort, and being also at the distance wished, about eight hundred yards, was to be formed into a first parallel for the attack, to which the ravine or water-course itself formed an imperfect approach. About one thousand yards to the right of the ground fixed upon for the parallel, there was a square redoubt of the enemy's near the river, and a mosque with very strong walls, at nearly the same distance on the left, both convenient posts to be occupied by the guard for the trenches.

"The troops for working, and for guarding the trenches, having assembled at the engineer's park as directed, marched down as soon as it was dark, to commence the interesting operations of the night. The disposition of the guard for the trenches, or covering party, consisting of the 36th regiment, and two battalions of sepoy, being the first arrangement, was made by Lieutenant-colonel Knox, according to the plan fixed with the chief engineer, and was as follows:—

"Captain Wight, with the grenadiers, and a battalion company of the 36th regiment, accompanied by Lieutenant Mackenzie, aide-de-camp to the chief engineer, with a party of pioneers with gabions for closing the gorge of the work towards the fort, was sent to dislodge the enemy, and take possession of the redoubt on the right of the parallel: the light infantry company of the 36th regiment, under Captain Hart, and two companies of sepoy, were to occupy the mosque to the left. Sergeants' parties were distributed along the front and flanks of the parallel, to prevent the possibility of surprise. A battalion of sepoy was

sent into the nullah intended for the parallel, and the remainder of the covering party lay upon their arms, on each side of the water-course in the rear of the parallel, under shelter of some banks near the burying-ground of Tippoo's Europeans, whose quarters had been at Somarpett.

"The chief engineer having detailed the working parties under the different officers of his corps, proceeded to execute the parallel which he had marked out the preceding night. They worked undiscovered, and so ineffectual were the blue lights of the fort, that, when illuminated on all sides, in consequence of the diversion which was made from the island, they did not enable the garrison to see the people who were at work within eight hundred yards of the walls; nor can those lights be of any service to discover an enemy, unless in a very close attack, where they are generally of still more use to the assailants.

"General Meadows, accompanied by the officers of his suite, came down in the evening to the advanced redoubt, where he remained during the night, in readiness to give his orders in case anything particular had occurred. In the morning he inspected the work that had been executed, and afterwards continued his daily visits to the trenches during the siege. By daylight, the nullah was formed into a wide and extensive parallel, and a redoubt was constructed to cover its left flank, the right being protected by the ravine.

"The party that had been sent to possess the redoubt near the river, having found it evacuated, and too open to be rendered tenable, in the course of the night rejoined Colonel Knox. In the morning the parties were withdrawn that had been posted in front, and on the flanks of the parallel during the night; but the party was continued in the mosque on the left, as it was thought strong enough to resist the cannon of the fort.

"Daylight showed the sultan that the exertions of his enemy had been directed to a more material object than beating up his horse camp during the night; and that his attention had been successfully drawn off to a different quarter, during the most interesting operation of the siege. He opened every gun he could bring to bear upon the parallel, and upon the mosque, and sent parties of infantry across the river to harass our troops in flank, and to interrupt the work.

"Tippoo, finding all his exertions from the fort would be ineffectual in repelling the attack on that side, thought of employing another expedient in his defence, by turning off the water from the large canal, which, being cut from Caniambaddy for the cultivation of the grounds on the north side of the river,

supplied the greatest part of our camp. This measure, he knew, would distress our troops, and, by depriving the camp of a large stream of running water, soon render it unhealthy; and moreover, by increasing the quantity of water in the bed of the river, would add to the difficulty of our approach. It is probable that the Bombay army, previously to their junction, prevented the sultan from an earlier attempt to deprive us of this source of health and comfort, to which he was now urged by the opening of our trenches, and the commencement of the attack on that side of the fort. The sudden deficiency of the water soon indicated that the enemy had diverted the stream from the canal. The 14th battalion of coast sepoy, commanded by Captain Wahab, was immediately detached with a party of pioneers to dispossess the enemy, and endeavour to repair the damage. Tippoo's troops did not attempt to defend the position they had taken on the banks of the canal, which they had broken down in order to turn the stream into the bed of the river; and the embankment being very massy, the little they had been able to destroy was soon repaired, and the stream again confined to its former channel."*

A battalion of sepoy was stationed there to prevent a second attempt by the enemy. After the commencement of the main attack as above described, the Bombay army was directed to cross the river, and invest the south-west side, and make ready for an enfilade attack upon the face of the fort. When Abercromby made good his passage, he perceived the enemy drawn out in battle array. Tippoo did not believe that the river could be forded with guns at that particular point, and had made no provision to prevent such a result. His cavalry had been thrown into such confusion by the surprise effected through the activity and boldness of Captain Roberts, that they were marshalled with difficulty. He now appeared in person at the head of his infantry, resolved to prevent Abercromby securing such points as would strengthen his position. These were a redoubt, and a "tope" or grove between the fort and the heights upon which Abercromby took post, and the sultan manifested an intense anxiety to prevent their occupation. The English forbore any attempt during the day, but at night Colonel Hartley, with a battalion of grenadier sepoy, effected a surprise. The next morning Tippoo saw from his fortress three Europeans and six sepoy battalions under Abercromby on the heights, strongly posted, and beyond the range of the guns of the batteries.

On the nights of the 19th and 20th, and

* *Narrative of the Campaign in India, 1792.*

21st of February, the English carried on their works with industry, courage, and skill; thirty men only were killed and wounded by the cannonade of the sultan during those operations. He watched the English with vigilance, and opposed them with activity. Every morning he paced anxiously and fearlessly the ramparts, to observe the progress made the previous night. Every feature of the defence was drawn by himself, and his fortitude amazed the allies. Deserters were now numerous, especially from his cavalry, to the English, the Mahrattas, and the nizâm—the majority of these renegades preferred the services of the sovereign of the Deccan.

During the progress of all these demonstrations Tippoo negotiated with hesitating and reluctant diplomacy. His vakeels were received by the British commander-in-chief. Tents were pitched near the Mosque Redoubt, and thither the representatives of the sultan and the allies repaired on the 16th, 16th, 19th, and 21st. Deserters reported that the chief men in the city, anxious to save their treasures, and preserve their families from alarm, and possibly insult, had remonstrated with the sultan against continuing a war which brought desolation and disaster to their doors. Tippoo refused to make the extensive concessions demanded from him, still believing that the allies would not long be able to obtain subsistence in a country already nearly exhausted. The strong fort of Mysore was still his. Cummer-ud-Deen Khan held the Bideenore country, as already shown, and he was supposed to be hastening thence with reinforcements and convoys.

On the 22nd of February Tippoo found that General Abercromby had pushed up his posts in closer proximity to the weakest part of the defence. He determined to dislodge them. For this purpose a strong detachment occupied the tope, a few moments before the arrival of an English party for the same purpose; a combat ensued, the English were reinforced from the redoubt, their surprise of which has been related, and the combat became extended and severe: the Mysoreans were driven out, and the English drew up in front of the grove opposite the batteries of the fort. All day Tippoo threw rockets against the tope, and sent out skirmishers, who succeeded in wounding the English sentinels. When night fell he directed the guns of the fort against it, while cavalry and infantry operated upon its flanks. The English were largely reinforced, and a fierce battle was fought. The arrangements for supplying the English with ammunition were, as usual, bad, and the brave men had to retire before continuous peals of musketry, to which they

had no means of replying. The enemy, emboldened, charged the tope, the troopers dismounting and leading the way sword in hand. The English instantly turned, charged with the bayonet, and drove the aggressors under the walls of the fort. Again the enemy advanced, but did not charge, maintaining a murderous fusilade, which the English could not answer by a single shot, and were obliged to retreat under a heavy and galling fire. While the enemy were pressing more closely, and their fire thickening, the 12th battalion of Bombay sepoy, with a supply of ammunition, arrived, and turned the fortunes of the day. The sepoy covered the retreating English, who, with replenished cartouch-boxes, rallied, and again drove the enemy out of the tope, once more taking post in its front, along which a battle of musketry was waged with furious energy. The English again reinforced, pursued the enemy under the guns of the fort, as the sun set closing the day and the battle. This battle caused great uneasiness to the British on the island, and in the camp of head-quarters, as the waving to and fro of large bodies of men, and the continued roar of musketry, led the British to believe that the whole of General Abercromby's force was in action, and hotly pressed. When night came, a burning anxiety to know the result pervaded the allied camps, and means were taken to obtain prompt intelligence, which allayed all doubts, and afforded fresh encouragement. Abercromby himself had been apprehensive that the attack was a feint by Tippoo to engage the attention of the English while Cummer-ud-Deen should fall upon his rear, so that he feared to detach support to the troops in the tope, so as to put an earlier termination to the conflict. The English lost about one hundred and twenty men, and many valuable officers, in killed and wounded.

On the night of the 23rd of February the second parallel was finished, and the ground selected for the breaching batteries within five hundred yards of the fort. On the same night a redoubt was constructed on an island in the river, from which it was believed a cannonade might be directed with effect in certain conjunctures. Abercromby advanced to a ravine between the fort and the lately contested tope, and made there a lodgment. A battery was commenced near that point, from which to throw red-hot shot and shells into the fort.

On the night of the 24th the English were prepared to open a fire from nearly sixty cannon and howitzers. The weight of metal was sufficient for breaching, and the means of setting the city on fire were ample and certain. The place was not yet fully invested. Pur-

seram Bhow was, as has already been shown, on an expedition which he chose to take without the concurrence of his allies. He was now expected, and with his force of twenty thousand cavalry, a brigade of English sepoy infantry which he had with him, and thirty pieces of cannon, the investment of the city would speedily be completed, and Tippoo would obtain no supplies, unless his lieutenant, the khan, could force his way through the blockade.

Major Cuppage was advancing from Coimbatore with a very strong brigade, and orders to take the fort of Mysore on the way. Supplies were abundant, and the arrangements for convoys effective. The sultan could no longer maintain himself, unless by sorties he could clear the vicinity of his capital and raise the siege. The 24th of February dawned on the besieged and besiegers, full of interest. The former, drooping and dependant, expected that as soon as the shadows of evening closed around the ramparts, the thunder of the breaching batteries would roll over the city. The besiegers were full of high hope, eager to avenge their murdered countrymen, and enrich themselves with the booty of a stormed capital. Suddenly orders came to the English to cease working in the trenches, and to abstain from all hostile acts. At the same moment, Tippoo, ever treacherous even when treachery brought little advantage and much peril to himself, opened an active fire from all points of the defence, wounding and slaying several officers, as well as many men. This was in contravention of articles of armistice signed the night before. Lord Cornwallis sent repeated flags of truce and remonstrances, but the sultan continued his fire until noon, although the English did not reply. His aim probably was to make his people believe that he had dictated terms of peace. The same day a proclamation of Lord Cornwallis announced the cessation of hostilities, but that the same vigilance, as if in actual warfare, was to be observed at all the posts of the allied armies. On the night of the 23rd Tippoo had signed preliminaries of peace, having accepted the terms dictated by Lord Cornwallis. These terms were severe, but not more than the conduct and character of Tippoo necessitated, and it was in the power of the allies to have then closed his career, and have saved much blood and treasure that afterwards it became needful to expend. As the struggle between the English and Tippoo did not end with this war, and the treaty made by Lord Cornwallis laid the foundation for subsequent quarrels, it is desirable to present its terms to the reader :—

Preliminary articles of a treaty of peace concluded between the allied armies and Tippoo Sultan.

ART. I.—One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultan was in possession before the war, to be ceded to the allies from the countries adjacent, according to their situation.

ART. II.—Three crores and thirty lacs of rupees, to be paid by Tippoo Sultan, either in gold mohurs, pagodas, or bullion.

1st. One crore and sixty-five lacs, to be paid immediately.

2nd. One crore and sixty-five lacs, to be paid in three payments not exceeding four months each.

ART. III.—All prisoners of the four powers, from the time of Hyder Ali, to be unequivocally restored.

ART. IV.—Two of Tippoo Sultan's three eldest sons to be given as hostages for a due performance of the treaty.

ART. V.—When they shall arrive in camp, with the articles of this treaty, under the seal of the sultan, a counterpart shall be sent from the three powers. Hostilities shall cease, and terms of a treaty of alliance and perpetual friendship shall be agreed upon.

Major Dymock relates that "the allies, Hurry Punt on the part of the Mahrattas, and the nizam's son, Secunder Jaw, and his minister Azeem-ul-Omrah, on the part of the nizam, conducted themselves with the greatest moderation and propriety in the negotiation, and on every occasion on which they had been consulted during the war."

The surrender of his sons as hostages caused much commiseration in the city, and a sort of insurrection among the ladies of the harem, who besought the sultan to request an additional day's delay from Lord Cornwallis, in order that the young princes might be sent into his camp with suitable preparation. His lordship, hearing of this, sent word that he was willing to defer the surrender of the hostages, and that he would wait upon their highnesses as soon as they arrived at the tents prepared for their reception. Tippoo requested that they might be at once conducted to his lordship's tent, and delivered into his own hands.

On the 26th the hostages left the fort, and seldom has the page of history recorded a scene more touching. The ramparts were crowded with soldiers and citizens, whose sympathy was deeply stirred. Tippoo himself was on the rampart above the gateway, and is represented as having shown profound emotion.

As the princes left the gate the fort saluted them with the usual discharge of cannon, and as they approached the British camp twenty-one guns thundered forth a similar token of respect. They were met by the English negotiator, Sir John Kennaway, the Mahratta and nizam's vakeels, and a guard of honour. The princes were conveyed on elephants caparisoned after the manner of Southern India; each was seated in a silver howder. The vakeels of the different courts were also borne

upon elephants. Harcarrahs* led the procession, and seven standard bearers, carrying small green flags suspended from rocket poles. After these followed one hundred pikemen, whose weapons were inlaid with silver. The rearguard consisted of two hundred sepoy and a squadron of horse.

Lord Cornwallis, attended by many of his principal officers, as well as his staff, met the princes at the entrance to his tent, as they descended from their howders. He embraced them, and taking one in each hand, led them into his tent. The elder, Abdul Kalick, was only ten years of age, the younger, Moozaad-Deen was two years younger. Lord Cornwallis placed them on each side of him as he sat. Gullam Ali, the principal vakeel of Tippoo, then surrendered them formally as hostages, saying, "These children were this morning the sons of the sultan, my master; their situation is now changed, and they must look up to your lordship as their father." Lord Cornwallis addressed the vakeel, assuring them that his protection should be extended to his interesting hostages; and he spoke so feelingly, yet cheerfully, to the children that he at once gained their confidence.

The princes wore flowing robes of white muslin and red turbans, in which each wore a sprig of rich pearls. They had necklaces composed of several rows of large pearls. From the necklace, each wore an ornament of the same pattern, the centre of which consisted of a large rich ruby, and one exquisitely chaste emerald. The centre piece was surrounded by brilliants. Their manners were characterised by propriety and dignity becoming their high rank. The elder boy had a Moorish aspect, his colour was rather dark, lips thick, nose flat, and the countenance long and preternaturally thoughtful. Neither his person nor manner was so much admired as the appearance and demeanour of the younger child, who was fair, with regular contour, large, bright, expressive eyes, and a countenance kind and cheerful:—"Placed too, on the right hand of Lord Cornwallis, he was said to be the favourite son, and the sultan's intended heir. His mother (a sister of Burham-ud-Deen's, who was killed at Sattimangulum), a beautiful, delicate woman, had died of fright and apprehension, a few days after the attack of the lines. This melancholy event made the situation of the youngest boy doubly interesting, and, with the other circumstances, occasioned his at-

tracting by much the more notice. After some conversation, his lordship presented a handsome gold watch to each of the princes, with which they seemed much pleased. Beetel-nut and otto of roses, according to the Eastern custom, being then distributed, he led them back to their elephants, embraced them again, and they returned, escorted by their suite and the battalion, to their tents. Next day, the 27th, Lord Cornwallis, attended as yesterday, went to pay the princes a visit at their tents, pitched near the Mosque Redoubt, within the green canaut or wall, used by the sultan in the field, of which we had so often traced the marks during the war. The canaut of canvas, scalloped at top, was painted of a beautiful sea-green colour, with rich ornamented borders, and formed an elegant inclosure for the tents. It was thrown open to the front, and within it the pikemen, sepoy, &c., of the princes' guard formed a street to a tent, whence they came out and met Lord Cornwallis. After embracing them, he led them, one in each hand, into the tent, where chairs were placed for his lordship, themselves, and his suite. Sir John Kennaway, the Mahratta and the nizam's vakeels, also attended the conference. The eldest boy, now seated on his lordship's right hand, appeared less serious than yesterday; and when he spoke, was not only graceful in his manner, but had a most affable, animated appearance. The youngest, however, appeared to be the favourite with the vakeels; and at the desire of Gullam Ali, repeated, or rather recited some verses in Arabic, which he had learned by heart from the Koran, and afterwards some verses in Persian, which he did with great ease and confidence, and showed he had made great progress in his education. Each of the princes presented his lordship with a fine Persian sword, and in return he gave the eldest a fuzee, and the youngest a pair of pistols, of very fine and curious workmanship. Some jewels, shawls, and rich presents were then offered to his lordship as matter of form; after which, beetel-nut and otto of roses being distributed, the princes conducted his lordship without the tent, when he embraced them and took his leave. The tent in which the princes received Lord Cornwallis, was lined with fine chintz, and the floor covered with white cloth. The attendants sprinkled rose-water during the audience; and there was a degree of state, order, and magnificence in everything, much superior to what had been seen amongst our allies. The guard of sepoy drawn up without was clothed in uniform, and not only regularly and well-armed, but, compared to the rabble of infantry in the

* *Harcarrahs*: messengers employed to carry letters, and on business of trust. They are commonly Brahmins, are well acquainted with the neighbouring countries, are sent to gain intelligence, and are used as guides in the field.

service of the other native powers, appeared well disciplined and in high order. From what passed this day, and the lead taken by the eldest son, it seemed uncertain which of them might be intended for Tippoo's heir. Perhaps, and most probably, neither; for Hyder Sahib, about twenty years of age, has always been said to be Tippoo's eldest son; had been educated accordingly, and had accompanied his father constantly during the war, till lately, when he was sent on a separate command."* The vakeels declared that he was not a favourite, nor destined to be the heir. This was, however, supposed to be said by them to prevent that prince also from being demanded as a hostage.

On the morning of the 28th, a salute was fired from the fort, to announce the satisfaction of the sultan, at the treatment which his sons received. Every preparation was now made to complete the definitive treaty, and hasten the departure of the allies. There arose many grounds of suspicion that Tippoo had actually murdered some of the English prisoners after the signature of preliminaries of peace, and that others were retained in a miserable confinement in Seringapatam. Ten sepoy of General Abercromby's corps were taken on the 29th of February, brought into the fort, each mutilated of his right hand, and sent back to the English camp. These men were shown to Tippoo's vakeels, who said they had been caught plundering. The sepoys declared that they were wandering about beyond the fort, were seized, brought before the sultan's chudbar, or officer of justice, and thus mutilated. The vakeels denied that this was by orders of the sultan, or with his knowledge. When Tippoo was remonstrated with by Lord Cornwallis, the reply was insolent and satirical:—"His lordship must have been misinformed; but for his satisfaction, if he desired it, he would throw down one of the bastions that he might see into the fort." In a variety of ways, the sultan appeared as if he doubted the sincerity of the allies, or was himself insincere. He was preparing the means of further defence, although his sons were hostages, and he had signed terms of a preliminary treaty. His vakeels also raised every obstruction which falsehood and artifice could create to the ratification of the treaty. He refused to pay the full fine stipulated, although a crore of rupees had been already sent. Cummer-ud-deen Khan had arrived with an immense convoy, and a powerful reinforcement, and was permitted to enter the fort. The cession of territory was after many disputes fixed, and yielded nearly half a million sterling to each of the three allied

powers. The sultan had determined, as soon as the allies withdrew, to take ample vengeance upon the Coorg Rajah for the aid which he gave to the Bombay army. Lord Cornwallis insisted therefore upon that prince being secured as an independent sovereign by the treaty. Tippoo refused, and so keen was his love of revenge, that no concession demanded of him excited such grief and indignation. He was nearly driven to madness.

Lord Cornwallis sent back the guns to the island, and ordered the troops to prepare to renew the siege, should matters come to that extremity. There was, however, such disarrangement and destruction of material as rendered a new siege far more difficult than the former. Fresh food was scarce in the camps, a pestilential effluvia stole over the posts which were occupied in the island, and many of the men sickened and some died. Upon all this the sultan had calculated, and therefore instructed his vakeels to procrastinate, while he added strength to his fortifications, especially to the north face of the fort. The civil officers of Tippoo represented to him the great forces now occupying his country, and urged him to remove all doubt of his sincerity, by a full and frank compliance with the terms of the treaty. They were justified in these representations, for, on the 16th of March, 1792, the following number of troops were in Mysore, and chiefly around Seringapatam:—11,193 Europeans, 72,620 natives, with 254 cannon.

The negotiations with the sultan made such unsuccessful progress, that on the 16th of March, the body-guard which attended the princes was disarmed, and the royal children were sent towards the Carnatic. Intimation was given to the sultan, that if the definitive treaty were not immediately signed, hostilities would be resumed.

Purseram Bhow, with his Mahrattas, and the Bombay sepoy battalions, under Captain Little, attached to the army of that chief, crossed the river to the south side of the fort, to join the force of General Abercromby, and make the blockade there more complete. "It may appear extraordinary that the other Mahratta-army, or the nizam's army, had not been employed to act with General Abercromby, in the absence of Purseram Bhow. Lord Cornwallis mentions in one of his despatches, that it suited neither the health nor inclination of Hurry Punt to go upon any detached service; and that the nizam's minister, although he, with great zeal, offered to supply the place of the bhow, was so completely ignorant of military affairs, and such was the want of arrangement prevailing in every department of his army, that he was

equally unable to put his troops in motion, or to provide for their subsistence, even for a few days, if removed from our army."

The blow took eagerly to his task, and with his cavalry scoured the country to Mysore, capturing elephants, camels, and bullocks belonging to the sultan. At last finding resistance vain, his troops unwilling to defend the city, and his family and vakeel anxious for peace on any terms, Tippoo signed the necessary documents. He requested that the ratification of the treaty should be presented by his sons to Lord Cornwallis in person. This was to induce his lordship to recall the *cortège*, which had been halted at a day's march. With this request Lord Cornwallis complied. Tippoo requested a personal interview with Lord Cornwallis, which his lordship refused, probably from an apprehension of giving cause of jealousy to our allies, from having no great respect for the sultan's character, and from seeing it would answer no essential public purpose.

"On the 19th of March the young princes, attended and escorted in the same manner as when they first arrived in camp, came to perform the ceremony of delivering the definitive treaty to Lord Cornwallis and the allies. They arrived at head-quarters at ten o'clock, which was the hour appointed, and were received by his lordship, as formerly, with the greatest kindness and attention. The boys had now gained more confidence; the eldest in particular, conducted himself with great ease and propriety; and, after some general conversation, having a parcel handed to him, which contained the definitive treaty in triplicate, he got up and delivered the whole to Lord Cornwallis. The nizami's son, or Mogul Prince as they call him, and the Mahratta plenipotentiary, Hurry Punt, did not think it consistent with their dignity to attend on this interesting occasion, any more than on the first day that the princes arrived in camp. Even their vakeels were late in making their appearance. At length, on their coming, the eldest prince receiving two of the copies of the treaty, returned to him by Lord Cornwallis, delivered a copy to each of the vakeels of the other powers, which he did with great manliness; but evidently with more constraint and dissatisfaction than he had performed the first part of the ceremony. One of the vakeels (the Mahratta) afterwards muttering something on the subject, the boy asked at what he grumbled; and, without giving him time to answer, said, 'they might well be silent, as certainly their masters had no reason to be displeased.' These may not be the precise words, but something passed to that effect, which did great honour to the boy's manli-

ness and spirit. The princes having completed the ceremony, and delivered this final testimony of their father's submission, took their leave and returned to their tents; and thus ended the last scene of this important war."*

The losses of Tippoo were very heavy. The British main army captured 432 pieces of cannon, and in the various conflicts with it, including the siege, Tippoo acknowledged that the number of men, killed, wounded, missing, and taken prisoners, was 31,720. The Bombay army took 224 guns, and the acknowledged loss of the sultan to that army in killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters was 9020 men. The Mahratta army, and Bombay brigade associated with it, slew, wounded, captured, or caused to desert, 6850 men, and made prizes of sixty-six pieces of artillery. The nizami's army, with the Madras brigade attached, won thirty-six guns, and slew or dispersed 1550 men. The naval squadron of the English at Fortified Island, seized or spiked forty-three cannon, and killed and wounded 200 men, besides taking the fort. The nizami's army took four forts, the Mahrattas six, the Bombay army sixteen, and Lord Cornwallis's own army forty. "The guns taken by Tippoo Sultan during the war were the thirty-seven at the Travancore lines, belonging to the rajah (found afterwards in the Paniany river); six field-pieces, which the detachment at Sattemangulum were, from the cattle being killed, under the necessity of quitting in their retreat; two or three guns at Permaccil, in the Carnatic; and the few guns which the detachment commanded by Cummer-ud-Deen Cawn retook in Coimbatore. The only forts of consequence that remained in Tippoo's possession at the conclusion of the war were, Seringapatam, Chittledroog, Bidenore, Mangalore, or a new fort near it called Jemaulghur, Kistnaghery, and Sankeridurgum. The two last forts being in the ceded countries, there were only four places which have not either been in the possession of his enemies during the war, or made over to them in consequence of the peace."

The prize money of the army was considerable. Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows gave up theirs for the benefit of the army in general. The company granted a year's batta, which, with the value of captured commodities, made nearly £600,000. The British armies and their allies soon began their homeward march when the treaty was signed, and the sultan was left to brood over his disasters in his diminished dominions.

* Major Dirom's account.

CHAPTER XCVIII.

DEPARTURE OF LORD CORNWALLIS FROM INDIA—SIR JOHN SHORE BECOMES GOVERNOR-GENERAL—HE RESIGNS—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON IS APPOINTED GOVERNOR-GENERAL—GENERAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE ENGLISH—EFFORTS OF THE FRENCH—TIPPOO SULTAN FORMS A FRENCH ALLIANCE TO EXPEL THE ENGLISH FROM INDIA.

LORD CORNWALLIS having brought the war with Tippoo to a successful issue, sought the earliest day compatible with public interests to retire from the government of India, and Sir John Shore assumed the reins of government; Major-general Sir Robert Abercromby receiving the appointment of commander-in-chief. The general was appointed to his high office by the court of directors in September, 1792; Sir John was installed in his high office, October 28, 1793. Lord Hobart, a nominee of Mr. Dundas (the enemy of Hastings), succeeded Sir Charles Oakley in the government of Madras, five days before Sir John Shore filled the chair of the general government.

Notwithstanding the successes of Earl Cornwallis, and the moral impression which he left behind with all the native states, their treachery and selfishness were such that the English could rely on no treaty, nor on the personal disposition of any chief; reliance could be alone placed on their own power for peace, and the integrity of their territories. The influence of the French was again beginning to be felt. They formed a fresh treaty with the nizam of the Deccan, and acquired such power over him by means purely diplomatic, that he took two French brigades into his service.

The disturbances in Europe, which ensued upon the French revolution, threatened to affect the interests of England in India. The coasting trade was impeded by French cruisers, and no effectual means were taken against them until much loss of property, and some loss of life ensued. Commodore Cornwallis, in the spring of 1794, checked these attacks upon the coasting vessels.

Tippoo Sultan having performed all that he had stipulated, and scrupulously maintained peace, his sons were therefore surrendered to him on the 28th of March. It was the belief of the governments of all the presidencies that the sultan was, by a rigid economy, and a skilful attention to the resources of his dominions, preparing for a new struggle, in order to regain the territories wrested from him, and his prestige in Southern India, and that he only awaited the restoration of his children to take a more decided course. Strong suspicions were entertained that he was, with such objects, already in

correspondence with the Sultan of Turkey, and with the revolutionary government of France. As soon as Tippoo received his sons, indications were given that he was preparing for war, and the foe against whom the bolt was likely to be thrown was the nizam. A jealousy existed between this prince and the Peishwa of the Mahrattas, and Tippoo was anxious to ally himself with the latter.

The treaties of 1790 clearly constrained neutrality on the part of the English, and such a policy suited the temper of the governor-general. The French took advantage of that neutrality, and instigated both the Mahrattas and the nizam to make war. French officers and troops actually joined both armies. The nizam was defeated without any help from Tippoo, and the Mahrattas were ascendant in all Southern India, except where the English, French, and Tippoo held a stern independence. The French continued to intrigue, and a French and English contingent were at the same time in the nizam's country.

While matters were thus uncertain in the Deccan, events rapidly occurred in the north, which increased the power of the English. The Vizier of Oude and the Rohillas had a fresh war, which ended in the supremacy of the ally of the English, and new arrangements, political and financial, in their favour.

The death of Sir William Jones, the learned and upright judge at Calcutta, was regarded as a loss to India and to England.

In the year 1796 the directors decided upon a revision of the military system of British India, which was carried out at an increased cost of £308,000 per annum. The appearance of a new French squadron off the coast of Coromandel caused uneasiness at the presidencies of Madras and Bengal, and the rumour that a powerful Dutch fleet was at sea, destined to co-operate with the French, deepened the alarm, and led to active defensive preparations. Sir George Keith Elphinstone encountered the Dutch fleet at the Cape of Good Hope, and compelled it to surrender, relieving the government of India of all fear from that quarter.

Before the year 1796 closed, the army of Tippoo had been increased so much, and his general military preparations were of such a character, that representations were made to him of the suspicious nature of his proceedings,

and explanations were demanded. At the same time the Madras army made ready for the field, in case the answer of the *sahib* should prove unsatisfactory. The government of Bombay also placed the coast of Malabar in a state of defence. The troops of that presidency were ordered to attack any French force landing in Western India, even if it were necessary to violate the territory of Tippoo.

The sultan's letter was ingeniously evasive, affording no explanation and offering no offence. Tippoo prepared more actively to assert certain claims upon Kurnaul, a dependency of the nizam, and the English government prepared to enforce respect for the treaty of Lord Cornwallis.

During 1796-7 the financial pressure upon the company was exceedingly severe. In whatever form the company prospered, financial distresses incessantly recurred. Sir John Shore was an able financier, but he had not the bold conceptions of Hastings, and he dared not incur the danger of impeachment in England by any measures of finance resembling those by which Hastings so often filled the coffers of the company. Sir John's conduct gave such satisfaction in England, that he was created Baron Teignmouth, October 24th, 1797.

The affairs of Oude were greatly disturbed during Sir John Shore's administration. The vizier died, a pretender ascended the musnid, the country was disturbed, the court a scene of debauchery and cruelty the most horrible and flagrant. Oude was what it had always proved before, and what it constantly became afterwards—a torment and difficulty to the English. Vizier Ali, who had been acknowledged by the government at Calcutta, was deposed, and Saadut Ali set up, who stipulated to pay seventy-six lacs of rupees instead of fifty-six paid by his predecessor, and also promised to pay up all arrears incurred by previous nabobs of that province. Territory was also surrendered, and money obtained for the company to a large amount under various forms and on different pretexts.

In March, 1798, Lord Teignmouth returned to England. Lord Cornwallis was again appointed governor-general, but, as was mentioned in a previous chapter, the state of Ireland required his services. The Earl of Mornington accepted the vacated post. On the 18th of May, 1798, Lord Mornington assumed the authority of governor-general. The first measure of great general interest upon which he entered, was a revision of the system of finance. The credit of the company was at a very low ebb, for

there existed a general impression in India that Tippoo, the French, the Mahrattas, and other powers, would all combine in a grand attempt to overthrow the English.

In June, 1798, the directors sent out a despatch for war to be proclaimed against Tippoo, if it were found that he had entered into any negotiations with the French. This resulted from a proclamation made at the beginning of the year in the Isle of France, declaring the wish of Tippoo to form an alliance offensive and defensive with France. At this juncture the force of French auxiliaries in the pay of the nizam amounted to fourteen thousand. Scindiah, the most ambitious prince in India, not excepting Hyder, had also a French force in his pay. Tippoo, early in 1799, sent an embassy to France. At Mangalore he accepted a French detachment to serve in his army, and he now seemed anxious for the moment when a renewed struggle with the English should begin.

After the peace with him in 1792, the state of the army was, as usual, permitted to decline in Madras, so that in 1799, General Harris, who then commanded the troops there, declared that it was inadequate even for the defence of the Madras territory. North-western India was in danger from the Affghans, whose incursions were incessant and fierce. The state of the British army there was most unsatisfactory. It was principally recruited from Oude fanatics, who were disloyal; and the relaxation of discipline was such as to excite the utmost alarm of General Sir James Craig, who went so far as to affirm that from the want of discipline, and the general character of the sepoys, "the fate of our empire in India probably hung by a thread of the slightest texture." Again, the commander-in-chief reported, "A defensive war must ever be ruinous to us in India, and we have no means for conducting an offensive one."

The Sikhs and the Mahrattas carried on consultations which were supposed to be inimical to the English. Under French influence and instigation all India seemed ripe for a combined attack upon the English, when in 1798 Lord Mornington found himself at the head of the government.

Immediately upon the arrival of Lord Mornington as governor-general of India, he found himself opposed by the council of Madras in a manner similar to that from which Hastings suffered so much inconvenience. His lordship possessed a spirit resolute like that of Hastings, but his aristocratic connexions in England gave him a power and authority which were wanting to Hastings. He resolved to exercise both, in asserting his

prerogative as governor-general, and he at last succeeded in quelling the insubordinate disposition of the jobbing council of Madras.

At this juncture in Indian history, a man appeared upon the stage destined to acquire a fame wide as the world, and lasting as time—Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington. In February, 1797, he landed at Calcutta with the 33rd regiment of the line, of which he was lieutenant-colonel.*

* The history of the Duke of Wellington is too well known to English readers to render it necessary to give any detailed account of the previous history of that wonderful man. Yet as the circulation of our History of the British Empire in the East is considerably beyond the limits of the British Isles, the following brief notice may be desirable:—"It is a circumstance of rather unusual occurrence that the day and place of a famous birth should be unknown even to contemporary inquirers; yet such is the case on the present occasion. It is certain that the Duke of Wellington was born in Ireland, and of an Irish family, and that the year in which he saw the light was that which ushered also Napoleon Buonaparte into the world. The 1st of May, 1769, is specified, with few variations, as the birthday of Arthur Wellesley by those of his biographers who venture on such circumstantiality, and Dangan Castle, county Meath, has been selected with similar unanimity as the scene of the event. The former of these statements has received a kind of confirmation by the adoption of the duke's name and sponsorship for a royal infant born on the day in question; yet, in the registry of St. Peter's Church, Dublin, it is duly recorded that 'Arthur, son of the Right Honourable Earl and Countess of Mornington,' was there christened by 'Isaac Maun, archdeacon, on the 30th April, 1769.' This entry, while it conclusively negatives one of the two foregoing presumptions, materially invalidates the other also; for, though not impossible, it is certainly not likely that the infant, if born at Dangan, would have been baptized in Dublin. Our own information leads us to believe that the illustrious subject of this biography first saw the light in the town residence of his parents, Mornington House, a mansion of some pretensions in the centre of the eastern side of Upper Merrion Street, Dublin, and which, as it abutted eighty years ago as a corner house upon a large area, since enclosed with buildings, was occasionally described as situate in Merrion Square. We are not inclined, however, to pursue a question of which the most notable point is the indifference with which it was treated by the person most immediately concerned. The Duke kept his birthday on the 18th of June."

Arthur Wellesley, by the death of his father in 1781, became dependent, at an early age, upon the care and prudence of his mother. Under this direction of his studies he was sent to Eton, from which college he was transferred first to private tuition at Brighton, and subsequently to the military seminary of Angiers, in France. On the 7th of March, 1787, being then in the eighteenth year of his age, the Hon. Arthur Wellesley received his first commission as an ensign in the 73rd regiment of foot. His promotion was rapid, but not more so in its first steps than in examples visible at the present day, and much less so than in the case of some of his contemporaries. He remained a subaltern four years and three months, at the expiration of which period of service he received his captaincy. The honour of having trained the Duke of Wellington would be highly regarded in the traditions of any particular corps, but so numerous and rapid were his exchanges at this period, that the distinction can hardly be claimed by any of the regiments on the rolls of which he was temporarily borne. He entered the army,

It will be seen from the brief abstract of the memoir given in the note below, that when the Hon. Arthur Wellesley landed in India, he was in his twenty-eighth year, had seen considerable service, and had occupied the post of a brigadier in critical circumstances; indeed, both the lieutenant-colonel and his regiment had received high commendations for their conduct at various operations in the Low Countries.

as we have said, in the 73rd, but in the same year he moved, as lieutenant, to the 76th, and within the next eighteen months was transferred, still in a subaltern's capacity, to the 41st foot and the 12th Light Dragoons, successively. On the 30th of June, 1791, he was promoted to a captaincy in the 58th, from which corps he exchanged into the 18th Light Dragoons in the October of the year following. At length, on the 30th of April, 1793, he obtained his majority in the 33rd, a regiment which may boast of considerable identification with his renown, for he proceeded in it to his lieutenant-colonelcy and colonelcy, and commanded it personally throughout the early stages of his active career. These rapid exchanges bespeak the operation of somewhat unusual interest in pushing the young officer forward; for in those days a soldier ordinarily continued in the corps to which he was first gazetted, and to which his hopes, prospects, and connections were mainly confined. So close, indeed, and permanent were the ties thus formed, that when Colonel Wellesley's own comrade and commander, General Harris, was asked to name the title by which he would desire to enter the peerage, he could only refer to the 5th Fusiliers as having been for nearly six-and-twenty years his constant home. The brother of Lord Mornington was raised above these necessities of routine, but what is chiefly noticeable in the incidents described is, that the period of his probationary service was divided between cavalry and infantry alike—a circumstance of some advantage to so observant a mind.

Before the active career of the young officer commenced, he was attached as aide-de-camp to the staff of the Earl of Westmoreland, then Lord-lieutenant of Ireland, and in 1790, having just come of age, he was returned to the Irish parliament for the family borough of Trim. The most eager researches into this period of his career have not elicited anything to prove that he was distinguished from those around him. In one particular, indeed, he shared the failings common to his class and times, after a fashion singularly contrasted with the subsequent developments of his character. Captain Wellesley got seriously into debt. So pressing were his obligations, that he accepted temporary relief from a bootmaker in whose house he lodged, and before quitting England on foreign service, confided the arrangement of his affairs to another Dublin tradesman, whom he empowered for this purpose to receive the disposable portion of his income.

At length, in the month of May, 1794, Arthur Wellesley, being then in his 26th year, and in command of the 33rd regiment—a position which he owed to his brother's liberality—embarked at Cork for service on the continent of Europe, so that his first active duties involved great independent responsibility. Throughout the war in the Netherlands, the Hon. Arthur Wellesley distinguished himself by courage and ability. The command of a brigade had devolved upon him by seniority, and he had commanded the rearguard in a disastrous retreat. After the termination of the Netherlands campaign, his regiment returned to England, where it remained until ordered to India.—*Abridged from Memoir of the Duke of Wellington, in "The Times," September 16, 1852.*

At the period that Colonel Arthur Wellesley and his brother, the Earl of Mornington, governor-general of India, met at Calcutta, war with Tippoo Sultan was imminent. On this account the 33rd regiment was ordered to Madras, where, in September, 1798, Colonel Wellesley arrived. It was a circumstance both singular and important, that the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, who was destined to play so important a part in the coming war with Tippoo, had had previous opportunity of making himself acquainted in a military point of view with Madras, the Carnatic, and the contiguous territory of Mysore. Soon after Colonel Wellesley had landed at Calcutta, he was ordered on an expedition to Manila, but the dangerous condition of affairs at Madras led to the recall of that expedition. On his return from the Straits of Malacca, he proceeded to Madras, without touching at Calcutta. He there made acquaintance with Lord Hotham, the governor, remained in the presidency for several weeks, examined the ground which must be passed over in a conflict with Tippoo, and made himself well acquainted with the military capabilities, defensive and offensive, of the Carnatic, so that when he was ordered to Madras officially, he was a competent judge of the military questions which were then under discussion.

On Lord Hotham's removal from the government, Lord Clive, eldest son of the great conqueror of Bengal, arrived to fill that situation. How different his position and prospects from that of his illustrious father! The first Clive landed upon the sea-stricken shores of Madras, poor and desolate, a mere clerk, in the lowest situation; the son and successor of that unfriended youth landed as governor of that very place, with the rank and title of a peer, and all the advantage which great wealth confers.

The Earl of Mornington entertained a very high respect for Lord Clive, although they had never met, and he at once opened communications with him of a confidential nature as to the government and prospects of the presidency, the causes of former failures and present dangers, and the grounds of hope for future success. There is a frank, manly, generous tone in the communications of the governor-general to Lord Clive, which cannot fail to impress men much in his favour. The governor-general also requested Lord Clive to accept the exposition of his views, which would be made by his brother, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley. Thus the latter was brought into intimate and confidential relations at once with the governor of the presidency, to the defence of which he was to

bear so important a relation. The connexion also of Colonel Wellesley with General Harris, then commanding the troops of the presidency, was intimate and full of confidence—another circumstance which bore upon the future favour of the colonel, and upon the good of the service.

Before passing to the narrative of events in which General, afterwards Lord Harris, took so important a part, some notice of that noble soldier is desirable. General Harris described himself thus, "A humble clergyman's son, thrown very early in life into the army, entirely a soldier of fortune, with scarce any assistance save my own exertions." It is remarkable that the great Duke of Wellington, notwithstanding his aristocratic connexions, attributed his advancement also to his own exertions:—"I raised myself to my present position," was one of his terse expressions in the house of lords, spoken in the closing period of his career.

The father of General (Lord) Harris was the youngest child of seven; he was educated for the church, but never advanced beyond the rank of a curate. Lord George Sackville was an intimate friend of the struggling curate, and promised to provide a profession for one of his children. George was the eldest son of the Rev. Mr. Harris, and was born in the year 1744. When about fourteen years of age, Lord George Sackville gave him a cadetship in the royal artillery, his lordship being then master-general of the Ordnance. On the displacement of Lord George, his successor, the Marquis of Granby, confirmed the appointment, and thus commenced the military career of Lord George Harris. He was afterwards gazetted to an ensigncy in the 5th regiment of foot. In 1765 he obtained a lieutenancy by purchase, the means of which were obtained by the greatest difficulty. He soon after obtained leave of absence in order to travel and study in France, and he there not only learned the French language, but studied the military art as professed by that nation. On his return he joined his regiment in Ireland, where many adventures befel him trying to his courage and prudence, but confirming those virtues in him. In 1771 he obtained a company by the severest self-denial on the part of his mother, as it had to be purchased by an outlay of £1100; he had then attained his twenty-sixth year. He soon after was ordered with his regiment to America. He soon saw active service there, and was desperately wounded at the battle of Bunker's Hill. After rapidly recovering from his wound, he was again engaged with the Americans, and was again wounded. He was afterwards entrusted by Earl Cornwallis with

a letter to Washington, and obtained the majority of the 5th regiment. Colonel Walcott having been shot through the body at German Town, Major Harris took the command of the regiment. While covering the embarkation of the troops from Philadelphia, he made the friendship of the celebrated Admiral Lord Howe, an event which influenced the major's future career. In October, 1778, he went with General Meadows on a secret expedition against St. Lucie. General Meadows, with one thousand seven hundred British, was attacked by five thousand French, who were signally repulsed. On this occasion Major Harris, at the head of the 5th, greatly distinguished himself.

After these events the major embarked in a Dutch vessel for England, and was captured by a French privateer. He was almost immediately set at liberty, and after visiting home, and marrying, re-embarked to join his regiment at Barbadoes. In 1780 he again returned to England, and was persuaded by General Meadows to go with him to Bombay, as military secretary and aide-de-camp. From Bombay he proceeded with General (Sir William) Meadows to Madras, and served in the campaigns against Tippoo Sultan, in 1790, so that the character of the country of Mysore, and of its resources, army, and sovereign, were well known to General Harris, when, under the government of the Earl of Mornington, his services were required in a post of high command.

After the campaigns of Earl Cornwallis, General Harris returned to England, but again went out to India, landing at Calcutta in October, 1794, when he received the appointment of commander-in-chief at Madras. His nominal rank in the army was afterwards raised to that of lieutenant-general, and a seat in the Madras council was given to him, in which he supported the authority of the Earl of Mornington, when as governor-general that factious body attempted to oppose him. These high honours were conferred upon him in 1797. In this position the events now under relation found the commander-in-chief of the Madras army.

The Earl of Mornington was determined to bring the dangers and difficulties of India to an immediate solution. He laid down a plan of action, and sent it as a secret despatch to Lieutenant-general Harris, and recommended his brother, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, to devote his skill and energy to the object of bringing the troops in cantonments to a higher state of discipline. The noble earl resolved upon bringing Tippoo to account for his conspiracy with the French against the English.

Meanwhile events went on elsewhere which quickened Lord Mornington's decision. "At the very moment when Colonel Wellesley was ordered to Madras, Buonaparte had actually disembarked a French army on the shores of Egypt, and had put himself in communication with Tippoo—facts quite menacing enough to warrant unusual misgivings. The strength, too, of the Mysore army gave at least seventy thousand troops, admirably equipped, and in no contemptible state of discipline, while the Madras muster rolls showed a total of no more than fourteen thousand of all arms, including less than four thousand Europeans. In fact, Lord Mornington had been compelled to exchange the scheme of attack originally contemplated for a more cautious and regular exertion of his strength. With these reluctant conclusions he ordered General Harris to stand on the defensive along the Mysore frontier, and to augment the efficiency of his army by all available means, while he turned his own attention to the native courts, whose alliance or neutrality it was desirable to secure. That nothing on his part might be wanting to the success of the enterprise, he had transferred himself and his staff from Calcutta to Madras, and the effects of his policy and his presence were quickly discernible in the impulse communicated to every department of the service, and the restoration of energy and confidence throughout the presidency. These efforts were admirably seconded by the practical exertions of his brother at Wallajahbad. So effectually had Colonel Wellesley employed the three months of his local command, that the division under his charge from being weak and ill provided had become conspicuous for its organization and equipment; and when the whole army afterwards took the field in wonderful efficiency, the especial services of Colonel Wellesley in bringing about this result were acknowledged in a general order of the commander-in-chief."

Among the measures which demanded Lord Mornington's care and vigour, was a plan for disarming the French in the nizam's employ. The scheme adopted was the governor-general's own, and the *modus operandi* was drawn up by him in detail, and executed with the utmost secrecy, and the most energetic promptitude. A treaty was concluded with the nizam, September 1st, 1798; by it a contingent of six thousand company's soldiers with artillery was to serve with the army of the Deccan. In pursuance of this arrangement, Colonel Roberts, with his detachment, reached Hyderabad on the 10th of October. Everything was silently made ready, and on the 22nd the English contingent, with a force of cavalry belonging to the nizam, surrounded

the French camp, disarmed all the sepoy, and seized the persons of the French officers, without shedding one drop of blood.

The governor-general showed an earnest desire to avert war; he granted a ready compliance with certain demands concerning disputed territory made by Tippoo's vakeels. He endeavoured to open up negotiations for conferring peace, by breaking up the alliance between Tippoo and the French. Colonel Doveton was commissioned to facilitate a settlement; but after three separate efforts to accomplish his purpose, which were defeated by the evasions of Tippoo, there remained no appeal but to the sword.

The governor-general having settled a new treaty with the nizam, directed negotiations through Colonel Palmer to the Mahrattas. The colonel produced at the court of Poonah the proclamation of the French governor of the Mauritius, announcing Tippoo as an ally to drive the English out of India. His excellency wished to have a contingent placed in connexion with the Peishwa, as had just been arranged at the court of the nizam. The Mahratta minister refused compliance, but expressed his purpose to abide by the treaty under which the last war with Tippoo had been brought to so happy an issue. By negotiations with Persia, a stop was put to the threatening proceedings of Zemaun Shah in the north-west. His excellency's next step was to form a commission for the purpose of correspondence with all tributaries, allies, or subject chiefs connected with Mysore, so as to detach them from connexion with the sultan. This commission was comprised of remarkable men, namely, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel Close, Lieutenant-colonel Agnew, Captain Malcolm, political assistant at Hyderabad, and Captain Macaulay. At last, a declaration of war was made; Tippoo was summoned to submit, and referred to General Harris as the medium through whom he must make any communication to the governor-general.

The council of Madras was reluctant to enter upon the war; everything there was, as it always had been when left to a Madras council, in confusion and distress. There were no funds, no commissariat, the troops insufficient in number and equipment, and no readiness even for operations of defence.

Mr. J. Webbe, the chief secretary, considered the plans of Lord Mornington dangerous and impracticable, and the opinions of this functionary had great weight with the community of Madras, native and European. The future Duke of Wellington had so high an opinion of him that he had his portrait hung up at Strathfieldsaye, and used

to point it out as the likeness of one of the ablest and honestest men he ever knew. General Harris was, however, determined to carry out the views of the governor-general, which he believed sound, whatever course might be taken by the "timid members of council." Mr. Webbe, so much esteemed by the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, pronounced against war with Tippoo, notwithstanding his conspiracy with the French, on the ground that the French could not then aid him, that Tippoo could not of himself disturb the balance of power, and that it was impolitic for the English to extirpate the sultan, as they would by that act increase unduly the influence of the nizam and the Mahrattas. The reasoning of Mr. Webbe was sound, although Tippoo deserved any penalty the English could inflict. The predictions of Mr. Webbe were verified, the destruction of Tippoo was one of the elements of the great Mahratta war, in which the English expended so much blood and treasure. Earl Mornington acted with justice towards Tippoo. He did not proclaim war until efforts of moderation failed. It was his conviction that the French would succeed in throwing forces into India to aid the sultan, unless he were speedily removed out of the way. The governor-general's mode of proceeding disclosed eminent capacity, but after all Mr. Webbe was correct in his policy. Had Tippoo been left to himself at that juncture, it might have been as well for English interests in India for a long time. The die however was cast, and the differences between the Mysore tyrant and the East India Company were soon to be settled by the sullen arbiter—war.

In the conduct of Lord Clive, General Harris and the governor-general obtained co-operation and support. His lordship relieved the general from the cares of the Madras government, which had virtually devolved upon him, and he worked with an earnestness worthy of his gifted father.

Mr. Webbe, the ablest civilian then in India, fell under the displeasure of the directors and the government at home, because of his conscientious and honourable opposition to Lord Mornington. His lordship, Lord Clive, and General Harris, protested against the removal and political degradation of so upright and competent a person, and induced the directors to revoke their measures, but the inferior members of the Madras council, anxious to gain favour with the home authorities, contrived to divest him of the chief secretaryship, and send him to Nagpore. The noble sufferer took this so much to heart, that, *en route*, upon the banks of the Ner-buddah, he died of a broken heart. The

conduct of the Earl of Mornington, Lord Clive, and General Harris towards this invaluable man, was honourable, generous, manly, and just, as might be expected from such men, who sympathised with honour and genius, and who in differing from the gifted secretary, respected his judgment and his motives, and confided in his talents and integrity. Probably at no period of the eventful life of General Harris, excepting while engaged, soon after, in the siege of Seringapatam, did he feel such a sense of anxiety and responsibility, as during the discussions with Mr. Webbe, and his preparations for this war. To such an extent was his mind oppressed with these feelings, that he wrote to the governor-general, begging that Sir A. Clark, then at Calcutta, should be appointed to the supreme command. His excellency considered the general competent, and ex-

pressed his reluctance to remove him from so honourable and important a post, even at his own request. The governor-general being then at Madras, a personal interview removed the general's doubts, and restored his confidence. The general, remembering the experiences of Lord Cornwallis, under whom he had served in the previous war against Tippoo, expressed his determination to advance at once upon the capital, to evade even a general engagement with Tippoo, and not to tarry for any advantage whatever, but to decide the war at the capital, unless Tippoo forced on an engagement by throwing his army across the march of the British. The governor-general concurred in this line of strategy, as did also the superior officers of the army. The progress and events of the war itself must form the subject of a separate chapter.

CHAPTER XCIX.

FINAL WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN—STORMING OF SERINGAPATAM—DEATH OF TIPPOO.

WHEN at last the hour arrived for commencing the conflict with Tippoo which he had by his folly provoked, the arrangements of the British were in a condition to inspire the highest hope, except in the department of the commissariat, in which the English had always proved themselves deficient. The opening of the campaign has been much praised. "The whole force put in motion consisted of three columns: the corps of the Carnatic, thirty thousand strong; that of Bombay, two-thirds less numerous; and the contingent of our ally, the nizâm. The latter consisted of the British detachment in the nizâm's service, of a few battalions of his own infantry, including some of M. Raymond's force lately disbanded, and of a large body of cavalry. To complete the efficiency of this powerful division it was resolved to add a king's regiment to its rolls, and at the express wish of the nizâm's minister, coupled with the prompt approval of General Harris, Colonel Wellesley's corps was selected for this duty, and on him the general command of the whole contingent was suffered to devolve. By these arrangements, which were to the unqualified satisfaction of all parties concerned, Colonel Wellesley assumed a prominent place in the conduct of the war, and enjoyed opportunities of displaying both his special intelligence and his intuitive military powers. Few opportunities indeed could be better calculated for the

full development of his genius. He held a command sufficiently independent to elicit all his talents; he formed one of the political commission attached to the commander-in-chief; and he acted under the eyes of a governor whose acuteness in discerning merit and promptitude in rewarding it were quickened on this occasion by the natural impulses of affection. Nor were there wanting in the same ranks either models of excellence or stout competitors for fame. Besides Harris himself, there were Baird and Cotton, Dallas and Brown, Floyd and Malcolm—soldiers all of them of high distinction and extraordinary renown, who either sought or staked a professional reputation in this memorable war against Tippoo Sultan."

The anonymous writer just quoted thus sketched the progress of the campaign:—"By the end of February, 1799, the invading forces had penetrated into the dominions of Mysore, though so difficult was the country, and so insufficient, notwithstanding the previous preparations, were the means of transport, that half-a-dozen miles constituted an ordinary day's march, and three weeks were consumed in conveying intelligence from the western division of the army to the eastern. The first movements of Tippoo from his central position had been judiciously directed against the weaker corps which was advancing from Cannanore on the opposite coast of

the peninsula, but in his attempt on this little force he was signally repulsed, on which, wheeling to the right about, and retracing his steps, he brought himself face to face with the main army under General Harris near Malavelly, a place within thirty miles of his capital city, Seringapatam. His desires to engage were promptly met by the British commander, who received his attack with the right wing of the army, leaving the left, which was composed of the nizam's contingent under Colonel Wellesley, to charge and turn the flank of the enemy opposed to it. Colonel Wellesley's dispositions for this assault were speedily made, and, having been approved by General Harris, were executed with complete success. The conduct of the 33rd decided the action. Knowing that if he could break the European regiment the native battalions might be expected to despair, the sultan directed a column of his choicest troops against Colonel Wellesley's corps; which, reserving its fire till the enemy had closed, delivered a searching volley, charged, and threw the whole column into a disorder which the sabres of the dragoons were not long in converting to a rout. After this essay it was clear that the campaign would turn upon the siege of the capital, and on the 4th of April the army, by the judicious strategy of Harris, arrived in effective condition before the ramparts of Seringapatam. Between the camp of the besiegers and the walls of this famous fortress stretched a considerable extent of irregular and broken ground, affording excellent cover to the enemy for annoying the British lines with musketry and rocket practice. At one extremity was a "tope" or grove called the Sultan Pétah tope, composed mainly of betel-trees, and intersected by numerous watercourses for the purposes of irrigation. The first operations of the besiegers were directed to the occupation of a position so peculiarly serviceable to the party maintaining it. Accordingly, on the night of the 4th, General Baird was ordered to scour this tope—a commission which he discharged without encountering any opposition. Next morning Tipoo's troops were again seen to occupy it in great force, on which General Harris resolved to repeat the attack on the succeeding night, and to retain the position when carried. The duty was entrusted on this occasion to Colonel Wellesley, who, with the 33rd and a native battalion, was to be supported by another detachment of similar strength under Colonel Shawe. This was the famous affair of which so much has been said, and which, with such various colourings, has been described as the first service of Arthur, Duke of Wellington. On receiving the order, Colonel Wellesley

addressed to his commander the following note, remarkable as being the first of that series of despatches which now constitute an extraordinary monument of his fame:—

Camp, 5th April, 1799.

MY DEAR SIR,—I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines, and show it to me. In the meantime I will order my battalions to be in readiness.

Upon looking at the tope as I came in just now, it appeared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah you have the tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.

I am, my dear Sir, your most faithful servant,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"This letter has been often appealed to as evidence of that brevity, perspicacity, and decision, afterwards recognised as such notable characteristics of the great duke's style. The attack made by Colonel Wellesley was a failure. Bewildered in the darkness of the night, and entangled in the difficulties of the tope, the assaulting parties were thrown into confusion, and, although Shawe was enabled to report himself in possession of the post assigned to him, Colonel Wellesley was compelled, as the general records in his private diary, to come, 'in a good deal of agitation, to say he had not carried the tope.' When daylight broke the attack was renewed with instantaneous success, showing at once what had been the nature of the obstacles on the previous night; but the affair has been frequently quoted as Wellington's 'only failure,' and the particulars of the occurrence were turned to some account in the jealousies and scandals from which no camp is wholly free. The reader will at once perceive that the circumstances suggest no discussion whatever. A night attack, by the most natural of results, failed of its object, and was successfully executed the next morning as soon as the troops discovered the nature of their duties."

During these and subsequent operations General Harris showed conscientiousness, capacity, and untiring diligence, so that the Duke of Wellington observed: "It is not sufficiently known that General Harris himself conducted the details of the victorious army which he commanded." Independent of his personal exertions in the details of the army, the general produced a voluminous body of despatches, letters, and reports, full of information and interest, and proving that he was competent in wielding the pen as well as the sword. In approaching Seringapatam his temper and diligence were severely tried by the casualties to baggage, baggage animals, carriages, stores, and guns, especially the battering trains, occasioned by the nature of

the country. All the predictions of Mr. Webbe were fulfilled, and much that the general feared from his previous experience under Lord Cornwallis came to pass. Fortunately the progress of General Harris was unopposed, in consequence of the expedition of Tippoo to cut off the Bombay army, as already referred to in the quotation just cited. That event was of considerable importance to the campaign, and the defence of the troops of the Bombay army reflected great honour upon them, and much influenced the fate of the war. Tippoo would have succeeded in surprising the army of General Stuart, and in cutting off a brigade before the main army could come to its assistance, but for the vigilance of the Rajah of Coorg, who, the reader will remember, materially aided the advance of General Abercromby's army in the previous war. Lieutenant-colonel Montresor had command of three native battalions at Sedaseer, near Periapatam. In this direction Tippoo's army cut through the jungles with astonishing celerity, and fell upon the brigade, which made an obstinate defence under the gallant example and skilful arrangements of the brigadier. This occurred on the 6th of March, but Tippoo's vicinity was discovered through the vigilance of the Rajah of Coorg, on the day before, who, hastening to General Stuart, apprised him of the danger of Colonel Montresor's detachment. The rajah hurried with his own troops to the colonel's assistance, and General Stuart in person made a rapid march with a regiment of British infantry, and the flank companies of another. The rajah, in his despatch to the governor-general, gave by far the most interesting account of the event which appeared. Its unique character will interest the reader:—"On Tuesday, the 5th of March, myself, Captain Mahony, and some other English sirdars, went to the hill of Sedaseer, which is within my territories. This mountain, which is exceedingly lofty, the English sirdars and myself ascended, and we remained there. Having from thence reconnoitred, we observed nothing for the first four or five hours (Malabar hours); after this we observed one large tent in the direction of Periapatam, which is within the territories of Tippoo Sultan, and continued to see some other white tents rising; a large green tent then appeared, and then another tent which was red, and after that five or six hundred tents. Upon this, the English sirdars and myself were satisfied that it was the army of Tippoo Sultan; we then returned to the English army at Sedapore, and acquainted the general that Tippoo's army was at Periapatam. The army was accordingly prepared, as were also the battalions at Sedaseer, under

the command of Colonel Montresor. Next morning, Tippoo's army advanced close to the battalions under the command of Colonel Montresor, and there was a severe action. After the battle commenced, the battalions put a great many of Tippoo's people to death. Tippoo, unable to sustain their fire, and having no road by which to advance, divided his army into two divisions, with the intention of getting into the rear of Colonel Montresor's battalions by a secret path. The colonel having received intelligence of this division, made a disposition of his force so as to sustain both attacks; and maintained the fight from the morning, uninterrupted, till two o'clock. The enemy were beaten, and unable to show their faces. When the information of Tippoo's attack reached the main body, General Stuart, in order to assist the force at Sedaseer, marched with two regiments of Europeans, keeping the remainder of the army in the plain of Karrydygood. Upon this occasion I accompanied General Stuart.

"Tippoo, in order to prevent the two regiments from advancing to the relief of the troops at Sedaseer, was posted in the road between. General Stuart, upon approaching, ordered the two regiments to attack the enemy. A severe action then ensued, in which I was present with my people. Many of the enemy were slain, and many wounded, the remainder having thrown away their muskets, and swords, and their turbans, and thinking it sufficient to save their lives, fled in the greatest confusion.

"Tippoo having collected the remains of his troops, returned to Periapatam. Having considered for five days, but not having taken up resolution to attack the Bombay army again, he marched on the sixth day (Saturday) back to Seringapatam. My continual prayer to the Almighty is, that the English circar may continue as my parent, that I may remain as their child; that all their enemies may be defeated, and that their territories, measures, and prosperity, may increase without end, and that I may enjoy peace under their protection. In this manner I approach the Sovereign Ruler with my constant prayer, night and day, and all times in humble supplication."

Arrived before Seringapatam, General Harris dispatched a strong corps under General Floyd, to meet and assist General Stuart. Floyd's force consisted of four cavalry and six infantry regiments, twenty field-pieces, and a body of the nizam's horse.

On the 7th of April, 1799, the allied army took up its position for the last siege of Seringapatam. Tippoo was so much engrossed with the proceedings in his front,

that twenty-four hours elapsed before he was aware of the dispatch of General Floyd, to bring General Stuart from Periapatam. When at length he heard of the movement, he sent his confidential lieutenant, Cummer-ud-Deen, with nearly his whole cavalry, in pursuit.

On Sunday, the 11th, General Harris moved out to meet Generals Floyd and Stuart, who had in the meantime formed a junction.

The most active, if not the most successful officer with General Harris, up to the time when the siege actually commenced, was the Hon. Colonel Wellesley; yet he was exceedingly delicate, giving no promise of the "iron frame," for which he became afterwards celebrated. There is an incidental proof of the physical delicacy, and arduous energetic temperament of the embryo great man, in one of the Earl of Mornington's dispatches written at the time. His excellency, writing to General Harris, said, "Do not allow Arthur to fatigue himself too much," showing the governor-general's opinion of his brother's inability to endure much toil, and of the eager earnestness of his nature.

On the 17th of April, General Harris recorded in his journal his apprehensions as to the supplies for the armies. The commissariat was still the defective part of the service of the British army; officers competent in the field, chivalrous everywhere, seem to have given no proper attention to that indispensable part of an effective army. Men of rank thought it beneath them. General Harris himself, although infinitely painstaking, and well aware of how much depended upon regular and ample supplies, was less proficient in the ability to provision an army than in any other part of his profession. The Hon. Colonel Wellesley surpassed the general-in-chief, and all his officers, in this invaluable requisite of generalship. The state of the supplies was such on the 17th, that General Harris believed it necessary, against military rule, to hasten the attack, and run great risks in doing so, rather than hazard the loss of his army by hunger and sickness; various outpost combats ensued in consequence of this determination, which occupied two days. On the 19th, General Stuart reported to head-quarters, that the Bombay column had only two days' provision. The journal of General Harris at this time (as subsequently published by his son-in-law) betrays an anxiety intense and feverish from the inadequacy of supplies, but, nevertheless, the expression of his apprehensions is uniformly pervaded by a trust in Providence and deference to the will of God, which must be edifying to all who peruse it, and invest the memory of the man with a sacred dignity.

Thus, on the 25th of April, he wrote—"A violent storm of wind and rain last night; I trust we shall not have more rain, or it will be next to impossible to get our guns into the batteries. Providence directs all things for the best; then let us bow down in humble resignation." The guns were got into the batteries by the exertions of the general and his soldiers, although there was more rain, and the difficulties were great, for, on the 26th, he recorded—"Our new battery, and the altered one, opened, and had very soon every success expected. Determined to attack the enemy's post in our front and right in the evening. Disposition made and communicated to Colonel Wellesley, who commanded in the trenches, with the 73rd Scotch brigade, 2nd battalion Bengal volunteers, 2nd battalion 3rd regiment coast sepoys." These dispositions proved effectual, but only after the English sustained heavy loss, the sultan making desperate resistance. It was the last effort of gallantry made by Tippoo previous to the assault. The proceedings were of great importance to the English, as furnishing the ground for the breaching batteries which were yet to be erected. The order for attack was given by the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, who personally superintended its execution, with the caution and boldness which were his characteristics. The following description was given by one who had the best means of knowing the events he relates:—"At the hour proposed, the guns from our batteries commenced a heavy fire of grape, which was the signal for the attack. The Europeans then moved out, followed by the native troops. The enemy, seeing this movement, began an active fire from behind their breastwork; guns from almost every part of the fort opened upon our troops with great effect, and, by the time they had quitted the trenches, the fire of cannon and small arms was general. The companies from the 73rd regiment and Scotch brigade then pushed on with great rapidity to the enemy's works, who, seeing the determined spirit of the English troops, fled from their posts in great confusion and dismay; but many fell by the bayonet while endeavouring to escape. The relief from the trenches, which was this evening commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke, had by this time arrived; a part of the 74th regiment, and the regiment De Meuron, composed the Europeans of that relief, and were ordered immediately to advance to support the rest. These pushed on to the right of the attack. A heavy fire was continued from the ramparts, and by those of the enemy who had fled from

* The Right Honourable S. R. Lushington, for some time private secretary of Lord Harris.

the part of their intrenchments first attacked, and taken post behind the traverses more to the right; several made a desperate stand, and fell by the bayonet; the Europeans dashed in, forcing the traverses in succession, until they had extended as far as the turn of the nullah towards the stone bridge. At this turn there is a redoubt, open to the south-east angle of the fort, but which flanked a watercourse running parallel and close to the intrenchment that was carried. This redoubt was stormed by the 74th regiment, and left in their possession, while Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, with a small party of that corps, and a few men from the regiment De Meuron, pushed forward along the intrenchments and the road, till he came to the bridge leading over the great river. Lieutenant-colonel Wallace at the same time advancing considerably more to the right, till, fearful of risking too many lives while acting in the dark, he prudently fell back, and took possession of the enemy's post at the stone bridge, on the road to Shawc's post; but this post being too much detached from the main body of the troops, he withdrew the party left to defend it during the night. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell crossed the bridge, and went some distance on the island; but it was necessary to make an immediate retreat from that dangerous situation, and nothing but the night and the consternation of the enemy could have given the smallest chance for the party to escape. They returned under a heavy fire from all sides, and made their way back to the redoubt, where Lieutenant-colonel Wallace had taken post with the few of the 74th regiment who had remained with him, and the rest of the troops with whom he had placed to the left along the watercourse, which runs close to the intrenchment, and in this situation they remained all night, exposed to grape from the fort, and galled by the musketry from the ground on the right flank, and from the post at the stone bridge, which took them in the rear. The enemy continued firing grape and musketry at intervals the whole night; at length the daylight appeared, and discovered both to us and to them the critical state of our men. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell having been crippled the preceding night by being barefooted during his excursion across the bridge, was obliged to return to camp, and Lieutenant-colonel Wallace being next in command, he sent to inform Colonel Sherbrooke of their situation, and to request further support, as the enemy were collecting in great force on the right flank, and at the post they occupied near the stone bridge, from which they galled our people in the rear to a great degree.

Colonel Sherbrooke, on receiving this report, instantly ordered all the Europeans who had remained in the trenches to advance to Colonel Wallace's post, and each man to take with him a pickaxe, or *moumitie*.* Colonel Wallace, in the meantime, seeing the necessity of dislodging the enemy from the bridge, ordered Major Skelly, with a few men of the Scotch brigade, to move down and attack that post. He was followed by a company from that regiment, and soon got possession.

"The Europeans had by this time arrived from the trenches, and by their exertion and the assistance of the pioneers, an intrenchment was thrown up and completed by ten o'clock; but from the dawn of day to that hour continued efforts were made by the garrison to regain what had been lost, but in vain. The determined bravery of our troops baffled all their endeavours. The post gained at the bridge secured the rear of the other, and presented a new front to the enemy; it was strengthened by another company from the 74th regiment and two companies of sepoys, and in a short time the whole of them were under cover. The loss on this occasion was great. Two officers and sixty men killed, ten officers and two hundred and sixteen men wounded; nineteen men also missing; altogether, killed, wounded, and missing, three hundred and seven officers and men."

On the night of the 28th, a breaching battery was erected, which on the morning of the 30th, was opened against the walls. By the 1st of May the outer wall of the west angle of the fort was partly demolished, and the masonry of the bastion within was greatly shaken.

On the 2nd of May, Tipoo made clever and daring efforts to close the breach, which he was enabled, in a considerable degree to effect, because the English working parties who were preparing for the assault, were in such a position as to prevent discharges of grape against Tipoo's workers. Colonel Wellesley, perceiving this disadvantage, used the most strenuous and persevering exertions to complete the task committed to the English workmen, so as to leave the range free against the workmen of the sultan, or the breach still practicable, if the general-in-chief should order an assault. The letter in which the future hero of so many other great sieges reported his proceedings, is very characteristic—terse, pointed, and complete. It will be seen that the Hon. Colonel Wel-

* A sort of spade, used throughout India in the removal of earth, and very efficient in the hands of those who are accustomed to it. It is chiefly employed in the formation of those magnificent reservoirs for water, to which the peninsula owes its fertility.

lesley had, in a subordinate command, to encounter at Seringapatam the very difficulty which so much impeded him in the war of the Iberian peninsula some years later—want of tools. Many a time during his brilliant career in Portugal and Spain had he to make a report in similar terms—"It could not be done for want of tools." Even so late as the siege of Sebastopol the English soldiers were unable from this cause to perform the task assigned to them. Or when supplied with tools, the result in India, Spain, and the Crimea has been the same—they were of such bad material as to be soon rendered useless. It is strangely characteristic of the English, that with resources beyond all other nations for military appliances, they should be neglectful beyond all other nations in providing them, notwithstanding innumerable proofs of the danger incurred by the neglect, and the sacrifice of human life which it occasioned.

To Lieutenant-general Harris.

MY DEAR SIR,—We did all our work last night, except filling the sand-bags, which could not be done for want of tools. I shall have them filled in the course of this morning, and there will be no inconvenience from the delay, as it was not deemed advisable last night to do more than look for the ford; and it is not intended to do anything to it until the night before it is to be used.

Lieutenant Lalor, of the 73rd, crossed over to the glacis. On the left of the breach, he found the wall which he believes to be the retaining wall of the glacis, seven feet high, and the water (included in those seven feet) fourteen inches deep. It is in no part more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other officers crossed by different routes, but none went so far as Lieutenant Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c., notwithstanding the fire which was kept upon it. It was impossible to fire grape, as our trench was exposed, from which alone we could fire as we repaired the other. Lieutenant Lalor is now on duty here with his regiment, but if you wish it, he will remain here to-night, and try the river again.

I am, &c., ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The period for the assault at last arrived, and the commander-in-chief resolved to devolve that duty upon Major-general Baird. That officer was ordered to capture the rampart as his preliminary measure in the actual attack. In order to accomplish this, his force should be divided into two columns, one to proceed along the northern rampart, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop; the other to proceed along the southern rampart, and to be commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke. These columns were to proceed in their respective routes until they joined on the eastern face, thus making a complete circuit of the rampart. They were then to descend into the town, attacking such cavaliers as were not captured in the onset, and routing any bodies of troops making a stand for the defence of the place.

An excellent arrangement was suggested

to General Baird by the commander-in-chief, to prevent confusion or accident among the troops giving the assault, and also to conceal from the enemy to the latest moment the intention to make it that night. The different corps were to proceed to the trenches at such hours during the night, and in such succession, as should place them there in the precise order that they were to go out to the assault. Thus each party would know its precise place the moment the signal should be given to incur the hazard of the undertaking. It was agreed between the commander-in-chief and Major-general Baird that such should be the plan of operations.

As the assault upon Seringapatam, which terminated the career of Tipoo, is one of the episodes in Indian history most interesting to English readers,—the war against Tipoo having been the only Indian war very popular in England,—the events which issued in the catastrophe of the throne of Mysore will be given in detail. Colonel Close, the adjutant-general (afterwards Sir Barry Close), communicated to General Baird, on May 3rd, his final orders for the morrow. Some knowledge of these is necessary for the clear comprehension of the whole action, for an account of a battle, especially if it be the storming of a fortification, however exciting certain features of the conflict may be, cannot afford an intelligent interest to the reader unless the plan of operations is first possessed, if not in all its minutiae, yet sufficiently in detail to show the dependence of one part upon another in conducting to one grand result.

Disposition of the Troops ordered for the Assault of the Fort of Seringapatam, on the 4th of May, 1799.

Left attack, under Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop.

To move in column, left in front.

To take possession of the cavalier, close to the breach, and move along the north rampart of the fort; to proceed till they join the right attack, leaving a battalion company of the 33rd regiment in charge of the cavalier already mentioned, close to the breach, and occupying such other parts on the ramparts, by detachments from the 12th and 33rd regiments, as shall be thought necessary by Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop.

Right attack, under Colonel Sherbrooke.

To move in column, right in front.

To move along the south rampart of the fort, leaving such parties as may be thought necessary by Colonel Sherbrooke, from the 73rd or 74th regiments, in charge of such parts of the ramparts as he may deem it essentially necessary to occupy.

Half of the European and half of the native pioneers to accompany each attack with hatchets; the European pioneers to carry the scaling ladders, assisted by forty men from the battalion companies of each of the leading regiments; the native pioneers to carry a proportion of fascines.

If the road across the river and the breach shall be deemed sufficiently broad, the two attacks to move out to the assault at the same moment. On coming to the top of

the breach, they are to wheel to the right and left, so as to get on the face they are ordered to move on; but if the road and breach are too narrow, the left attack is to move out first. The leading companies of each attack to use the bayonet principally, and not to fire but in cases of absolute necessity.

Each attack to be preceded by a sergeant and twelve volunteers, supported by a subaltern officer and twenty-five men.

The leading flank companies of each attack to be provided with hand-hatchets.

Major-general Baird carried his orders into speedy and precise execution. While he was doing so, the English batteries kept up through the night an incessant fire, and so well was it directed towards the breach, that the enemy was unable to work at it. There were no indications that the enemy expected the assault, although this continued night fire might have been regarded by him as a portent of the coming storm. The British army, confident in the genius of such men as Harris, Baird, Wellesley, Close, Stuart, Shawe, Malcolm, &c., were full of joyous excitement. These, upon whom the chief responsibility devolved, were exceedingly anxious. At a little before one o'clock, the hour appointed for the assault, the commander-in-chief sat in his tent alone, in profound thought and painful suspense. Captain Malcolm, already famous, although destined to be better known to the world as Sir John Malcolm, came on business connected with the approaching crisis. Seeing the general's expression of countenance so full of mingled doubt and stern resolution, the captain cheerfully rallied his chief, saying, "Why, *my lord*, so thoughtful?" referring playfully to the probability of the conqueror of Seringapatam gaining a peerage. The general replied, "Malcolm, this is no time for compliments; we have serious work on hand; don't you see that the European sentry over my tent is so weak from want of food and exhaustion, that a sepoy could push him down. We must take the fort or perish in the attempt. I have ordered General Baird to persevere in his attack to the last extremity: if he is beat off, Wellesley is to proceed with the troops from the trenches; if he also should not succeed, I shall put myself at the head of the remainder of the army, for success is necessary to our existence."*

At the given hour—one o'clock in the afternoon, which was selected because the enemy was likely to seek repose in the heat of the day—the storming parties moved from the trenches. They boldly forded the Cavery, under a heavy fire, and many fell. Each of the divisions reached the ramparts

according to the plan prescribed, and fought their way round to the place assigned for their meeting. The resistance offered to these divisions was unequal, Tippoo in person, surrounded by his principal chiefs, having delayed the course of one of the sections of the attacking force, while the other encountered no leaders of eminence, although the troops opposed to them were numerous. Having descended into the city, all points where the enemy assumed a defensive position were speedily conquered, and at last the sultan's palace was the only considerable place remaining unvanquished.

While these events proceeded, Colonel Wellesley remained at the head of the forces in the trenches, in a state of mind similar to that of General Harris at head-quarters. Colonel Wellesley had received reports of the state of the breach, had revised them in terms exactly like those afterwards used at Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz; had superintended the final preparations, and was expecting the result from his appointed post. "It was," says one near him, "a moment of agony, and we continued with aching eyes to watch the result, until, after a short and appalling interval, we saw the acclivity of the breach covered with a cloud of crimson." The assault in fact succeeded, and Colonel Wellesley advanced from his position, not to renew a desperate attempt, but to restore some order in the captured city, and to certify the death of our dreaded enemy, by discovering his body yet warm and palpitating under a heap of his fallen adherents.

The events in the city, when the troops were drawn up before the palace eager for the assault, formed portions of the most touching and exciting episodes of the siege, and constitute one of the most romantic stories of Indian warfare. The soldiers were eager to storm the palace gates, believing that Tippoo was there, and hoping to release some British prisoners. A report, however, had spread among the troops, upon authority that seemed worthy of reliance, that Tippoo had murdered all the English prisoners taken during the siege. This turned out to be true; but before full evidence of the fact had been acquired, the belief of its truth incited in the English soldiery a thirst for vengeance. Within the palace, the confusion and disorder equalled the consternation of its residents, and those upon whom its defence devolved. The killidar (governor) was paralyzed by a report that Tippoo had been shot, and was lying dead under one of the gateways.

The royal family refused to open the palace gates, dreading retribution for the murder of so many English. Major-general Baird, who

* *The Life and Services of General Lord Harris, G.C.B., during his Campaigns.* By the Right Honourable S. R. Lushington, Private Secretary to Lord Harris, and late Governor of Madras.

headed the assault, had himself been cruelly incarcerated for three years in Seringapatam. General Baird was unwilling to expose the occupants of the palace to the horrors of a storm in the temper of his infuriated soldiery. He commissioned Major (afterwards Sir Alexander) Allan to hold up a flag of truce, and, if possible, induce the inmates of the palace to place themselves under the protection of the English general. The major was familiar with the language of Mysore, and was a man of happy address and engaging manner. He undertook the task with his usual ability, and eager to prevent the further effusion of blood, and the vengeance which the exasperated soldiers of the 33rd were panting to inflict, he persevered with honourable and laudable pertinacity, until his persuasiveness and tact were crowned with success. It is impossible for any narrative to do justice to his conduct, or to depict the scenes in which he took part. He has himself left a modest record of what took place, which is too interesting not to afford to the reader :—

“Having fastened a white cloth on a sergent's pike, I proceeded to the palace, where I found Major Shee and part of the 33rd regiment drawn up opposite the gate; several of Tippoo's people were in a balcony, apparently in great consternation. I informed them that I was deputed by the general who commanded the troops in the fort, to offer them their lives, provided they did not make resistance, of which I desired them to give immediate intimation to their sultan. In a short time the killidar, another officer of consequence, and a confidential servant, came over the terrace of the front building, and descended by an unfinished part of the wall. They were greatly embarrassed, and appeared inclined to create delays, probably with a view of effecting their escape as soon as the darkness of the night should afford them an opportunity. I pointed out the danger of their situation, and the necessity of coming to an immediate determination, pledging myself for their protection, and proposing that they should allow me to go into the palace, that I might in person give these assurances to Tippoo. They were very averse to this proposal, but I positively insisted on returning with them. I desired Captain Scohey, who speaks the native languages with great fluency, to accompany me and Captain Hastings Fraser. We ascended by the broken wall, and lowered ourselves down on a terrace, where a large body of armed men were assembled. I explained to them that the flag which I held in my hand was a pledge of security, provided no resistance was made; and the stronger to impress them with this belief, I took off my

sword, which I insisted on their receiving. The killidar and many others affirmed that the princes and the family of Tippoo were in the palace, but not the sultan. They appeared greatly alarmed, and averse to coming to any decision. I told them that delay might be attended with fatal consequences, and that I could not answer for the conduct of our troops by whom they were surrounded, and whose fury was with difficulty restrained. They then left me, and shortly after I observed people moving hastily backwards and forwards in the interior of the palace: I began to think our situation rather critical. I was advised to take back my sword, but such an act on my part might, by exciting their distrust, have kindled a flame which, in the present temper of the troops, might have been attended with the most dreadful consequences, probably the massacre of every soul within the palace walls. The people on the terrace begged me to hold the flag in a conspicuous position, in order to give confidence to those in the palace, and prevent our troops from forcing the gates. Growing impatient at these delays, I sent another message to the princes, warning them of their critical situation, and that my time was limited. They answered, they would receive me as soon as a carpet could be spread for the purpose, and soon after the killidar came to conduct me.

“I found two of the princes on the carpet, surrounded by a great many attendants. They desired me to sit down, which I did in front of them. The recollection of Mooza-ad-Deen, who, on a former occasion, I had seen delivered up, with his brother, hostages to Marquis Cornwallis, the sad reverse of their fortunes, their fear, which, notwithstanding their struggles to conceal, was but too evident, excited the strongest emotions of compassion in my mind. I took Mooza-ad-Deen (to whom the killidar, &c., principally directed their attention) by the hand, and endeavoured, by every mode in my power, to remove his fears, and to persuade him that no violence should be offered to him or his brother, nor to any person in the palace. I then entreated him, as the only means to preserve his father's life, whose escape was impracticable, to inform me of the spot where he was concealed. Mooza-ad-Deen, after some conversation apart with his attendants, assured me that the padishah was not in the palace. I requested him to allow the gates to be opened. All were alarmed at this proposal, and the princes were reluctant to take such a step, but by the authority of their father, to whom they desired to send. At length, however, having promised that I would post a guard of their own sepoys with-

in, and a party of Europeans on the outside, and having given them the strongest assurances that no person should enter the palace but by my authority, and that I would return and remain with them until General Baird arrived, I convinced them of the necessity of compliance, and I was happy to observe that the princes, as well as their attendants, appeared to rely with confidence on the assurances I had given them.

"On opening the gate, I found General Baird and several officers, with a large body of troops assembled. I returned with Lieutenant-colonel Close into the palace for the purpose of bringing the princes to the general. We had some difficulty in conquering the alarm and objections which they raised to quitting the palace; but they at length permitted us to conduct them to the gate. The indignation of General Baird was justly excited by a report which had reached him soon after he had sent me to the palace, that Tippoo had inhumanly murdered all the Europeans who had fallen into his hands during the siege; this was heightened, probably, by a momentary recollection of his own sufferings during more than three years' imprisonment in that very place: he was, nevertheless, sensibly affected by the sight of the princes, and his gallantry on the assault was not more conspicuous, than the moderation and humanity which he displayed on this occasion. He received the princes with every mark of regard, repeatedly assured them that no violence or insult should be offered to them, and he gave them in charge to Lieutenant-colonel Agnew and Captain Marriott, by whom they were conducted to head-quarters in camp, escorted by the light company of the 33rd regiment; as they passed, the troops were ordered to pay them the compliment of presenting arms.

"General Baird now determined to search the most retired parts of the palace, in the hope of finding Tippoo. He ordered the light company of the 74th regiment, followed by others, to enter the palace-yard. Tippoo's troops were immediately disarmed, and we proceeded to make the search through many of the apartments. Having entreated the killidar, if he had any regard for his own life, or that of his sultan, to inform us where he was concealed, he put his hands upon the hilt of my sword, and in the most solemn manner protested that the sultan was not in the palace, but that he had been wounded during the storm, and lay in a gateway on the north face of the fort, whither he offered to conduct us, and if it was found that he had deceived us, said the general might inflict on him what punishment he pleased. General Baird, on

hearing the report of the killidar, proceeded to the gateway, which was covered with many hundreds of the slain. The number of the dead and the darkness of the place made it difficult to distinguish one person from another, and the scene was altogether shocking; but aware of the great political importance of ascertaining, beyond the possibility of doubt, the death of Tippoo, the bodies were ordered to be dragged out, and the killidar, and the other two persons, were desired to examine them one after another. This, however, appeared endless, and as it was now becoming dark, a light was procured, and I accompanied the killidar into the gateway. During the search we discovered a wounded person lying under the sultan's palanquin; this man was afterwards ascertained to be Rajah Cawn, one of Tippoo's confidential servants; he had attended his master during the whole of the day, and on being made acquainted with the object of our search, he pointed out the spot where the sultan had fallen. By a faint glimmering light it was difficult for the killidar to recognise the features, but the body being brought out, and satisfactorily proved to be that of the sultan, was conveyed in a palanquin to the palace, where it was again recognised by the eunuchs and other servants of the family.

"When Tippoo was brought from under the gateway, his eyes were open, and the body was so warm that for a few moments Colonel Wellesley and myself were doubtful whether he was not alive. On feeling his pulse and heart that doubt was removed. He had four wounds, three in the body, and one in the temple, the ball having entered a little above the right ear, and lodged in the cheek. His dress consisted of a jacket of fine white linen, loose drawers of flowered chintz, with a crimson cloth of silk and cotton round his waist; a handsome pouch, with a red and green silk belt hung across his shoulder, his head was uncovered, his turban being lost in the confusion of his fall; he had an amulet on his arm, but no ornament whatever.

"Tippoo was of low stature, corpulent, with high shoulders, and a short thick neck, but his feet and hands were remarkably small; his complexion was rather dark, his eyes large and prominent, with small arched eyebrows, and his nose aquiline: he had an appearance of dignity, or perhaps of sternness, in his countenance which distinguished him above the common order of people."

The portrait of this remarkable man thus given by Major Allan is correct. Tippoo himself believed, or was desirous of persuading himself, that he was descended from Mohammed, and had received, as he believed

Mohammed had, a divine commission. His flatterers were accustomed to compliment him, by averring that he very much resembled in person the great Arab conqueror. This opinion has been generally entertained in Europe, but had no foundation in fact. Muir's description of "the false prophet" is generally received as correct, and the reader can judge how far it agrees with Major Allan's delineation of Tippoo:—"Slightly above the middle size, his figure, though spare, was handsome and commanding; the chest broad and open, the bones and framework large, the joints well knit together. His neck was long and finely moulded. The head, unusually large, gave space for a broad and noble brow. The hair, thick, jet black, and slightly curling, fell down over his ears; the eye-brows were arched and joined. The countenance thin but ruddy. His large eyes, intensely black and piercing, received additional lustre from their long dark eyelashes. The nose was high and slightly aquiline, but fine, and at the end attenuated. The teeth were far apart. A long black bushy beard, reaching to the breast, added manliness and presence. His expression was pensive and contemplative. The face beamed with intelligence, though something of the sensuous also might be there discerned. The skin of his body was clear and soft; the only hair that met the eye was a fine thin line which ran down from the neck toward the navel. His broad back leaned slightly forward as he walked; and his step was hasty, yet sharp and decided, like that of one rapidly descending a declivity. There was something unsettled in his blood-shot eye, which refused to rest upon its object. When he turned towards you, it was never partially, but with the whole body."*

The body of the sultan was the next day buried with military honours in the mausoleum built for his father. During the funeral ceremony a thunder-storm burst above the city. The lightnings played around the place of sepulture, as if Heaven designed to mark its anger against a man whose every step through life was stained with blood, and whose character, like that of his father, was essentially cruel. Several Europeans and natives were killed, and others injured by the lightning. The scene, its causes, and attendant consequences, deeply impressed the minds of the whole population of Seringapatam and of the British army. Search was made by order of General Harris for the state papers of Tippoo, when abundant material was obtained to justify the Earl of Mornington in declaring war against him, although the line of policy

* Muir's Mohammed.

sketched out by the able and indefatigable Mr. Webbe (the chief secretary at Madras), was that which was most consonant with the data upon which his excellency proceeded. It appeared that Tippoo had carried on correspondence hostile to the English, and for the purpose of expelling them from India, with the French Directory, with the Affghan Prince Zemaun Shah, the Mahrattas, and other Indian powers. The plan of co-operation with Buonaparte, then in Egypt, for an invasion of India, was also discovered.

The despatches of General Harris are master-pieces of good sense and professional knowledge. The Earl of Mornington's sagacity in selecting such a man for the arduous post of commander-in-chief of such an army was proved. He wrote home letters of high compliment to General Harris and the army; and, eloquent as these despatches were, they were not too encomiastic. His lordship, acting upon the principle which always characterized the conduct of his illustrious brother, the future Duke of Wellington, selected suitable men for his purpose, and left such a measure of responsibility and discretion with them, as kept them unfettered, and stimulated their exertions. General Harris was in every way worthy of his lordship's confidence, which was rendered with respect and cordiality.

The adjustment of affairs at Mysore, and the arrangements necessary for carrying on the government of the newly-acquired province, occupied the attention of the governor-general. He had, however, men at hand competent to the task. The intellectual resources of the English in India were at that time very abundant, and the Earl of Mornington well knew how to use them. Among his officers, civil and military, there were few who at all approached in administrative ability his own brothers, Mr. Henry Wellesley, and the Hon. Colonel Wellesley. He dispatched the former, with Lieutenant-colonel Kirkpatrick, to Seringapatam, to make preliminary arrangements, and furnish him with full information for a perfect judgment of what might be necessary for the government of Mysore. Before his excellency formed any definitive judgment of the affairs of that kingdom, he directed General Harris to adopt measures insuring the complete and permanent military mastery of the country. He ordered that possession should be taken of the district of Canara, and of the heads of all the ghauts communicating between Canara and the upper country, as well as the Coimbatore country. The general-in-chief was also ordered to demand the unequivocal surrender of all forts throughout the Sultanate of Mysore, and peremptorily to demand, in the name

of the East India Company, from all officers of the late sultan, civil and military, that all description of public property should be placed at his disposal.

The governor-general entered into minute detail as to the portion of troops to be employed by the general on each particular service, but always deferring to General Harris as to the soundness of any judgment pronounced in military affairs. So clear, comprehensive, and complete were the military views of the Earl of Mornington, that one is forced to adopt one of two opinions—that his gifted brother, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, imparted them, or that he himself possessed an intuitive military genius. There were no men of such remarkable talents about him as to leave a third view probable—that some one of the military men of Calcutta or Madras inspired his views. The prompt replies to General Harris's despatches leave the impression that the Earl of Mornington, like his great brother, Colonel Wellesley, was gifted by nature with military talent.

The governor-general supposed a French invasion by way of the Red Sea possible. He is represented by most historians of the time as unduly apprehensive of it. Such an impression is erroneous. He desired it. It was his conviction that such was then the power of the English in India, that they could give a very good account of any army of Frenchmen landing on the peninsula. His excellency was very desirous that the nizam's troops should move to the south-east, and gradually pass out of the Mysore territory, leaving the English contingent to garrison certain places near that frontier.

The chief difficulty connected with Mysore, in the mind of the earl, was the relation of the Peishwa to that territory. The Mahrattas had acted haughtily, yet evasively; they had not carried out the principles of the treaty

formed in prospect of the former war with Tippoo, and made permanent; they indicated a desire themselves to possess the sovereignty of Southern India. They were sure to claim a large portion of the conquered dominions of Tippoo, and his excellency believing that they had no claim similar in validity to that of the nizam, who had entered heartily into the war, resolved that they should acquire no more than was necessary to a fair show of alliance. The numerous French prisoners he ordered to Madras. Finally, matters were put in train for the permanent occupation of Mysore and the distribution of territory among the allies. The government of the English province, including the capital, was given to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley with the universal approbation of the English in India, both civil and military.

The old royal family, that had been so cruelly and treacherously deposed by Hyder, was restored to the throne—a nominal one—under the protection, and, in fact, dictation of the English; and the old capital, the city of Mysore, was once more made the depository of metropolitan dignity.

The conquest of Mysore was complete, and the glory of Seringapatam gone for ever. For a time the English were destined to look down from its high turrets and conquered bastions, as from a watch-tower, upon Southern India, as if observing the enemies of their growing empire, still numerous and powerful there. Eventually the mosques and palaces, the walls and battlements, of the once mighty queen of the table-land of Southern India were to sink into decay. When its ruins were trodden by the descendants of the conquerors, they could regard them with no regret as to the prosperity of Southern India or of Mysore, and view them only as appropriate monuments of the achievements of British valour over a treacherous and sanguinary despotism.

CHAPTER C.

THE HON. COLONEL WELLESLEY, AS GOVERNOR OF MYSORE, MAKES WAR ON DHOONDIA WAUGH—RESULTS UPON THE INTERESTS OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA—GENERAL DIFFICULTIES OF LORD WELLESLEY'S GOVERNMENT—AFFAIRS OF OUDE—DISAGREEMENTS WITH BIRMAH—MISSIONARY EFFORTS IN THE 18TH CENTURY.

THE conquest of Mysore made much impression in Europe. England hailed the intelligence with delight. The pride of the country was gratified. The English felt that the French were not the only conquerors. In the subjection of a great oriental kingdom as large as Scotland, the national vanity found a set-off against the triumphs of the French.

Throughout the continent the event was regarded as a great triumph to the arms of England, and an acquisition of power raising that country in its position, in respect to other European states. "It is not easy, perhaps, at this period of time, to appreciate the extraordinary interest with which it was viewed by contemporary observers, but it deserves

to be remarked that these impressions were by no means confined to the shores of Britain. In the negotiations for the peace of Amiens, the French plenipotentiaries repeatedly specified the conquest of Mysore as counterbalancing the continental triumphs of Napoleon himself, and the argument was acknowledged by Mr. Fox and his party to be founded on substantial reason."

In July, 1799, General Harris left Seringapatam for Pondicherry, and according to the orders received by him from the governor-general, he surrendered to Colonel Wellesley the government of Mysore, civil and military. It has been said that so great an honour would never have been conceded to the colonel, had he not been the brother of the governor-general. This remark, might with justice be made, if both these illustrious persons were not gifted and conscientious men. The Earl of Mornington was certainly desirous to promote the welfare of his brothers, but he was not the man to do so at the cost of the public weal. Indeed, so slow was he to recognise the superior gifts of the colonel, that he more than once disappointed the just expectations of the latter, when his excellency supposed that his duty pointed out the preferment of a competitor. In this way, Major-general Baird—no doubt a gifted man, but far inferior to Colonel Wellesley—received preference when the whole army looked for and desired the promotion of Arthur Wellesley. There are few instances which show more competent and conscientious performance of duty than is to be found in the government of Mysore by the Hon. Arthur Wellesley. He displayed a capacity for detail, for intricate accounts, for laborious public business, for judging of men in military and civil situations, for discerning the native character, for penetrating and unravelling native intrigue, such as has seldom in the world's history been seen in so young a man. His laborious toil for the public good, while his health was really delicate, showed a devotion to duty which became characteristic of the man, and enabled him to set an example to the people of the British Isles which has not been lost.

From various providential causes, the purpose of the governor-general to send Colonel Wellesley on different expeditions was frustrated. The designs of the governor-general upon the Isle of France, which was a nest of pirates and French privateers, were rendered nugatory from a circumstance common in Anglo-Indian history—the refusal of the admiral to co-operate, standing out upon the superior dignity of his profession, and attempting nothing until the period for doing anything had passed away. The design of Lord

Wellesley to give his brother the command of an expedition against Batavia, was overruled by the wise remonstrances of Lord Clive, who affirmed that the condition of Mysore required the administrative ability and military talent of a man such as he pronounced Colonel Wellesley to be. Lord Clive also declared that no other officer appeared to possess in so high a degree the qualifications necessary to quell a chief of the adventurous spirit of Dhoondia, and so well adapted to sustain a desultory and predatory warfare. So long as Dhoondia was in arms, Mysore must have continued in a dangerous condition, as the daring exploits of that chief inspired hopes in the disaffected from the coast of Malabar to the jungle country, along the Mahratta confines. That strange people encouraged Dhoondia; while professing alliance with the company, they allowed men and supplies to be drawn by the insurgent chief from their country, although when he was ultimately driven within their borders, they robbed his camp of elephants, cattle, and treasure. The opinions of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley concerning the policy necessary to be pursued towards Mysore and the surrounding country below the Ghauts, was full of wisdom. His letters and despatches at that period are most remarkable productions. Concerning the people along the Malabar coast who sympathised with the Mysoreans, ready to rise upon the prospect of success should Dhoondia gain any important advantage, Colonel Wellesley observed:—"As soon as the person of this rebel shall be taken, it is probable that the inhabitants will be more ready than they have been hitherto to give up their arms; and the day on which the inhabitants give up their arms and acquiesce in the orders and regulations of government, which require that no man shall appear armed, will be the date of the establishment of civil government in the province. Till then everything must be chance or force." These opinions were verified by the events in which the Colonel took so important a part. The chief strength of the rebel leader consisted in the difficulties of the country he occupied for the operation of regular troops. He knew all its recesses, and made its unequal ground and far-spreading jungles—so unhealthy to Europeans—his fastnesses, from which he sallied forth at the most favourable moments with expert skill, resolute daring, and opportune vigilance, against the cultivated country, laying waste whatever parts were known to be disposed to settle down peaceably under English rule. The mode of operating in such a country, recommended by Colonel Wellesley, and practised by him so far as his authority and opportunities allowed, was new to the English

in India, but opened up to them a plan of aggression against the natives as efficient as it was original. When afterwards acting in Cotiote, the opinions entertained by Colonel Wellesley on this matter were expressed more formally and received more notice; but it was in his first pursuit of Dhoondia that the plan was adopted, on a limited scale, for the means at his command did not allow of its extensive adoption:—"The result of my observations and considerations upon the mode of carrying on war in jungly countries is just this,—that as long as the jungle is thick as the enemy can conceal himself in it, and from his concealment attack the troops, their followers, and their baggage, the operations must be unsuccessful on our side. You propose, as a remedy, to move in small compact bodies in different directions, in order that the enemy might have no mark, might be in constant fear of falling in with some party, and might lose confidence. I agree in opinion with you that your remedy might answer some purposes for a body of troops which could move without baggage or incumbrances of any kind,—I say only some purposes, because their success would not be complete; our troops cannot move to all parts of the jungle as the Nairs can, and it might always be expected that at some place or other our detachment would get into a scrape. But, as we know that no troops can move without baggage so as to answer any purpose for which an operation might be undertaken, and as that mode of carrying on the war will avowedly not answer where there is baggage, we must look for some system the adoption of which will enable us to bring on in safety that necessary evil. I know of no mode of doing this excepting to deprive the enemy of his concealment by cutting away the lower part of the jungle to a considerable distance from the road. This, you say, is a work of time; it is true it is so, but it must be recollected that the labour of every man turns to account,—that the operations, however long, must in the end be successful, and we shall not have to regret, after a great expense of blood and treasure, that the whole has been thrown away, and the same desultory operations are to be recommenced in the following season as has been the case hitherto, and as will always be the case until some such mode of carrying on the war with security to the followers is adopted."

The separate command of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley in Mysore not only introduced a new mode of warfare against the desultory

proceedings of irregular native troops, but it opened up a new era in the military discipline of British India. Peculation and jobbery pervaded all ranks and grades of both the company's and the royal army, but more especially the latter. To conceal the robbery which was practised, perjury was resorted to when investigations took place, which was seldom the case. The tribunals nominated to hear complaints and try offences were of little utility, for they were seldom conducted honestly, being generally ready to screen powerful delinquents, and often composed of men who ought themselves to be placed on their trial for the plunder of public property, or the oppression of inferior officers, the common soldiery, or the natives. The Hon. Colonel Wellesley made strong representations to his superiors as to the importance, duty, and necessity of establishing a good administrative system. In one of his despatches on this subject, he gave a definition of the administration of justice which has been called "Aristotelian":—"I understand the administration of justice to be the decision of a competent tribunal upon any question, after a complete knowledge of its merits, by an examination of witnesses upon oath in order to come at the truth."

In his attempts to carry out, and cause to be carried out, the administration of justice after such fashion, the governor of Mysore met with difficulties which would have deterred probably any man then living but himself. Hastings or Clive might have undertaken the task, but after those two most eminent persons, Colonel Wellesley alone was competent to grapple with this great evil. His mode of procedure may be illustrated by a single case, and related in his own words:—

"While I was absent in the month of January last (I believe) the Lascars, &c., of the store department of Seringapatam wrote a petition to the military board and a letter to General Brathwaite, both without signature, in which they represented the existence of all kinds of enormities and bad practices in the store department,—such as false musters, stealing of stores, cheating, &c. Captain ——— was at Madras at the time these papers were received, and they were communicated to him; whereupon he went off in a great hurry to stop some bandies loaded with gun-metal, which General Brathwaite was informed were coming from Seringapatam. He did stop these bandies at Vellore, and it was found that the gun-metal belonged to General Smith,—at least, it was said so.

"However, the military board and government determined to defer the inquiry till I should return, and then to order that the

* *Supplementary Despatches and Memoranda of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington. India, 1797—1805.* Vol. ii. Murray, 1858.

whole matter of the petition and letter above-mentioned should be inquired into. Accordingly I received orders to institute an inquiry shortly after my return, and of course I determined that it should be an inquiry in earnest. I first gave orders to the commissary to turn off his dubash, and then I assembled a large committee, consisting of myself, all the staff of the army and garrison, and all the most respectable officers not employed upon any other duty; and, indeed, they were mostly the friends of the commissary.

"On the first day we went into the arsenal to inquire into the grounds of the complaints; the petition was explained to all the Lascars and artificers, and they were asked particularly whether they had any grounds of complaint on the subject of each allegation. They all declared not, and appeared anxious to come forward to vindicate the commissary and his dubash from any imputation that might have been laid upon them by the petition and letter. However, I was not satisfied with this proceeding, and on that evening I issued a proclamation, in which I called upon the inhabitants to state who had purchased stores, and threatened punishment to those who had purchased them and concealed it. Then came out a scene of villany and speculation which has never been surpassed, and seldom equalled in this country. It was proved before the committee that Colonel —— had sold large quantities of saltpetre, which he had stolen from the stores while he was a member of the committee for the valuation of captured property, and that the arsenal was a public sale shop for all kinds of military stores and ordnance, the principal agent in which transactions was the commissary's dubash. The artificers and Lascars who had at first declared that they had no reason to complain, and knew nothing of the petition and letter to the military board, then came forward to testify the truth of everything, and proved particularly that false musters had been taken and sent to Madras, and that, in fact, half the people for whom pay was drawn were not employed.

"When the dubash was called upon to make his defence, to the surprise of everybody, he said that he was determined to tell the truth and to conceal nothing; and he declared that he had orders for everything that he had ever done, either from Colonel —— or Captain ——, and that he had papers in the arsenal which would prove the truth of what he then asserted. On account of what appeared against Captain —— on that day I determined to turn him out, and I did dismiss him that evening, but he went to the arsenal before he was dismissed and broke open the desk, and, as the dubash says, destroyed some

of the papers which he had heard him promise to produce to the committee. However, he did not destroy all, and particularly not those relating to himself, which I forced him to produce; and the dubash, by means of them, has been able to prove clearly that Captain —— had a large share of the profits resulting from the sale of ordnance and stores. In regard to Colonel ——, the proof against him was not equally clear, for want of the papers which were destroyed; but it is clearly proved against him that he sold copper bands taken from the pillars of the Mysore palace, contrary to the orders of the military board; that he never gave General Smith credit for above an eighth part of the money produced by the sale of guns, which he avows, and which he says belonged to General Smith, until, by the proceedings of the committee, it appeared he had sold guns to that amount, and there are papers still forthcoming which will prove that he had his share of the profits arising from the false musters. Besides this, Captain —— sent gunlocks, &c., to Madras, for sale, and he knew of Colonel ——'s robbery of the saltpetre, and was concerned with him in cheating the captors and the public out of a large part of it.

"All this can be proved by writings and accounts, besides by the evidence of a host of dubashes and conicopolies.

"I have thus given you the outline of what has passed, but the intervals have been filled by details of scenes of villany which would disgrace the *Newgate Calendar*.

"Government are now deliberating upon all this, and I expect shortly to have orders which will let me know whether these gentry are to be brought to a court-martial, or to be dismissed the service, or to be hanged."

Thus, Colonel Wellesley had at the same time to reform the administrations of justice in his own army, to administer a large and disorganized kingdom, to maintain anxious correspondence with the governments of Calcutta and Madras on most important subjects, sometimes in connection with enterprises in which he was expected to take part, and to drive a powerful chieftain from a difficult country, whose followers were numerous, and who had the sympathy of the natives and of neighbouring states. Some of the instructions received by Colonel Wellesley from his superiors, were of a nature to cause apprehensions of the results should he obey them. He was directed, in case of the expulsion of Dhoondia, to pursue him into the Mahratta territory, which the colonel foresaw would cause a Mahratta war. Notwithstanding the professed friendship of the Peishwa, that high personage sent troops against Dhoondia, who

routed them with such ease and with such little loss of life on either side, as to lead to the suspicion that the war waged by the Peishwa was a pretence. For two months, Colonel Wellesley was left unsupported by the Madras government, while in vain endeavouring by long marches and night surprises to bring his enemy to battle. The British commander had to extemporise a commissariat, to provide support for his troops, and even to organize a corps of engineers from the service of the line. He was neglected by his superiors, as he was afterwards in the Spanish peninsula.

After a harassing campaign, on the 10th of September, 1800, Colonel Wellesley came upon the rebel camp. The force at his command was four regiments of cavalry, the horses of which were nearly worn out with excessive toil. The colonel did not hesitate to charge the enemy. It was a brilliant performance; the rebel force was routed with slaughter, and Dhoondia himself was slain. An interesting boy of four years of age, son of the rebel chief, was taken among the baggage. The colonel took him to his tent, and protected him. During his residence in India he tenderly guarded the child, and when about to return to Europe, he left a sum of money for the education and maintenance of his favourite. The results of this campaign were important to Colonel Wellesley himself, as well as to the public. The reputation of the governor of Mysore rose high among the native courts, and in the presidential capitals of the company. The governor-general was greatly gratified, and the government at home not less so. The Earl of Mornington had been blamed for placing his brother in a post which it was alleged ought to have been given to General Baird or some other superior officer; but the selection had justified itself, and the success of the colonel increased the fame of the elder brother, by extending the confidence already so largely entertained in his judgment. Concerning his position at that time, some curious remarks were made by him a short time before his death, when Duke of Wellington and Warden of the Cinque Ports:—"I thought myself nobody at the time, but now, on perusing my own despatches, I perceive that I was a very considerable man."

The death of Dhoondia put an end to all fears about the disturbance of Mysore and the coasts of Malabar. This, however, did not exempt his excellency, the governor, from anxiety, as it was from Mysore that the English chiefly watched the Mahrattas, who were known to be intensely inflamed by jealousy against the English, and anxious to form any

combination to dispossess them of power. The Peishwa and the lesser magnates of the tribes were, however, at variance; and Colonel Wellesley displayed an acute policy in playing off one chief against another, so as to prevent any immediate organization of the confederacy against the English.

The government of Colonel Wellesley in Mysore was interrupted by his appointment to the command of the army intended to attack the Isle of France, and afterwards Batavia, but the final destination of which was Egypt, the Earl of Mornington having conceived the plan of sending thither an expedition against Buonaparte. Colonel Wellesley having been unjustly superseded in that command by his brother, who gave the appointment to General Baird, he returned to his government in Mysore. The expedition to Egypt sailed under Baird, but was too late, the army of Abercromby having defeated the purposes of the French expedition.

It was in April, 1801, that Colonel Wellesley resumed his government of Mysore. He continued in the government, conducting it with discretion and sagacity, and rendering large services to the state without any honour having been conferred upon him until April, 1802, when he received promotion in his military rank: he was gazetted major-general. For some time longer Colonel Wellesley gave his chief energy to the government of Mysore, still exercising vigilance in reference to the proceedings of the ambitious and discordant Mahratta confederacy, until at last the breaking out of the Mahratta war furnished a new field for the exercise of his military genius.

Meanwhile, the governor-general was occupied in incessant cares to preserve the peace of India and the security of the British possessions. On every side there were difficulties. The government of Hyderabad was losing stability and power. In order to preserve it as a counterpoise to the Mahrattas, it was necessary to meddle with its affairs more intimately than suited the tastes of the directors, the policy of the imperial government, or accorded with the instructions sent out to the governor-general. Certain territory was assigned to the company as an indemnity for the outlay in support of the contingent forces maintained for the defence of the nizam's dominions.

The Affghans became exceedingly troublesome. Repeated invasions of the Sikh territories by their chief alarmed the government of British India. Negotiations with Persia to counteract these incursions of the Affghans eastward had some effect in retarding their progress, but their aggressions were a constant source of uneasiness at Calcutta, and all

over British India. These invasions inspired the Rohillas with hope of independence, and while the Oudeans were ever ready to oppress them, they were equally willing to unite with them against the English. The affairs of Oude, always more troublesome and harassing to the English than those of any other part of India, caused more disquietude to the Earl of Mornington, or, as he became, Marquis of Wellesley, than even the enmity and plots of the Mahrattas.

The financial embarrassments of the Oude government were much the same as they had always been; and, as usual, it was in arrears of the stipulated tribute to the government of Calcutta. The whole condition of Oude during the administration of the Marquis of Wellesley, and the philosophy of that condition, were afterwards expressed in a memorandum of the Hon. Major-general Wellesley on the subject, with a brevity and perspicuity exceedingly remarkable as coming from one who had spent so few years in India. No documents concerning Oude since presented by officers of the British government have surpassed in accuracy and clearness that of General Wellesley. The reader may learn the state of that country, not only at the beginning of the present century, but even since the period of annexation, from the masterly memorandums of him, who, afterwards as the Duke of Wellington, became so important an authority on all political subjects when regarded from a military point of view. This memorandum has been very appropriately termed a *resume* of the subsequent history of the province:—

“Oude is a fertile country, was at that time well cultivated, and is peopled by a hardy race, who have for a great length of time supplied soldiers to all the states of India.

“In this situation, it is obvious that the government of Oude must always have been an object of jealousy to that power which possessed the provinces of Behar and Bengal, which are situated lower down upon the Ganges. In fact, these provinces had no natural barrier against an invasion from Oude, and depended for their security upon their own artificial means of defence.

“This was the case not only in respect to the state of Oude itself, but in respect to the Rohillas; to the king, who was at that period of time in some degree of strength; and to the Mahrattas; each of which powers might have found an easy and convenient passage through Oude to an invasion of the company's provinces of Behar and Bengal.

“On the other hand, by the possession of the provinces under the government of Oude, or an intimate union with the government, a

barrier was immediately provided for the provinces under the Bengal government. Nothing remained on the left or east of the Ganges besides the Nabob of Oude and the company, excepting the Rohillas, and this river afforded a strong natural barrier against all invaders. Besides this object, the seat of war, in consequence of the alliance with or possession of Oude, was removed from the company's provinces, the source of all the means of carrying on war, to those of the enemy if it should have been practicable to carry on offensive war; or, at all events, to those of the nabob if such supposed war should have been reduced to the defensive.

“By the first treaty with the nabobs of Oude, the company were bound to assist the nabob with their troops, on the condition of receiving payment for their expenses. The adoption of this system of alliance is always to be attributed to the weakness of the state which receives the assistance, and the remedy generally aggravates that evil. It is usually attended by a stipulation that the subsidy should be paid in equal monthly instalments; and as this subsidy is generally the whole or nearly the whole disposable resource of the state, it is not easy to produce it at the stipulated moment. The tributary government is then reduced to borrow at usurious interest, to grant tuncaws upon the land for repayment, to take advances from *aumildars*, to sell the office of *aumildar*, and to adopt all the measures which it may be supposed distress on the one hand and avarice and extortion on the other can invent to procure the money necessary to provide for the payment of the stipulated subsidies.

“As soon as such an alliance has been formed, it has invariably been discovered that the whole strength of the tributary government consisted in the aid afforded by its more powerful ally, or rather protector; and from that moment the respect, duty, and loyalty of its subjects have been weakened, and it has become more difficult to realise the resources of the state. To this evil must be added those of the same kind arising from oppression by *aumildars*, who have paid largely for their situations, and must remunerate themselves in the course of one year for what they have advanced from those holding tuncaws and other claimants upon the soil on account of loans to government, and the result is an increasing deficiency in the regular resources of the state.

“But these financial difficulties, created by weakness and increased by oppression, and which are attended by a long train of disorders throughout the country, must attract the attention of the protecting government,

and then these last are obliged to interfere in the internal administration in order to save the resources of the state and to preclude the necessity of employing the troops in quelling internal rebellion and disorder, which were intended to resist the foreign enemy."

The occupation of Lahore by the enterprising Affghanchief, Shah Zemaun, compelled the Marquis Wellesley to enter in a decided manner into the circumstances of Oude. His decision to do so was, however, made imperative by events which he could neither foresee nor controlled. Sir John Shore (Lord Teignmouth) had in his last arrangements connected with that province of the Mogul empire, permitted Vizier Ali, after his deposition, to remain in Benares. The Marquis Wellesley deemed it imprudent to allow him to reside so near to the scene of his former intrigues, and ordered his removal to Calcutta. The deposed vizier refused to leave Benares for any place of residence south or east.

On the 14th of January, 1799, he called on the English resident, Mr. Cherry, and complained in violent and vindictive terms of the purpose for his removal entertained by the governor-general. The resident remonstrated, when suddenly Ali struck him with his sword, and the attendants of the vizier instantly cut Mr. Cherry down. Four other Englishmen who were present were also assassinated, but a fifth defended himself until assistance arrived, when Ali and his fellow-conspirators fled. He collected about him other men as desperate as himself, but they were pursued by the British authorities, and, after having behaved most cowardly, dispersed. Ali sought refuge in Rajpootana, where a chieftain, whose protection he relied upon, delivered him up to the English. These circumstances created a great sensation in Oude, where the populace sympathised with the desperate Vizier Ali.

Colonel Scott was then sent to the nabob with a demand for the dismissal of his native troops, and his acceptance of a British contingent. The nabob endeavoured, with the usual hesitation of Indian princes, to evade those demands, and when that was no longer possible, he offered to resign the sovereign authority, which the governor-general did not feel at liberty to permit without instructions from home, unless, indeed, the nabob resigned his sovereignty to the company. The artful nabob calculated upon this, and therefore made proposals which he presumed would create delay. Finally, he refused to support a British contingent, on the ground of the expense. The Marquis Wellesley then demanded that territory equivalent

to the tribute agreed to be paid to Sir John Shore should be assigned absolutely to the company, and that new arrangements should be made between his highness and the English, which would in effect place the administration of Oude in the hands of the latter. Troops were ordered to advance from Bengal against Oude; this led the nabob to surrender. The marquis immediately appointed a commission for administering the affairs of Oude, and nominated one of his gifted brothers, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, as chief commissioner. He acted with vigour towards the petty states contiguous to Oude, concluding a treaty with the nabob or rajah of Ferokabad, similar to that which had been concluded with Oude. Rajah Rajwunt Sing refused to acknowledge the treaty; siege was therefore laid to his fortress, and his power was subjugated. A number of zemindars who maintained a state of revolt for a short time were vanquished. Mr. Henry Wellesley having quelled all revolt, and established tranquillity in Oude, resigned his office.

The Marquis Wellesley carried his authority with a high hand, asserting the supremacy of the English wherever the least opening for interference was made by circumstances. The Nabob of Surat and the Rajah of Tanjore were among the lesser magnates who were compelled to recognise English authority by new forms and under new stipulations. The Nabob of Arcot, whose affairs had so often involved the company in war, were almost as troublesome to the presidency of Madras as those of the Nabob of Oude were to the presidency of Bengal. Lord Clive conducted the negotiations with wisdom and skill worthy of his father. He succeeded step by step in asserting the supremacy of the English in Tanjore and the Carnatic, so as completely to absorb the authority of the rajah and the nabob.

While during the last decade of the eighteenth century the English were engaged in so many fierce struggles in Western, Southern, and South-eastern India across the peninsula, much uneasiness was created in the presidency of Bengal by events in the extreme East. The first quarrels with the Birman empire began during that period.

In 1782, Minderagee-praw, Emperor of Birmah, invaded the country of Arracan, on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal.* His invasion issued in conquest:—"Many of the Mughls, or natives of Arracan, preferring flight to servitude, took refuge in the Dumbuck Hills, on the borders of the Chittagong district, and amid the forlorn wastes and

* See the geographical portion of this work.

jungles skirting the frontiers; where, having formed themselves into independent tribes of robbers, they carried on unceasing hostilities against the Birmans. Some settled in the district of Dacca and Chittagong, under the protection of the British flag; while others, rather than abandon their country, submitted to the conquerors.*

The Mughls settled in the eastern provinces of Bengal were industrious, and prospered exceedingly. The fame of their success soon spread to their countrymen, who were suffering in Arracan under Birmese oppression. They accordingly flocked in great numbers to Dacca especially, and so extensive was the emigration, that it threatened to depopulate the newly-acquired province of the Birman empire. The prosperous settlers in the British provinces aided their brethren who had fled to the mountains and there led a predatory life, as well as inhabited the shores of the numerous creeks, and carried on a constant piracy against their Birmese conquerors. In 1794 many of these sea warriors plundered the Birmese traders, and carried their booty into the British territory. His Birman majesty pursued them with an army. The British government sent Major-general Erskine with a force to oppose them. A truce was obtained, the Birmese recrossed the boundary river into their own territory, and the British, seizing the ring-leaders of the Mughls, delivered them into Birmese custody.

In 1797-98 the oppressions of the Birmese upon the Arracanese were so unendurable, that forty thousand of the latter escaped into the British territory:—"When they entered the province of Chittagong, the situation of the unfortunate wretches was deplorable in the extreme: numbers perished from want, sickness, and fatigue, while the survivors were constrained to live upon reptiles and leaves, until such time as the British government humanely relieved their wants by providing them with food and materials for the constructing of huts, to shelter them from the then approaching rains. The Birmese having collected an army of about four thousand men, followed the emigrants into the province of Chittagong. The commander of the troops addressed a letter to the magistrate of the district, demanding the expulsion of the refugees. The magistrate of Chittagong replied that the Birmese troops should instantly retire from the province, or otherwise their commander must stand the consequence; and the magistrate further informed him that no negotiation would be entered into until such time as they had. The Birmese troops, in the mean-

time, fortified themselves with stockades in the mountains, and for many weeks carried on a petty warfare with the company's troops. They successfully repulsed an attack that was made upon their stockades on the 18th of July, 1799; but soon afterwards retired to their own boundary of Arracan. A British officer was then deputed by the government of Calcutta to the governor of Arracan, to endeavour to effect an amicable adjustment of differences."*

The state of the emigrants in eastern Bengal engaged the serious attention of the supreme council at Calcutta, and Captain Cox was dispatched to the Birmese frontier to register the refugees, and allot them ground for their subsistence. Their number was nearly fifty thousand. This proceeding gave offence to his Birman majesty, who sent an ambassador to the governor-general to protest against any patronage being extended to those who had fled from his authority, and to require the English government to coerce their return. Lord Wellesley assured the ambassador that the fugitives were at perfect liberty to go or stay, but that they should not be interferred with so long as they conducted themselves peaceably.

The ambassador was not satisfied, and the governor-general was so anxious to conciliate him, that the effect produced was to leave the impression that the English feared a recourse to arms on the part of his Birman majesty. There was a strong disposition on the part of his excellency's advisers to reverse the liberal and hospitable policy which had previously been pursued, but which was vindicated at the time, and afterwards by the able Anglo-Indian statesmen, Sir John Malcolm, who pronounced that "policy became enlisted on the side of humanity; that they should at least obtain a temporary asylum."†

In the latter part of the year 1800, the governor of Arracan addressed the English magistrate of Chittagong, conveying a threat of invasion, if the emigrants were not forthwith expelled from British territory. The Marquis Wellesley doubting that the demand of the government of Arracan had been made with the authority of the King of Ava (as his Birmese majesty was frequently called), resolved to dispatch an embassy to that court to ascertain the fact, and to improve the general relations of the two governments. The question of the emigrants received no decision, but lay festering as a cause of quarrel between the two governments until, in 1811, it received a practical solution.

* *A Political History of the extraordinary events which led to the Birmese War.* London, 1827.

† *Political History of India.*

* *Modern Traveller*, part xxv.

It was towards the close of the 18th century that the great modern missionary enterprise began in India, under the auspices of the Baptist missionaries, Carey, Marshman, and Ward. This is one of the most interesting pages in Anglo-Indian history, yet one of the most discreditable to the East India Company and the British government. Considering his instructions, the Marquis Wellesley displayed more moderation than, with his own views and feelings, might have been expected. He was hostile to missionary operations, and to evangelical religion in any of its aspects, and he was surrounded by those who were even more hostile. The Baptist missionaries were not suffered to settle in British India, but were indebted to the liberality and Christian feeling of the Danes for a home and a sphere of operations. Eventually, they were allowed to conduct their pious enterprises within English territory, but it was only when a determined expression of religious feeling in England created apprehension on the part of the company and the board of control, that public opinion would influence the parliamentary elections, and initiate proceedings hostile alike to the company and the government.* The whole conduct of the directors, the board of control, the cabinet, and of the supreme council of Calcutta was unjust, unchristian, and hostile to the spirit of British liberty. To show that the author does not allow any partial views to dictate so severe an opinion, the reader shall have opportunity of judging the event in the light in which it has been presented by a popular reviewer, by no means favourable to Christian missionaries as a class, nor to the principle of Protestant evangelical missions. While the tone of the reviewer is sometimes barely respectful to the missionaries, it extenuates the conduct of the British government, and of the Anglo-Indian government in Calcutta; yet there is sufficient truthfulness of narrative, and sufficient candour in the review, to place the history of the affair before the impartial reader in such form as to enable him to form a correct judgment of the conduct of all the parties concerned. Referring to Messrs. Carey, Marshman, and Ward, personally, the reviewer observes—"Under the auspices of the Baptist Missionary Society, the latter two, after some previous attempts by Mr. Carey, proceeded to Serampore, then under the Danish flag, in 1799. In the first instance, such was the apprehended danger

from their labours that they were required by the authorities at Calcutta to enter into engagements to return immediately to England. But the governor of Serampore protected them for a time, and eventually the English governor-general, Lord Wellesley, permitted them to remain. Indeed, the latter was content that they should establish their mission in a settlement beyond the reach of British interference, where he would be relieved from the necessity of disturbing them; and at Serampore, where Carey joined them, they set up a printing-press, printed tracts and testaments in Bengalee, and established boarding-schools, out of which they defrayed a portion of the expenses of their undertaking. In 1800, they entertained their first candidate for conversion, who, as the marginal abstract states, disappointed the missionaries themselves. His name, which was Fukeer, and his story are both symbolic. He was 'the first native, after seven years of severe and discouraging exertions, who had come up to the point of avowing himself a Christian. He was received as a Christian brother, with feelings of indescribable emotion.' The missionaries persevered against various impediments which were cast in their way by Englishmen as well as Hindoos. The English captured Serampore, and in 1802, the court of directors ordered the abolition of the college at Fort William, with which Carey had also connected himself, from a feeling of annoyance at its patron, Lord Wellesley. Lord Wellesley, who was annoyed in turn, requested the directors to revise their order, and in the meanwhile sustained the college for a time. The missionaries, on the other hand, in the commencement of 1803, actually baptized their first Brahmin, an amiable and intelligent youth named Krishnu Prasad. Before his baptism he trampled on his *poita*, or sacred thread, to indicate his rejection of the creed with which it was associated, and then placed it in Mr. Ward's hands, who records in his journal,—'this is a more precious relic than any the Church of Rome can boast of.' So far, however, did the missionaries condescend to the prejudices of caste, that 'Mr. Carey and his colleagues did not at that time consider it necessary to insist on a Brahmin's divesting himself of his thread, which they considered as much a token of social distinction as of spiritual supremacy.' The converts were therefore baptized, and preached to their fellow-countrymen with their *poitas* across their shoulders. But eventually they were induced themselves to discard them, while to the honour of these particular missionaries, it ought to be added that from the first they excluded all distinctions

* *The Life and Times of Carey, Marshman, and Ward, embracing the History of the Serampore Mission.* By John Clark Marshman.—Longmans, 1859. *Christianity in India; an Historical Narrative.* By John William Kaye, &c. Smith and Elder, 1859.

of caste from the celebration of the holy communion. Where the Brahmin Christian had formerly received the elements before the Soodra Christian, in this very instance, when called upon to lay down a rule, they abolished every vestige of caste in this particular, and the Brahmin received the bread and wine after the carpenter, Krishnu. Their first baptism was soon followed by the first marriage of converted Hindoos, by which the Brahmin aforesaid was united to the daughter of the carpenter. So far another step was made towards the obliteration of caste distinctions, which the missionaries were undeniably anxious to effect. A week after this marriage, Gentooism had its demonstration in return, in the celebration of suttee, when 'three women were burnt with their husbands on one pile, near Mr. Ward's house.' Then followed the first burial of a Christian convert, at which there was some difficulty in overcoming the caste prejudices of his companions, and inducing them to carry his body to the grave. Among the Hindoos the Brahmin only carries the dead Brahmin, and each caste the deceased of its own caste only. But again the missionaries stood out and conquered this inveterate reluctance, Mr. Marshman himself assisting as one of the bearers. A later triumph over caste may be ascribed to the love of science, when, about twenty years ago, the Brahmin students of the Medical College at Calcutta consented, for the first time, to handle a dead body in the dissecting-room. So far, however, the missionaries laboured with fair success in individual instances, and in 1805, they contributed largely, by their endeavours, to a much greater work—the suppression of the immolation of widows. To do them justice, we should bear in mind their great exertions in this behalf. From their first settlement at Serampore they had been unremitting in their endeavours to draw the attention of government to this practice. Its frequency at the time was little known in England, and it awakened no feeling of national responsibility. Few even in India were aware of the extent to which it prevailed, and the missionaries considered the first step towards its abolition was to bring the *number* of victims prominently into view. They accordingly deputed natives in 1803 to travel from place to place within a circle of thirty miles round Calcutta to make inquiries on the subject, and the number was found to exceed four hundred in the year. To obtain a more accurate return, ten agents were the next year stationed within this circle, at different places along the banks of the river, and they continued at their stations for six months, noting down every instance of suttee

which came within their observation. The result, even for this interval, gave the number of three hundred; and Mr. Carey instructed one of the members of council on this point, and he made a stirring appeal to Lord Wellesley, then on the eve of his departure. No immediate result followed that history can recognise. In fact, the question was substantially postponed for another quarter of a century, and twenty thousand more victims ascended the funeral pile before it was decided. But no one who reads these pages can doubt that Brother Carey and his coadjutors assisted very materially in preparing opinion in India and England to achieve this special glory of our creed and dominion.

"In 1808, the proceedings of the missionaries were so distrusted by the government that they were required to submit the manuscript of every publication to the inspection of the Secretary, and could not print a single page without his *imprimatur*. They were allowed, however, to circulate the Scriptures, and, as Lord Minto had happily recovered from the panic of the Vellore mutiny, when, in 1808, Serampore fell again into the hands of the English, the missionaries were empowered to extend their operations. On the renewal of the East India Company's Charter in 1813, there was a parliamentary fight for their further liberation from restrictions, in which Wilberforce sustained them, and in which their efforts for the Christianization of India were effectually sanctioned. If these efforts have not been very successful as yet, nevertheless their subsequent history has some elements of interest, and it is not without some few ingredients of encouragement. The charter of 1813 was the commencement of a new era, from which we date a higher theory of our mission in the East. The prescriptive principles of Leadenhall Street were then abjured; Europeans were allowed freely to resort to India; the missionaries have been allowed to travel to every division of the empire, and have enjoyed a perfect liberty of the press. They have come in contact with the strongest religious prejudices of the people, and have distributed thousands of tracts exhibiting the absurdities of Hindoo superstition, in language more fervid than that which was considered fifty years ago certain to lead to an explosion; and during the formidable rebellion of 1857, when the whole of the north-west provinces was in a blaze of revolt, and the most strenuous efforts were made to expel us from the country, 'the missionaries,' according to Mr. Marshman, 'were treated with uniform deference and respect by the most influential classes in the country.'"

* *The Times*.

This notice of the work of the missionaries, its commencement, progress, success, the hostility shown to it, is carried down to a period (1813) long subsequent to the government of the Marquis Wellesley. Its introduction here prevents the necessity of recurring to the events to which it refers, when relating the great political movements of the early portion of the nineteenth century.

At the beginning of 1801, both Lords Wellesley and Clive contemplated retiring from their respective governments, but the events which occurred in India compelled them, from patriotic feelings, to remain. Both those able men were surrounded by difficulties which were hardly appreciated in England, because of the brilliancy of their career. The financial talents of Lord Wellesley were not considered equal to his gifts in other respects, and his war against Mysore was waged at a prodigious expense. His lordship's opinion of the powers necessary to a governor-general were regarded as too ambitious, and sometimes arbitrary, both by those who carried out his views in India, and by the directors and proprietary of the East India Company. He demanded the entire control of the whole financial resources of India, a demand which appeared to the directors unconstitutional, unreasonable, and unnecessary. These considerations influenced the noble marquis in a desire to retire from the onerous post which he had occupied with so much ability. Public considerations, however, decided the part he took, and the aspect of affairs in Europe and in India at the beginning of the nineteenth century, justified his lordship in devoting his great energies, talents, and experience to the government of British India, however some portions of his conduct, and some of his opinions, might be regarded unfavourably in India or at home.

CHAPTER CI.

RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH TO INDIA IN THE OPENING OF THE 19TH CENTURY—POLICY OF THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY IN REFERENCE TO FRENCH INFLUENCE IN INDIA, AND THE MAHRATTAS—WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS—OPERATIONS OF GENERAL WELLESLEY—BATTLES OF ASSAYE AND ARGHAUM.

IN the beginning of 1801 some official changes took place in the supreme government by orders from home. Letters patent were issued by the crown, appointing the Marquis Wellesley captain-general in India. The differences of opinion and feeling between the king's and the company's officers rendered this step desirable. Officers holding the king's commission frequently murmured when called upon to serve under company's officers of superior rank, and sometimes obedience to such officers was refused, on the ground that they did not hold the king's commission. The letters patent invested the governor-general with full command over all military forces employed within the limits of the company's exclusive trade. They also required his lordship's obedience to all orders, directions, and instructions from the first commissioners for the affairs of India, or from any of her majesty's principal secretaries of state.

Lieutenant-general Gerard, afterwards Lord Lake, was appointed commander-in-chief by a vote of the court of directors, on the 1st of August, 1800, in succession to Sir Alured Clarke. In February, 1801, General Gerard assumed his new functions, and Sir Alured retired. Colonel Stevenson was appointed to command in Malabar and Canara, under the civil jurisdiction of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley—shortly afterwards made major-general.

The proceedings of the French caused uneasiness in London and in India, as to their designs upon that country. In May, 1802, Mr. Bosanquet, then chairman of the court of directors, wrote to the Marquis Wellesley, informing him that the French government was exceedingly jealous of British sovereignty in India, declaring his conviction that the peace recently made with France could not be lasting, and advising his excellency to be prepared for whatever might ensue upon its violation. Lord Wellesley had himself entertained the opinion that the French would spare no pains to unsettle the power of England in Asia, and he had distributed agents in all the countries of western Asia and eastern Europe, whence intelligence might be procured or where alliances might be formed. At Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Bussora, Alexandria, &c., British agents served their employers with great efficiency. A mission had been sent from Calcutta to Baber Khan, Shah of Persia, to ascertain the intentions of that prince, to form a more correct estimate of his military power, and to gain through his court precise knowledge of the relations

maintained with it by Zemaun Shah of Affghanistan, who had so frequently threatened northern Hindostan. The officer entrusted with the mission to the court of Persia had been instructed to gain its assent to some arrangement which would check the incursions of Zemaun Shah, and to form a treaty against the French, should they attempt by way of Persia to penetrate into India. Captain Malcolm had been selected for the performance of this delicate and important task. He arrived in Bushire in February, 1800, and in twelve months transmitted to Calcutta two treaties with Persia, one political the other commercial. He returned in September, 1801, having succeeded in all the objects of his mission. He also formed a good understanding between his government and the Pasha of Bagdad, which was considered politic, and an excellent provision against certain schemes supposed to be indulged by the French. The operations of the French in Egypt induced the governor-general to form a treaty with the Portuguese viceroy of Goa, in result of which eleven hundred British royal infantry, under the command of Sir William Clarke, were added to the garrison. Thus the governor-general, independent of any instructions received from home, made provision in all directions against the much dreaded designs of France.

The French were aware of all these proceedings. Their agents abroad and their spies in London informed them, for the most part correctly, of what the governor-general of India did, and of the tone of feeling, suspicion, and manœuvres of the English cabinet and the directors of the East India Company. Preliminaries of peace between France and England had been much hastened by the success of the English in Egypt. They were signed October 1st, 1801. The definitive treaty was, however, not signed until March 27th, 1802. The delay in signing the definitive treaty confirmed the English in their suspicions that the peace was not intended by France to be solid and lasting. Their suspicions were but too well grounded. In October Buonaparte, then elected first consul for life, addressed the Helvetic republic in terms which alarmed the English. The first consul plainly desired to control the Swiss nation in the exercise of its independent rights, and indicated that the system of propaganda and aggression, which the French had professed to give up, was still their policy. Lord Hawkesbury wrote to the French ambassador, M. Otto, that the English government had not surrendered such conquests as might have passed to France and Holland under the articles of the late treaty of peace,

of which the conduct of the first consul to the Helvetic republic was considered a violation. Lord Hawkesbury also sent instructions to the Marquis Wellesley in accordance with his communication to M. Otto. On receipt of this intelligence, the governor-general regulated all his proceedings upon the assumed certainty of war with France and Holland.

On the 17th of June, 1803, England declared war against Holland, which was soon followed by a similar declaration against France. None of the vanquished possessions of France and Holland in Asia, which the English were to have surrendered at the conclusion of the peace, had been given up.

The proceedings of the British government and the governor-general of India, in reference to France and Holland, met with the approbation of the court of directors, but very strong difference of opinion existed as to the means to be employed. The Marquis Wellesley was for proceeding with all his measures on a gigantic scale of expense, proportionate to the grandeur and energy of his conceptions. Lord Castlereagh, then at the head of the board of control, concurred with the governor-general, and was as little disposed to economy. The directors considered that the operations of the company in India should be purely defensive, and should consist only in the defence of their trade and territory. Lords Castlereagh and Wellesley desired to employ the resources of the company for the purposes of imperial aggrandizement. The correspondence of these two notable persons, in reference to the court of directors, sometimes resembled that of enemies to the company, whose duty it was to turn its property to other account than its own use, rather than that of high functionaries of the king's government, bound to protect the company, to co-operate with it, and to regard its trading resources with the same sacredness of trust as the resources of any other company, or of any individual British citizens ought to be, and in most cases would be regarded, however indifferent the British government generally showed itself to the rights of private citizens, or of corporations, when such stood in the way of ministerial or party convenience. Whenever the company laid out money for political purposes in the service of the government, the accounts were disputed, payment was delayed, perhaps refused, or their settlement clogged with some unjust conditions.

In 1803, information reached Marquis Wellesley of a secret engagement between France and the Batavian republic, in virtue of which the latter ceded Cochín and other oriental settlements to France. M. Lefebvre, a staff officer at Pondicherry, wrote a memoir

justifying the French in resuming these possessions, under the treaty of Amiens. According to this memoir, while the English were wholly occupied in Western India against French aggression from that point, a secret expedition should be prepared to proceed from Spain, *via* Mexico, to Manilla, and thence to India. At the same time the Dutch republic should send an expedition by the Cape of Good Hope to the Spanish islands, and thence to Trincomalee. The author of the memoir predicted that if France did not deprive the English of their Eastern dominion, Russia, rapidly advancing in power, would attempt it.

A copy of this memoir was procured by the Marquis Wellesley, and he judged that although such a scheme might never be attempted by the governments in question, it was evident that the national feeling of France was directed to the acquisition of territory in India, and to the expulsion of the English thence, as freshly as when first the conflicts between the two nations gathered in "little wars" around Mylie and Tellicherry. The great error of the British had been in restoring Pondicherry, when first conquered, but the exigencies of peace in the European relations of the two powers, constrained what, received as an oriental policy only, was an error and misfortune.

The conduct of Lord Wellesley to the various branches of the Mahratta empire was based upon his knowledge and conjectures of the designs of the French. He perceived that the French hoped through the Mahrattas, as formerly through the Nizam of the Deccan, to gain a footing in India. The Mahratta sovereignties, stretching away from the shores of Malabar to the confines of the Punjaub, holding sway in the heart of India, furnished means for French intrigue. If by disciplining and commanding their armies the French gained a military prestige among them, French generals might undermine the authorities they served, as well as organise and lead powerful, well equipped, and efficiently drilled armies against the English territories in numbers which, so led and disciplined, no resources derivable from England could repel. The policy of Lord Wellesley was that which Lord Cornwallis adopted in the Deccan—that of compelling or inducing the dismissal of all French and foreign mercenaries, and the employment of strong British contingents, the expense of which to be borne by the governments which they ostensibly defended. This was a far more subtle plan than that of the French; it was indeed of French origin, for it was the scheme by which Dupleix and Bussy had so long before ruled the court of

Hyderabad, and used the power of the Deccan, in the disputes of peninsular India. The Marquis Wellesley had, by what was called the subsidiary treaty of 1798, secured the nizam as an ally. His highness was obliged to rely upon a British contingent; his French forces were gone, although he still reserved some officers and troops contrary to the treaty, and he was rather desirous to increase their number as a counterpoise to the overbearing influence of the English.

The Mahratta sovereignties at that time were the Peishwa, the Guicawar, Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. The Peishwa was supreme in *nominal* authority, as in real rank. He was the grand vakeel of the Delhi emperor, but had been partly cajoled and partly coerced by Scindiah to make him his deputy in that office, who so used it as virtually to wield whatever was left of authority, and to bear whatever prestige remained of the name and dignity of the Great Mogul. The grand seat of Mahratta authority was then, as it had always been, at Poonah. Dowlut Row Scindiah might be considered rather as the chief sovereign in India than as a Mahratta chief owing allegiance to the Peishwa. Scindiah's territory lay in and around Malwa, lying to the west of Central India. The Guicowar dominated Gujerat to the west of Scindiah's possessions. Holkar prevailed south of Malwa, and ruled in his capital of Indore. The Rajah of Berar, or as he was more frequently called, the Nagpore Rajah, reigned in the city of that name, over a wild people, and a country of rigid and uncultivated soil east of the other Mahratta chiefs, and contiguous to the British province of Bengal.

"Independently of the apprehensions created by their immense resources and their inveterate aggressiveness, the Mahrattas were evoking at this moment the dreaded vision of French influence and ascendancy. Though the peace of Amiens had checked the overt operations of our redoubtable rivals, their intrigues were still continued with characteristic tenacity. Napoleon had sent Decaen to India with strict injunctions to provide for war while observing the stipulations of peace. Nor was this all; for Peron, a French adventurer, who had arrived in Hindostan twenty years previously as a petty officer in Suffrein's squadron, was rising rapidly to the command of the whole Mahratta forces. He had disciplined and armed some fifteen or twenty thousand men for Scindiah's service, who were officered by his own countrymen, and who were not inferior to the trained battalions of the company. His influence with Scindiah was so

unbounded as actually to excite jealousy among the Mahratta chiefs; and if he had possessed the national spirit of Dupleix, or been opposed by any less a soldier than Arthur Wellesley, it is not too much to conceive that our Eastern empire might have hung upon a thread."*

Holkar was as active as Scindiah in disciplining his troops by French officers, although he did not set the example, nor employ so large a foreign force. Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar were all competing for ascendancy at the court of Poonah, the Peishwa, their nominal and rightful lord, being not only unable to control them, but controlled by them in turn. The Guicowar would no doubt have been as forward in this competition as the other three, but his territory lying seaward, and other circumstances, brought him more into contact with the English. His territorial position gave him less opportunity of exercising any control at the Peishwa's court, and whatever the differences of the other three confederates, they were willing to coalesce against him. His pretensions were, as if by common consent of the other chiefs, excluded.

The policy adopted by the English was more easy of application in his case than in that of the Peishwa, or the other nominally confederated but really hostile chiefs. The English accordingly, having failed to induce the Peishwa to accept and support a powerful British contingent, treated with the Guicowar, with whom, for various objects, they had been in close negotiation, and upon whose power they had been gradually encroaching for years. The East India government, never wasting opportunities nor wanting pretexts, now discovered that Surāt was shamefully misgoverned. This, and the nonpayment of the tribute, formed a good justification for annexing it to the company's territories; which plea was further strengthened by the constant difficulties arising out of the right of succession. The Nabob of Surat, like many other vassals of the Delhi empire, when strong enough, became virtually independent, and rendered his succession hereditary. But disputes having arisen respecting the inheritance, the British interfered and exercised their authority. A subsequent dispute upon the same subject, in 1789, afforded a further opportunity for the company, and the nabob was treated similarly to the ruler of Oude, being compelled to surrender the civil and military government of his dominions to the English, receiving in lieu a pension, and with it protection. But the chout,

or tribute, he had agreed to pay to the Mahrattas, was not so easily settled. The Guicowar prince declared his readiness to relinquish his portion of the tribute to the company, but the Peishwa was not so yielding.

The Guicowar, further to secure the British alliance, yielded the Chourassy district. His death, in September, 1800, produced great disturbances; for his son was perfectly imbecile, and unfit to control the intrigues of the court of Baroda. These intrigues speedily brought on a war between the late prime-minister, Nowjee Apajee, and an illegitimate brother of the deceased Guicowar; but the English, siding with the minister, and furnishing troops, victory declared in his favour. Nowjee being unfettered, pursued his economical reforms by dismissing the Arab mercenaries; but this body refused to disband, demanding enormous arrears: afterwards mutinying, they seized Baroda and imprisoned the Guicowar. The English immediately invested Baroda, which surrendered in ten days. Contrary to capitulation, many of the mutineers joined the rebel Kanhojee; but were pursued, and ultimately, with the latter, driven from Gujerat.

The policy of the English towards the Guicowar was pertinacious, wily, and successful; it lay with the discretion of the Bombay government whether a contingent of its army should not occupy the capital of Gujerat. The British were also persistent in urging upon the government of Poonah the reception of an English force, to be paid for by the Poonah treasury; no French, nor other foreign officers or soldiers to be admitted to serve the Peishwa: but that dignitary, mainly under the influence of Scindiah, still resisted. Events, however, brought about what negotiation had otherwise failed to accomplish. The confederates became open enemies. Scindiah conducted hostilities with varying fortunes. The horrors of war rolled over the great Mahratta empire, advancing and receding like the flowing tide, but still coming nearer and nearer to the capital. The Peishwa fled to Bassein, and claimed the protection of the English. This was granted on the much-coveted condition of his admitting an English division to garrison his capital. He reluctantly consented, and signed an agreement afterwards known as the treaty of Bassein. Meanwhile, the flight of the Peishwa to Bassein was treated by Holkar, then in the ascendancy, as an abdication, and he, with the other chiefs, appointed Ameerut Rao Peishwa in his room. Had it not been for this hasty proceeding of Holkar, the Peishwa would not, although indebted for his safety to the English, have signed the

* *Travellers' Library*, 31.

treaty of Bassein. No sooner had he committed his hand to the hated stipulations, than he intrigued for their violation. He opened up communications with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for that purpose. While he was intriguing against his protectors, they were fighting for him. He was, by prompt and expert military measures, reinstated in his government, and the usurping Peishwa was deposed. The latter, however, so conducted himself towards the English after his deposition, that they granted him a pension and assigned him a residence at Benares. The engagement concluded between the Peishwa and Colonel Close at Bassein, on the last day of the year 1802, was confirmed by the governor-general on the 11th of February, 1803. By the seventeenth article, "The union of the two states was so firmly connected that they were to be considered as one, and the Peishwa was not to commence, nor pursue in future, any negotiations with any power whatever." A subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular native infantry, with the usual appointment of field-pieces and European artillerymen, was to constitute the contingent.

The circumstances attending the reinstatement of the Peishwa again brought General Wellesley into prominence. The government of Madras collected a force which Lord Clive, the governor, placed under the command of General Wellesley. General Lake was ordered either to remain in Oude at the head of the army there, or to proceed to Hurryhur and take the command of the force there.

The government of India was at this time singularly well served by diplomatists of talent. Mr. Welby was then resident of Seringapatam, a man of extraordinary resources, who was regarded with implicit confidence and the highest respect, amounting to reverence, by General Wellesley. That gentleman was ordered to Nagpore, to watch the movements of the rajah, with whom the Peishwa, in whose interests these movements were taking place, was in traitorous correspondence. Major Malcolm, whose services in Persia had been of such signal importance, was appointed to Seringapatam, but he proceeded to the city of Mysore, where the new sultan resided, as a place affording him a better position from whence to watch the Mahratta intrigues. Upon these two experienced politicians devolved mainly the procuring of such intelligence as would influence the governor-general's orders.

The Madras army assembled at Hurryhur, under the command of the Hon. General Wellesley, who, on the 9th of March, 1802, commenced his march towards Poonah. On the

12th, he crossed the Toombudra river. Holkar watched him, but moved away towards Ahmednuggur and Chandore. General Wellesley was joined by the son of Purseram Bhow, and other chiefs and sahibs, who came to avow their allegiance to the Peishwa and render their support. General Wellesley learned from his native coadjutors that the usurping Peishwa intended to burn Poonah when the British approached it. The general, to prevent such a calamity, performed one of the most splendid feats in his whole military history. Between the morning and the night of the 19th of April he accomplished a forced march of sixty miles, although detained in the Bhore Ghaut for nearly six hours. This march seems, in the present day, all but incredible. It saved the city; Ameernut Rao, the usurping Peishwa, had barely time to escape. On the 13th of May the Peishwa re-entered his capital, and resumed his seat upon the musnud. The Peishwa was hardly reinstated in his authority when he acted in all respects contrary to the advice tendered to him by the British government, and upon which he had undertaken to act. His extreme vindictiveness infuriated old enemies and made new ones. He neglected business, and so treated his troops that they began to disband, and the sirdars who had come to his standard in a generous devotion, separated to their jaghires.

General Wellesley sought to unite by negotiation Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar in the treaty of Bassein. These chiefs temporised, while preparing to reunite their forces against the British. They believed that their united arms could sweep from India all other powers, and concerted means to bring this belief to the test.

The governor-general found it impossible at such a distance as Calcutta to act with that celerity or effect necessary, when the tidings he received from day to day were so diverse, and the great Mahratta chiefs apparently so vacillating, while really resolved on war. He therefore entrusted his brother, while in command of the Madras forces, to conduct all affairs, civil and military, connected with Poonah, the Deccan, and Hindostan, and with full powers to decide any question that might arise, and to conclude any negotiations he judged beneficial to the state, with either Scindiah, Holkar, or the Nagpore rajah.

Everything done by those three potentates portended war. They were active and acute, full of vigour and sagacity. The Peishwa threw the whole burden of his own defence upon his ally. He engaged to add fifteen thousand men to the army of General Wellesley; he actually sent but three thousand,

and those wretchedly equipped, without ammunition, and no paymaster or means of pay. He had no intention of observing any of his engagements. Indian princes prided themselves on the ingenuity with which they compelled others to keep treaty, while they evaded all stipulations which belonged to it. The disposition of the English was, as usual to postpone, and allow their enemies to gain time by bootless negotiations. Lord Wellesley, the Hon. General Wellesley, and Lord Clive were prompt and decisive, but the supreme council, as well as the councils of the presidencies, were continually creating delays by plausible obstructions of some kind. General Wellesley experienced much mortification from the defective organization of the commissariat of his army, and the Madras council was as incompetent as its predecessors in previous wars in furnishing adequate and opportune support. General Stuart, however, the commander-in-chief of the Madras presidency, co-operated efficiently with the governor in matters strictly military, and so far as he could without exciting the morbid jealousy of the council. At length, all being ready, and negotiations having proved fruitless, the series of stirring events commenced which have been designated—

THE MAHRATTA WAR.

The dispositions of the British forces, when the grand Mahratta conflict began, were masterly:—"The course taken by the governor-general, in concert with the governments of Madras and Bombay, was to order the assembly of a *corps d'armée* at all the points threatened by Holkar in the conduct of his operations against the Peishwa. A corps of observation was placed on the southern frontier of the Peishwa, to maintain the integrity of the British possessions, and the territories of the nizam, and the Mysore rajah. Another was established on the north-west frontier of Mysore, while the Bombay government pushed troops to the eastern and southern confines of the territory which it controlled. The nizam was not inactive. The subsidiary force at Hyderabad prepared for service."

The Hon. General Wellesley made Poonah his point of support and base of operations. General Lake was appointed to command what was called the army of Hindostan; his theatre of operations was the Mahratta confines of Upper Bengal.

On the 6th of August, 1802, General Wellesley ordered the Bombay troops in Gujerat to attack Baroch, which was successfully accomplished. The general's command extended to that remote part, and this vast

extent of authority and responsibility involved on his part inconceivable care and anxiety. The general ordered Colonel Stevenson, his second in command, to move forward from Aurungabad. The 8th was the first day the weather permitted the general himself to march, on the 9th arriving at the fort of Ahmednuggur, which was stormed with great rapidity and terrible loss to the enemy. Scindiah, writing of this exploit, observed:—"The English are truly a wonderful people, and their general is a wonderful general. They came, looked at the pettah, walked over it, slew the garrison, and returned to breakfast: who can withstand them?"

After the surrender of Ahmednuggur, General Wellesley received such intelligence as led him to place a portion of his troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson on the 21st of September, directing him to march by a separate road on the 22nd, and form a junction with the corps under his own command on the 23rd, so as to attack the enemy with their united forces on the 24th. On the 22nd of September the two corps marched by separate routes, for the purpose, as General Wellesley alleged in his despatches, of preventing the enemy's escape by one route while the British were pursuing the other, and also because the whole army could not proceed, in one day, through a certain pass which lay in General Wellesley's line of march. These reasons for the course adopted are so distinct and convincing, that it is surprising that military critics should have animadverted upon the general's division of his forces. General Wellesley hoped that either corps could keep the enemy at bay, if encountered by him, until communication were opened with the other. This was not, however, so easy as the general supposed, for, according to Sir Archibald Alison, although the two British columns were only a few miles apart, they were separated by a line of rugged hills preventing mutual access.

General Wellesley having arrived at Naulniah, intended to encamp there, and form his projected junction with Colonel Stevenson. Having, however, learned to his surprise that the enemy was encamped in full force near the village of Assaye, he determined to attack them without waiting for Colonel Stevenson. The force of the enemy has been very variously estimated. Thorn computes it at sixteen regular battalions of infantry (Pohlman's brigade), amounting to six thousand men; the brigade of Dupont, amounting to twenty-five hundred; four battalions of the Begum Shimroo,* amounting to two thousand. The

* This lady had been a dancing girl, whom Shimroo, the Swiss adventurer, who made himself infamous by the massacre at Patna, had married.

irregular infantry of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar's infantry probably amounted to as many more. The cavalry, Thörn alleges to have amounted to thirty thousand. There were one hundred pieces of cannon, numerous attended by artillerymen disciplined on the French system.

The force at General Wellesley's command is estimated by Thörn as twelve hundred cavalry, European and native, two thousand sepoy infantry, and thirteen hundred European infantry and artillery, constituting a force of four thousand five hundred. The Rajah of Mysore's and the Peishwa's cavalry were with this force, and amounted to three thousand men. The total force of the enemy could hardly have been less than fifty-five thousand men and one hundred cannon; that of the British, the Peishwa, and the Rajah, seven thousand five hundred. General Wellesley left a large detachment of native cavalry with his baggage and tents at Naulniah, and advanced against the enemy.

As the battle that ensued was one of the most sanguinary ever fought in India, and General Wellesley ran the risk of a terrible defeat, his generalship has been much criticised, many military critics alleging that the attack should never have been made. The reasons which influenced General Wellesley were, however, conclusive. It was of the utmost consequence that the enemy should not escape, and have an opportunity of initiating a mode of warfare which would have proved most harassing to the English. If General Wellesley had waited for Colonel Stevenson, he would have been attacked before that officer could have arrived to his support, and where the enemy's large cavalry force could have acted with advantage. In the position occupied by the Mahratta forces, their cavalry could not with much advantage be brought into action, and even the force of their artillery would be limited. The moral prestige of the English would be sustained by a bold attack, inaction would have lessened this power on the minds of the sepoys; they were more likely to act offensively with spirit, than defensively with coolness and fortitude. The general knew his men, and knew his enemy, although he afterwards admitted that he had undervalued their discipline. Lieutenant-general Welsh, in his military reminiscences,* affirms that the Mahrattas had intended to attack the two divisions in detail, and that when they saw only one of the corps advancing to assail their position they thought the English mad.

General Wellesley perceived the enemy

posted near the junction of two rivers, so that if he could place himself between them and that junction, part of their artillery and the whole of their cavalry would be ineffectual. "They were drawn up in a peninsula, formed by the rivers Kaitna and Joocce, in a line facing the Kaitna, and about half a mile distant from it; the cavalry on the right in the neighbourhood of Bokerdun, reaching to their line of infantry, which, with the guns, was posted near the fortified village of Assaye. Their cavalry were on the right, and the infantry and guns were on the left. The village of Assaye was in rear of the enemy's left, and the distance between the rivers was about a mile and a-quarter. The enemy, expecting their left flank to be turned, formed their right wing of infantry, with its right resting on the Kaitna, and the left on the village of Assaye; their left wing being formed to the rear, at a right angle with the left of the front line, *en potence*, and with their rear to the Joocce, the left flank resting on Assaye; there being nine battalions in the front, and seven in the second line. About a mile and a-half in front of the enemy's new line was the junction of the two rivers, so that when General Wellesley formed his army in front of the enemy's front line, the battle field was in the form of a triangle, the enemy forming the base of it. General Wellesley occupied the centre of the space, by which means his flanks and rear were covered, the junction of the rivers being in rear of his centre. The enemy had more than half their guns in the front line, the rest in the other line (*en potence*). The general drew up his infantry in two lines, and the cavalry in his rear."*

General Wellesley had left by far the greater part of his cavalry to guard his camp, and observe the masses of the enemy's horse. General Wellesley opened a cannonade, which, although well directed, was not successful; he had only seventeen cannons opposed to the whole front line of the enemy's artillery. His gunners fell fast, and the enemy's fire was not in the least slackened. He ordered his infantry to advance and carry the enemy's cannon with the bayonet. This was performed in a manner the most gallant. Under showers of shell and grape they advanced and bayoneted the gunners, many of whom remained at their posts to the last.

The British infantry re-forming, charged the second line of guns, which were supported by dense masses of infantry, with their numerous cavalry in the rear. The Mahratta line was well formed, their rear turned to-

* *Military Reminiscences of Thirty Years*, by Major-general Welsh, vol. i. p. 174.

* *British Military Exploits*. By Major William Hough, Deputy-Advocate General, Bengal army. Allen and Co., Leadenhall-street.

wards the river Joocce. As the British advanced, the Mahratta cavalry continued to cross the rivers on either flank, and get in their rear, sabreing the English gunners. Many of the artillerymen of the first or vanquished line of the enemy had pretended to be slain, a common artifice in oriental warfare, and finding their cavalry advancing against the rear of the British infantry, they started up, reloaded their guns and fired upon the advancing English. Some of the English cannon were also turned upon the English infantry. It will be naturally asked where at such a moment, was General Wellesley's cavalry. Colonel (afterwards General) Welsh says that "they had just then charged a large body of the enemy in front, who had, with the assistance of a very heavy and destructive fire from their guns, not only galled, but nearly annihilated the gallant 74th, and pickets on our extreme right. This last line, although it stood well, was at length broken, and the guns captured; while our cavalry pursuing the fugitives, fell in with an immense column, who, though retreating, opposed them, and killed Colonel Maxwell, the brigadier; nor were they completely routed without a severe struggle, and heavy loss on our side. The second line being put *hors de combat*, the general, who was everywhere, placed himself at the head of the 78th regiment, faced about and charged the enemy, who were in possession of the first line of guns, and routed them with great slaughter. Here ended the conflict; those who had captured our guns making off as soon as they saw their danger, although about half-past five a body of ten thousand cavalry came in sight, and made some demonstrations, but dared not charge; and at eight o'clock in the evening they entirely disappeared."

The death of Colonel Maxwell had nearly occasioned the loss of the battle. He gallantly led on the charge, but received a musket ball which inflicted a fatal wound; he suddenly threw up his arms, and his horse halted; his men, supposing it to be a signal for retreat, turned right shoulder forward, and galloped along the whole of the enemy's line, receiving his fire. When the mistake was discovered the men were re-formed, and were so anxious to redeem their honour that they made one of the most desperate cavalry charges ever performed by the British even to the present day, contributing most effectively to retrieve the fortunes of this well-contested battle.

General Wellesley, in a letter to Major Malcolm, describing the conduct of both armies thus wrote:—"Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India, excepting our own,

and they and their equipments far surpass Tippoo's. I assure you that their fire was so heavy, that I much doubted at one time, whether I should be able to prevail upon our troops to advance; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably: the sepoy's astonished me. These circumstances and the vast loss which I sustained, make it clear that we ought not to attack them again, unless we have something nearer in equality of numbers. The enemy's cannonade was terrible,* but the result shows what a small number of British troops can do. The best of it is, that if it had not been for a mistake of the pickets, by which the 74th were led into a scrape, we should have gained the victory with half the loss; and I should not have introduced the cavalry into the action at all, till all the infantry had been broken; and the cavalry would not have been exposed to the cannonade, but would have been fresh for a pursuit. In this manner also we should have destroyed many more of the enemy than we did."

The loss of both armies was heavy, but the British suffered proportionately more than the vanquished, owing to the great disproportion of numbers. General Wellesley in his despatches computed the Mahratta loss as 1200 men killed on the field of battle, and four times that number wounded. He computed his own loss, in officers and men, to be 626 killed, 1580 wounded. The fruits of the victory were many. The enemy's guns were captured—more than one hundred in the field, and twenty pieces more in the pursuit. Much baggage and stores were seized by the auxiliary cavalry. The best disciplined of Scindiah's infantry, who offered the bravest resistance, were left *hors de combat* upon the field. The moral influence of the British general and his troops was much enhanced. Colonel Stevenson was enabled to conquer Berhampore and Asseergur on the 16th and 21st of October, while General Wellesley, with his small force now somewhat augmented by the troops of the Peishwa and British sepoy's, was free to act with effect in other directions. Scindiah sought a truce, and sent vakeels into the camp of the general. But he was not sincere in his negotiations, merely seeking to gain time. The general finding this to be the case, and indignant that the truce was violated, proceeded to attack the Mahratta army under the Rajah of Berar and Ragogere Boorslah, on the plains of Argaum.

Having formed a junction with Colonel Stevenson's corps, the general came in sight of the enemy on the 28th of November,

* Despatches.

strongly posted near the village of Argaum. Their line extended five miles. The village of Argaum, with numerous gardens and enclosures, lay in the rear; in their front a plain intersected by watercourses. The task before the English was not so formidable as at Assaye, the enemy not possessing half the number of guns, nor were their artillerymen so well disciplined. The English force was more numerous, and native and European were veterans. This, however, did not much improve the quality of the native forces, who behaved shamefully, and so endangered the result of the battle to the English, that but for the courage and presence of mind of General Wellesley, the British would undoubtedly have suffered a defeat. No account of the battle of Argaum ever published possesses the united advantages of brevity, accuracy, and authority, in the same degree as those accounts given by the conqueror himself, in his despatches and letters. In his despatch he thus wrote:—"I formed the army in two lines; the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second and supporting the right, and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy; with the right rather advanced in order to press upon the enemy's left." After alluding to the confusion caused by the unsteadiness of the native troops, the general stated that when his line was formed, "the whole advanced in the greatest order; the 74th and 78th regiments were attacked by a large body, (supposed to be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah's cavalry charged the first battalion 6th regiment, which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed; and their whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition. The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels, and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Unfortunately sufficient daylight did not remain to do all that I could have wished; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night."

In a letter to Major Shaw, military secretary to the governor-general,* General Wellesley wrote—"If we had had daylight an hour more not a man would have escaped. We should have had that time if my native infantry had not been panic-struck and got into confusion when the cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly three entire battalions, who behaved so admirably

in the battle of Assaye, being broke, and running off when the cannonade commenced at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assaye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for everything that we should certainly have performed. The troops were under arms, and I was on horseback, from six in the morning until twelve at night."

The allusion of General Wellesley to the conduct of the sepoys at Assaye being better than at Argaum requires some qualification. In the advance upon the second line of the enemy at the former battle, two sepoy regiments in succession gave way, and it was only when the Highlanders, who had previously suffered much in storming the first line, advanced against the second that it was carried. The loss sustained by the enemy in the battle of Argaum was very great, but could not be ascertained with any approach to accuracy by the English. That of the latter was severe, considering how soon the action was over: 346 officers and men were put *hors de combat*. The British cavalry suffered little, but forty-five horses were either disabled or slain in the pursuit. This was the third action which General Wellesley had fought, and his reputation had been raised by each to a very high degree, although he had been severely criticised by military connoisseurs for his generalship. His first action against Dhoondia was simply a charge of cavalry, which the critics avowed should not have been made on the occasion, according to the rules of war. The success of the general was regarded as a piece of good fortune. It is impossible, however, not to perceive, where no professional prejudice warps the opinion, that the means adopted were just such as were calculated to accomplish the end immediately in view. The battle of Assaye, it was admitted, was conducted in every respect properly, and was a great victory, but it was alleged that the attack should never have been made. Had it not been made, it is plain, that no similarly favourable opportunity could have been found to strike a severe blow upon so numerous an enemy, while to evade a battle, must have issued in a retreat before a cavalry four times more numerous than the general's whole army. The battle of Argaum was described as fought against military rule, and only won by the activity, self-reliance, and presence of mind of the general. No doubt he had a sufficient consciousness of his possession of those great

* Despatches, vol. i. p. 533. 2nd December, 1803.

qualities to take his own gifts into account as elements of success. If he turned aside from the maxims of military science, it was with a happy audacity like that which Napoleon had been for some years displaying in Europe and Egypt. The opinion of that great man concerning the conduct of General Wellesley in India, and especially in the battle of Assaye, given many years after, showed a high appreciation of the genius of the English general, although the critique of his great rival was tinged by those personal, national, and political prejudices to which Napoleon the First so often allowed his mind to be subjected. The terror which the name of General Wellesley inspired in the southern Mahratta country was great, and wherever he turned, the enemy fled or made a comparatively feeble resistance. The fort of Gawilghur was taken from the Rajah of Berar,* on 14th of December, which was followed by the peace with him in three days, under the treaty of Deogaum.†

On the 30th peace was signed with Scindiah, by the treaty of Surgee Augengaum. Scindiah was probably influenced in signing a treaty, as was also the Berar Rajah, by the fear and defection of minor chiefs. Ambajee forsook the standard of Scindiah early in December, and formed a separate treaty with the English on the 16th. Ambajee was, however, treacherous to the English as to Scindiah, for he refused to deliver up the fort of Gwalior, so famous in India, and which, according to the treaty, had been ceded to the British. It was not surrendered until the 5th of February, 1804, after a breaching battery had opened upon it. In the treaty of the 30th of December, 1803, Scindiah made his possession of this fortress a *sine quâ non*. In a letter to Major Malcolm, written May, 1804, General Wellesley declared—"I am convinced that I should not have made the peace if I had insisted upon Gwalior." The Marquis Wellesley differed from his brother on this question, but events proved that General Wellesley had a more intimate knowledge of the subject, and of the policy to be pursued, as might be expected from his opportunities as commander of the army by which the disputed treaties had been conquered. It was not until the 25th of December, 1805, when the Marquis Wellesley had returned home, after the death of the Marquis of Cornwallis, his successor, and when Sir George Barlow was governor-general, *pro tempore*, that an end was put to the quibbles and questions connected with the fort of Gwalior.

While General Wellesley was conducting

the war in one direction, General Lake was operating with a separate army in another, and after both armies had conducted successful campaigns, their respective commanders were kept in continued vigilance and action, from the wayward and uncertain conduct of Holkar and other chiefs, who regarded conventions and agreements simply as means of deceit or delay.

In February, 1804, Holkar, undismayed by the successes of the British, demanded from General Wellesley cessions in the Deccan. He immediately sent an agent to Scindiah, in order to induce that chief to violate his treaties and join him in an attack upon the British possessions. General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray, then commanding in Gujerat, to enter Malwa, and penetrating to Indore, attack Holkar in the capital of his dominions, while another of Colonel Murray's detachments was to proceed to the Deccan, and act against Holkar there. Lake took measures on the opposite side of the Mahratta dominions, to render more easy of accomplishment the plan of operations from Gujerat laid down by General Wellesley. Throughout these proceedings, the General displayed a sagacious foresight, and an intuitive perception of the conditions of Indian warfare, which must strike all persons acquainted with the character of the nations of peninsula India as indicating the great military genius, and general intellectual capacity of the British general. His instructions to Colonel Stevenson, which were implicitly followed out by that officer, and ensured the success of his undertakings, prove the ability of General Wellesley to make successful war in India, while they show how little he regarded the received rules of war, where it was politic to depart from them:—"Supposing that you determine to have a brush with them, I recommend what follows to your consideration. Do not attack their position, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access, for which the banks of the numerous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have intrenched it; but when you shall hear that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage, and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common disorder of march; they will not have time to form, which, being but half-disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they will not have chosen for the battle; a part of their troops only will be engaged; and it is possible that you will gain an easy victory.

* Despatches, vol. ii. p. 583.

† Ibid., vol. ii. p. 588.

Indeed, according to this mode, you might choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might meet them upon that very ground."

It was not reserved for General Wellesley to accomplish any very signal feats of arms in the Mahratta war, although the superintendence of military arrangements over a wide field continued to devolve upon him while he remained in India. Whether in the camp, the field of battle, the barrack-room, the stores of the commissary, his perfect power of military organization, his capacity alike for generalization and detail were observed by all. Nor was his genius less conspicuous in civil things. At the desk writing letters and despatches, in *viva voce* discussion with vakeels and ministers, in the durbar of native princes, in the chair of government administering the affairs of provinces, he displayed as masterly parts as when exercising the functions of what was regarded as his peculiar profession.

When tidings of the battles of Assaye and Argaum reached England, the directors paid no particular attention to them, and conferred no honours on the chief by whom they were won. The government conferred upon him the Order of the Bath. In India his deeds were highly appreciated, a sword valued at £1000 was voted by the British inhabitants of Calcutta. The general was not contented with the value set upon his achievements by either the crown or the company, although the Order of the Bath was in those days highly estimated. It will interest readers of the present day to peruse the general's own language expressing his sense of neglect. In a letter to Major Shaw, he wrote :—"I have served the country in important situations for many years, and have never received anything but injury from the court of directors,

although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments, and in communication with all the residents, and many civil authorities; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper, from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted. The king's ministers have as little claims upon me as the court of directors. I am not very ambitious, and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered on the scale on which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the staff of India, and if it had not been for the lamented death of General Frazer, General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary."

In March, 1805, Sir Arthur Wellesley (as his Order of the Bath entitled him) left India for England. His health had suffered considerably, and his dissatisfaction with the ministers and the company contributed still more to induce in him a desire to quit India for ever. His service there had made impressions of a lasting kind. He had set an example of kindness in his treatment of the natives, and checked the arrogance of his countrymen wherever it came within his observation. He established the importance of promptitude, both in the field and in negotiations with native states. His letters and conduct had impressed upon the general staff of the army, and all officers on service, the necessity of acquaintance on their part with the people and topography of all countries made the theatre of war, or which were likely at any future period to become so.

CHAPTER CII.

MAHRATTA WAR (*Continued*)—OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAKE—BATTLES AND SIEGES—FINAL SUBJUGATION OF THE MAHRATTAS, AND TREATIES OF PEACE.

IN the last chapter, the operations of General Wellesley against the Mahrattas were traced through the campaigns in which he vanquished Scindiah at Assaye, the Rajah of Berar at Argaum, and directed Colonel Murray's invasion of Malwa and Indore from Gujerat, in order to suppress the power of Holkar. It was intimated also in that chapter

that General, afterwards Lord Lake, operated against the Mahratta forces from Bengal. His first movements were directed against Scindiah, his subsequent campaigns against Holkar. The campaigns of Lake were more continuous, and involved a fiercer struggle over a greater area, but were not so interesting in their character as those of the com-

mander in the south. While Wellesley was gaining Assaye and Argaum, he was winning the victories of Delhi and Laswaree. There were three armies acting at the same time against the various Mahratta tribes. Two of these were under the supreme direction of General Wellesley, one of which was under his immediate command, of which for some time Colonel Stevenson commanded a separate corps; the other army which Wellesley directed was that which operated from Gujerat, but which was too far off for him to guide its details.

It will assist the memory of the reader to see the dates of the chief actions fought by these different armies presented in one view:—General Wellesley, on the 12th August, 1803, took Ahmednuggur. On the 29th August General Lake defeated Perron's troops at Coel; on the same day, Baroch in Gujerat was taken by storm. Lake took the fort of Allyghur on the 4th September, on the 11th gained the battle of Delhi. On the 23rd September, Wellesley gained the battle of Assaye. On the 18th October, Lake took possession of the fortress of Agra. On the 1st November he gained the battle of Laswaree. On the 28th November, Wellesley gained the battle of Argaum. In October, Colonel Stevenson had taken Berhampore and Asseergur; and Colonel Woodington had reduced Champa-neer and Powanghur. Colonel Harcourt had been successful in Cuttack; and Colonel Powell had attained advantages in Bundelcund. Both Scindiah and the Berar Rajah had pledged themselves to "retain no Frenchmen" in their service, or "the subjects of powers in a state of hostility to Great Britain; nor of any of our own, without permission." The Marquis Wellesley had by his proclamation of August, 1803, brought over most of the foreign officers, as well as all our own. In the four great battles we had taken above three hundred guns, and in the fortresses a great many guns, and great quantities of military stores.

To understand clearly the operations of General Lake both against Scindiah and Holkar, it is necessary to state that while both those chiefs were at war with the English, they were also carrying on hostilities with one another. On the 25th of October, 1802, a great battle had taken place between them at Poonah, in which Holkar had gained a great victory. His army at that time consisted of fourteen battalions of infantry, numbering each about one thousand men, commanded wholly by French officers, and as many more commanded by native officers. His cavalry numbered twenty-five thousand. He had one hundred pieces of cannon. Both

in the cavalry and artillery, especially the latter, French officers held important commands. At that date Holkar's object was not to attack the English, but to destroy the power of his competitors. Had he then directed his numerous and well-equipped army wholly against the British, it was the opinion of the best English officers that the confederated Mahrattas would have been too strong for us.*

On the 27th of December, 1803, Lake moved after Holkar, with instructions if possible to engage him and destroy his army. In February, 1804, Holkar sought assistance from the Rohillas and Sikhs, with the view of extending a confederation through North-western India against the English. In March, 1804, so confident was Holkar of his power to cope with all enemies, that he demanded the cession of territory in the Doab and in Bundelcund, and asserted the right to collect the chout (one-fourth of the landed revenue). At the same time, he made overtures to Scindiah for united action against the English. While Scindiah's forces lay at Assaye, he sent an army under Ameer Khan to assist the rival Mahratta chief. The promptitude of General Wellesley in the meantime defeated Scindiah, and rendered the junction impossible. When at last Holkar resolved to confront the English, he found General Lake, flushed with victory over Scindiah, ready to encounter him. The Mahratta chief had outwitted himself; while the English were destroying the flower of Scindiah's troops, they were removing all impediments that lay in the way of attacking the still more formidable Holkar.

When the war on the Bengal side commenced in June, 1803, about a month after the Peishwa was restored at Poonah by General Wellesley, the following were the arrangements and amount of troops:—One thousand three hundred men under Colonel Fenwick at Midnapore, not far from Calcutta; two thousand men under Major-general Deare, stationed at Mirzapore, on the Ganges, as a protection to the province and city of Benares. Four thousand nine hundred and sixteen was assembled under Colonel Harcourt, of Madras and Bengal troops for the conquest of Cuttack, belonging to the Rajah of Berar. A force was assembled on the south bank of Soane under Lieutenant-colonel Broughton. Three thousand five hundred men, under Lieutenant-colonel Powell, were collected near Allahabad, for the purpose of invading the province of Bundelcund: while the grand army under

* *British Military Exploits in India, Afghanistan, and China*, by Major W. Hough, Deputy-Judge-Advocate-General, Bengal army.

General Lake, commander-in-chief in India, amounted to ten thousand five hundred men; these acted under his excellency's orders. The total British force was about fifty thousand men. The Mahrattas were estimated* at two hundred and fifty thousand: and forty thousand men organized and drilled by French officers under M. Perron; and one thousand guns.

The marquis was desirous of striking a blow before the cold season should allow the Mahrattas to cross the Nerbuddah into Hindostan. On the 29th August, 1803, General Lake defeated Perron's troops under the walls of Allyghur†—stormed and carried it on the 4th September, fought the battle of Delhi on the 11th September,‡ when he released the Emperor, Shah Alum, who had been imprisoned for many years by the Mahrattas. His eyes had been put out by Ghoolam Khadir. General Lake took Agra on the 18th October, 1803. M. Perron allowed his second in command (M. Pedron) to make his military arrangements, while he himself returned with his body-guard to Agra. The capture of Allyghur was effected by blowing open the gate.§

General Wellesley expressed much admiration of this exploit of General Lake, which, he declared, he had often attempted, without being able to accomplish. Allyghur would have proved a most formidable place for an escalade.

On the 7th of September, Lake marched from Allyghur, and encamped near Delhi on the 11th. The enemy consisted of six thousand cavalry, and thirteen thousand infantry, under the command of a French officer, M. Louis Bourquien. Lake's force was only four thousand five hundred men. Bourquien despised the English brigade which had advanced against an army. He had intrenched himself before Delhi, supposing that he would have been attacked by a very superior force. He resolved at once to attack the English, and for this purpose threw out his whole cavalry force, which, when they approached nearly to musket range, halted, and the infantry passed them. These were met by the English with close and successive volleys, by which their ranks were broke, and they fled behind their guns. Against these the English intrepidly advanced, under a terrible fire from cannon and musketry. The British infantry gave one volley and charged, opening their ranks to let the cavalry pass, whose charge was splendid. The battle was short,

sharp, and decided. The result,—Shah Alum was restored to his throne. He had been in the hands of the Mahrattas since 1771—since he left the alliance and protection of the English at Allahabad at that time. At the juncture of the battle of Delhi, he was treated by Scindiah just as the Peishwa, the rightful sovereign of the Mahrattas, was treated at Poonah. He was obliged to issue the orders of Scindiah as the decrees of the empire.

General Lake was authorised by the governor-general to establish at Delhi a settled form of government in the name of the Mogul. He then departed for Agra. On the 24th of September, Lieut.-colonel Ochterloney, deputy-adjutant-general of the Bengal army, was nominated resident at Delhi, where only a battalion of sepoys, and four companies of recruits, gathered in the surrounding country, was left in garrison. There had been many British as well as French officers in the service of Scindiah; the former left his ranks as soon as proclamation of war was made by the governor-general. These officers having joined the corps under General Lake, were employed as guides, were used to strengthen regiments weakly officered, and were appointed to the command of Mewathies, as the recruits about Delhi were termed. It was one of those officers, named Incan, that blew up the gates of Allyghur, and led the English safely through the intricate mazes of the place.

On the 2nd of October General Lake reached Muttra, where Colonel Vandeleur joined him with a detachment. That gallant officer afterwards earned distinction for himself as a good cavalry officer. An important event occurred at this place; several British officers and some French, in command of a detachment of troops sent by Scindiah to join General Perron, surrendered themselves prisoners of war to Colonel Vandeleur shortly before the arrival of General Lake. This detachment consisted of several regular battalions of Scindiah's army, and its surrender much weakened his force.

On the 8th of October, the army arrived at Agra, and on the 9th the Rajah of Bhurtpore offered a treaty offensive and defensive. This was an immediate advantage to the British, for the rajah sent five thousand horse, such as they were, to operate with Lake's army before Agra. The garrison acted with vigour, arresting all the European officers at once, a measure of safety and of danger, for some of these officers were in the English interest, others were, however, true to the Mahrattas, and the loss of their services was irreparable to the city.

Seven battalions of the enemy occupied the

* Thurn, p. 315.

† Ibid., p. 91.

‡ Ibid., p. 111.

§ *A History of British Military Exploits and Political Events in India.* By Major Hough.

glacis and the town, with a well-appointed and powerful artillery, directed, in many cases, by intelligent French officers who had not been placed under arrest. The first operation of General Lake, after going through the essential preliminaries in laying siege to a fortress, was an attack against the posts occupied by these battalions, which was successful. The enemy made an obstinate defence within the town, but Lake seized a large mosque, from which a heavy fire was kept up against the enemy. In two days after this success, the enemy's infantry outside the fort surrendered, numbering two thousand five hundred men. This terrible reverse did not diminish the exertions of the troops within the fortress. It was not until the 17th that the breaching batteries opened. On the 18th, under the influence of an English officer within the fortress, the garrison surrendered. The Mahratta troops, five thousand five hundred in number, marched out prisoners of war. Twenty tumbrils of treasure, containing 22 lacs of rupees, equivalent to £220,000, were obtained in the treasury. The ammunition and stores were very valuable, as Agra was more a depot of arms and a treasury than a strong fortification. M. Perron, the French commander, had the falsehood and effrontery to claim the money as his personal property—a claim which was of course rejected, Colonel Hessing, the governor, having honestly avowed that the treasury contained only the property of the state.

General Lake's proceedings had been so well calculated, and so complete, that Scindiah's plans were soon entirely frustrated.

Two battalions of Scindiah's army had escaped from Delhi; these formed a junction with fifteen battalions, the remainder of the corps, the advance of which had surrendered to Colonel Vandeleur. Guns and a force of cavalry accompanied these battalions, making a very fine army, which hung upon the rear of the English, but did not attempt the relief of Agra. The main object was to watch Lake's movements, deceive him, and recapture Delhi, so as to regain possession of the person of the Mogul. The army of Scindiah seized convoys, harassed reinforcements, and bombarded Cotumbo. Lake having left Agra, was to the north-west of Futtehpoore Sikree, when the booming of the cannon at Cotumbo broke upon his ear. The next day (the 30th), by a forced march, leaving his heavy guns and baggage at Futtehpoore, the army advanced to Cotumbo, near which it encamped next day.

General Lake determined on an attempt with his cavalry to seize the guns and bag-

gage of the enemy, while his infantry was on the march. At eleven o'clock on the night of the 31st, Lake, with the cavalry, began a forced march, and after a progress of twenty-five miles, came up with the enemy at sunrise on the 1st of November. Their force consisted of seventeen battalions of infantry, of much less than the usual strength, not exceeding together nine thousand men; a cavalry division of about five thousand men, and a powerful artillery of seventy-two guns.

The Mahrattas had heard of the approach of Lake, had magnified his army, and retreated rapidly from Cotumbo. They were making a forced and confused march when his advanced guard beheld the struggling crowds in their wild Mahratta costume, their guns showing darkly in the grey morning. The guns were ingeniously chained together, a circumstance which baffled Lake's cavalry, who found that they were unable to retain their conquests, for, as they retired to reform, the artillerymen jumped up from beneath the guns and bore them away. Lake checked the progress of the enemy until his infantry arrived at twelve o'clock. He formed them in two columns of attack. The enemy awaited the attack with two lines of infantry, the guns drawn up in double lines in front of the first rank of the infantry, the rear guns being placed in the intervals of the first line. The village of Mokaupore was between the two lines of the infantry near the right flank. It was fortified, and partly rested on a rivulet which covered the enemy's right. The Mahratta cavalry were well posted in the rear of their second infantry formation. The position was a fine one, and the appearance of the troops stalwart and confident.

Lake arranged a portion of his cavalry so as to watch that of the enemy, the remainder to support his attacking columns. What used in those days to be called "galloper guns" were arranged so as to support the advancing infantry. Lake himself, with one of the columns of attack advanced against the enemy's right formation of battle. The column was badly formed, confusion arose in the ranks, the men came up slowly, and the sepoys showed a disposition to leave the fighting as much as possible to the Europeans. The officership of the British was bad, and only by hard fighting, and after terrible courage, did they succeed. The cannonade of the enemy was cool, prompt, and rapid:—"The effect of this fire, which was terrible in the extreme, was felt with peculiar severity by the 76th regiment, which fine body, by heading the attack, as usual, became the direct object of destruction. So great indeed was the loss of this corps, and such was the

furious fire of the enemy, that the commander-in-chief deemed it more advisable to hasten the attack with that regiment, and those of the native infantry, consisting of the second regiment, twelfth and sixth companies of the second battalion sixteenth, which had closed to the front, than to wait till the remainder of the column should be formed, whose advance had been delayed by unavoidable impediment."

The guns were captured. The enemy gave way on the left, as the success of the British on the right became assured. The dauntless indifference to danger shown by the Scottish soldiery struck the enemy with awe, and while the men opposed to them died at their posts, those on the left became so intimidated as to offer an inferior resistance. The day was won by the right attack. The loss of General Lake was extremely heavy. Major Hough thus details it:—"The loss in killed and wounded amounted to 824. Of these the cavalry lost 258; his majesty's 76th regiment, 213; the 2nd battalion, 12th, and the company's 16th native infantry,* lost 188; leaving the remainder, sixty-five, to be divided among all the other corps—and 553 horses killed, wounded and missing. The guns captured were seventy-one in number." Lake's secret letter explains the nature of the battle. The following extracts are full of interest:—"These battalions (Scindiah's) are uncommonly well appointed, have a most numerous artillery, as well served as they can possibly be, the gunners standing to their guns until killed by the bayonet; all the sepoys of the enemy behaved exceedingly well, and if they had been commanded by French officers,† the event would have been, I fear, extremely doubtful. I never was in so severe a business in my life, or anything like it, and pray to God I never may be in such a situation again. Their army is better appointed than ours, no expense is spared whatever; they have three times the number of men to a gun as we have, their bullocks, of which they have many more than we have, are of a very superior sort; all their men's knapsacks and baggage are carried upon camels, by which means they can march double the distance. We have taken all their bazaar, baggage, and everything belonging to them; an amazing number were killed—indeed the victory has been decisive. The action of yesterday has convinced me how impossible it is to do anything without British troops, and of them there ought to be a very great proportion." "Had

we been beaten by these brigades, the consequences attending such a defeat must have been most fatal. These fellows fought like devils, or rather like heroes, and had we not made a disposition for attack in a style that we should have done against the most formidable army we could have been opposed to, I verily believe from the position they had taken we must have failed."

The general was of opinion that the organization of the British army was dangerously defective; that the sepoys would seldom fight well, unless mixed with a proportion of Europeans, which he thought should never be less than one to four, but, if possible, in a much greater proportion; and that under any circumstances their devotion was not to be relied on. He considered that the loyalty of the Bengal sepoys was not worthy of confidence, and that if they were trusted as the main strength of the army, British power in India was "suspended from a thread." These views of the general produced no effect upon the policy or opinions of the company.

In 1804 the operations of Lake and his lieutenants against Holkar were unfortunate. Lake dispatched Colonel Monson against him with the forces of the Rajah of Jeypore; while Murray, by the orders of General Wellesley, as before shown, acted against him from Gujerat. Holkar soon lost his possessions in Hindostan, north of the Chambul, and was hemmed in between Murray and Monson. From these difficulties he extricated himself through the faults of his adversaries. Murray was tardy, Monson was utterly incompetent, and believed the sepoys to be disloyal. His rearguard, commanded by Baboojee Scindiah, was betrayed by that chief.

When the rainy season commenced, General Lake went into cantonments at Cawnpore, too remote to render assistance to Monson. General Wellesley was of opinion, that had Lake fixed his head-quarters at Agra, Monson might have been saved from discomfiture and disaster. Lake was not as competent to manage the operations from Bengal, as Wellesley was from the south. Indeed, General Wellesley threw much of the blame of Monson's ruin upon General Lake.

Lake marched from Cawnpore, and arrived at the general rendezvous at Agra on the 22nd of September. The strategy of Lake was unskilful; Holkar proved more than his match. After the bad arrangements of Lake had caused a considerable sacrifice of munitions of war and provisions, Holkar succeeded in engaging the general's attention with his cavalry, while he conveyed his infantry and artillery to Delhi, and laid siege to it. The Mohammedan population were insurgent.

* The 16th were removed to the brigade in which his majesty's 76th were, owing to gallant conduct in the attack on the town of Agra in October, 1803.

† The proclamation brought them over.

An intense fanaticism against Christians animated the whole people, and Colonel Ochterlony had much difficulty in repressing insurrection. He called in the troops dispersed in the neighbourhood, strengthened the defences of the city, and gave the command of the forces to Lieutenant-colonel Burn, the senior officer.

From the 8th of October to the 15th, the siege was maintained by Holkar, and Ochterlony, with his few irregular soldiers, conducted a defence not often surpassed in skill and valour. Like Colonel, afterwards General Williams, at Kars, half a century later, he was everywhere, superintending the detail of the army, but was not so successful in attaching to him the people of the city he defended. It is doubtful whether the enemy would not have succeeded, had not Ochterlony contrived to apprise Lake of his circumstances, the approach of whose advance guard was the signal for the retirement of Holkar's army, which consisted of twenty thousand infantry and one hundred guns. As he retired, he plundered the country in every direction. Lake pursued the enemy with his cavalry, and overtook him while encamped at night. The general, instead of attacking the camp with his troopers, fired grape into it from his horse artillery guns, which allowed Holkar to escape. Lake still maintained a hot cavalry pursuit. Holkar, who was with his cavalry, would hardly have been so ready to fly, had he not heard of a signal defeat inflicted upon his infantry and artillery at Deeg. To that place, Major-general Fraser had pursued them. A battle was fought, during which General Fraser lost his leg, and the command devolved upon Colonel Monson, who nobly redeemed his former ill fortune by good conduct and bravery; nearly two thousand of the enemy perished in this battle. The English lost three hundred and fifty, killed and wounded. Eighty-seven guns were captured, and the enemy were obliged to abandon the open country and take shelter in the fort of Deeg. This place belonged to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, with whom, in 1803, Lord Lake had made a treaty offensive and defensive. He, like most of the native princes, proved to be a traitor. Lord Lake resolved to punish him as well as inflict further defeat upon the enemy he sheltered. The fort and citadel were taken by storm after an obstinate defence.

On the 25th of December, the English were in possession of all the guns of the remaining artillery of Holkar's army, of the stores of the fort, and of that army. Two lacs of rupees were found in the treasury. In conquering the intrenched camp, fort, and citadel, Lake's

army lost only forty-three men killed, and 184 men wounded.

The general left a garrison in Deeg, and marched with his army on the 28th. On the last day of the year he was joined by Major-general Dowdeswell, with his majesty's 75th regiment and a supply of stores. The army halted until New Year's Day, and marching in the evening, reached Bhurtpore on the 2nd of January, 1805. This fortress was situated thirty miles W.N.W. of Agra. Having battered a breach, Lake attempted to storm on the 9th, and was beaten off with a loss of 456 men killed and wounded. He erected fresh batteries, as the enemy succeeded in stockading the breach. Major-general Smith, arriving with three battalions of sepoys and one hundred convalescent Europeans, and Ishmael Bey, a partisan of Holkar, having come over with a regiment of cavalry, a second storm was resolved upon, which took place on the 21st, when a breach was pronounced practicable, from intelligence gained by the following stratagem:—"To learn the breadth and depth of the ditch a havildar and two troopers of the 3rd native cavalry volunteered their services. Dressed like the natives of the country, and pursued by men as if deserters, they got to the ditch by the stratagem of pretending to be enemies of the English and wishing to enter the fort, by which plan they passed along the ditch to a gateway and saw the breach, then galloped back to the army. They were rewarded and promoted.*"

This storm also failed, with terrible loss. Eighteen officers were killed and wounded, and more than five hundred men. The remainder of the month the army lay before the fortress, watched by the cavalry of Holkar strongly reinforced, various affairs of outpost occurred, and Holkar's troopers made attempts more skilful than gallant to intercept or interrupt convoys from Agra, compelling Lake to keep a considerable portion of his army marching backwards and forwards, to ensure the safety of his stores and escorts.

The chiefs with Holkar quarrelled; some withdrew to Rohileund, some to Rajpootana. General Smith was sent in chase of some of these parties, without much plan either on his own part or that of Lord Lake, and with little result beyond the loss of some officers and men in cavalry skirmishes, and the return of the troops wearied with incessant marching. On the 10th of February Major-general Jones arrived with a division of the Bombay army, consisting of two battalions of king's troops, four of sepoys, and about six hundred native cavalry.

* Thorn.

Lord Lake had now a large army and a great many generals, and if Bhurtpore was not impregnable he must take it. He a third time, however, failed, with a loss of 894 men killed and wounded. The conduct of the soldiers was excellent. The sepoya fought with a quiet submission to the word of command, the Europeans with devoted courage. Neither Lake nor his generals showed much skill, and the task itself was most difficult. Cannon continued to play upon the place until the 22nd of February, when a fourth storm took place. The Hon. Brigadier Monson, who had shown such incapacity when co-operating with Colonel Murray in a previous campaign, commanded the stormers, who were in number more than three thousand. The brigadier fought with desperation, and kept his men fighting when no result could happen but their destruction; they were beaten, with a loss of nine hundred and eighty-seven men killed and wounded. Few assaults in Indian sieges, and few defences, were more terrible than this, as the following description shows:—"The bastion to be attacked was extremely steep, and there was no possibility of getting up to the summit. Several soldiers drove their bayonets into the wall, one over another, and endeavoured by these steps to reach the top, but were knocked down by logs of wood, and various missiles, from above. The enemy from the next bastion kept up a destructive fire. Several efforts were made against the curtain. The enemy's grape told with fatal effect. The people on the walls threw down upon the heads of the troops ponderous pieces of timber, and flaming packs of cotton, previously dipped in oil, followed by pots filled with gunpowder and other combustibles, the explosion of which had a terrible effect. The struggle was carried on with the most determined resolution on both sides. Brigadier Monson strained himself to the utmost in maintaining the unequal struggle; but after two hours' arduous exertion, he was reluctantly compelled to relinquish the attempt, and return to the trenches."*

Lake might well be dispirited after so many failures. He had consumed an immense amount of stores and ammunition; his guns were worn out; the cost of his army had been very great. He still persevered, ordering supplies from Agra and Allyghur. At this juncture the rajah's treasury became exhausted. Lake had been recently exalted to the peerage, and the rajah made that circumstance the occasion of friendly overtures. He sent a vakeel to Lord Lake, congratulating him on his being ennobled, and expressing a

desire for peace. On the 10th of April, 1805, the treaty was signed. The chief clauses of it were, that the rajah would pay twenty lacs of rupees (£200,000), never employ any Europeans in his service, and the fortress of Deeg was to be retained until there was no longer a possibility of renewed treachery on his part, or the English were satisfied of his amity.

Lord Lake was much chagrined at the failure before Bhurtpore, and attributed it mainly to his deficient material, the fewness of his officers of engineers and artillery, and men who understood sapping and mining. The British officers displayed dauntless bravery, and but little military ability. The first act of Lord Lake after the signature of the treaty was to make a cavalry attack upon the camp of Holkar, who hovered about seeking for a favourable moment by some bold manœuvre to raise the siege. Lake routed him, killing many of his men, and capturing many of his horses. The indomitable Holkar, however, soon found new recruits and new resources, and went about, like a Tartar chief, plundering all around. Lake then disposed of that portion of his army, which he desired to keep the field, along the western bank of the Jumna, well placed for co-operation as new events might demand.

Holkar retired into Joudpore and Rajpootana. Lake, with five regiments of cavalry, four of infantry, and a strong body of horse artillery, followed and sought battle. The Mahratta requested the assistance of the Punjaabee chiefs. The Sikhs, in a grand national council, agreed to withhold all aid from the fugitive. This decided the fate of Holkar, who, as well as Scindiah, agreed to a treaty of peace. The treaty with the latter included various minor chiefs, such as the Rajahs of Joudpore and Kotah, the Rance of Odeypore, &c. The treaty was ratified on Christmas-day, 1805. Peace, however, was not altogether restored. Meer Khan, the best general of Holkar, and claiming to be an independent chief, felt aggrieved that he was not named in the treaty. His remonstrance having been treated carelessly, he sarcastically observed, "a fly may torment an elephant," and retired to his house. Soon afterwards he appeared in arms in Rajpootana, and caused immeasurable trouble. He managed his desultory warfare so well, that he acquired an independent position, and was afterwards recognised as a nabob by the English. Holkar became mad a few years after, and Meer Khan became the vicegerent of Holkar's dominions, in the name of that chief's wife. It was not until the 9th of January, 1806, that the British army retraced their steps.

* Major Hough.

Thus ended the great Mahratta war. Some of the bitterest enemies of the English made good terms for themselves; it was the interest of the British to conciliate them. Some of the most faithful friends of the company, who were weak, were thrown aside and exposed to the vengeance of the Mahrattas. The Rajah of Jeypore was one of these, and it is to the discredit of Lord Cornwallis, in his second government, and of Governor-general

Barlow, that this injustice was perpetrated with their sanction, in spite of the indignant protests of Lord Lake, who, under the authority of a previous governor-general, Lord Wellesley, had formed a treaty offensive and defensive with the rajah. The bitter taunt of Hyder Ali was thus again justified—that no confidence could be placed in the English, as a treaty made by one governor-general was revoked by another, or by the company.

CHAPTER CIII.

RESIGNATION OF THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY—MARQUIS CORNWALLIS SUCCEEDS HIM—POLICY AND DEATH OF HIS LORDSHIP—APPOINTMENT AND REVOKATION OF SIR G. BARLOW—NOMINATION OF LORD MINTO—AFFAIRS OF MADRAS—MUTINY AND MASSACRE AT VELLORE—ARRIVAL OF LORD MINTO—HIS POLICY.

DURING the campaigns with the Mahrattas, and for some time subsequently, there were various changes in the presidential and chief governments, which affected the general policy of the English in India. Lord William Bentinck's arrival in Madras was beneficial to that presidency. The Marquis of Wellesley was apprised by Lord Castlereagh, in 1803, of the war with France, and was urged to make the expenses of India be paid by the revenues of India, which the noble governor's warlike policy rendered impossible. When the general government in Calcutta heard that France had taken possession of Holland, it increased the military ardour of his excellency. His brother's successes in the Deccan tended to the same result; and he became more and more committed to a policy, much too warlike for the views of the board of control, and the court of directors. In 1806, when intelligence reached Lord Wellesley that England declared war against Spain, and that his government relied on his prudence and vigour to protect the Eastern dependencies of England from any casualties in the result, his lordship's military ardour found renewed scope.

On the 30th July, 1805, Lord Cornwallis arrived at Calcutta, to assume a second time the united office of governor-general and commander-in-chief. Lord Lake, much to his mortification, was nominated to the command of the forces in the Bengal presidency. Lord Wellesley shortly after returned to England. The Marquis Cornwallis had received instructions from the court of directors and the board of control, to carry out the policy which when before in India he had initiated, of holding no connection, and carrying on no hostilities, with the Mahrattas.

He scarcely waited for the Marquis Wellesley to quit Calcutta before he began to reverse all that that nobleman had done, or authorised his generals to perform, in connection with the late war. Treaties and arrangements were revoked, and alliances dissolved, so that his lordship, by his disregard of the actual state of things, sowed broadcast the seeds of future troubles all over India. Some of these were nipped in the bud, others grew and ripened. Blood and treasure had to flow again freely before this error and precipitancy of his lordship could be retrieved. The Marquis Wellesley might possibly have avoided both the Mysore and Mahratta wars, so, at all events, Mr. Secretary Webbe thought, whose opinion was as good as any in India; but these wars having been brought to an issue, and treaties framed resulting from such issue, it was perilous policy to act as if nothing had occurred, and to treat matters as if the *status quo ante bellum* had been suddenly restored by the hand of Providence.

While the stern and indignant remonstrances of Lord Lake and other officers were before him, the marquis sickened and died. He died at Ghazepore, on the 5th of October, 1805.* Sir G. H. Barlow succeeded as governor-general. He adopted "the policy of his predecessor," abandoning all connection with the petty states, and generally, with the territories to the westward of the Jumna."

On the death of Lord Cornwallis, Lord Lake, as the senior officer in India, assumed the command in chief, when he was about to retire from the country, indignant at his previous supercession.

Barlow was not long permitted to wear his new honours. The court and cabinet were jea-

* Mill, vol. vi. p. 658.

lous of the company's influence, and revoked. Sir George's appointment, giving the high post to Lord Minto. The latter candidate had power and influence in parliament; Sir George had only his talent and long services. These qualifications availed little in comparison with parliamentary and court influence.

While these changes were passing in Calcutta, Lord William Bentinck was winning fame for himself by the administration of the affairs of Madras. He completely altered the fiscal management of Tanjore, where peculation prevailed among the natives to an extraordinary degree. The conditions of Malabar and Canara, the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty with Travancore, suppression of insurrectionary movements among the polygars, introduction of new judicial and revenue systems engaged the attention of his lordship, and repeatedly drew from the directors the expression of their approbation.

On the 17th of October, 1804, Sir John Cradock succeeded General Stuart as commander-in-chief of the forces in Madras. General Wellesley retired from Madras when his brother resigned the government of India.

In consequence of the war in Europe, Lord W. Bentinck retained Pondicherry. His attempts to introduce there good revenue and judicial systems, to govern the settlement fairly, were countervailed as much as possible by the French residents, who were nearly all spies of the French government. Among the many events in which Lord W. Bentinck had a deep interest, there was none that so much affected his own interests and reputation as the mutiny at Vellore, which broke out in the month of July, 1806.

Sir John Cradock, when commander-in-chief, found no code of military regulations for the army of Madras; and in March, 1805, he proposed to Lord W. Bentinck the formation of one. His lordship recommended the council to adopt such as had already appeared "in orders;" other regulations approved by the general, he commended to the consideration of council.

The tenth paragraph of the code thus formed ran as follows:—"The sepoys are required to appear on parade with their chins clean shaved, and the hair on the upper lip cut after the same pattern, and never to wear the distinguishing mark of caste, or their earrings when in uniform. A turban of a new pattern is also ordered for the sepoys." This last clause was added in the new regulations. This "tenth paragraph" of the new military code, having been inserted among the old orders, did not come under the consideration of the governor and council. The sepoys did not appear to take any particular notice of

this order. The first symptoms of dissatisfaction arose in the 2nd battalion of the 4th regiment of native infantry, which composed part of the native garrison of Vellore. On the 6th and 7th of May they objected to wear the turban, and did so with an insolent manner, and with indications of a mutinous spirit. They were reduced to order by the stern application of authority. The Madras government was surprised to hear of this; they had not noticed the paragraph until the reports of these demonstrations against the turban had reached them. Inquiry was instituted, and the native officers and men generally professed to have no objection to the turban. The governor issued an order to the troops, declaring that "no intention existed to introduce any charge incompatible with the laws or usages of their religion." The commander-in-chief, a self-willed man, did not think it necessary, and it was not published. Probably if it had been promulgated no good would have resulted, for although the objections of the sepoys were conscientious and sincere, they were formed upon false representations made by political emissaries. This may readily be conceived, as Vellore was the place appointed for the residence of the sons of Tippoo Sultan; they were allowed a large sum for the maintenance of their dignity, and their retainers were numerous. Every vagabond Mysorean who wished to attract their notice settled in the neighbourhood, and treated them as sovereigns. The Mohammedans of all ranks regarded them as the rightful rulers of Southern India, and therefore as aggrieved by infidels and foreigners. They were held sacred by the devotees, as sons of the great apostle of Mohammedanism in Southern India. These princes encouraged this disaffection, and not only favoured, but expended, it was afterwards alleged, large sums of money to promote disaffection. A conspiracy amongst the Mohammedans of Southern India, to overturn the British government by general insurrection of its own soldiers, had been set on foot. The means of accomplishing this, was by persuading them that their religion was endangered; that the English desired to make them Christians by force. Some pretext in the violation of caste privileges was sought, and, as the English officers were very ignorant of the native languages and prejudices, it was believed an opportunity would soon be afforded. The tenth paragraph of the military code furnished such an occasion. Fakeers went among the troops, with the connivance of the native officers, and persuaded them that the turban violated their caste, that the screw on the front of their uniform was a

cross, and that the order concerning their beards was an infringement of the Koran; that they must strike a great blow for their religion, or submit to be made Christians by force. These reports were spread not only among the troops at Vellore, but all the stations of Southern India, more especially among those which formed the contingent at Hyderabad, in the Deccan.

Information was given to the commander at Vellore, by a soldier named Mustapha Bey, that a conspiracy for revolt and murder existed among the native troops. His statement was absurdly referred to the native officers. They declared the statement false, and accused the witness of continued drunkenness, which at times affected his reason, and that he was then labouring under such hallucination. The want of vigilance, intelligence, and a proper knowledge of their troops by the European officers was such that the statement of the informer was discredited, and the accused were believed, whose interest it was to conceal the fact. The information probably hastened the revolt, and made it premature for the purposes of the general conspiracy.

On the 10th of July, at two o'clock in the morning, when the English soldiers of his majesty's 69th regiment were asleep, the sepoys rose and fell upon them. Colonel Fancourt, thirteen of his officers, ninety-nine non-commissioned officers and privates, were massacred, and fifteen others died of their wounds. Nearly all were injured to some extent. The rage and fury of the fanatics was boundless, and their thirst for blood such as has characterised Mohammedan zealots everywhere, in every age of their history. No quarter was given, no pity was shown. Comrades in arms, who had fought by their sides, and perhaps rescued them from peril, were murdered in their sleep, or cut down or shot as they rushed forth undressed to seek the cause of alarm. There was a searching eagerness for blood on the part of these men such as only Mussulmans can show. The massacre had not been confined to the two companies of the 69th regiment; every European that the mutineers could reach they barbarously slew and mutilated. All the Europeans, military and civil, must have perished had not some awoke in time to arm, and made a most gallant and desperate defence. The common soldiers fought with discipline and courage when all their officers were killed or wounded. Even after their ammunition was expended they charged the revolvers in line with the bayonet, and performed prodigies of valour. Mr. Thornton* gives the following

condensed and faithful account of what ensued:—"About four hours after the commencement of the attack, intelligence of it was received by Colonel Gillespie, at the cantonment of Arcot, a distance of about sixteen miles, and that officer immediately put in motion the greater part of the troops at his disposal, consisting of the 19th regiment of dragoons and and some native cavalry, of the strength of four hundred and fifty men. Putting himself at the head of one squadron of dragoons and a troop of native cavalry, he proceeded with the greatest celerity to Vellore, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow with the guns under Lieutenant-colonel Kennedy. On his arrival, Colonel Gillespie effected a junction with the gallant residue of the 69th; but it was found impracticable to obtain any decisive advantage over the insurgents until the arrival of the remainder of the detachment, which reached Vellore about ten o'clock. The main object then was to reduce the fort. The mutineers directed their powerful force to the defence of the interior gate, and, on the arrival of the guns, it was resolved that they should be directed to blowing it open, preparatory to a charge of the cavalry, to be aided by a charge of the remnant of the 69th, under the personal command of Colonel Gillespie. These measures were executed with great precision and bravery. The gate was forced open by the fire of the guns—a combined attack by the European troops and the native cavalry followed, which, though made in the face of a severe fire, ended in the complete dispersion of the insurgents, and the restoration of the fort to its legitimate authorities. About three hundred and fifty of the mutineers fell in the attack, and about five hundred were made prisoners in Vellore and in various other places to which they had fled."

At Wallajabad, Hyderabad, and various other places, the officers in command were more cautious; and when they heard of the terrible catastrophe at Vellore, they disarmed the Mohammedan sepoys, and their alarm amounted to panic.

Lord W. Bentinck instituted a commission of inquiry. His council and the commander-in-chief of Madras were for vigorous measures of punishment. The government at Calcutta was for a course between extreme severity, and that of extreme leniency insisted upon by Lord W. Bentinck. Finally, a temporary incarceration, and the banishment of some, were the punishments inflicted by Lord W. Bentinck. The Mohammedan soldiery believed that the English dare not punish their brethren, or so dreadful a massacre, inflicted with unrelenting bloodthirstiness, would never have

* *Chapters on the Modern History of British India.*
By Edward Thornton, Esq. London, Allen, 1840.
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been treated so lightly. Neither Lord W. Bentinck nor General Cradock was equal to the emergency, and the directors recalled both. The sons of Tippoo and their dependents were removed to the neighbourhood of Calcutta.

Dr. Hayman Wilson, in tracing a parallel between the mutiny of 1857 and that of 1806, attributes both to the same causes—religious fanaticism, and caste prejudices, acted upon by agents of a political conspiracy. This is the true philosophy of both revolts. The learned doctor, however, is of opinion that in each case the British officers displayed most culpable ignorance of the habits of thought and prejudices of the troops they commanded, and that, in consequence of this ignorance, outrages were offered to the religious feelings of the soldiery sufficient to provoke revolt.

In 1806 the provocation was chiefly given to the Mohammedan soldiery; and the family of Tippoo, their abettors, and the chief Mohammedan families of the Deccan made use of the dissatisfaction thus excited to create a military revolution, in the hope of driving the English from India, and once more asserting Mohammedan ascendancy. In 1857, the same state of things as to the feelings of the soldiery and the folly of the English officers, in reference to both Mohammedan and Brahminical devotees, furnished the Mohammedan princes of the north-west with grounds for organizing a conspiracy which would include the Hindoo princes, and originate one more grand struggle for the expulsion of the English.

Mr. Petrie succeeded Lord William Bentinck in the government of Madras. The new governor had immediately to encounter a most extraordinary opposition from Sir Henry Gwillim, one of the puiſne judges of Madras, whose language against him and his government from the bench shocked the notions entertained by the English of judicial propriety. The Indian judges had frequently proved themselves neither just nor temperate. The intemperate and political judge was ordered home by the king's government. Sir G. Barlow, having vacated the government of Bengal, was nominated to that of Madras. Mr. Petrie, who had held that post provisionally, resumed his former position as member of council.

Lieutenant-general Hay Macdowal succeeded General Cradock as commander-in-chief of the Madras army. That presidency remained for years, as it nearly always had been, torn to pieces by the disputes of all classes of persons connected with the administration of its affairs.

Lord Minto having arrived at Calcutta at the end of July, 1807, he at once announced a policy opposed to annexation, and

to all interference with the native states. He ostensibly adopted the opinions of Governor Barlow and the Marquis Cornwallis, where these differed from the policy of Marquis Wellesley.

The general feeling of the small native states who had been betrayed by the policy Lord Minto came to India to perpetuate was irrepressible. His lordship perceived this, and was extremely anxious to do what lay in his power to soften it, but the directions from home were peremptory. The board of control and the directors were alike bent upon a timid time-serving policy towards peoples who were acute enough to perceive its weakness, and dishonest enough to take advantage of it, in spite of promises, conventions, treaties, and even their experience of the danger of arousing British power.

During the year 1808, the new governor-general was much occupied in the affairs of the Deccan; the nizam became so bewildered by the intrigues of his ministers, and the chief rajahs of his dominions, and the conflicts of these persons with one another and the English resident, that he abandoned all hope of directing the government, and sunk into supineness.

Various impracticable measures were urged upon Lord Minto by the board of control, which was little influenced by the conclusive reasons urged by Indian statesmen against them. An impression was at this time entertained at home, that a balance of power might be established in India for the security of the several states, and for the interest of the whole; but such a system had never existed in that country: it seemed to be opposed to the character and constitution of those states. Rapine and conquest were their legitimate pursuits, being sanctioned by the principles of the religion professed by the Mohammedan power, which was dead to all semblance of public faith, justice, or humanity. In justice to the directors of the East India Company it must be remarked, that their arguments, remonstrances, and protests with the board of control against a policy so injurious to India were as ceaseless as they were unavailing. Meanwhile, the strange policy of alienating the friends that had been faithful, and of conciliating every robber and assassin who had by the acts of villany common in the East, or by his audacity, made himself powerful, prevailed at Calcutta. Among the chiefs which received favour from the English, was one Ameer Khan, referred to on a former page as Holkar's chief general, to which office he had risen from the condition of a private horseman. This person had, in spite of previous treaties, a considerable portion of Holkar's territory made over to him

by Lord Minto; and a formal treaty sealed the bond of amity between this desperate robber and murderer and the East India Company. Although Lord Minto engaged the alliance of this person, it was not until the government of the Marquis of Hastings that the plunder was perpetrated upon Holkar in his favour, and a treaty formed to secure it to him through no less a personage than Mr. Metcalf. One passage of Ameer Khan's history will illustrate the character of the man, and the morality of English policy in those days; for there was no pressing necessity to force the English into an alliance with him to the disadvantage of other chiefs really worthy their protection and amity. This Ameer Khan had been literally hired to murder one Sevaee Sing by a potentate who was the rival of the latter. The Ameer found in this commission an employment to his taste, and thus accomplished it:—"Sevaee Sing had been persuaded to promise a visit to Ameer Khan, but when the hour came, the Rajpoot chief, who probably had received some intelligence of the designs against his life, hesitated. Ameer Khan, when he learned his irresolution, mounted, and proceeded with a few followers to the shrine of a Mohammedan saint, close to the walls of Nagore. He was here joined by Sevaee Sing, whom he reproached for his fears, and asked him if he thought it possible that a man who cherished evil designs could show such confidence as he had that day done, by placing himself in the power of the person he meant to betray. Sevaee Sing confessed his error. Presents, dresses, and even turbans (a pledge of brotherhood) were exchanged, and Ameer Khan swore at the tomb of the saint to be faithful to his new ally, who was persuaded to go next day to his camp, where splendid preparations were made for his reception, and a number of chiefs appointed to meet him. The troops were under arms, some on pretext of doing honour to the visitor, others apparently at exercise. The guns were loaded with grape, and pointed at the quarters prepared for the rajah, who, with his principal adherents, to the number of two hundred, were seated in a large tent, when it was let fall upon them at a concerted signal: and while the officers of Ameer Khan saved themselves, all the Rajpoots were inhumanly massacred by showers of grape and musketry from every direction. Of seven hundred horse that accompanied Sevaee Sing, and continued mounted near the tent, only two hundred escaped; the rest were slain, and a number of Ameer Khan's people, among whom was one of his own relations, fell under the promiscuous fire of the cannon. Sevaee Sing had been killed by grape, but his head

was cut off, and sent to Maun Sing, who rewarded Ameer Khan with a jaghire and a large sum of money." *

To the close of 1813, the affairs of Baroda, Gujerat, the Guicowar, and the Peishwa, engaged the English in perpetual negotiations and mediations. It was also necessary to have recourse to arms on a small scale, and reduce several forts belonging to the Kattywar rajahs.

The affairs of Oude in 1810-11 gave great concern to the general government. The causes of anxiety were precisely similar to those which had always existed since Oude became a source of strength and weakness to the British. The vizier was anxious to gain from his zemindars high rents, utterly indifferent to the capacity of the land to yield them. The zemindars were turbulent and fraudulent; the poorer cultivators sleek, sly, treacherous, and dishonest. Oude and Ireland exhibited many features of resemblance in the relations of landlord and cultivator.

The external political relations of British continental India demanded the diplomatic skill, and drew largely upon the time and energies, of the governor-general, from his arrival to his departure. The French were, as usual, the bugbear of Calcutta politicians. At the close of 1807, it was rumoured that the French intended to invade North-western India by way of Persia and Afghanistan, and with the aid of these powers and of Turkey. It was feared that all Mohammedan India would rise in revolt at the appearance of an allied French and Mussulman force anywhere. Lord Minto appointed Colonel Malcolm (afterwards Sir John) his agent in Persia, with powers plenipotentiary in Persia, the Persian Gulf, and Turkish Arabia, suspending the authority of the agents at Bagdad, Buseora, and Bushire. From Bushire he transmitted, in 1808, an historical review of the progress of French intrigues in Persia, and of the military proceedings of the Russians on the north-west frontier of that country. Colonel Malcolm was unable to reach the Persian capital, the intrigues of the French having succeeded in gaining a prohibition from the shah. The efforts of Colonel Malcolm were followed by those of Sir Harford Jones from England in 1807-8. He succeeded in making a treaty by which the French ambassador was ordered to leave Persia. In 1808-9, Colonel Malcolm travelled along the Persian and Arabian coasts, gaining intelligence, and watching vigilantly every indication of hostile influences. In 1810, he succeeded in gaining a gracious reception at Teheran, where he remained until Sir Gore

Sir John Malcolm.

Ouseley arrived there from England as ambassador from his majesty.

Soon after his arrival, Lord Minto also dispatched an envoy to the court of Cabul, to counteract French and Russian influence in that quarter. The person selected for this office was the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who conducted himself with such temper, wisdom, and address, in exceedingly difficult and provoking circumstances, that he concluded a treaty in June, 1809, securing the alliance of the court of Cabul against the French contingent, upon any invasion of India. The revolutions in Cabul, and the constant dangers to which it was exposed from Persian invasion, rendered English diplomacy extremely delicate and cautious. All the qualities required in the arduous position were united in the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone. Mr. Hankey Smith was dispatched upon a mission to the Ameers of Scinde, to promote the common object; the result was, "an agreement of friendship, which excluded the tribe of the French from settling in Scinde." The object of the Ameers was, however, the conquest of Cutch, and when they found the English indisposed to aid them in an aggressive war, they became very indifferent about the "agreement of friendship," and "the tribe of the French."

A mission to the Sikhs was confided to Mr. Metcalfe. The celebrated Runjeet Sing was then monarch of Lahore. That chief led troops to the north-west confines of the company's Bengal territory. The governor-general wisely supported the efforts of Mr. Metcalfe by troops, under the command of Colonel Ochterlony, taking care not to violate the territory of Runjeet. It was a species of diplomacy which the Sikh rajah very well understood, and he entered at once and heartily into the negotiations. The stipulations of a treaty were signed in 1809, which constrained Runjeet not to retain imposing military forces on the north side of the Sutlej, and the English not to interfere with the interests of that territory. The present of a beautiful carriage and pair of carriage horses wonderfully pleased Runjeet, who punished several inferior chiefs who had inflicted injury upon British officers.

From 1806 to 1814 disputes occurred with the Nepaulese on every supposable subject between two oriental border powers. The English underrated the power of Nepal, and afterwards paid dearly for having done so.

In the Eastern Archipelago, Lord Minto displayed great activity, but an account of events there must be reserved for a separate chapter.

The disputes with the King of Ava, which

had continued for many years, more or less active, in consequence of the immigration of the Mughls to British India, broke out with more than usual violence in 1811. The origin of it was thus briefly stated in a letter from the Bengal government to the court of directors, 23rd January, 1812:—"In the early part of the past year, 1811, a native of Arracan, named Kingberring, whose ancestor, as well as himself, possessed lands to a considerable extent in that province, near the frontier of Chittagong, and who, in consequence of his having incurred the displeasure, and been exposed to the resentment of the King of Ava, took refuge, with a number of his followers, in the district of Chittagong, about fourteen years ago, meditated the design of embodying those followers, as well as other Mughls, who many years since emigrated from Arracan. This project he actually carried into execution in the month of May, 1811, having either by persuasion or intimidation, induced a large body of Mughls to join his standard. Partly owing to the secrecy and caution with which he carried it into effect, and partly to the negligence of the darogas (native magistrates) of the Thannas on the frontier, his proceedings were unknown to the magistrate of Chittagong until he had crossed the Nauf river, which forms the common boundary of the two countries."

This account, although official, is inaccurate. It is painfully difficult to rely upon any documents published by the board of control. They generally consist of extracts, partially culled out of official despatches, and often garbled or curtailed. It would appear from other documents in possession of the Bengal government, that Kingberring's plan of organizing an attack upon Arracan was known to the local magistrate, who declared, in a report made to his government, that, in consequence of being apprised of it, he sought to arrest that person, but could not succeed. The local authorities displayed such culpable negligence, that they appeared to connive at the raids of the Mughls, and gave to the government of Ava much just cause of complaint, and war was imminent. Lord Minto dispatched Captain Canning as envoy to Rangoon, to appease the government of Ava. Captain Canning promised that Kingberring and his associates should find no shelter in the British territory. This promise was violated. Captain White, in his narrative of the disputes with Birmah, goes so far as to allege that the promise was made to deceive; that neither the envoy nor the government of Calcutta were sincere in their stipulations.*

* *A Political History of the Extraordinary Events which led to the Burmese War.* By Captain W. White.

The result of Kingberring's invasion of Arracan was thus announced to the court of directors by the government of Calcutta:—"Your honourable court will observe from the tenor of these last advices, (from the magistrate of Chittagong, dated the 11th and 14th of January,) that, contrary to expectation and appearances, the government of Ava has found the means of collecting a force of sufficient strength to defeat the troops of Kingberring, who, deserted by most of his followers, has become a fugitive. That numbers of his people whom he drew from Chittagong, and the inhabitants of Arracan, have fled for refuge to our territories, and more are expected. That the magistrate, with a view to prevent the probable incursions of the Birmese troops in pursuit of the fugitives, has instructed the commanding officer of the station to proceed with the whole of the disposable force and take post on the frontier, furnishing him with directions for the guidance of his conduct, until our orders should be received regarding the course of proceeding to be observed with respect to the fugitives; for the surrender of whom it may be expected that demands will be made on the part of the government of Ava, even if the forces of the latter should not penetrate into the province of Chittagong, for the purpose of seizing or destroying them."

Early in January, 1812, the troops at Chittagong assembled at Ramoo, the head-quarters of Colonel Morgan. The passes, and other strategical positions, were immediately occupied. The Birmese forces, commanded by the rajah of Arracan, advanced to the boundary of the province upon the river Nauf. His excellency demanded the surrender of the two principal leaders of the invasion. The magistrate referred the matter to his government. An answer not arriving soon enough to please the rajah, he sent another demand, couched in language very imperative, demanding the surrender of all the fugitives, and of Dr. McRae, whom he alleged had assisted the invaders. The magistrate replied, that the ringleaders should be secured, and their followers prevented from doing mischief. The disposal of those taken into custody he alleged must be settled at Rangoon between the English viceroy and the Birmese government. The magistrate warned the rajah against violating British territory. More troops advanced to the frontier to support the English magistrate. A ship of war, and a cruiser of twenty guns, to convey the envoy in safety in case of a rupture between the two states.

Early in 1812, the Birmese crossed the frontier, attempted to stockade themselves within the English territory, and sent parties in different directions to arrest the fugitives. The Arracan rajah sent at the same time vakeels to the English camp to negotiate. The British commander demanded as a preliminary to any negotiations the retirement of the Birmese troops within their own confines. The Birmese proved faithless in their negotiations at Ramoo, as the English had done at Rangoon. A viceroy of the King of Ava administered affairs at Rangoon, and the negotiations of Captain Canning were therefore tedious and circuitous, leaving opportunity for difficulties on the frontiers to ripen and increase. At Rangoon the situation of Captain Canning became dangerous; designs to kidnap him and to destroy the British ships were put into execution, and only defeated by the vigilance of the British. Finally, the envoy was withdrawn, the Birmese soldiers re-crossed the Arracan frontier, and the English troops retired to their usual cantonments. The English government published a manifesto, that if the King of Ava had any complaints to make, or redress to demand, he must do so through a vakeel, at Calcutta.

While matters were taking a peaceable turn, Kingberring again collected a force for the invasion of Arracan, and on the 4th of June, 1812, actually invaded the province. He was again defeated, and found shelter in the British territory. The Birmese troops did not pursue across the boundary, but the viceroy at Rangoon treated with scorn the pacific allegations of Captain Canning, whose recall was revoked by the governor-general. The indefatigable Kingberring collected fresh forces in October, and possessed himself of the frontier hills and jungles. This time British troops were ordered to disperse the gatherings of the insurgents within the company's territory, which was not effected without bloodshed. The desperate leader escaped, and at the end of the year, for the third time, invaded Arracan with results similar to those which attended his previous raids. He was a man of dauntless intrepidity, and the most wonderful perseverance. Courage and persistence were also shown by his followers. The troubles on the Arracan border continued during the remaining period of Lord Minto's government, and the relations between it and the government of Ava were most unsatisfactory. Disputes also arose on the frontier of Nepal. On the 4th of October, 1813, the Earl of Minto resigned the government of India to the Earl of Moira.

CHAPTER CIV.

GOVERNMENT OF THE EARL OF MOIRA—BORDER FEUDS ON THE CONFINES OF ARRACAN—WAR WITH NEPAUL—DIFFICULTIES IN OUDE—THE PINDARREE AND SECOND MAHRATTA WAR—HOLKAR, SCINDIAH, AND THE RAJAH OF BERAR SUBJUGATED.

THE first matter which called for the attention of the Earl of Moira, was the desperate efforts of Kingberring to reconquer Arracan for the Mughls. In consequence of his proceedings, Birmese troops entered the British province of Chittagong, and plundered numerous villages, during the month of January, 1814. In February, the English government invited the Birmese commander to enter the territory and clear it of the Mughls, who were preparing an invasion, as the English found it impossible to prevent their gatherings. This the Rajah of Arracan refused to do, believing that so extraordinary a communication would never have been made by the English, if they had not meditated some treachery. The object and policy of the Mughls in this persevering border warfare was thus pointed out in the despatch of the Bengal government on the 5th of February, 1814:—"Mr. Pechell (the magistrate) observed that it had been suggested to him at different times, and from a consideration of all the events of the last two years, he was himself strongly inclined to believe it, that the Mughls despaired of regaining Arracan by their own means, but that their object was, by working upon the unreasonable jealousies and arrogance of the Ava government, by a continuance of their periodical incursions into Arracan, ultimately to embroil the British government in a war with the state of Ava, the consequence of which might possibly be the expulsion of the Birmese by the British power, and the re-establishment of themselves in Arracan under a government of their own."

Early in April, 1814, Kingberring made his fourth descent on Arracan. He was as usual beaten, and was pursued into Chittagong, where the pursuers committed some murders, but retired on the approach of British troops. After this failure Kingberring and his more active followers remained fugitives in the province of Chittagong until April, 1815, when he died. This circumstance ensured peace only for a few months, for in the following October, Rynjungzing, an enterprising friend of the deceased chief, gathered the Mughls into a fresh aggressive confederacy, which plundered the frontier villages of Arracan, and bore their booty in safety to the hills. This course he continued to follow until May, 1816, when, fearing arrest and capital punishment at the hands of

the English authorities, he delivered himself up. In 1817, another daring leader, one Cheripo, having committed frontier ravages, he was seized by the English magistrate, but set at large on promise of keeping the peace. Matters continued for years along the line of the Chittagong and Arracan frontiers in nearly the same state. In 1819 a quarrel arose between the Birmese and other native states at a great distance from Arracan, but which occasioned renewed disturbances in that quarter, and complicated the English relations with Birmah.

The province of Assam had been in a state of anarchy during the whole period of the government of Lord Moira (Hastings) up to 1819. This endangered the peace and prosperity of the British district of Rungpore, and was regarded with uneasiness by the government of Calcutta. The Birmese placed one Chunder Kaunt upon the musnid of Assam, in opposition to the reigning Rajah Poorundur Singh. The rajah fled for refuge to Rungpore. He at once appealed to the British government for assistance to regain his throne, offering to pay the expenses of the troops employed in his restoration, and to become tributary to the English. The government of Calcutta declined interfering with the affairs of foreign states, but assured the rajah that he and his followers should be protected so long as they resided peacefully at Rungpore. The rajah did remain peacefully so far as English interests were concerned, but he formed various plans for raising a sufficient force of his own countrymen to reconquer his throne. The Birmese resented this, and the sanctuary of British soil was violated. The mode in which the Birmese proceeded in the affairs of Assam, led the governor-general to believe that that power was forming a conspiracy and acting on a plan to drive the English from Eastern India. This idea received colour from the fact that the Birmese interference in Assam began soon after a formal demand had been made upon the governor-general for cession to his Birmese majesty of Ramoo, Chittagong, Dacca, and Moorshedabad, on the ground that they had been dependencies of the Birmese government. The despatch of the governor-general, in 1818, when this demand was made, conveyed his views to the court of directors in these terms:—"There is no way of accounting for this extravagant

step on the part of the court of Ava, but by supposing it to have originated in a secret agreement with the Mahrattas. The governor of Merhege, a Birman chief of great eminence, had been permitted to visit the upper provinces for professed purposes connected with religion. There is reason to surmise that his real object was to ascertain the real strength and determination of the Mahrattas, in consequence of previous overtures from them; and it is probable that he had adopted delusive notions of both. The King of Ava immediately after the transmission of the message, which was really a declaration of war, would learn that the views of his expected allies had been anticipated, and that the Mahrattas were crushed. 'Thence his hostile intentions subsided without further explanation.' Sir John Malcolm instituted an inquiry into this transaction, and reported to the government that the court of Ava was engaged in hostile intrigues with the rajahs of central India, and the devotees of Benares.

In 1820, the usurper of Assam and his patron, the Avanes monarch, demanded that the English should give up the fugitive rajah, which they indignantly refused to do. The Assam usurper quarrelled with his patron, and cut off the head of a Birmese, who held the high post of prime-minister. On account of these transactions the Birmese invaded Assam again, and their former *protégé* was driven from the musnid, and, like his predecessor, fled to the company's territories for shelter. The Birmese, with their usual insolence and arrogance, pursued him across the frontier, bringing fire and sword upon many peaceful villages inhabited by British subjects. Satisfaction was, however, offered for this injury before the English government had time to demand it.

The English had now two ex-rajahs of Assam in their hands at Rungpore. The second fugitive had, while rajah, captured the commander-in-chief employed by the first, a half-caste native gentleman named Bruce. Through his former captive he applied to the British government for arms and ammunition to regain the throne which he had usurped, and from which those who placed him there had for his treachery expelled him. Lord Hastings—not following the principle of non-interference pursued by Lords Minto and Cornwallis, and which in common with them he avowed—allowed arms to this adventurer from the public arsenals, affording the Birmese a *casus belli*. The application on behalf of the exiled *quasi* rajah was made by the British resident, Mr. Scott. Lord Hastings, in his homeward despatch, thus alludes to

the transaction:—'We informed Mr. Scott, in reply, that we had directed the sanction of government to be conveyed to Mr. Bruce, for the transport of three hundred muskets, and ninety maunds of gunpowder, intended as a supply to Rajah Chunder Kaunt. The necessary orders, we informed Mr. Scott, would be issued through the territorial department, to give effect to any pass he might himself hereafter grant; and in case of application being made at the Presidency, the sanction of government would be given, as in the present instance.'

Sir John Malcolm admits that the Birmese received great provocations, but denies that the government of Lord Hastings had done anything to incense them, whereas it was his administration which was responsible for the chief exasperations which sprang up. Captain White, who served long upon the Birmese frontier at Chittagong, thus notices the mode in which Sir John disposes of the merits and demerits of our relations with Birmah up to the end of 1821:—"The whole of these events have not only been omitted to be noticed by Sir John Malcolm, in his *Political History of India*, but he goes further, and pronounces, 'those reasonable grounds which the Birmese had for discontent had certainly not increased during the administration of Lord Hastings.' How far Lord Hastings may feel obliged to Sir John, for not only passing over the facts recorded, but for such an unqualified assurance, it is difficult to say; but one thing is certain, the statement appears totally at variance with candour and truth." Towards the close of the year 1821, a most arrogant demand was made by the King of Ava,* for the surrender of the ex-rajahs and all their adherents. In reply to this request the Birmese chief was informed, 'that it was not the custom of the British government to deliver up persons who might take refuge in its territories on account of political disturbances.'

The ex-rajahs of Assam continued each on his separate account to make war on the Assam frontiers, but were defeated, and in July, 1822, the commander-in-chief of the Birmese army in Assam announced to the English authorities in Rungpore, that if the fugitives again found hospitality there, he would cross the frontier at the head of 18,000 men. The government of Calcutta ordered that all fugitives should be disarmed and sent to a distance from the frontier. Notwithstanding the order, they collected troops and prepared for fresh inroads. Lord Hastings, among the last acts of his government, dis-

* His majesty was called by this title and by that of Emperor of Birmah indiscriminately.

armed them, and many were sent into the interior. The whole of his lordship's policy towards the Birmese empire was inconsistent and capricious, and laid the foundation for the great Birmese war, which so soon followed. Lord Hastings' chief officers, military and official, had declared that it must soon come; but no preparation was made by him or them for the emergency.

Birmah was not the only neighbouring country with which the government of Lord Hastings quarrelled. In his summary of his administration he says, "There were made over to me, when the reins were placed in my hands, no less than six hostile discussions with native powers, each capable of resorting to arms." The sixth named in his list was the first which encountered his arms; this was the Goorkha state of Nepal.

THE NEPAULESE WAR.

Very early in the administration of Earl Hastings he was called upon to declare war with Nepal. For a series of years that state had made border aggressions, and as these were perpetually protested against by the English, and menaces held out in case of their repetition, and yet no armed resentment shown, the Nepaulese calculated upon impunity, after the manner of orientals generally. When the British at last appeared to be in earnest, the Nepal monarch supposed them so occupied in Hindostan, and Eastern and Western India, as to be unable to molest him. He opened communications with the Pindarree chiefs and their Mahratta sovereigns, with the Sikhs, and with the Birmese. The King of Ava, either relying on his own unaided power, or suspicious of Nepal, refused any complicity with the projects of the latter power, although the border feuds on the confines of Arracan and Chittagong were then raging.

Lord Hastings regarded with great anxiety the symptoms of an approaching war with Nepal. In his summary of his administration, published long afterwards, having enumerated other warlike discussions which he found when he assumed the government, as occupying the supreme council, he refers to this one in the following terms:—"The sixth contention, with Nepal, remained for decision by arms. A struggle with the latter was unpromising. We were strangely ignorant of the country or its resources; so that overlooking the augmented abilities latterly furnished by science to a regular army for surmounting local obstacles, it was a received persuasion, that the nature of the mountains, which we should have to penetrate, would be as baffling to any exertions of ours, as it had

been to all the efforts of many successive Mohammedan sovereigns: no option, however, remained with us." On the 29th of May, 1814, the Nepaulese attacked the company's frontier police. War was declared, and an army ordered to the field.

The relative situation of the Nepal or Goorkha country to that of the company has been sufficiently explained in the geographical portion of this work, to which the reader is also referred for its geographical and topographical peculiarities. A perusal of the descriptions there given will enable the reader to apprehend the plan of hostilities adopted by Lord Hastings. He ordered a division to the western extremity of the line of frontier, numbering 6,000 men, under Major-general Ochterlony. The Dehra Doon was to be occupied by Major-general Gillespie, who was to besiege Jeytak. The force under his command was a strong brigade of 3,500 men. Major-general Wood was directed to march from the Gurruckpore frontier with a small division of 4,500 men. He was to take his course through Bhotwul and Shooraj to Pulpa. A small *corps d'armée*, under Major-general Marley, numbering 8,000, was to force its way through the valley of Muckwanpore to Katmander.

On the south-east frontier Captain Latter was placed with the local battalion of Rungpore and a regular battalion of native infantry. He was to guard that line of territory, but to act defensively or aggressively as circumstances allowed or demanded. The entire force ordered against Nepal was about 30,000 men and sixty guns.

The force of the enemy was not estimated at more than 12,000, but their artillery appointments were believed to be good, and their country was more easily defended than any on the Indian frontiers. Major-general Gillespie's column was the first to come into action. In the third week of October his troops were before Kalunga, upon which the Goorkhas fell back. On the 31st the fort was stormed, although no proper breach had been made. There were four columns of attack, who were to give the assault simultaneously, on the firing of a signal gun. Three of the columns had to make a considerable detour, and never heard the signal. The enemy made a sortie which was repelled, and the general, thinking that the troops might, by pursuing them hotly, enter with them into the fort, ordered those at his disposal to make the attempt. The men did not succeed in entering with the retiring Goorkhas, and could not force the gate. The scaling ladders, as mostly the case in English assaults, were too few and too short. The general madly urged on his

men to accomplish impossibilities. In his wild attempts to force the soldiers against stone walls, which they could not conquer by escalade, he was shot through the heart. The arrival of one of the stray columns covered the retreat of the unfortunate and ill-directed assailants.

On the 25th of November the British again appeared before the place; breaching batteries were erected. On the 27th at noon a breach was considered practicable. The troops appointed for the assault advanced with unloaded muskets. The breach was found to be impracticable, and was defended by spearmen and matchlock men—a species of arms well adapted for such a defence. The English, unable to return the enemy's fire, could not keep the position which they had gained in and near the breach long enough for fresh troops to arrive. The result was defeat, with a loss of 680 men. The total incapacity of those in command was so obvious to the soldiery, that they were unwilling to advance under such leaders.

It was found that the garrison obtained its supply of water from beyond the fort; it did not occur to the British commanders to cut off the supply. A bombardment was resorted to. The fortress was only defended by 600 men, and the outer walls were its only defence. The place soon became untenable. The garrison stole away in the night with perfect impunity, the English commanders not having sufficient vigilance and skill to suppose the like practicable, or take measures to prevent it. The Goorkha commandant joined a fresh body of troops, and defied pursuit. A gallant and enterprising English officer of inferior rank, went after them with a small detachment, suddenly fell upon them, cutting up many, and totally dispersing the remainder. Kalunga was destroyed. The Goorkhas were much encouraged by the slaughter of the English around its walls, and despised their antagonists. Lord Hastings, annoyed and disappointed, felt it necessary to augment the army of operation, as well as recruit extensively the whole army of Bengal. Colonel Mawby, who commanded this division after the death of General Gillespie, was ordered to form a junction with General Ochterlony. Before forming the junction Major-general Martindale reached the division, and it was resolved to attack the fort of Jytate, situated on the summit of a mountain 5,000 feet above the level of the sea. The British advanced against it in two columns. The Goorkhas had stockaded several positions commanding the approaches. The English violated every rule of warfare; the Bengal sepoy fought with reluctance and without

spirit. The British were beaten at every point; nearly 500 men and officers were put *hors de combat*. The whole conduct of this division of the army had been disgraceful. The contempt which the Goorkhas entertained for the British after the affair at Kalunga much increased.

To the west the operations of Ochterlony were guided by a skilful mind. He was confronted by the best general of the Goorkhas. The country was difficult, but that circumstance only tested the ability of the English general. His opponent's points of support were strong forts on mountains thousands of feet above the level of the sea; every important point in the approaches was stockaded. Ochterlony "turned" some of these, shelled others, and by strategy conquered them all without sacrificing his men. The strong places fell before him, and he was only checked in his career by tidings that the co-operating column had failed in the task allotted to it, with terrible loss of men and prestige. Ochterlony resolved to wait for reinforcements. As these came up in detachments his patience and temper were tried by the want of firmness and courage on the part of the Bengal sepoy, and the deficient management of the officers. He made roads, organized irregular levies, brought up wild and hardy Sikhs, turned them all into soldiers by his example and activity, and again resumed the offensive.

On the 27th of December Colonel Thompson was dispatched to prosecute directions given to him for intercepting convoys of the enemy, cutting off their lines of communication, and spreading along their rear, conducting a desultory warfare. By the amazing skill of his dispositions, celerity of his marches, number of his detachments, all operating at once, and yielding one another effective support, he dislodged the enemy from many of his strong places without striking a blow or losing a man. The foe bewildered, as detachments of British confronted them in every direction where they supposed it was impossible the English could penetrate, gave up one fort after another, not knowing where to make a stand, or from what direction danger was to be apprehended.

The snows fell heavily among the mountains of Nepal during the winter of 1814-15. The elements alone protected the enemy from being circumvented and deprived of all their defences in the direction in which General Ochterlony acted. Nevertheless, by the 1st of April, 1815, he was before the great fortress of Maloun, which he invested. The armies acting on the opposite extremity of the line were unsuccessful. The third division, under General Wood, was at Gorakpore at the be-

ginning of November, but the army was in no respect fit for action, and continued unable to move at all until the middle of December. The march from Bhotwul to Pulpalay through a difficult mountain pass. The first obstacle encountered by General Wood was a strong stockade. He and his staff came upon it unexpectedly, and many of his escort fell by the fire directed from it. When his troops came up they were attacked by a sortie from the stockade, and thrown into disorder. Wherever the general was there was confusion. Captain Croker, who led an attack on the flank of the stockade, achieved great success, but was left unsupported. The general did not know what to do. Loss of life, defeat, and shame resulted. He made no attempt to redeem his country's honour or his own. He lingered about with the army until malaria swept numbers of his men to an untimely death.

Wilson affirms that Earl Moira's chief reliance for the success of the operations was upon the division which was directed to march against the capital. It assembled at Dinapore, on the right bank of the Ganges, and on the 23rd of May began its march. Major Roughsedge, with a local battalion, operated to clear the country of Goorkha outposts, for the advance of the division. The major acted like a true British soldier. He swept the patrols and detachments of the enemy back in every direction, penetrated the jungle, surprised Purseram Thapa, the governor of the district, who was encamped with four hundred men. They were so suddenly attacked they could make no resistance, fifty were slain, many drowned in the Bhagmati. Captain Hay and Lieutenant Smith carried out the major's orders in this good work so well, that the whole district known as the Tirai was occupied, and proclaimed annexed to the company's territory. The division advanced, and had a marvellous list of apparently good reasons for not being able to do anything. They had to wait for so many things, that the Goorkhas regained heart, finding that the major who had cleared the way for the division was much more formidable than the division itself. The English officers in command of detachments in the country, which Major Roughsedge had so speedily cleared for them, took no precautions, were left in isolated positions, no plan of mutual support laid down for them, they were attacked and beaten in every direction. The officers, and in some cases, most of the men with them, perished. The principles of war did not appear to be understood by these men, nor even the commonest attainments of their profession, beyond mere drill and the personal use of arms.

General Marley gave up the Tirai without a single operation worthy of a general. Reinforcements swelled his corps to thirteen thousand men, having a large proportion of Europeans. He was afraid to move. Having wasted all January, 1815, he suddenly abandoned his army. Colonel Dick assumed the command, and awaited the arrival of Major-general Wood, to whose command the corps was originally entrusted. While awaiting the arrival of the general, Colonel Dick and his officers cleared the Tirai of the enemy with hardly the loss of a man. General Wood was indisposed for active warfare; he thought the season too advanced, and another month was thus wasted. He broke up his army and cantoned it from the Gunduck to the Kusi.

The various corps advanced in 1816, encountering the enemy in stockades and forts. There was great sameness in these campaigns, the operations being similar in every direction. The chief interest, however, was connected with the army of Ochterlony, who after the news of surrender of Maloun reached England, was created a baronet. It would be endless to describe the errors, mistakes, and dauntless acts of bravery of British officers in detached posts. This mountain warfare was so new to them, that they only began to adapt themselves to it when the war was coming to a close. On the 12th of February, Ochterlony marched through "the great forest," an extent of nine miles. By the efforts of his engineers he discovered a pass which the enemy had not stockaded nor defended. Leaving his camp standing, he penetrated it with a brigade, and "turned" the pass, which the enemy had prepared to defend. Seeing his tents, and the sentries performing their usual duties, the Nepaulese supposed that the whole force remained in the encampment. A single action, and that not a general battle, decided the campaign. On the 6th of March, a ratified treaty was brought to camp. Among its stipulations was one to the effect "that the cession of territory exacted from Nepal should comprehend the country conquered in the actual campaign and the valley of the Rapti." It appeared, during the negotiations for the treaty, that the Nepaul Rajah had sent an embassy to China for help, alleging that the English made war upon them for not offering a free passage to their troops for the invasion of China. The Chinese ministers laughed at them, telling them that "if the English meant to invade China, they would take a shorter way than through the mountains of Nepaul." The war with Nepaul being thus terminated, the Nepaulese Rajah professed to be an ally of the company, and on some occasions subsequently gave proof of alliance.

It is almost unnecessary to say that Oude was among the number of his lordship's difficulties, and that its financial management and general government caused continual uneasiness at Calcutta. No state possessing its power, wealth, area, and a population so gigantic, ever displayed so much poltroonery. Boastful, arrogant, tumultuous, and seditious, the soldiery and people were ever ready to revolt, and commit the most cruel murders, and as ready to fly before the face of a military force. The vizier, voluptuous and greedy, like his predecessors, robbed his people, and squandered his revenue, so that he was unable to meet the exigencies of his government, and pay the stipulated tribute, on condition of which he held his throne. Lord Moira, after much trouble and difficulty, brought some arrangement into the distracted affairs of his court and his dominions.

A war having broken out with Nepaul, Scindiah, and the Rajah of Nagpore, considered it a good opportunity to resume their old ways, and make a little war for themselves. They meditated the reduction of the small state of Bhopal. Lord Moira, apprised of their designs, frustrated them by opportune measures, and at the close of the year 1816, those old Mahratta chiefs were again subdued.

During the year 1816, a British force was engaged in the territory of Cutch, reducing forts, deposing petty rajahs, reconciling conflicting allies, and reducing rebellious subordinates of the Guicovar and the Peishwa. Fierce disputes arose between these two branches of the great Mahratta family of chiefs, which involved the governments of Madras and Bombay in anxiety.

THE SECOND MAHRATTA, OR PINDARREE WAR.

This war, which received both these designations, properly, began in hostilities with the Pindarrees alone, but ended in a war with the great confederated chiefs of the Mahrattas.

The Pindarrees, or "free companies," were literally bands of military freebooters, who followed chiefs, Hindoo or Mohammedan, which were bold enough or rich enough to organize a free corps. These Pindarrees were dispersed throughout the Mahratta states, but the places from which they mainly sallied forth on their expeditions of murder and plunder were Malwa and Central India. They were mostly subjects of Holkar and Scindiah. These chiefs pretended a great horror of the dishonest doings of those fierce robbers, but in reality profited by them. The English agents, officers, and commercial people suffered much from them. They constantly plundered the territories of allies whom the English were bound to de-

fend, and the superior Mahratta chiefs sometimes joined in those expeditions. The attack upon the Rajah of Bhopal, a faithful friend of the English, by Scindiah and the Nagpore Rajah was simply a Pindarree incursion in the first instance, incited by those chiefs, and then turned to account for their own aggressive ends. The troops of both Holkar and Scindiah became in fact Pindarrees, supporting themselves by pillage, and only recognising the standard of their sovereigns when a grand national war took place. Ameer Khan, whom the English petted so much, was simply a Pindarree leader—a recognised military robber.

The princes of Rajpootana were held in subjection by their own nominal troops, who were nearly all Pindarrees. Professor Wilson thus describes the condition of some of them:—"The Rajah of Odeypore, indolent and improvident, was bearded in his capital by military adventurers,* and robbed of his domains by his own feudatory chiefs and clansmen. The Rajah of Joudpur, affecting idiocy, abandoned the reins of government to the hands of a dissolute prince, whose career was soon after cut short by the hand of an assassin. The Rajah of Jeypore, a slave to an infatuated attachment to a Mohammedan dancing girl, preserved only a portion of his hereditary possessions, by the sufferance of Meer Khan. Every vestige of regular and orderly government had disappeared, and complete dissolution of the bonds of society must have ensued, had not the government of British India obtained, by persevering representation and remonstrance from the authorities in England, a reluctant and qualified permission to effect the extirpation of that part of the predatory system which consisted in the peculiar organization of the plunderers, termed Pindarrees, as preliminary to the overthrow of the whole scheme of military depredations."

As early as 1812, the Pindarrees had made attempts upon the British provinces. When first known to the British authorities,† the Scindiah Shahi Pindarrees, who were by far the most numerous of the two, were under the leading of a number of sirdars, of whom Cheetoo, Karim Khan, and Dost Mohammed, were the principal. None of the Holkar Shahi chiefs were leaders of much note. Blacker‡ gives the following estimate of their numbers:—"The Scindiah Shahi, 18,000

* His palace on the bank of the lake was besieged, and as Colonel Tod said, the servants bringing up water were plundered. Our government allowed him in 1818, the sum of 4000 rupees (£400) a month, till his country yielded some revenue.

† Wilson, p. 105. See *Papers Pindaric War*, pp. 24, 25.

‡ *Memoir of the War* (1821), p. 18.

horse, 13,000 foot, and fifteen guns; the Holkar Shahi, 3,000 horse, 200 foot, and three guns. To add to these sources of disorder, the mountaineers on the south and west of Malwa, and the Bhils and Mhers, and the petty Hindoo chiefs on the south and east of the same country, were committing unchecked ravages in retaliation for invaded rights* or disregarded claims."† "The Pindarrees threatened Mirzapore, plundered Ganjam, Masulipatam, Guntore, and the Northern Circars. It was expected that any attack on these hordes, as being under the protection of Scindiah and Holkar, might cause a war with those chiefs. It was, moreover, known that these chiefs and the Berar rajah advocated the supremacy of the Peishwa, who again, in 1816, was collecting armed followers at no great distance from Poonah.‡ The governor-general, therefore, resolved to be prepared for all events."§

The great difficulty of suppressing the Pindarrees was the countenance given to them by the Mahratta sovereigns. They in fact were themselves Mahrattas, and subjects of those princes, and to a great extent controlled their nominal rulers. Besides, the whole of the Mahratta chiefs were bitterly hostile to the English, and the abrogation, or modifications amounting to abrogation, of the treaties with Lord Wellesley by Lord Cornwallis, followed up by a policy in the same direction by Sir G. Barlow and Lord Minto, so elated them that they calculated upon the instability of English treaties, whether for or against them, and presumed upon ultimate impunity.

The treaty of Bassein had been repeatedly broken by the Peishwa's ministers, and it required the firmness, temper, and intelligence possessed by the English resident at the court of Poonah, Mr. Elphinstone, to avert recourse to arms for the redress of British wrongs. Murder, assassination, and treachery in every form were the instruments with which the ministers of the Peishwa worked, and it was necessary for the English to interpose resolutely in order to prevent the confines of their territory from becoming scenes of anarchy. This success lasted only a few years. The Peishwa and his ministers, as well as all the Mahratta chiefs, were encouraged to resume their intrigues against the English by the latter being occupied with two wars which were supposed sufficient to strain their resources, the Pindarree and the Nepaulese; by the disturbed state of Oude, and by the perpetual contentions with Ava, which, it

was rumoured all over India, would lead to a war most perilous to English power. Accordingly, early in the year 1817, Trim-buckjee Daughiah, an assassin and murderer, who possessed the Peishwa's confidence, and had held the chief authority in his dominions, collected forces, with the connivance of the Peishwa, for the purpose of surprising and murdering the English contingent at Poonah, after the manner in which the mutinous sepoys at Vellore massacred their comrades. Means were at the same time taken to seduce the British native soldiers from their allegiance.

The English assembled troops in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and denounced the contemplated movement of the Peishwa. Mr. Elphinstone demanded a new treaty instead of the violated treaty of Bassein as the alternative of a declaration of war. At the same time, Mr. Elphinstone demanded the surrender of the leader and originator of the plot.

The following sets forth, in as brief a form as it is possible to give it, the revolution in the Mahratta empire, which the Elphinstone treaty created, for the Peishwa, terrified by the military preparation of the English, signed it. The preliminary convention provided that the Peishwa should surrender several of his strongest forts, as a guarantee that the treaty would be fulfilled. The treaty was concluded on the 13th of June, and ratified on the 25th of July, 1817:—"The most important feature in this treaty, was the disavowal of the Peishwa's paramount right, as the head of the Mahratta confederacy, and the cessation of the mutual reception of vakeels by the Peishwa and all other states; and the restriction imposed upon the communications of his highness with the foreign powers, except through the medium of agents of the British government, as such vakeels had been known to carry on clandestine intercourse. The Peishwa renounced all future claims on the Guicowar, which claims had, in fact, arisen from his position as head of the Mahratta confederacy. He was also to be excluded from all concern in the affairs of Gujerat, and he agreed to restore to the Guicowar, in perpetuity, the Ahmedabad farm, at the former rent of four and a-half lacs. The tribute from Kattywar was transferred to the company. Provision was made to enable the Guicowar to reduce the claims of the Peishwa, by the payment of four lacs per annum, or standing on arbitration. In lieu of the contingent force to be supplied in virtue of the treaty of Bassein, the Peishwa was to place at the disposal of the British government funds for 5000 cavalry and 3000 infantry. The company acquired the Northern

* By the Pindarrees.

† Wilson's Notes.

‡ Wilson, p. 215.

§ Major William Hough.

Circars, with the Peishwa's possessions in Gujerat, and the Kattywar tribute, with an extent of country in the Carnatic, including the strong forts of Darwar and Koossegul. The fort of Ahmednuggur, held by the company through sufferance, was transferred to them in perpetual sovereignty; likewise all the Peishwa's rights in Bundelcund and Hindostan. He was thus excluded from all connection or concern with the countries north of the Nerbuddah. Provisions were also made relative to the services of the southern jaghiredars.*

It is difficult to suppose that any one acquainted with the Mahrattas could believe that the Peishwa would observe a treaty subversive of all his honour and power, and so utterly humiliating. He did not observe it. He had scarcely signed it when he began secret military preparations, and efforts to seduce the Hindoo portion of the British troops. He gradually assembled a large army near the British camp. English officers were waylaid and murdered in every district of his previous dominions, more especially in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and it became at last absolutely necessary to enforce the treaty at the point of the sword. Mr. Elphinstone had but a small brigade of English near the capital, which was speedily reinforced by several sepoy detachments and a European regiment. The Peishwa commenced operations by burning and plundering the British residence at Poonah. But for the sound judgment, presence of mind, and calm intelligence of Mr. Elphinstone, the ruin of the British detachment must have been effected. His measures secured it from surprise, averted the seduction of the sepoy battalions, and placed the brigade in a position to act with promptitude and effect. He ordered Lieutenant-colonel Burr to advance and attack the forces of the Peishwa, which were mad with triumph from the destruction of the presidency.

On the 5th of November 1817, a battle was fought between these forces. The golden pennon (zurree pulkah), the grand standard of the Mahrattas, held in veneration by all the tribes, was borne by Mozo Dickshut a trusted chief of tried valour, but he fell defending it, and this circumstance being deemed ominous by the superstitious soldiery, deprived them of confidence, and they did not any longer maintain the contest with spirit. Colonel Burr gained a victory, but only by desperate fighting, nearly all the survivors of his force being severely wounded. His gallant little army numbered 2500 men, the host of the Peishwa was 25,000. On the 17th of No-

vember, General Smith advanced at the head of a formidable force, swept all before him, entered Poonah, and planted the standard of England on the palace of the Peishwa, who fled at his approach.

While these events were transpiring in Western India, the Marquis of Hastings was carrying out his project for the destruction of the Pindarrees, a work which required various especial alliances, military conventions, and temporary engagements of different descriptions with other chiefs of the Mahrattas, the Patans, and numerous tribes in Central India, and bordering on the Bengal frontiers. The Patan chief, Meer Khan, referred to in the account given in a previous chapter of the operations against Holkar, under Lord Lake, was presumed to be a suitable instrument of the designs of the government, and he was accordingly made the object of these favours, an account of which was anticipated in the chapter relating the war against Holkar.

The intrigues between the English and Meer Khan against the integrity of Holkar's dominion were not honourable to our nation. In connection with them, all persons about the court, all parties in that state, intrigued for and against the English, and for and against one another. Perjury, perfidy, abduction, assassination, murder, plunder, revolt, and civil war, rent and stained the realms which had owned the sovereignty of the once far renowned Holkar. That chief died in 1811, and his successor was a child, the regent, his mistress, mother of the child, who was young, beautiful, talented, despotic, and profligate, and who was betrayed and murdered. As the only release from anarchy, the government of young Holkar appealed to the English for protection, and Mr. Metcalfe was nominated to conclude negotiations. Before he could accomplish anything, Scindiah, who had been plotting against the English and watching for an opportunity to attack them ever since the defeat of his forces by Wellesley and Lake, succeeded in inducing a change among the ministers of the young chief, and confederated with them for purposes hostile to the company.

In November a British force, under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop, crossed the Nerbuddah. The advanced divisions, under General Malcolm and Colonel Adams, were to act against the Pindarrees; Sir Thomas was ordered by the governor-general to advance into Malwa, although the resident warned his excellency that the rajah would in consequence declare war.

Early in December, the whole of Holkar's army assembled within twenty miles of Mahidpore, and, after a council of war, marched

* Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. ii. p. 524-5.

against that place. On the morning of the 20th of December, young Holkar was playing in his tent, when he was enticed away, and at the same instant a guard was placed over Toolsah Bacc, the mistress of the deceased sovereign: at night she was beheaded, and her body thrown into the Seepra. The Patan chiefs loudly demanded to be led against the enemy, and began to plunder the baggage of the English. General Hislop ordered an instantaneous attack upon Holkar's army, which was well posted on the banks of the Seepra, nearly opposite to Mahidpore, their left flank protected by the river, their right by a deep ravine, while their line, which could only be approached by one ford, was protected by ruined villages. The bed of the river afforded some cover for the British troops in forming, and as their flanks were all but impregnable, it was determined to attack in front. The plan of battle was simple, and the execution of it prompt, orderly, and gallant. In crossing the river many men were lost, but the foot artillery, well arranged on the right bank, covered the passage. The horse artillery crossed to the enemy's side, and silenced many of their guns. The whole army effected the passage, and stormed the defences of the enemy, carrying them all with sword and bayonet. When the Mahrattas began to retire, a charge of cavalry turned their retreat into a rout. Sir John Malcolm commanded the right wing; Major J. L. Lushington, afterwards General Sir James Law Lushington, and Lieutenant-colonel Russell, commanded the two lines of cavalry in the final charge.

Signal as this defeat was, it did not secure peace. Various zemindars and rajahs in the Doab held fortified places, which were stormed. The Patan population in Rohilcund rose in arms, and various troublesome dispositions of troops and weary marches were necessary before the insurrection was suppressed. Scindiah, who had led the government of Holkar into the disasters thus experienced, did not strike a blow, but hastened to make such accommodations as would screen himself from penal consequences. He made a new treaty on the 5th and 6th of November, 1817, by which he bound himself to an alliance offensive and defensive, and to furnish a large cavalry contingent for the Pindarree war.

Incredible as it may seem, none of these events, disastrous as they were to the Mahrattas, and triumphant to the British, had any effect in deterring the Rajah of Nagpore from correspondence with Bajee Rao, the fugitive Peishwa, and organizing an army to attack the English. It was plainly intimated to him that his treason was discovered, and he was

warned that military operations would be directed against him if he took a single hostile step. He attacked the residency, which Mr. Jenkins, the resident, afterwards M.P., and a director of the East India Company, defended with great spirit and success. Happily there was a small body of troops at hand, but the best and bravest of them were surpassed by the devoted courage and activity of the civilians, some of whom fell. Reinforcements arriving, the rajah's capital was attacked in force. He sought terms: they were granted. He endeavoured to turn them to account by an act of treachery for the destruction of the British. He was suspected, his scheme defeated, and his capital stormed. He was made prisoner. Mr. Jenkins, for political reasons, reinstated him, on condition of the surrender of his chief forts and much of his territory. His officers refused to surrender the forts, and his servants retained possession of the territory, and he connived at their defection. The territory was conquered, the forts stormed, and the rajah himself being detected in a correspondence with the ex-Peishwa, for a united attack upon the English, Mr. Jenkins seized his person, and declared the musnid vacant. The rajah and two of his chief ministers were sent in custody to Allahabad. On the way he escaped.

In 1818 pursuit of the Peishwa occupied the attention of the governor-general and the military chiefs. When his highness fled from Poonah, he found many abettors and followers. All the petty rajahs of his dominions were ready to take up arms on his behalf against Europeans. He collected an army stronger than that which had been beaten at Poonah. They took quarters at Corygaum. A British officer named Staunton was on his way to Poonah, with a weak battalion of infantry, a few squadrons of horse, and a considerable detachment of artillery; arriving at the heights of Corygaum, he beheld the Peishwa's army in the plain beneath. Staunton immediately made for the village with the design of occupying it. He had only just succeeded in doing so when he was attacked by the whole army of the enemy, probably numbering 40,000 men. The attack continued all day until 9 p.m. The mosques and pagodas were again and again taken by each party. All the British officers were put *hors de combat*, except Captain Staunton and two others. All the artillery men were killed or wounded. The cavalry were cut up or exhausted. There was no water. Some wells were discovered in the night, and the fainting soldiers were relieved from the pangs of thirst. In the morning the Peishwa did not renew the attack, but withdrew his army. The captain brought

off his guns and colours, his sick and wounded, to Seroor, which place they entered on the third day, during which they had no refreshment but water. The gallant conduct of Captain Staunton and his troops was much applauded in India and in England. The East India Company voted him a purse of 500 guineas, and a splendid sword of honour, with an inscription panegyricizing his courage, skill, and fidelity to duty. The rewards bestowed upon his chivalrous soldiers bore no proportion to their deserts.

Soon after this event Generals Smith and Britzler marched against the formidable fortress of Sattara, which was soon reduced. Mr. Elphinstone raised the standard of the Rajah of Sattara, announced the protection of the company, a just system of revenue, and the establishment of religious liberty. In the whole of this transaction Mr. Elphinstone acted with sagacity and justice. His activity and precision everywhere that his presence and influence could reach, entitled him to the gratitude of his country.

General Smith maintained a hot pursuit of the Peishwa, whose army he overtook at Ashtee, where he gained a signal victory, taking the Rajah of Sattara and all his family prisoners, who were sent to Mr. Elphinstone, who conducted them to their palace at Sattara. Gocklah, the best general in the Peishwa's army, fell in the battle of Ashtee, which circumstance depressed the troops. The Peishwa fled from the field of his defeat, and was joined by Holkar and his infantry in his retreat; they both took refuge in Candeish, where Gumput Rao, with what was left of the Rajah of Nagpore's army, joined them. The jaghiredars* of Candeish, timid of the consequence to themselves of favouring such refugees, corresponded with Mr. Elphinstone. This led to desertion by many of the followers of the confederated Mahratta chiefs. The Peishwa led the life of a fugitive for six months, pursued by Generals Smith, Hislop, and other British commanders. During that time, Brigadier-general Monro conquered many forts, and, in command of a small body of troops, performed many glorious enterprises, which were, however, connected with a warfare so desultory, and involving operations so similar, as to preclude a detailed account. The Peishwa sought to reach Malwa, but Sir John Malcolm's dispositions effectually thwarted that purpose. On the 27th of May, being pressed by the forces of Sir Thomas Hislop, the Peishwa intimated, by his vakeel, to Sir John Malcolm an intention to surrender. At Keree, on the 2nd of June, Sir John visited the Peishwa. The

events which followed this visit are thus described by M. Auber:—"He appeared low and dejected, and retired for a private interview, when he said, that he had been involved in a war he never intended; that he was treated as an enemy by the state which had supported his family for two generations, and was at that moment in a position that demanded commiseration, and believed that he had a real friend in Sir John Malcolm. The latter replied, that every moment of delay was one of danger, and that he should either throw himself at once on the British government, or determine on further resistance. 'How can I resist now?' he exclaimed, 'I am surrounded.' Sir John Malcolm remarked that he was so, but he could not complain; that he still had the power of escape as much as ever, if he wished to become a freebooter and wanderer, and not accept the liberal provision designed for him. He replied, with the flattery of which he was master, 'I have found you, who are my only friend, and will never leave you; would a shipwrecked mariner, after having reached the port he desired, form a wish to leave it?' Still, upon the plea of a religious ceremony, and that it was an unlucky day, he wished on the third to postpone till the next day surrendering himself up and accepting the propositions, by which he engaged to proceed to Hindostan, a pension of not less than eight lacs of rupees per annum being secured to him. To this delay Sir John Malcolm most positively objected. The firing of some guns in the quarters of Asseer had a considerable effect upon him, and at eleven he determined to come to Sir John Malcolm's camp."

The fortunes of the other Mahratta chiefs are thus briefly summed up:—"Trimbeckjee, on learning the dispersion of Bajee Rao's force, retired to the neighbourhood of Nassick, where he was taken prisoner by Major Swanston, sent round to Bengal, and lodged in the fort of Chunar. The exertions of Mr. Elphinstone were very successful in effecting the introduction and establishment of the new government.

"The settlement of the Bheels in Candeish was prosecuted by Captain Briggs, under Mr. Elphinstone's direction, and the state of Sattara was likewise making favourable progress.

"The condition of the newly acquired provinces, and the measures adopted by the British government, (subjects of deep interest,) properly form matter for a separate work. The remaining fugitive, Appa Sahib, the ex-rajah of Nagpore, would have been captured near the fort of Asseerghur, but for Jeawunt Rao Sar, who sallied forth and saved him from his pursuers. He proceeded from

* Holders of jaghires or estates.

thence to Lahore, where he was allowed to live in absolute privacy, on a very scanty allowance from Runjeet Singh; a permission extended by that chief in a manner which showed his sincere desire not to dissatisfy the British government." It became clear in the course of the proceedings connected with the temporary surrender of the fort of Asseerghur, required from Scindiah under the treaty of November, 1817, that secret communications and engagements were carried on by him in the Peishwa's interest while he was making ostentatious parade of alliance with the English. He humbled himself, besought pardon, and was forgiven, provided his future conduct proved true.

This troublesome, expensive, and sanguinary war arose from the ignorance of the board of control, which sent out the Marquis of Cornwallis the second time with express instructions to revoke the policy of the Marquis Wellesley. Lord Cornwallis entered heartily into these instructions, for he had always been adverse to any connections with the Mahrattas. Still he had himself been obliged to form treaties and military connections with them, and he did not continue long enough in power during his second government to perceive the alteration of circumstances which rendered the severe policy of Lord Wellesley necessary after the first Mahratta war. Had Lord Cornwallis been spared, there can be no doubt, from his clearness of perception and wisdom, that he would have allowed Lord Wellesley's arrangements to remain, and not have exposed the company and his country to the dangers and costs of a second Mahratta war, to assert that ascendancy he so unfortunately revoked. Had the treaties of Lord Wellesley been permitted to stand, there is abundant reason to believe, from all the evidences which were evoked during the second Mahratta war, that so great a calamity would have been averted.

During the year 1819 Mr. Elphinstone was actively employed in arranging the government of the Mahratta states. It is a curious circumstance that in 1859, forty years after, a copy of his proclamation to the landholders should be called for in the British legislature, and was actually printed in the returns, according to which it appears that the proclamation was to be circulated freely, with a view to convince the amildars and pattels of the hopelessness of the Bajee Rao's cause, and

to assure the natives of the good treatment and protection which they would experience from the British government. Villages that had distinguished themselves by expelling or resisting the rebel troops were to be rewarded by large remissions, and by permanent marks of favour. Conspirators and all banditti were to be treated as rebels and punished "promptly and severely." The necessity of adhering to the customs of the country was strongly urged during the provisional government, even to the exemption of Brahmins from capital punishment, except when guilty of treason. No new imposts were to be levied, and those that seemed oppressive or unpopular were to be repealed. All lands held free of revenue were to remain so, and to be left with the present proprietors, who were, however, to prove their titles by showing their "sunnuds." The conciliation of the Bheels and Ramoosees was to be effected "by every means."

Upon the conclusion of the war the Marquis of Hastings carried out the whole scheme of policy originated by the Marquis Wellesley, a scheme which Lord Hastings had himself denounced when imperfectly acquainted with Indian affairs. Blacker states that the number of British officers killed and wounded were 134, and the number of all other ranks 3,042. The campaign, or series of campaigns, lasted from November 5, 1817, to May 13, 1819.*

In 1819 treaties were made with the Rajahs of Odeypore, Jeypore, Joudpore, Jesselmer, and Bicanur, also with the petty chiefs of Banswara, Dungepore, Pertabgerh, Sirohi, Krishnagerh, Kerauli, Bundi, and Kotah. "With each of these formal engagements were contracted, upon the general basis of subordinate co-operation and acknowledged supremacy." During the more quiet periods of his government, Lord Hastings made considerable alterations in the financial and judicial systems. He also organized a superior police force. After an unusually protracted period of government, Lord Hastings retired in January, 1823. It was on his passage home that he drew up the summary of his administrations, which has since been so much quoted. His arrival in London led to many debates in the India-house, and notable rewards were conferred upon his lordship and his successor in the title.

* Blacker's account of the Pindarree War.

CHAPTER CV.

PROGRESS OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN CHINA AND THE ARCHIPELAGO, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE END OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MARQUIS HASTINGS—CONQUEST OF MAURITIUS AND BOURBON; OF THE MOLUCCAS; OF JAVA, AND THE ISLES IN ITS VICINITY.

IN China the century opened with the eventful circumstance of the American flag having been first hoisted at Canton. This occurred on the 2nd of January, 1801.

On the 5th of November, 1803, the court of directors informed the select committee of Chinese merchants that hostilities had recommenced between the English government and the French and Batavian republics.

On the 22nd of May, the same year, the court of directors of the East India Company were informed by the board of control, that his majesty intended to address a letter to the Emperor of China, and send him presents; and it was recommended that the chairman should send a letter to the viceroy and the hoppo. Lord Castlereagh sent a letter to the prime-minister of the Chinese emperor. One of the king's gardeners was sent to Canton to collect specimens of the vegetable productions of that part of China, and he was accompanied by a botanical painter to take drawings.

On the 14th of February, 1804, a squadron of French men-of-war, commanded by Admiral Linois, encountered the English homeward-bound China fleet in the Straits of Malacca. The French admiral counted upon an easy victory, as his force was very formidable. His own ship, the *Marengo*, carried eighty guns. Two of his vessels were large fast-sailing frigates, a corvette of thirty guns, and a Dutch brig of eighteen guns. Captain Dance was the commodore of the English vessels. He sailed in the *Earl Camden*, a good ship. Captain I. T. Timins, of the *Royal George*, bravely and skilfully seconded the commodore. All the captains and their crews entered into the action with alacrity and spirit. There was much to defend, for the value of the fleet and cargo was estimated at nearly eight millions sterling.* The *Royal George* received sixty-six shots in her hull and rigging, and bore the brunt of the

enemy's fire. The enemy's squadron was beaten off, and the company's fleet proceeded in safety.

In 1805 the letter of his royal majesty to his imperial majesty was delivered to the viceroy, after innumerable delays and obstacles created by the Chinese officials. A "chair," fancifully and richly decorated, was sent for the conveyance of the box containing his majesty's letter. The supercargoes went in procession to the palace. On the 22nd of January the royal presents were formally presented; the chair containing the letter was laid down before the front entrance to the palace. The supercargoes were conducted, under a salute of three guns, into the hall of audience by a side entry, while the letter was borne through the grand entrance. The viceroy and hoppo were seated under a gorgeous canopy at the upper end of the hall, attended by numerous mandarins in their official costume. The letter was then presented to the viceroy, who, with the hoppo, rose to receive it, and remained standing some time in token of respect. The letter was then carried to an inner apartment, and the grand officers resumed their seats. The viceroy declined receiving the letters sent by Lord Castlereagh and the chairman of the court of directors, on the ground that it was contrary to the laws of China to receive presents or communications from any foreign minister or mandarin. The president of the supercargoes requested that the letters might remain, pending permission being granted by his imperial majesty to receive them. To this arrangement the viceroy consented. The supercargoes retired under another salute of three guns.

On the 8th of May, 1806, a letter from the emperor to the King of England, with presents, arrived at Canton. They were delivered to the president on the 19th, with precisely the same ceremonials as those observed in receiving the letter from his Britannic majesty. The letter of his imperial majesty was very unlike the communications made to the English by former emperors, and was couched in terms of singular propriety, although clothed with an air of strange originality of manner, and pervaded by a tone of eccentric and unique thought. The

* M. Auber, in his *History of British Power in India*, gives this estimate. His work was published in 1837. It is to be presumed that he intended to correct a former estimate of the value of this fleet made in another of his works, "*China*," published in 1834, in which he names sixteen millions as the value. Both works are regarded as standard authorities, yet they present this striking discrepancy. The discrepancies among other authorities also, take a wide range as to the value of the homeward-bound China fleet of that year.

following extracts will no doubt much interest the reader.

"Your majesty's kingdom is at a remote distance beyond the seas, but is observant of its duties and obedient to its laws, beholding from afar the glory of our empire and respectfully admiring the perfection of our government. Your majesty has dispatched messengers with letters for our perusal and consideration; we find that they are dictated by appropriate sentiments of esteem and veneration; and being therefore inclined to fulfil the wishes and expectations of your majesty, we have determined to accept of the whole of the accompanying offering.

"With regard to those of your majesty's subjects who for a long course of years have been in the habit of trading to our empire, we must observe to you, that our celestial government regards all persons and nations with eyes of charity and benevolence, and always treats and considers your subjects with the utmost indulgence and affection; on their account, therefore, there can be no place or occasion for the exertions of your majesty's government."

In 1806 the directors of the East India Company permitted a Mr. Maning to go to China at their expense, who professed to have for his object the pursuit of science and the exploration of the country. Some curious circumstances arose out of that gentleman's mission. In 1807, he arrived at Canton. He presented a petition to the hoppo, "to be received into the service of the Emperor of China." He offered himself for employment by his imperial majesty as "Astronomer and Physician." His services were refused. In February, 1808, he proceeded to Cochin China, hoping to be allowed to stay there some time, and thence to effect an entrance to China. This scheme also failed, through the jealousy of the Cochin Chinese. He then proceeded to India, intending, if possible, to gain an entrance by way of Thibet, Bhotan, or Tartary. On all these frontiers he found an accurate description of his person and purposes in possession of the Chinese authorities, and he was baffled. Finally, this persevering gentleman accompanied the embassy of Lord Amherst to Peking, in the year 1816.

In the year 1807 the company's trade was stopped in China in consequence of the death of a Chinese in an affray with some sailors belonging to an English ship. The dissipated and disorderly conduct of the English sailors had done much to prevent the friendly intercourse of the British and Chinese. The Chinese demanded the death of an Englishman for that of their countryman who had fallen. The conduct of the merchants on this

occasion, as on other occasions in the history of the English in China, was cruel and unjust. They were quite willing to sacrifice the life of some one of the sailors, although none of the men could be fixed upon as having committed the manslaughter. The courage and firmness of the English naval officer on the station alone saved his country and his countrymen from this degradation, and rescued the man whose life was fixed upon by the English merchants as an atonement to save their trade. It is to the honour of the directors of the East India Company that they not only approved of the gallant conduct of Captain Rolles in saving the life of his countryman, but presented him with £1000.

Sir George Staunton, whose services to the company at Canton had been very considerable, was appointed interpreter to the factory.

In 1808 the English at Canton were alarmed by rumours of a French invasion of Macao, and they represented to the governor-general of India the necessity of strengthening the defences of that place in a manner which it was beyond the power of the Portuguese to effect. In September of that year, a considerable French force was off Java, and in consequence Admiral Drury led an English squadron to Macao. Troops were landed and the defences made stronger. The hoppo protested against any foreign troops being landed there without permission of his imperial majesty, according to the treaty existing between him and the Chinese. The English and Portuguese were unwilling to retrace their steps, and the Chinese prepared for a barbarous system of warfare.

Conflicts on the river between her majesty's ships and the Chinese forts occurred, although war was not declared. "Admiral Drury seems not to have possessed that cool and deliberate judgment which was essential to the business he had been engaged in."*

The committee were so alarmed for their trade by the occupation of Macao by the French, and were so animated in their resentments against that nation, that they were willing to risk a war with China to accomplish their purpose. The British naval officers acted with prudence and forbearance, as well as courage, and decided that the imperial treaty with Portugal forbid the occupation of the island by any but Portuguese. The committee at last gave way. The directors were so displeased with the conduct of "the select committee" for managing their affairs in China, that they displaced them, and appointed servants in inferior positions above them.

In 1809 the insolent and haughty conduct

* Parliamentary papers.

of an English naval officer at Canton had nearly embroiled his country with the United States of America. Captain Pellew, R.N., impressed American seamen, or seamen on board American ships, into the service of the king. The American government demanded redress, which had to be conceded to avert war, the pride and petulance of this British officer thus causing humiliation to his country.

From the years 1806 to 1810 the Chinese Ladrões, native pirates, called after their brethren the Portuguese of Macao, infested the coasts of China.* These men were similar to the pirates which infested the Chinese seas in the seventeenth century, from whom the Dutch settlers in Formosa suffered so severely. Mr. Davis, afterwards Sir J. F. Davis, governor of Hongkong, has given the following curious and interesting description of the character and history of these Chinese pirates:—"Not the least remarkable feature about this formidable fleet of pirates was its being, subsequent to the death of its original chief, very ably governed by his wife, who appointed her lieutenants for active service. A severe code of laws for the government of the squadron, or of its several divisions, was enforced, and a regular appropriation made of all captured property. Marriages were strictly observed, and all promiscuous intercourse, and violence to women, rigorously punished. Passes were granted to the Chinese junks or boats which submitted to the pirates: but all such as were captured in government vessels, and indeed all who opposed them, were treated with the most dreadful cruelty. At the height of their power they levied contributions on most of the towns along the coast, and spread terror up the river to the neighbourhood of Canton. It was at this time that the British factory could not venture to move in their boats between that place and Macao without protection; and to the Ladrões, therefore, may be partly attributed the origin of the valuable survey of the Chinese seas by Captain Ross; as the two cruisers which were sent from Bombay, at the select committee's requisition, to act against the pirates, were subsequently employed by them in that work of public utility, the benefits of which have been felt by the whole commercial world.

"Finding that its power was utterly unavailing against the growing strength of the Ladrões, the Chinese government published a general amnesty to such as would submit, and return to their allegiance, a stroke of

policy which may be attributed to its acquaintance with the fact, that a serious dissension had broken out between the two principal commanders of the pirate forces. This proceeded even to the length of the black and red squadrons (which they respectively headed) engaging in a bloody combat, wherein the former was discomfited. The weaker of the two now submitted to accept the offers of the government, which promised free pardon, and kept its engagements; the leader was even raised to some rank in the emperor's service! Being thus weakened by the desertion of nearly half her forces, the female chieftain and her other lieutenant did not much longer hold out. The Ladrões who had submitted were employed by the crafty government against their former associates, who were harassed by the stoppage of their supplies, and other difficulties, and a few more months saw the whole remaining force accept the proffered amnesty. Thus easily was dissolved an association which at one time threatened the empire; but as the sources and circumstances, whence piracy has more than once sprung up, are still in existence, the success and impunity of their predecessors may encourage other bands of maritime robbers to unite in a similar confederacy at no distant period."

Difficulties between the English merchants and the Chinese authorities were perpetuated by the frequent fatal conflicts of the English sailors and the natives, and the sternness of the Chinese penal code, which exacted blood for blood, life for life.

The Chinese officials were constantly finding pretexts for stopping the trade. An inexorable jealousy of foreigners characterised the policy of the imperial government. In consequence of this, objections were taken to the presence of European ships of war in the Canton river, and to the service of the natives at the foreign factories.

His majesty's ship *Doris* exercised a blockade against the American merchantmen during 1814. The ship captured an American vessel, which offended the Chinese, who ordered the committee of the English factory to send the *Doris* away. This, they explained, was beyond their power, the ship of war belonging to his Britannic majesty, not to the East India Company. The Chinese could not understand this explanation, or affected to be unable to do so. Captures and re-captures of American ships in the river followed the making of the first prize, and inflamed the resentment of the Chinese. They interrupted communications between the East Indiamen and the English men-of-war; their magistrates

* *The Chinese: a General Description of China and its Inhabitants.* By John Francis Davis, Esq., F.R.S., &c., Governor of Hongkong. London: C. Cox, King William-street, Strand, 1851.

* Davis's *China*, chap. iii. pp. 63, 64.

seized and subjected to cruel punishment all who took service with the English; the mandarins violated the sanctuary of the factory; and, in fine, all the long-conceded privileges of the English were infringed. What followed has been well described by Mr. Davis.

"The committee, seeing the hostile disposition of the government, determined on the bold measure of stopping the trade, as the only means of arriving at a remedy. The Chinese, somewhat startled at their old weapon being turned against themselves, began to display a more conciliatory temper, and, after some debate, a mandarin was appointed to meet Sir George Staunton, who was deputed to conduct the negotiation on the part of the committee. Accordingly, on the 20th of October, Sir George proceeded to Canton, accompanied by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe and Mr. Davis. The first subject of complaint was the arrest of the linguist Ayew, for performing a service which was merely complimentary on the part of the English, and expressive of their respect for a dignified officer of government, who had conducted the first embassy through China, and been on friendly terms with its members. It was immediately replied, that his seizure was on account of a totally different affair, and that there was no intention of condemning the proceeding. Several meetings took place with the principal mandarins and one or two assessors, but little progress was made towards an adjustment; when the viceroy suddenly determined on breaking off the negotiation. The committee upon this resolved on issuing a notice to all British subjects to quit Canton: Sir George Staunton and the gentlemen with him embarked in the *Wexford*, and the whole fleet proceeded down the river.

"This step had the effect of completely curing the obstinacy of the viceroy. A deputation of Hong merchants was sent down to the ships, with authority to state that mandarins would be sent to discuss the remaining points in dispute if Sir George would return. On his reaching Canton, an attempt was made to retract the pledge, but this could not be persisted in; and, after several long and tedious audiences with the mandarins, the principal points in dispute were gained, and incorporated in an official paper from the viceroy, as the only security against a breach of faith on the part of the Chinese. The privilege of corresponding with the government under seal, and in the native character, was now for the first time established; an assurance was given that no Chinese officer should ever enter the British factory without leave previously obtained; and licence was given to native

servants to enter into the service of the English without molestation from the petty mandarins; together with some other points."*

Mr. Davis has summed up the concessions of the Chinese on this occasion in language improperly vague for a work professing to give complete information on the subject of British relations to the Chinese government. M. Auber has been more complete on this head, although prolix in his narrative of the events that led to such an issue. According to that writer, the relations between the Chinese and English were placed in 1814 upon the following basis, which includes the matters mentioned by Mr. Davis, and "some other points," which he leaves his readers to guess:—

"On the 29th November, a communication was made by Howqua of the decisions passed by the viceroy, to the following effect:—

"1st. Permission given to address the government in Chinese through the Hong merchants without the contents being inquired into.

"2nd. The use of offensive language not very satisfactorily answered.

"3rd. The local magistrate not to visit the factory without giving due previous notice.

"4th. The communication by boats between Canton and Whampoa to be open and free as usual.

"5th. Natives may be employed as coolies, porters, tea-boilers, cooks, and in other similar capacities, but persons not to be hired under the denominations of *keupan* and *thawan*.

"6th. Ships of war to remain at their usual anchorages while the ships are at Whampoa, but when they depart, the ships of war to depart.

"7th. Boats to receive passes at certain stations.

"8th. The country ships have been fired at as due notice to the Bogue Fort.

"9th. Merchantmen only admitted to Whampoa.

"Additional Articles.

"1st. Address to be laid before the emperor to be written in the foreign character as before.

"2nd. Important affairs to be addressed to the viceroy, commercial affairs to the hoppo, local district affairs to the local magistrates.

"3rd. Further arrangements respecting the boats passing the Bogue; the people will then be directed to behave courteously.

"4th. The opening or not of the trade will not be inquired into.

* Davis's *China*, chap. iii. pp. 72, 73.

" 5th. Notice will be given when natives are tried implicating foreigners.

" An edict confirming the same was issued on the 2nd December."

The year 1814 was signalised in the history of the British in India by the commencement of the compilation of an Anglo-Chinese dictionary, by the Rev. Dr. Morrison, a missionary of the London Missionary Society, and an English congregational minister. The perseverance and devotedness of this remarkable man made him in this, as in so many other respects, a benefactor to the Chinese people, to the English in China, and useful to the relations of the two nations. The directors of the East India Company favoured this great undertaking, as did their select committee at Canton. Sir G. Staunton, at the request of the committee, superintended the issue of the work. The whole work was not completed until 1824, Dr. Morrison having been interrupted in his labours by attendance at the embassy in 1818.

In 1816 it was determined by his majesty's government and the court of directors, that an embassy should be sent to the Chinese emperor from the Prince Regent of England. Lord Amherst was fixed upon as a suitable person for this important mission. The ostensible objects of this embassy were briefly stated to be—"a removal of the grievances which had been experienced, and an exemption from them and others of the like nature for the time to come, with the establishment of the company's trade upon a secure, solid, equitable footing, free from the capricious, arbitrary aggressions of the local authorities, and under the protection of the emperor, and the sanction of the regulations to be appointed by himself."

The embassy embarked at Spithead, on board his majesty's ship *Alceste*, on the 8th of February, 1816, and arrived at the mouth of the White River, Gulf of Pe-tche-lee, on the 28th of July. The disembarkation did not take place until the 9th of August, when the imperial legate visited Lord Amherst. It was arranged that negotiations should not be entered into until the arrival of the ambassador at Tien-Sing. On the 12th his excellency arrived there, and was met by a second imperial legate, when a discussion at once arose as to the performance of "ko-tow"—the homage demanded by the emperor from all representatives of foreign princes. Lord Amherst refused. His excellency and suite, accompanied by the legates, proceeded up river. On the 16th of August, his lordship was roused from his bed at a very early hour by the Chinese officials, for the purpose of informing him that the homage or "ko-tow"

must be performed, or his further advance stopped. Lord Amherst objected to the ceremony as an indignity to the king his master, and to the British nation. He argued that if the ceremony were merely a form, as the Chinese officials pretended, then he had no objection to practise it, provided a written declaration were made to him that a Chinese ambassador would perform the same ceremony at the court of his Britannic majesty in case such were sent there. The legates refused to give any such pledge, and made the "ko-tow" the alternative to the dismissal of the embassy. The legates proposed that a rehearsal should be performed, in order that the ambassador might try how far his scruples were unrelenting, but it was intended that this rehearsal should be public and ceremonious, and was evidently intended as a trap for his excellency, who declined any rehearsal whatever, adhering to his previous stipulation, which he repeated. The voyage was prosecuted to Tong-choo-foo, where the navigation of the river ends, and whence the journey to Peking, only twelve miles, is performed by land. At this place the legates proposed that the ambassador should write home for instructions. His lordship declined doing so, and was treated rudely by the mandarins. He insisted upon sending a letter to the emperor; upon producing the superscription, the evidence of his lordship's high rank seemed to awe the officials, and their rudeness gave place to obsequiousness.

In the afternoon of the 28th, the embassy arrived at Peking, which it was not permitted to enter, but was conducted round the walls, and at sunrise was in the neighbourhood of Yuen-min-yuen. The ambassador was not allowed to see the emperor, or personally to deliver his credentials to the prime-minister, as he still persisted in refusing a homage which amounted to idolatrous worship, and which recognised the Emperor of China as the sovereign of the universe, and the King of England as his tributary.

His excellency and suite were compelled to return; *en route* to Canton he was treated with respect. He arrived at the factory on the 1st of January, 1817. The frustration of the mission was mainly due to the viceroy, and other officials at Canton, who knew that its chief object was to complain of their insolence, violence, oppression, and extortion.

During the passage of Lord Amherst up the river, and overland to Peking, and even while returning, the Canton authorities behaved with ill will to the British naval officers in the Canton river. The captain of the *Alceste* (Lord Amherst's vessel) was refused anchorage at Whampoa. Of this circum-

stance, Mr. Davis observes:—"It was intended to degrade the British ambassador below the tribute-bearer from Siam, whose junk has free leave to enter the river! The *Alceste*, however, proceeded very leisurely on her way; and Captain Maxwell, on being fired at by the junks, and the fort at the river's mouth, silenced the junks at a single shot; while one broadside sufficed to send the garrison of the fort scampering up the side of the hill, down which that defence is somewhat preposterously built. The effect of this decisive conduct was evinced in the short space of one day, by the arrival of all sorts of provisions to the *Alceste* at Whampoa, by a free consent to load the *Heckett*, and by the publication of a statement that the firing at the entrance of the river was an affair of saluting! Those who composed the embassy were gratified to find on their arrival at Canton, on the 1st of January, that Captain Maxwell had not been deterred by any unnecessary apprehensions for their safety from duly maintaining the dignity of the British flag."

The duties and annoyances of Lord Amherst were not over on his arrival at Canton. The emperor had written a letter for the Regent, and committed the delivery of it to his viceroy at Canton, who was personally to place it in the hands of the British ambassador. This ceremony was performed in an eminently uncivil manner, which the ambassador took care to rebuke in a way which comported with the dignity of his bearing throughout. This ceremonial terminated Lord Amherst's business in China. Barrow relates,* that Lord Macartney's embassy cost the Chinese government £170,000. Mr. Davis was of opinion that the embassy of Lord Amherst cost it an equal sum. The letter of the emperor to the Prince Regent was intolerably insolent and arrogant. The following passages from it will suffice to disclose its character:—"Hereafter there is no occasion for you to send an ambassador so far, and be at the trouble of passing over mountains and crossing seas;" and in a vermillion edict† the following passage:—"I therefore sent down my pleasure to *expel* these ambassadors, and send them back to their own country, *without punishing the high crime they had committed.*"

Immediately after the departure of the ambassador, various acts of cruelty were perpetrated by the Canton authorities, which were intended chiefly as insults and threats to the English. The failure of the embassy was much discussed in England, very many

were of opinion that Lord Amherst should have complied with the Chinese customs, whatever they were. Dr. Barry O'Meara, in his *Voice from St. Helena*, represents the imprisoned Emperor Napoleon I., as deriding the English and Lord Amherst for their pride and impracticability in not stooping to any humiliation the Chinese thought proper to impose, which the ex-emperor considered indifferent, whereas the commercial advantage to be obtained was substantial. The opinion of so renowned a person was much quoted in Europe, and especially in England after O'Meara's book was published, whenever Chinese affairs brought up the subject. The Emperor Napoleon was however a bad judge on points of ethics or honour, however sagacious in matters of war or policy. He could assume the language and conduct of a Mohammedan in Egypt, a Romanist in Italy, and an atheist in France, when political and personal objects were to be promoted by so doing. Lord Amherst's honour and principle were of a higher cast, and regulated by a sense of duty drawn from purer sources than any acknowledged as authoritative by Napoleon Buonaparte. Lord Amherst did not, like his French imperial majesty, place the Bible on his *political* book-shelves; he had another and more becoming compartment for it. Duty to the person of his king, the honour and dignity of his country, and to the religion he professed, forbid Lord Amherst to render the idolatrous homage and recognition of supremacy demanded by the Tartar emperor. He acted conscientiously, and the present generation of Englishmen at all events approves. Had Lord Amherst participated in the degrading and dishonourable ceremonial proposed, he would not in all probability have obtained any advantages for his nation, and the English would have been reminded at Canton by the viceroy, that their king was the emperor's slave. At it was, the firmness of the ambassador much impressed the Chinese authorities, and notwithstanding their first outbursts of resentment, made them more wary of affronting a people who might assert their independence in a very troublesome manner. At all events, Mr. Davis, who had opportunities of personally observing the effects, thus expresses a similar opinion:—

It has often been a subject of just remark, that this *unsuccessful* mission was followed by a longer interval of tranquillity, and of freedom from Chinese annoyance than had ever been experienced before. From the year 1816 to 1829, not a single stoppage of the British trade took place, except in the affair of the *Topaze* frigate in 1822; and then the Canton government was glad to

* *Travels in China.*

† From its being written on paper of that colour by the emperor's own hand.

make the first advances to a resumption of the suspended intercourse, as we shall see. In 1820 an accidental occurrence took place, which gave rise to transactions of a very remarkable nature, proving in the strongest manner the anxiety of the government to avoid a discussion with the English. Some boats from one of the company's ships were watering in the river, when they were barbarously attacked by a party of Chinese with stones. The officer in charge of the boats fired over the heads of the assailants to make them desist, but the shot unfortunately took effect among some boys on a high bank opposite, and killed one of them. The Chinese, as usual, demanded that somebody should be given up; but the committee insisted on the urgent emergency which led to the discharge of the gun, as well as on the accidental nature of the case. In the meanwhile, the butcher on board one of the ships committed suicide; and the Chinese, on hearing this, immediately took it up, thinking proper to assume that *he* must be the individual who had shot the boy! The utmost eagerness and haste were shown by them in appointing an inquest of mandarins, who proceeded to examine the body; and, as it was decided by them at once that the deceased butcher must be the homicide, the trade proceeded as usual. It must be observed, that the committee only granted permission for the ship to be boarded by the mandarins when they demanded it, and that the whole proceeding showed the extreme anxiety of the local authorities to accommodate the affair."

The English abstained, however, from all compromise in the transaction, as is known by the distinct testimony of the Rev. Dr. Morrison, the congregational missionary, and Chinese interpreter to the company. This narrative shows at once the difficulty the English had in carrying on trade peaceably with the Chinese, and the good effect of firmness tempered by justice and discretion in dealing with the Cantonese authorities. No other events of interest occurred in connection with English relations to China, during the period to which this chapter refers.

CONQUEST OF MAURITIUS.

During the Marquis of Wellesley's government, various measures were contemplated by him to frustrate the purposes and humiliate the power of the French and Dutch in the Eastern Archipelago. The expedition of Buonaparte to Egypt disconcerted these measures. General Baird and General Wellesley, who were nominated first to command the military portion of an expedition to the Mauritius, and then against Batavia, received

other commissions. The admiral who was to command the naval part of these enterprises did not make his appearance at the rendezvous, Trincomalee; and General Baird was dispatched with the troops to Egypt, General Wellesley to Mysore. No opportunity for prosecuting either of the meditated attacks occurred until 1810, during the government of Lord Minto. The capture of Mauritius does not properly come within the range of this history; it is therefore here only necessary to observe that the expedition against the Mauritius was successful, and that the conquest much reduced French influence in the East.

At the same time the Isle of Bourbon was captured, but was restored to France at the peace of 1814.

CONQUEST OF THE MOLUCCAS.

Lord Minto's career as an Indian statesman was closed with more *éclat* than it otherwise would have been, by his acquisition of the Moluccas and the Island of Java. "An empire, which for two centuries had contributed to the power, prosperity, and grandeur of one of the principal and most respected states of Europe, was wrested from the short usurpation of the French government,* added to the dominions of the British crown, and converted from a seat of hostile machinations and commercial competition, into an augmentation of British power and prosperity."†

In the year 1808 Mr. Raffles, afterwards Sir Stamford Raffles, was secretary to the government of Prince of Wales' Island. Ill health compelled change of scene, and he proceeded to the Moluccas. There he acquired considerable information as to the trade and general condition of the islands near and beyond the Straits. He also obtained very precise information of the power of the Dutch, and the value of their possessions in the great Archipelago. Mr. Raffles drew up reports of the condition of Penang and Malacca, which influenced the government in modifying their intentions in respect to these settlements, and their views of the importance which should be attached to them. Mr. Raffles drew up a paper on "the Malayan Archipelago," which so pleased Lord Minto, that he desired to make the gifted author governor of the Moluccas. With this intention other claims interfered. In the document drawn up by Mr. Raffles, he insisted upon the necessity to the ultimate interests of

* The Moluccas and Java, with its minor islands, were subjected to France, when Holland, the parent country, was conquered by the French.

† Auber's *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, vol. ii. chap. xii. p. 470.

England in the East, that French influence should be completely extirpated throughout the Archipelago. The governor-general resolved to carry out the opinions of Mr. Raffles, and to proceed himself with an expedition against Java.

Previous to the accomplishment of his purpose, some other achievements were performed in consonance with the general object, such as the reduction of the Moluccas, or Spice Islands.

In the middle of February, 1810, Captain Tucker, with his majesty's ships *Dover*, *Cornwall*, and *Samarang*, and part of the Madras European regiment, under Captain Court, arrived off the island of Amboyna. The ships opened a heavy cannonade. Under their fire four hundred of the Madras regiment were landed, in two detachments, one under Captain Court, the other commanded by Captain Philips. Philips attacked a battery in front, and carried it by storm. Court made a circuit and took some of the redoubts in reverse. The next morning the guns of the captured batteries were directed against the town and fort. The Dutch governor was summoned to surrender, and obeyed. Thirteen hundred Dutch and Malay soldiers laid down their arms. The former were sent to Java,—a very questionable policy, as that place was about to be attacked. The Malays were enlisted in the English service. Thus the English at last, and finally, avenged the insults and outrages inflicted upon them so long before, by the Dutch at that place. The whole of the Moluccas were soon afterwards captured, the Dutch in every case making a feeble resistance, unworthy of their former glory. The garrisons of the Batavian republic were swiftly swept from the Archipelago, except from Java and its neighbouring isles. The last of the Moluccas that yielded to British power was Ternate, the scene of so much competition and contention between them and the Dutch in the early enterprises of the traders of those nations among the Spice Islands. There exists but little information concerning the attack on this place, once so famous as a battle-field for the maritime rivals in the Archipelago. Mill has compressed some fragmentary accounts in the *Asiatic Register*, vol. xii.—the official despatches and old newspaper correspondence. His narrative is brief and clear, and supplies all that is worth relating. "Ternate was taken by Captain Tucker with a detachment of Europeans, the seamen and marines of the *Dover*, and some of the newly enlisted Amboyna corps. Captain Tucker arrived off the island on the 25th August; but light and baffling winds kept him off the shore, and a landing was not practicable till the 28th. A hundred and seventy

men were landed in the night, with intent to surprise the forts and batteries which guarded the bay. The difficulties of the approach frustrated the scheme, and the men were re-embarked. Early in the morning they were again put on shore; and, whilst the frigate engrossed the attention of the enemy, they proceeded unobserved to an eminence supposed to command the Fort of Kayomaira, the principal Dutch post. They arrived on the hill at noon; but to their great vexation they found that the fort was screened from their view by an intervening forest. They then endeavoured to proceed by an inland route, but, after incessant exertion throughout the day, it was found impossible to disencumber the path of the immense trees which had been cut down and piled across it. Turning to the right, they followed the course of a rivulet which led to the beach, and brought them about ten o'clock within eight hundred yards of the fort before they were discovered. Disregarding a smart fire of grape and musketry, they rushed forward, escaladed the walls, and carried the fort. On the following morning the combined operations of the detachment and frigate overpowered the other defences of the bay, and by the evening the town and island were surrendered. Few casualties impaired the exultation of the victors. Their conquest completed the reduction of the Moluccas, and Java with its dependencies alone remained in the possession of the Dutch."

CONQUEST OF JAVA AND ITS DEPENDENCIES.

Having wrested the Moluccas from the united grasp of France and Holland, the English were eager for the meditated attack upon Java. The governor-general determined upon personally superintending the operations; some delay was therefore necessary. The delays perpetually interposed by the naval commanders were, however, the chief difficulties in the way of all enterprises which the Indian government had hitherto attempted by sea. This want of alertness was shown at Mauritius and the Isle of France, Amboyna, and Ternate; and but for the intelligence of Mr. Raffles, and the determination of the governor-general not to be impeded by the admirals, and to carry out his purpose promptly and resolutely, the undertaking would have been deferred that year,—probably for ever; for it is certain that the French and Dutch would have made desperate efforts to send reinforcements and supplies, and the garrisons would have made the defences infinitely more formidable. In pursuance of his object Lord Minto proceeded to Madras, on the 9th March, 1811. Troops

were ordered to proceed from Bengal on the 15th and 16th; on the 18th of April he reached Penang. The extent of information with which Mr. Raffles was enabled to furnish the governor-general on all points relating to countries of which scarcely anything was known, and the comprehensive views with which he accompanied his reports, proved of infinite value. An incident that occurred at this stage of the proceedings marked the judgment and decision of Mr. Raffles. The late period when the expedition reached Malacca, caused some anxiety on account of the favourable monsoon, which was nearly terminating. A question arose as to which of two passages should be followed, in the course towards Java. The point called for an immediate determination; the choice was to be made between the northern route, round Borneo, which, from the little known of the navigation of those seas, was thought to be the only practicable one, especially for a fleet; but how the dangers of the Bartabac passage, where only one ship could pass at a time, were to be avoided, no one could suggest. Mr. Raffles had strongly recommended the south-west passage, between Caramata and Borneo, and "staked his reputation on the success which would attend it." The naval authorities were opposed to it; but Lord Minto reposed full confidence in the judgment and local information of Mr. Raffles, by embarking with him in his majesty's ship the *Modeste*, commanded by Captain the Hon. George Elliot, on the 18th of June, 1811, and leading the way on Mr. Raffles' sole responsibility. The result was entirely successful. The fleet, consisting of sixty sail,* was in six weeks in sight of Batavia, without a single accident. The *Modeste* alone would have done it a fortnight sooner.† In the progress of the expedition from the roads of Madras, much danger was incurred by storms. His majesty's ship *Dover*, and many other vessels which remained longest, were driven on shore at Madras, and wrecked. Happily, the transports, with the troops on board, left in time, and escaped. The first division of the army left Madras April 18th,‡ 1811, under the command of Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie. When Lord Minto arrived at Malacca, he learned that General Daendels had been recalled by the French government, and that General Jansens had replaced him, and had brought out strong reinforcements.

* Mill computes them at 100 sail. He probably reckons a description of vessels which Auber does not include in "the fleet."

† M. Auber's *Rise of British Power*, &c.

‡ Thorn's *Memoir of the Conquest of Java*. London, 1815.

Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the British commander, was led by the information which reached him from various quarters, to decide on attacking Batavia, as the place where the contests for the Franco-Dutch colonies of Java and dependencies was likely to be decided.

On the evening of the 3rd of August, the vanguard of the fleet made Cape Carawang, and early next morning ran in for the mouth of the Mirandi river. During the lulls which occurred between the land and sea breezes, the ships safely anchored. Early in the evening the first division of the troops landed. The fleet, when all had assembled, consisted, according to Major Hough, of four sail of the line, fourteen frigates, seven sloops, eight of the honourable company's cruisers, fifty-seven transports, and seventeen gun-boats, under the command of Rear-Admiral Stopford, who joined the expedition at Batavia. When at Malacca, the military force was officially reported* to be as follows:—

General Abstract of the Army, Malacca, 4th June, 1811.

	OFFICERS.	NATIVE OFFICERS.	N. C. O. & PRIVATES.	TOTAL.
European forces	200	—	5144	5344
Native forces	124	123	5530	5777
	324	123	10,674	11,121
Pioneers, Lascars, &c.				839

Grand total 11,960

Of this force 1,200 were left behind sick, at Malacca; 1,500 of the remainder became ill on landing at Java. The cause of this sickness was not the climate of Java, but the bad, and, in some cases, disgusting quarters afforded to the men while on board the transports, together with the rough weather encountered on the passage.

Colonel Gillespie and the advance brigade first landed at Chillingching, a village ten miles or so to the eastward of Batavia. He immediately took up a position over the road to Cornelis, to gain possession of that road, and protect the landing of the rest of the troops, which was safely effected.

On the 7th of August, the advance guard of the British crossed the Angale river by a bridge of boats, and halted themselves.† The next day, Batavia was summoned. The inhabitants, such as the French had not driven away, were eager to surrender; and our troops had therefore no difficulty in taking possession of the town.

It was expected that the French and Dutch would make a stand at Weltevreden. Against that place the army began its march on the 10th. The cantonments were abandoned on

* Major Thorn, deputy quartermaster-general at Java.

† Wilson, vol. vii. p. 356.

the approach of our army, but General Jumel, the French officer second in command, had intrenched a camp for a division of the Dutch army in a strong position, overlooking the road to Cornelis, about a mile from Weltevreden. Two villages covered the position of the Dutch infantry. The enemy met our advance with grape and musketry; the English general skirmished in front, using his horse artillery and rifles freely, and turned with his main force the left flank of the defence. Having set fire to the villages, the British troops charged through the smoke and burning houses, dispossessing the Dutch infantry and artillery of every strategical point, and driving them in headlong retreat until they found protection under the cannon of Cornelis. In the arsenal of Weltevreden a large amount of military stores and 300 guns became the prize of the victors. General Jansens was confident that Cornelis would defy the whole force of the governor-general until the rainy season would render it impossible to occupy trenches or a camp in its vicinity, and cause great loss in sickness to the English if they attempted a blockade. Jansens held an intrenched camp, his flanks protected between two rivers, the Sloken and the Batavia river. It was a position resembling that which Scindiah occupied when General Wellesley fought the desperate battle of Assaye. The Batavian river near Cornelis was unfordable, and the banks broken in abrupt acclivities. The Sloken was, with difficulty, fordable, but it was defended by powerful batteries and redoubts. There was a strong redoubt on the British side of the river to protect the only bridge left standing. Between the two rivers the trenches were protected by formidable redoubts, and the inequality of the ground concealed the strength of the defences, and gave the defenders opportunity to manœuvre against any assailants, whatever quarter the attack came from. The camp, both in front and rear, was protected similarly, both by art and nature. The circumference of the lines was nearly five miles, and was mounted by 280 pieces of cannon. Seldom had the English in all their daring assaults on strong places, a position presented to their attack more undesirable.

On the night of the 20th of August, the English began regular approaches, and as the works progressed, a heavy battering train was mounted. The main attack was upon the *tête du pont*. Having battered the redoubt, and considerably weakened the enemy's fire, the moment for the assault arrived. Colonel Gillespie took the command. He was the same officer who (related in our account of the Goorkha campaign), as Major-general Sir

R. R. Gillespie, was killed on the 31st of October, 1814, at Kalunga, in Nepal. He had some dismounted dragoons, the body-guard, and a body of marines; besides the grenadier and light and rifle companies of the 14th, 59th, 69th, and 78th regiments, and grenadiers of 5th and 6th volunteers, Madras pioneers. Lieutenant-colonel Macleod and Major Tule were ordered to advance, the first named against a redoubt in the angle of the enemy's front and left, the other upon the bridge leading to the rear.

On the night of the 26th of August, the English began their formidable task. Gillespie led his men on in silence; at dawn the enemy's videttes perceived him: the British, as commanded, abstained from firing a shot, but rushed upon the pickets with the bayonet, nearly all of whom perished, and the advance redoubt was carried nearly as soon as the alarm was given. The promptitude, celerity, and discipline of the English gave effect to valour, and this first step of their progress was accomplished without loss. The 78th regiment, without entering the redoubt, carried the bridge over the Sloken. Gillespie crossed with them, and without firing a shot dashed at once against the redoubt within the lines, which also commanded the passage of the bridge. Each of these redoubts had twenty eighteen-pounder guns, besides several of twenty-four and of thirty-two pounds. Colonel Gibbs, who was guided to the scene of action by the enemy's fire, crossed the bridge after Gillespie, and while that officer stormed the redoubt to the left, Gibbs turned to the right, where another redoubt was also in a position to command the bridge; he at once stormed it, relying solely on the bayonet. When the bulwark was conquered, a Dutch officer set fire to the magazine, which blew up, causing terrible havoc and destruction. The devoted man who thus sacrificed his own life to what he considered the honour and interests of his country, inflicted by his suicidal act severe loss upon his enemies. The grenadier companies (there were two on the occasion) of his majesty's 14th regiment were blown up. Many other English soldiers perished. Contrary to the intentions of the Dutch officer, his act also slew many of his own countrymen. The magazine was fired before the Dutch and French could make good their retreat. By these events a way into the intrenched camp was conquered, and the English poured over the bridge impetuously, spreading in every direction most likely to make their conquest sure. Cornelis was entered, and the enemy driven out. The whole of this work was performed in the dim grey

light of early dawn, but by the time it was accomplished the sun was above the horizon, and both armies were presented to one another in full view. The enemy was dispersed, broken, or bayoneted in the redoubts and trenches. The English were mustering in order, undisputed victors of the position. The enemy had strong reserves which had made no effort to save the place; these were drawn up on a plain in front of the barracks and lesser fort, protected by its guns. There were several battalions of infantry, a considerable body of cavalry, heavy guns in position, and twenty pieces of horse artillery in line. There appeared a prospect of a new and fierce engagement. His majesty's 59th regiment at once advanced, and the enemy shamefully gave way. The 59th entered and captured the fort, while Colonel Gillespie, coming up with the dragoons and horse artillery, the retreat of the enemy broke into a disgraceful flight. For ten miles Gillespie maintained the pursuit, pouring grape into the flying masses, and passing between the different bodies with his cavalry, cut them up, unless as their cries for mercy stayed the hands which wielded the British sabres. Six thousand were thus spared; a regiment of French voltigeurs, fresh from France, laid down their arms. The number slain was not computed; at all events, no correct reports remain to attest it. The English lost eighty-five officers killed and wounded, and eight hundred men. There were besides, seventy-three seamen and marines numbered among the British who fell. General Jansen escaped with a small body of his light cavalry to the eastern coast. A squadron of frigates, with extra detachments of marines, were sent to Cheribon, the place surrendered to Colonel Wood.

While Sir S. Auchmuty went in pursuit of Jansens, a naval expedition was directed against the Island of Madura, off the north-east coast of Java; it was captured. Jansens collected a force of native cavalry at Jater, six miles from Samarang. Auchmuty landed at Samarang, from which the inhabitants fled. He went at once in quest of the enemy's camp, which was drawn up on a range of hills, difficult of access, their steep slopes presenting a surface of sharp and broken crags. The occupants of the camp were chiefly natives, and numbered about eight thousand men, with twenty guns in position. Auchmuty's force was one thousand strong, a very excellently formed body, all Europeans, engineers, sappers and miners, artillery, &c., being in proportion to the companies of the line. He had a strong detachment of pioneers, and six light field-pieces. The summit of the

range was level and grassy, fit for cavalry, of which the native army was composed. There were also slopes by which the troopers could ascend or descend along the opposite sides with ease. As soon as Auchmuty's pioneers began their work, the troopers took to flight, leaving the guns behind them, which, with the exception of occupying the field, was the only honour or advantage won by General Auchmuty. General Jansens shortly after surrendered the island to Great Britain, and the troops yet in arms as prisoners of war.

The conquest of Java and the Molucces led to the promotion of Lord Minto in the peerage; he was made an earl. Mr. Raffles was knighted, and made "lieutenant-governor of Java and its dependencies." Colonel Gillespie obtained the command of the troops. This officer manifested a strangely hostile feeling to Sir Stamford Raffles. He could regard no subject in the same light as the governor. The latter was a statesman, a scholar, and a philosopher, and Colonel Gillespie was unable to apprehend the extent or depth of the governor's views. The colonel desired to occupy Java with numerous forces; the governor believed it unnecessary, and insisted upon economy in the new government. Gillespie resented this, and brought so many and such serious charges against his excellency, that it became necessary for the governor-general of India to institute an official inquiry, which issued in the honourable acquittal of Raffles from all the impeachments so petulantly brought against him. The commander-in-chief was displaced.

While yet Colonel Gillespie continued in command, his services were actively demanded in various ways to preserve in order the territory which he had so gallantly done his part to conquer. The French and Dutch stirred up the natives against the English by all sorts of misrepresentations. The Sultan of Yadtryakaita proclaimed war against the invaders. Gillespie attacked his capital, and carried it by storm. The sultan himself was taken prisoner and exiled to Penang. His son was placed by the English on the vacant throne. The capture of Yadtryakaita appalled the young sultan, and made him submissive to the English. It had been defended by one hundred thousand men, who showed much courage, but their weapons and discipline were so inferior, that they were unable to defend the place even against a few thousand Europeans.

On the north-east coast of Sumatra, the Sultan of Palembang defied the power of the English. Gillespie sailed from Java, in March, 1812, and the sultan fled without striking a blow for his independence. The English

commander dethroned him, and placed his brother on the throne. The expedition was taken, because the sultan had entered into an engagement with the Dutch, refused subsequently to revoke it, and bound himself not to admit them or the French to his dominions. The position in which the English then were positively demanded the adoption of a policy, towards the neighbouring sultans, of treating all as enemies who were not allies: otherwise the French and Dutch would form points of support on the different islands, and endanger the British possessions. Batavia had too long proved a source of peril to English commerce in the Eastern seas, for the English quietly to allow French or Dutch, when vanquished in one place, to create a position of power in another.

On the 18th of May, Colonel Gillespie left Sumatra for Banca, of which place he took possession. Java remained in the quiet possession of the British until 1815, when a circumstance occurred which created considerable alarm. The native officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of a Bengal light infantry battalion conspired, in October, with some other sepoys and their officers, to murder all Europeans upon whom they could lay their hands, and desert, or, subverting the constituted authorities, join the natives of Java in effecting a revolution. The cause of this atrocious conspiracy lay as usual in a breach of faith committed by the government. The conspirators were volunteers, who, contrary to the prejudices of their caste and nation, freely offered to join the expedition to Java, on condition of being restored to their country at the expiration of the third year of service. The government was very glad to make the bargain, but the English officials had no concern about keeping it. It was scandalously and tyrannously violated. The sepoys, despairing of all hope of again seeing their country, and smarting under a sense of wrong, gave way to the vindictive passions which characterise the Bengalees, and the hatred of Europeans and Christians, which is as strongly characteristic of them, and formed the sanguinary purpose, which, had it not been timely discovered, would have been ruthlessly executed. It is remarkable how the sepoy has ever proved himself the same sanguinary monster, whether at Vellore, or Java, or Cawnpore. It is equally remarkable that after such decided proofs of their readiness, men and officers, to assassinate their comrades and defenceless Europeans, upon any provocation from the government, that both the government and British officers continued to trust them, until the mutiny of 1857, and the horrid butcheries

of Cawnpore. Some of the criminals of Java were executed, the rest were drafted into battalions returning home. A sanguinary outrage was in truth the shortest way to obtain justice, when the soldier in India was robbed or wronged by his superiors.

In 1816, Java was given up to Holland. The overthrow of Napoleon Buonaparte in the campaign of 1813, led to general rearrangements among the European governments, all of whom showed jealousy of England, upon whom the brunt of the war fell in the coalition against France. The ministers of England were deficient in intelligence, patriotism, and diplomatic talent. They were far more solicitous to prop up the despotisms of continental Europe, to flatter, and to caress them, than they were to secure the commercial advantage and national honour of the United Kingdom. The authorities in India made strong representations against the surrender of Java. The East India Company was anxious for its retention. Sir Stamford Raffles pointed out, in an able despatch, the vast resources of that island, as one of the richest and most fertile places on the globe. He showed that the time must come when a mighty trade would be carried on through the Straits with China, and that whatever European power or powers would possess the islands of the Eastern Archipelago could command that trade. The despatch of the eminent statesmen, the lieutenant-governor of Java, was not even read by the minister of the day: and other important despatches were at the same time treated with similar insolent contempt, or culpable neglect. The grand object with the ministry was the upholding and extension of despotic government everywhere. The opposition were influenced in their arguments, and perhaps in their motives, by party. When Java was conquered, Sheridan, who knew nothing of the subject, and who, except for party purposes, seldom paid attention to any matter of public interest, derided the conquest as not worth the expense incurred. The object of the eloquent declaimer was to damage the ministry; he took no trouble to ascertain the truth. The object of the English ministry was to satisfy the Holy Alliance: English commerce, and the interests of the English people, were secondary objects. No surrender of territory was ever made by the English more impolitic. The abandonment of Borneo at a later period, although a most injurious step to English interests, and in spite of the expressed will of the bankers, merchants, and manufacturers of England, as well as the merchants of Singapore and India, was not so purblind as the surrender of Java. In 1814 when England agreed to surrender

Java to the Dutch, the revenue of the island was more than half a million sterling. The government of Holland was so occupied by the return of Napoleon from Elba, and the campaign in Belgium and France in 1815,

that it was unable to take advantage of the cession made by "its generous ally." It was not therefore until the end of 1816, that the Dutch flag again floated over the queen of the eastern isles.

CHAPTER CVI.

HOME EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE EAST INDIA COMPANY FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE RENEWAL OF THE CHARTER IN 1833-4.

THE century opened as to the home affairs of the company with a grave discussion concerning "the shipping interest." The company's ships were the finest merchantmen in the world; capable of coping in battle with the martial navies of other countries, even with those of Holland, France, and Spain. The peculiar manner in which these ships were held as property, by persons holding votes in the proprietary, gave a distinct preponderance of this particular interest over other separate interests in connection with the company. The result was a monopoly which proved injurious to the company and the country, which was offensive in England as in India, and objected to by the parliament and the board of control. The measures of the Marquis Wellesley in India, in taking up Indian-built ships to carry freights to England, shook the monopoly, and led to a fierce opposition on the part of the proprietary to the encroachments of the crown. After a contest, the details of which would afford no interest to the reader in these days, the crown triumphed. The circumstance is important, as it was the beginning of successive encroachments upon the exclusive privileges of the company, which rapidly succeeded in the course of the present century, until the East India Company ceased to be a trading society. The disputes with the shipping interest were not concluded, when new differences arose between the company and the board of control, about "the private trade." M. Anber, commenting upon this quarrel, wisely observed, "A combination of circumstances frequently gave rise to feelings that never would have existed had the causes which produced them been disposed of as they arose." At the close of 1802, M. Bosanquet, being chairman of the court of directors, and Lord Castlereagh president of the board of control, there was more harmony than usual between the two branches of Indian government. Still there arose discussions upon finance that were vexatious. The company possessing the exclusive trade of India and China, the English public

and parliament were unwilling to render any aid to the company towards bearing the expenses of the great wars carried on in India. Besides it was alleged that the conquered territory should pay the expense of the conquest. Yet, whatever might be the ultimate relation of the revenues of the new territory to the expense incurred in obtaining them, they seldom repaid it for many years. Most of the wars in the East with European powers have been, through the whole period of British connection, initiated by the board of control, or by the governors-general, who were its nominees and in secret correspondence with its chief. These wars were frequently opposed to the policy and directions of the company. The board was exacting upon the directors. The directors complained that their profits were swallowed up by the expenses of a policy adverse to their interests and their wishes, and entirely the work of the government. Frequently, when it appeared to the world as if the company and the board were of one mind, the former was obliged to submit to the latter, under threats of bringing their differences before parliament, and overthrowing their monopoly by an appeal to the principles of one class and the prejudices of other classes of the British people. In fact the company was in continual danger of having their ships, stores, and funds employed for the advantage of the general public, under the orders of the secret committee of the board of control, or under the direct and arbitrary orders of the crown. Whenever the company requested the reimbursement of the immense property thus squandered by the state at their expense, their accounts were disputed, or they were told that the public exchequer would not allow of the repayment. Hints and threats were generally added, that if they made any noise about the matter, the parliament and public would be appealed to against the monopoly. From the time the company was rich enough to become an object of plunder, the crown and parliament were ever ready iniquitously to deprive it of its property, under

threats, if it did not submit, of destroying its privileges. Among the most blunt and uncourteous of the company's tyrants at the board of control was Lord Castlereagh. The mild but severely just remonstrances of the company's chairman, Mr. Bosanquet, in 1803, rebuked the officious and unprincipled statesman, with a dignity and power which any other minister but his lordship would have felt.

The directors in 1803, as indeed at all times, wrote to the governor-general, urging economy and the liquidation of the debt. The governor-general urged that money should be sent from England for the investments. Lord Wellesley, and all other governor-generals appointed by the board of control, treated Indian finance as if the East India Company was an association conveniently existing for the purpose of providing England with funds to make war in the East against other European nations, offensive or defensive, as the case might be, and for adding to the glory of England by Asiatic conquests. Clive, Hastings, Barlow—in a word, the company's own servants, when invested with supreme power, acted as if the object of their government was to consider and to promote the interests of a great commercial association, called the East India Company, which they were bound to serve as their employers. In their conquests, while they were patriotic and jealous for the renown of England, they regarded battle and victory as a part of their business as agents of the company. Under the board of control, the governor-general was a leading member of the aristocracy, appointed for party purposes, as a reward for home services, rather than his fitness for India; and he acted as if his main business was to fulfil his period of office in such a manner as would redound to his own glory, prove the cabinet which nominated him wise in their nomination, and assist in keeping up, or creating, a parliamentary majority for his party. The company, which created the English interest in India by its own resources and at its own risk, has been generally treated as a troublesome appendage to the board of control, interfering with the patronage of the president, the cabinet, and the governor-general. The double government never worked well, not because it was a double government, as was supposed by many, but because the objects of the two governing bodies were opposed. Either the board of control should have been so constituted as to be a check, in the interest of the nation, upon the improper exercise of the privileges entrusted to the company, or the company should have been abolished when the board was formed. The president of that

board aimed at objects altogether alien to the privileges and existence of the company, and in the interest, not of the nation, but of a dominant party of the crown, and of the ministry of the time being.

In the beginning of 1804, the directors were alarmed at the drain of specie caused by the wars of the Marquis Wellesley. Lord Castlereagh encouraged the marquis in disregarding the opinions of the directors, who, whenever they complained of the expenses caused by wars, were set at naught by the joint action of the person at the head of the board at home, and the person at the head of the council abroad. While war was raging, and the directors dreaded bankruptcy, the board of control was engaged in costly plans connected with the Calcutta college and other projects.

In 1805 the policy of Lord Wellesley was impugned with great severity in the house of commons by Paull. This gentleman had been a servant of the company, and resident in Oude. In that situation he received much kindness from Lord Wellesley, which he repaid with ingratitude. The dissolution of parliament in 1807 stopped Mr. Paull's proceedings. This gentleman did not again obtain a seat in parliament. He committed suicide in 1808.

Lord Folkestone took up the impeachment of Lord Wellesley. He was aided by a considerable number of members, but their inculpatory resolutions were rejected by large majorities. Still his lordship's transactions in Oude were regarded as precisely similar to those of Hastings, and it was demanded that his aristocratic connexions should not screen him. The whole of these discussions were set at rest by a resolution, asserting his personal honour, public zeal, and usefulness, being proposed by Sir John Anstruther, which was carried by an overwhelming majority. This did not satisfy the directors of the East India Company, who persisted in regarding the policy of Lord Wellesley as one of aggrandizement and war, injurious to the trade and ruinous to the finance of the company. They believed that neither the war with Tippoo nor the Mahrattas was necessary, that both should have been allowed to pursue their course of intrigue in their own way, the governor-general simply providing for the security of the company's territories in case of invasion.

Throughout these proceedings in the commons, the noble marquis received the support of the crown and the cabinet. He was even offered the seals of the foreign office during the progress of the parliamentary proceedings. His lordship, with a high sense of honour, such as all who knew him would have expected, declined office while charges were hanging over him.

In 1809 he was deputed ambassador to the junta in Spain; in 1810, he was invested with the Order of the Garter, and throughout his long career held many offices of distinction, and always with honour.

When Lord Cornwallis assumed the government of India, his first care was that most usually the trouble of all governor-generals—*finance*. He was very popular with the directors; they were therefore filled with astonishment and alarm when they learned that he had taken treasure intended for the Chinese investment out of the ships at Madras, to the amount of a quarter of a million sterling. When, in February, 1806, intelligence of his lordship's death reached England, the directors received it with the deepest concern. Apart from the personal esteem which they entertained for him, he had initiated a policy of retrenchment to make up for the quarter of a million sterling, and to compensate for the war policy of his predecessor. So attached were the directors to his lordship, and so highly did they approve of his plans, that they bestowed upon his son and successor the sum of £40,000.

On the 20th of January, 1806, Mr. Pitt died, a man whose policy had exercised a decisive influence upon the affairs of the company. But for him it is probable the board of control had never been formed.

A fierce contest ensued between the board of control and the court of directors in naming a successor to Lord Cornwallis. It was agreed on all hands that Sir George Barlow should occupy that post temporarily, but the board wished to force upon the directors Lord Lauderdale; the directors contended that Sir G. Barlow, their own servant, was competent. They knew nothing of Lord Lauderdale, had no confidence in him, and would not be parties to his appointment. The court refused to revoke the appointment of Sir George. Lord Minto had succeeded Lord Castlereagh as president of the board of control, and he intimated to the directors, on the 29th of May, that the king had revoked the appointment of Sir G. Barlow. The court of directors presented an indignant remonstrance. As a compromise, Lord Minto himself was appointed. The whole proceeding was discreditable to the crown and the cabinet. Whatever the merits of Lord Minto ultimately proved to be, Sir G. Barlow was competent, and there was no ground for his removal, but the desire on the part of the ruling party in the state to wrest the patronage from the company, and make the office of governor-general of India an appointment dependent upon the services rendered in English party politics by the person obtaining it.

This mode of disposing of the high office of governor-general of India was as strikingly illustrated by the way in which Lord Minto himself was replaced by the Earl of Moira (Marquis of Hastings). Professor Wilson states, that on the change of ministry in November, 1811, the ministry were obliged by circumstances to confer the office on Lord Moira. His lordship had been engaged to form a ministry, and this was to be his reward.

"A resolution was accordingly moved by the chairman (of the court of directors), under the dictation, no doubt, of the board of control, that Lord Minto should be recalled. No reason for the measure was assigned; but it was adopted in opposition to the tenor of a letter received from Lord Minto's friends, expressing his wish to be relieved in January, 1814. This letter was assigned as the reason for the immediate appointment of Earl Moira; but, as objected by one of the opponents of the arrangement, Mr. Charles Grant, the plea was delusive, as no one could pretend to assign it as a sufficient reason for proceeding to the choice of a governor-general in November, 1811, whose presence at Fort William could only be necessary in January, 1814."

In the years 1813-14, the amount of the debt of India was £27,000,000; the interest, £1,636,000, a permanent diminution of £592,000 annual interest. But taking the sicca rupee at two shillings, the debt would be only £23,183,000, and the interest only £1,402,287.

The year 1813 was one of great importance to the East India Company. It was then the first great inroad was made in its exclusive privileges. From the beginning of 1811 a very warm discussion was maintained by the mercantile public, and by political economists, with "the East India interest." A very considerable power was brought to bear upon the members of both houses of parliament against the renewal of the company's charter.

On the 22nd of February a petition was presented to parliament by the company praying for a renewal of the charter, and setting forth the grounds upon which such prayer was urged.

On the 13th of March the house of commons, on the motion of Lord Castlereagh, resolved itself into a committee, when his lordship submitted resolutions altering the constitution of the company. The company demanded permission to give evidence, and to be heard at the bar of the house. On the 30th of March their first witness was produced, no less a person than the great Warren Hastings. Afterwards the subject was con-

sidered by select committees, and the results published in two large quarto volumes.* The minister was not moved by any evidence submitted by the company: neither was the commons. They passed the resolutions of Lord Castlereagh, and a bill founded on them. The lords hastily passed it.†

In the chapter on the government of India, notice was taken of the various changes made in the power and authority of the company by successive acts of parliament. It is therefore unnecessary in this place to enlarge upon the subject of the changes in 1813. The following abstract of the modifications then made is, however, necessary to enable the reader to take a comprehensive view of the new condition of the company, and the way in which the affairs of India were influenced by them:—

“The trade of India was thrown open in ships of a given tonnage, under license from the court of directors, on whose refusal an appeal lay to the board, to whom the directors were to transmit the papers with their resolution thereon. The resort of parties to India for commercial and other purposes was placed under similar provisions.

“In order to satisfy the doubts which had arisen regarding the outturn of the company's commercial affairs, the accounts were, in future, to be separated, under the two heads of ‘territory’ and ‘commerce,’ according to a plan approved by parliament. It exhibited what portion of the extensive establishments, both in India and at home, came under each head of charge, and showed the result of the company's financial resources, whether arising from commerce or territory.

“A general authority was given to the board over the appropriation of the territorial revenues, and the surplus commercial profits, which might accrue after a strict observance of the appropriation clauses.

“The board were to have control over the college and seminary in England. The offices of governor-general, governors, and commanders-in-chief, were now made subject to the approval of the crown. Restoration of suspended or dismissed servants was not valid without the consent of the board; neither could the court of directors grant any sum beyond £600 without their concurrence.

“An episcopal establishment was also authorised.”

The revenue measures of the Marquis Hastings occupied the attention of the court of directors during several years, beginning in 1816. His reports on criminal justice and

civil judicature made in 1818, also engaged much of the attention of the directors.

In 1819 the directors were so pleased with the labours and successes, civil and military, of the Marquis of Hastings, that they recommended the court of proprietors to vote a sum of £60,000 out of the territorial revenues of India, to purchase estates in any part of the United Kingdom for his lordship's emolument.

From the year 1819 until the termination of the government of Lord Hastings, disputes were maintained between the British and Dutch governments concerning Eastern affairs. The occupation of Singapore, where Sir Stamford Raffles had asserted British authority, provoked the jealous susceptibilities of the Dutch, who, after the surrender to them of the Island of Java, laid claim to a monopoly of the trade of the Archipelago. Mr. Canning was then president of the board of control, and he spared no pains to qualify himself to meet the Dutch commissioners, who were appointed to press upon the English government an adjustment of the dispute. For five years these debates continued, frequent reference to India necessarily deferring a settlement. At last, in 1824, a treaty terminated the contest. By this agreement the Dutch were to surrender to the English all their settlements in continental India; Malacca, and Singapore, were to be recognised as English settlements. The Dutch were to obtain Sumatra. Great public dissatisfaction was felt by the British mercantile public with this treaty. To the influence of Sir Stamford Raffles it was due, that the English minister who in 1814 had surrendered Java, did not surrender all the Straits' settlements. Lord Castlereagh cared little for commerce, or the commercial classes; his aim was to satisfy the despotic governments of the continent, and maintain an intimate alliance with them. His successors for many years were as little disposed to study the interests of the mercantile classes.

Sir Evan Nepean having resigned the government of Bombay in 1818, Mr. Canning intimated to the directors his desire to appoint as governor of that presidency some eminent servant of the company, or distinguished otherwise in public employment. This was an invasion by Mr. Canning of the custom of the board of control in grasping at the patronage of India for party and ministerial purposes. The directors made choice of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.* He was nominated governor of Bombay in October, 1818.

In 1823 the Marquis of Hastings was re-

* *Reports of the East India Committees*, 1813-14.

† 53 George III., cap. 155.

* Subsequently this gentleman acquired great celebrity by his work on India, especially the Mohammedan period of Indian history.

ceived, upon his return to England, with distinguished manifestation of approval by the government and the company. It was resolved by the latter to confer upon him some further substantial mark of their approbation. This consisted in a vote of £20,000 to his son, which, however, was not conferred until 1827.

When, in 1822, the Marquis Hastings resigned the office of governor-general, the Right Hon. George Canning was nominated to that office. This was the spontaneous act of the directors, in consequence of Mr. Canning's intelligent and conciliatory direction of the board of control. This arrangement was, however, doomed to disappointment, for the death of the Marquis of Londonderry (Lord Castlereagh) led to a reconstruction of parties, and of the ministry, and on the 18th of September, Mr. Canning accepted the seals of the foreign office.

In 1819 Sir Thomas Munro was appointed governor of Madras, and it was generally expected that, upon the resignation of Mr. Canning, he would be promoted to the vacated office. Two other candidates of greater influence, however, stood forward, Earl Amherst, and Lord W. Bentinck. The interest of the former nobleman prevailed. He assumed the office on the 1st of August, 1823. Mr. Adam, the senior member of council, had filled the chair from the departure of the Marquis of Hastings.

For several years after the departure of Earl Amherst to his government, the company and parliament had little to occupy them concerning India of a nature to interest the general public, except returning thanks for victories gained by British troops in fresh wars, and the distribution of prize-money won by their exploits.

In 1827 the company was deprived of a valuable servant, by the death of Sir Thomas Munro. He had rendered great advantages to the presidency of Madras by his improvements in the judicial and revenue systems, and possessed the highest confidence of the court of directors and proprietary. His opinions on Indian affairs are quoted as decisive authority, yet few men of eminence in India, and of equal ability and experience, have more frequently erred in their views of the probable prospects of the people and the country. The directors found it a difficult task to select a suitable successor to Sir Thomas Munro. Their choice fell upon the Right Hon. S. R. Lushington, Jan. 1827. On the same day, Major-general Sir John Malcolm was appointed governor of Bombay, in the room of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.* Nei-

ther Mr. Lushington nor General Malcolm left England for India until the July following the date of their nomination to office. The year which witnessed the appointment of Mr. Lushington and Sir John Malcolm to the government of the minor presidencies, saw the departure of Lord Amherst from India, and the appointment of Lord W. Bentinck as governor-general. He did not, however, leave England for his post of honour until February, 1828. He and Lord Amherst met at the Cape of Good Hope.

The uneasiness of the court of directors during 1828-9, concerning the increase of the public debt in India, was very great. From 1824 to 1828 it had increased more than thirteen millions sterling, in consequence of war, and the acquisitions of territory causing the extension of the civil service. The revenues of the company did not keep pace with this accumulation of debt. The instructions of the board of directors to the governor-general to effect retrenchment assumed a tone of great urgency.

In 1830 the proposition for constituting a legislative council occupied the government in Calcutta, and in London. In the month of October in that year the draft of a proposed bill was sent to the court of directors by the governor-general, for the purpose of being submitted to parliament. This draft underwent modifications, after much discussion at the board of control and the court of directors, and finally formed a part of the new act upon the renewal of the company's charter, in 1833.

In the month of May, 1833, Lord William Bentinck was appointed commander-in-chief in India, in the room of Sir Edward Barnes. This was the third instance of a governor-general being at the same time commander-in-chief. During the whole time of Lord William Bentinck's government, the correspondence between the company and the governor-general on the subject of revenue was constant. The revenue papers of this period are most voluminous, and disclose the labour and ability of his lordship, and the diligence and talent which were then in the court of directors.

The employment of natives in various departments of the state was strenuously advocated by Lord William Bentinck, and perhaps too readily acquiesced in to the extent of his recommendations by the directors. Native agents must be employed in India, but they constitute the grand difficulty of administration. Evils, for which the government of the presidencies, the supreme council, the board of control, and the court of directors, have been held severally or together responsible,

* This enlightened historian, diplomatist, statesman, and administrator survives in 1859.

have originated in the native agencies, which are almost always corrupt, mercenary, cruel, and perfidious.

During the government of Lord William Bentinck, the home authorities were much occupied with the consideration of the dilatory modes of communication between India and England. Except in certain instructions regulating the personal conduct of the governor-general, little was done to remedy an inconvenience intensely felt. The subject of steam navigation, as applied to India, had been brought under the notice of the court in 1823 by a despatch from the government of Bombay, but in the meantime nothing had been effected. In the year 1825, the voyage to India by steam had been accomplished in the ship *Enterprise*, commanded by Captain Johnson. She was, however, under sail without steam a fourth of her voyage. This ship, with other steamers, had been employed in the Birmese war, yet no organized method of utilizing steam, for the benefit of our Indian empire, and English communication with it, had been adopted. The enterprising labours of Mr. Waghorn, in order to establish steam navigation *vid* Egypt, engaged the attention of the English in India and in England during a considerable portion of Lord William Bentinck's administration. It was not until 1834 that the subject was thoroughly taken up by the house of commons. It was deemed expedient to extend the line of the Malta packets to such ports in Egypt and Syria as would complete the communication between England and India, and that a grant of £20,000 should be made by parliament for trying the experiment with the least possible delay. The enterprises of Colonel (General) Chesney in proving that the Euphrates was navigable, and that its navigation might be made to facilitate the intercommunication of the East and West, also engaged parliamentary discussion.

The dreadful bankruptcies of commercial houses in Calcutta, and other parts of India, in 1833-4, produced great alarm in London, and in several respects embarrassed the court of directors. In the commercial chapters of this work an account was given of this state of things in India, and the causes which produced it.

In a former chapter a history of the different charters was presented to the reader, rendering it unnecessary in this place to enter into minute detail. The affairs of the company, however, assumed in 1833-4 an aspect so entirely new as to require a relation of their progress. On Thursday, the 13th of June, 1833, Mr. Grant, in a committee of the whole house, brought before the commons the consideration of the charter. He made a general

statement on behalf of the government, and proposed a series of resolutions. The statement partly conveyed the purposes of the government, and partly the opinions upon which their project was based. The following, stripped of the arguments and eloquence of the speaker, is an abstract of his statement:—"The whole of the transaction was to be entirely free from the finances of this country. The ability of the Indian territories was not to be doubted. The intentions with regard to the internal government of India were then pointed out. It was proposed to establish a fourth government in the western provinces; to extend the powers of the governor-general; to appoint a supreme council, to whom power was to be given to make laws for India, and to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court. The presidencies of Madras and Bombay were to be made more subordinate to the governor-general, and their councils reduced. The following resolutions were then moved:—

"1st. That it is expedient that all his majesty's subjects shall be at liberty to repair to the ports of the empire of China, and to trade in tea and in all other productions of the said empire, subject to such regulations as parliament shall enact for the protection of the commercial and political interests of this country.

"2nd. That it is expedient that, in case the East India Company shall transfer to the crown, on behalf of the Indian territory, all assets and claims of every description belonging to the said company, the crown, on behalf of the Indian territory, shall take on itself all the obligations of the said company, of whatever description; and that the said company shall receive from the revenues of the said territory such a sum, and paid in such a manner, and under such regulations, as parliament shall enact.

"3rd. That it is expedient that the government of the British possessions in India be entrusted to the said company, under such conditions and regulations as parliament shall enact, for the purpose of extending the commerce of this country, and of securing the good government, and promoting the moral and religious improvement of the people of India."

These resolutions, and the bill founded upon them, a copy of which was sent to the directors on the 29th of June, led to much discussion between the company and the ministers of the crown. On the 3rd of July the bill was laid before the court of proprietors, having been presented to parliament and read a first time on the 28th of June. The second reading of the bill took place in the

commons on the 11th of July, and a third time on the 25th. The bill went up to the lords with such powerful support that it rapidly passed that house, being read a third time on the 16th of August. On the 28th, the royal assent was given to it by commission. The rapidity with which the bill was carried, was thought as extraordinary as the change which it effected in the character of the company.

M. Anber makes the following comment upon the parliamentary success with which the government measure was crowned, and the policy of the East India Company in reference to a bill which deprived it of so much of its authority and privilege:—"The change which it has made in the character of the company is as great as the rapidity with which it was effected was extraordinary. Scarcely six weeks intervened between the announcement of the scheme to the general court and its adoption in principle by a ballot of eight to one in its favour. It was a strong testimony to the judgment and foresight manifested by the court of directors in the management of the company's commercial affairs, that, on so sudden and unexpected a termination of those operations, the financial

out-turn should have secured a continuation of the same rate of dividend as had been enjoyed by the stockholders for the preceding forty years, when the company were in possession of their exclusive privileges, and also provide for the foundation of an accumulating guarantee fund for their principal of twelve millions."

The commercial character of the company was now at an end. From 1813 to 1834 it existed in a restricted form; in April, 1834, it ceased for ever. Its title of "East India Company," and its territorial lordship, remained. All the commercial property of the company was sold. Their *real* capital was estimated at twenty-one millions sterling. Their dividends were guaranteed by the act of 1833, on a nominal capital of six millions, at 10½ per cent. These dividends were made chargeable on the revenue of India. Although subsequent events did not confirm such expectations, the charter of 1833-4 ostensibly threw open India to British adventurers, and natives and settlers were eligible to office. How the new charter worked, and its effects upon affairs, home or Indian, must be reserved for other chapters.

CHAPTER CVII.

GOVERNMENT OF LORD AMHERST—BIRMESE WAR—CAPTURE OF RANGOON—ADVANCE UP THE IRRRAWADDY—OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF BENGAL—TREATY WITH BURMAH.

LORD HASTINGS left Calcutta in January, 1823, and Mr. Adams, as senior member of council, assumed the government *pro tempore*. That gentleman only retained the high office seven months, during which he obtained much odium and much praise. Some of his measures were well calculated to confer benefit on India; others, although well meant, were not fortunate, and some were very unfavourably received. None of them were of sufficient importance to bring before our readers. That which involved Mr. Adams's administration in most discussion at home, was his attempt to impose restrictions upon the press, which the Marquis of Hastings had removed. Mr. Adams believed that the natives who possessed some education, would use the press seditiously, and that European settlers would employ it to the detriment of the company. It was explained in the last chapter how Mr. Canning was elected to the post vacated by Lord Hastings, and resigned the

office before sailing for India. It was also shown how Lord Amherst secured the interest requisite for an appointment, which began to be regarded as desirable by the highest of the aristocracy. When, on the 1st of August, 1823, Earl Amherst arrived, he found serious cares remaining for the government. There was nothing in the first few months during which he administered affairs to call for remarks from the historian, but he was then obliged to maintain a war with the Burmese, which, as shown in former chapters, had for many years menaced the frontiers of Assam and Arracan. This formidable quarrel was the more an impediment to the civil administration of his lordship, as his government was much opposed by the partizans of Lord Hastings, and he was himself averse from several of the noble marquis's proceedings, especially in the affairs of Calcutta and Bengal. Captain White observes:—"It is almost impossible to imagine the arduous, difficult, and

perplexing situation in which Lord Amherst stood. For besides the important duties he had to perform as governor-general, he had a most formidable opposition to contend against in the council chamber. This was produced by the *change of men*, in the change of governor-generals. Lord Hastings had generally left much to his council, or his favourites, who were men certainly not of the most brilliant talent. Lord Amherst, not wishing to imitate the example of the noble marquis, determined to judge for himself, and not by proxy. There were other causes, too, which tended to create difficulty, and render his lordship unpopular. These were unfortunate circumstances to have happened at any time, but more particularly so at that critical period; because they all tended not only to embarrass the mind of his lordship, which required the utmost tranquillity, but to impede the progress and welfare of the operations of government."

The captain was himself a partizan of Earl Amherst, and some allowance must be made when he draws a comparison invidious to Lord Hastings. It was, however, plain enough that the noble earl inherited from the noble marquis some very troublesome questions, which the friends of the former would have preferred to find in a satisfactory course of settlement.

BIRMESE WAR.

The *immediate* cause of hostilities with Birmah was rival claims concerning the Island of Shuparee, situated at the entrance of the Nauf river. This river was the boundary between the two territories, and, flowing between the island and the Birmese side, the English naturally claimed it as their own. The Birmese contended that it had been theirs centuries before; but if this claim had been good, they might also be the owners of Chittagong and Moorshedabad. The Birmese had made no pretension to this island until 1821, nor did they then urge any alleged right. Their demand, therefore, in 1823 had all the appearance of seeking an occasion for war.

Early in January, 1823, a "Mugh boat," laden with grain, was passing near the island. It was stopped by the Birmese, and the steersman was shot. The object of this was to deter the ryots of the company from cultivating the island, which being a mere sand-bank, was certainly not an enviable possession for either British or Birmese. When the magistrate of Chittagong heard of the cruel outrage, he posted a sergeant's guard of sepoy upon the island. Immediately the Birmese assembled a much stronger force on

their bank of the Nauf. The English magistrate increased the strength of the post to fifty men. Early in May, the Birmese authorities of Arracan made a formal demand to the magistrate of Chittagong to withdraw the troops, or there would be war. Late in May the demand was renewed more sternly, and in language of stronger menace. The magistrate replied that the island had belonged to the British for a lengthened period, but if the King of Ava had a claim, it would be negotiated at Calcutta, in conformity with justice and the friendship of the two nations, but that force would be repelled by force.

On the 3rd of August, a vakeel from the governor of Arracan waited upon the magistrate of Chittagong, and made a written demand for withdrawal from the island, which, it alleged, belonged not to the British, but to the "Golden Government." The governor-general himself replied to this communication, asserting the right of the Bengal government to the island, but offering to send an officer of rank to negotiate, and bring all disputes, if possible, to an amicable termination. The Birmese had no faith in the English government from the repeated violations of pledges in former disputes, they therefore resolved to bring the matter to the arbitrament of force. On the night of the 24th of September, a party of 1000 Birmese landed on the island, attacked and routed the guard of sepoy, killing and wounding several. What Sir John Malcolm had predicted had come to pass, and in consequence of the neglect, on the part of the government of Bengal, of those means which he had recommended. The Birmese did not remain on the island, and as soon as they evacuated it, another party of sepoy was sent there.

The governor-general, anxious to promote peace, treated the attack on the island as one by the governor of Arracan, unauthorised by his imperial majesty of Ava. A letter was sent to Rangoon, by ship from Calcutta, addressed to the viceroy, mildly expostulating against the outrage committed, and expressing the expectation that the act of the governor of Arracan would be disavowed. The governor-general also addressed a letter to the governor of Arracan, expressing his astonishment and indignation. The rajah replied:—"The island was never under the authority of the Moors or the English; the stockade thereon has consequently been destroyed in pursuance of the commands of the great Lord of the Seas and Earth. If you want tranquillity, be quiet; but if you rebuild a stockade at Shein-ma-bu, I will cause to be taken by force of arms the cities of Dacca and Moorshedabad, which originally belonged

to the great Arracan Rajah, whose chokies and pagodas were there. The rajah also verbally informed the messenger dispatched with the letter, that if the British government attempted to retake the island, they would invade Bengal by Assam and Goolpara, and would enter Chittagong by the mountains from Goorjeeneea, up to Tipperah: adding that the King of Ava had armies ready for the invasion of the British dominions at every point; and that they had driven them from the Island of Shuparee by his majesty's command.*

It was evident from this reply, written and *viva voce*, that the Birmese emperor had been long preparing for war, and had laid his plan of operations.

On the 11th of November, the agent to the company on the north-east frontier, announced to the government that a large force had been dispatched from the Birmese province of Assam for the conquest of Cachar; bordering on the company's province of Silhet. The English government had made a tributary convention with Cachar, and in virtue of this demanded that the Birmese troops should make no offensive demonstrations against that state. The Birmese, however, claimed an older prescription for a connection of the same kind. The English, therefore, threatened as they were along the whole line of the north-east frontier,—the Birmese openly avowing their intention to wrest from them Moorsshedabad, Dacca, Tipperah, and Chittagong,—could allow no incursion in that direction by the troops of Birman. On the south-east frontier of Chittagong, large armies were collecting for the purposes of invasion in that quarter. "It was no longer a question for the surrender of fugitives and rebels, but a far more important one—who should be the supreme sovereigns of India."

In January, 1824, the sepoys were withdrawn from the island at the mouth of the Nauf, in consequence of its unhealthy situation. The Arracan rajah then offered to regard it as neutral territory, but accompanied the proposal with insulting menaces of invasion in case of non-compliance. The governor-general refused to accept a proposal so made.

On the 15th of January four ministers of rank from Ava, arrived on the frontier, crossed to the island, and hoisted the standard of the Birmese empire. The ministers sent invitations to the officers of the company's troops on the frontier to visit them, and to the officers of vessels in the river, in the hope

* *Political History of the Events which led to the Birmese War.*

of accommodating matters by friendly conversation. The officers of the pilot schooner, *Sophia*, attended by two lascars, landed in acceptance of the invitation. They were all seized and sent into the interior of Arracan. The military officers were sufficiently wary not to place themselves in the power of a people who made war so treacherously. This perfidious and violent act of the Birmese emperor's ministers alarmed the people on the Chittagong frontier, who fled with their families, fearing that they might be seized and made slaves. The English government demanded the restoration of the kidnapped officers and lascars, and reparation for the offence. No notice was taken of the demand. The British employed themselves writing and negotiating when they ought to have been acting, and in this way increased the public danger, and caused eventually a heavier loss of human life.

At the end of January, 1824, the Rajah of Arracan formally refused, in the name of the emperor, to deliver up the officers and men of the *Sophia*. Early in the same month Cachar was invaded by two Birmese armies. The English met this demonstration by several well-written letters on the part of their agent, which probably amused more than edified the Birmese commanders; and certainly, after all that had occurred between the two states, was not likely to deter the Birmese officers from executing the commands of their superiors. The general wrote a letter in reply, the substance of which might be comprised in one of its sentences—"We have eyes and ears, and have the interest of our sovereigns at heart."*

The regions of Cachar and Assam were torn by factions, which facts were made available by the Birmese to promote their own designs of aggrandizement. The English resolved to make these local feuds instrumental in checking the Birmese. Accordingly, on the 18th of January, the officer on the frontier, learning that a united Birmese and Assamese force had passed into Cachar, at the foot of the Birtealien pass, and were stockading themselves at Bickram-pore, and that two other forces had penetrated in other directions, resolved also to enter the Cachar country. The first blood drawn was on the 17th, the English fell in with a Birmese stockade, from which a fire was opened upon them. Major Newton, who commanded the British, stormed the blockade in the most gallant manner with trifling loss, and put 175 Birmese to the bayonet. The Birmese army, six thousand in number, advanced within five miles of the company's

* There were two kings or emperors at Ava, the temporal and the ecclesiastical.

territory. Major Newton withdrew his troops to the frontier post of Bhadrapore. The English wrote letters, and sent messengers requesting the Birmese to do what they had so many times declared they would not do. Instead of attending to these epistolary expostulations, they published flaming manifestoes, strongly stockaded themselves on the English frontier, and demanded that Major Newton and his soldiers should be given up to the Birmese authorities to be executed! The English, of course, again replied, and it is difficult to say how long they would have continued to substitute arguments for arms, if events had not compelled a more decisive course. The release of the kidnapped mariners, who had been treated kindly in their captivity, possibly deferred a little the final blow; but it at last fell—the governor-general proclaimed war against the Birmese empire. The justice of his doing so has been arraigned by a party in England who are ever ready to denounce the proceedings of their own government, and more especially in India. The following opinion and statement of facts, from the pen of the immortal Sir Henry Havelock, the saviour of India, is a just defence of the war:—"Previous to this invasion of our little island territory, the question of the direct invasion of Bengal had been discussed in the hall of the Lotoo, or grand council of state, and the king, though a man of mild disposition, and not caring much to encounter a war with the governors of India, had yielded to the arguments of his councillors, and, amidst the applauses of the assembly, had sanctioned the invasion of Bengal. At that grand council the Bundoola, with vows and vehement gestures, announced that from that moment Bengal was taken from under the British dominions; his words being: 'Henceforth it has become in fact, what it has ever been in right, a province of the Golden King. The Bundoola has said and sworn it.'"^{*} It was a war, said Havelock, "for the vindication of the national honour, insulted and compromised by the aggressions and encroachments of a barbarous neighbour. A war for the security of the peaceable inhabitants of the districts of Chittagong, Moorshedabad, Rungpore, Silhet, Tipperah, menaced with the repetition of the atrocities perpetrated the year before in Assam. That would indeed have been a parental government that should have consented to have abandoned its subjects to the tender mercies of Bundoola and the Maha Silwa!"[†]

^{*} *The Good Soldier: A Memoir of Major-general Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B.* By Rev. W. Owen. London.

[†] It is not generally known that "the good soldier,"

The measures taken by the commander-in-chief of the British army were as follows. He recommended three brigades of three thousand men each to be stationed on the eastern frontier, at Chittagong, Jumalpoore, and a flotilla on the Burrampooter towards Assam, and in the vicinity of Dacca. The troops on the frontier were ordered to defend those provinces, and if necessary or politic, to cross into the frontiers of the enemy, but not to seek conquests in those directions. The grand attack was to be made on the maritime provinces of the Birmese empire.

Thus, while the emperor meditated an invasion of the contumacious territory of the British, the latter, barely defending that line, carried war along the coasts of the emperor. The troops to conduct the defensive operations belonged, as a matter of course, to the Bengal army. The forces destined for offensive operations were partly from Bengal, and partly from Madras, royal and company's regiments: from Bengal her majesty's 13th and 38th foot, two companies of artillery, and the 40th native infantry (marine corps), 2175 men; from Madras her majesty's 41st and 89th foot and Madras European regiment, and, including seven native regiments, 9th, 12th, 28th, and 30th Madras native infantry, artillery, and pioneers, 9300 men, or grand total, 11,475 men. The object was to occupy Rangoon, and the country at the mouth of the Irrawaddy river. The Bengal troops sailed in April, 1824. Besides transports, there was

Sir Henry Havelock, was an author. On this subject our readers will peruse with interest the following remarks of the Rev. W. Owen, from his most interesting memoir of the general:—"Havelock had not been long in India before the outbreak of the first Birmese war called into action his qualities as a soldier, and subsequently gave him an opportunity of employing his pen as a 'soldierly writer.' Owing to the publication of his 'Memoir' in Serampore instead of London, and six months after the excitement had died away, the work never acquired the popular favour which its merits should have commanded. The volume has nearly fallen into the class of rare books, and it is said that one copy only can be found in London. This book affords an opportunity of presenting Havelock before the public as the narrator of the various scenes in which his military prowess was first called into exercise. The memoir of the three campaigns of Sir Archibald Campbell's army in Ava, was written when Henry Havelock was a lieutenant in the 13th light infantry, and deputy-adjutant-general to the forces of the Rangoon expedition. The writer, who speaks of this production as his 'first essay in military history,' tells us that he 'was employed on the general staff of the Rangoon expedition; and that he has devoted a very few hours of his leisure of peace to tracing this memorial of the operations of an army, a part of the sufferings of which he shared, and the last successes of which he had the happiness to witness.' Havelock describes this war as one directed 'against barbarians, a struggle against local difficulties, and as excluding the promise of those splendid achievements which illustrate the page of history.'

a flotilla of twenty-gun brigs, and as many row-boats, carrying an eighteen pounder each. There were his majesty's sloops *Larne* and *Sophie*, and several company's cruisers, and the *Diana* steamboat. Major-general Sir A. Campbell, commander-in-chief of the forces; Brigadier-general Macbean commanded the Madras troops. The Bengal troops reached the rendezvous about the end of April (Port Cornwallis in the great Andamans). They were joined by his majesty's frigate *Liffey*, Commodore Grant, and *Slaney*, sloop-of-war. The last Madras division left on the 23rd of May, and joined at Rangoon in June and July. More troops were sent from Madras in August and September; and, by the end of 1824, his majesty's 47th regiment, and the governor-general's body-guard, making the whole force engaged in the first campaign 13,000 men. Captain Canning went as political agent, and joint commissioner with Sir Archibald Campbell.

On the 9th May, 1824, the expedition arrived off the Rangoon river, and the same evening (in nautical phrase), "stood in." Before arriving at Rangoon, detachments were sent to seize the islands of Cheduba and Negrais.* There were various other operations in the neighbourhood of Rangoon, all of them successful, scarcely any opposition having been offered. The approach of the fleet to Rangoon caused the greatest consternation. The account given by Major-general Sir Henry Havelock (as he ultimately became) is graphic and striking:†—"The arrival of the British fleet off the mouth of the Rangoon river filled the court of Ava with consternation, and was immediately followed by some of those demonstrations of rage and cruelty which display the barbarous character of the people against whom the expedition was directed. The subordinate officer left in command of Rangoon immediately directed the seizure of all the English residents in the town, an order which included all 'who wore the English hat.' In consequence of this order the American and English missionaries, the British merchants, the American merchants, and other wearers of the English hat, were seized, loaded with fetters, and thrown into prison. The sufferings to which these persons were exposed, and their subsequent release, depicted by Havelock in vivid colours, correspond in a striking manner with recent exhibitions of Indian cruelty, while their release might be regarded as a sort of promise of future acts of deliverance in which Havelock was to bear a

leading part. The historian tells us that 'they had been dragged from their homes under every circumstance of brutal indignity; their clothes had been torn off, their arms tied behind them with ropes, tightened until they became instruments of torture rather than means of security. They had been followed by the execrations of the populace, whose national barbarity was heightened into frenzy by the terrors of the crisis. They had been loaded with chains. They spent a night of hunger, pain, and agonizing uncertainty. But no sooner had the fleet appeared in sight, than an order from the Rewoon was delivered through the grating of their prison. The prisoners, all of whom were acquainted with the language of the country, listened intently to catch its import. Suspense was converted into despair. The Rewoon had commanded that, if a cannonade should be opened against the town of Rangoon, every prisoner should be put to death. The first gun was to be the signal for their decapitation. Instantly the gaolers commenced their preparations. Some spread over the floor of the Taik-dan a quantity of sand to imbibe the blood of the victims. Others began to sharpen their knives with surprising diligence. Others brandished their weapons with gestures and expressions of sanguinary joy over the heads of the captives. Some seizing them, and baring their necks, applied their fingers to the spine with an air of scientific examination. The Birmans, coerced for ages by dint of tortures and frightful punishments, have acquired a kind of national taste for executions. The imagination cannot picture a situation more dreadful than that of these foreigners placed at the mercy of such fiends. These prisoners, who were subsequently brought still nearer to death, were at length set free by the entry of the British troops.'" The authorities and the inhabitants of Rangoon fled, after opening a feeble cannonade, so that the English entered the place almost unopposed. Both Commodore Grant, who commanded the naval squadron, and Sir Archibald Campbell, the military commander, were of opinion that by the river the forces might proceed to the capital; an opinion combated by the naval and military staff. Neither of the commanders were acquainted with Indian warfare. Sir Archibald had served well in Spain, which did not particularly qualify him for war on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. The army was in fact incapable of going anywhere, by sea or land, in consequence of the defective state of the commissariat—the old deficiency of English armies everywhere. To remain, inadequately supplied with provisions and the place deserted, was almost as difficult as to proceed to

* Official documents.

† The author of this history quotes from the Rev. W. Owen, who has, with indefatigable pains, selected all the salient points of the gallant general's history of this war.

any other place. The army was also numerically too small, had it been supplied with provisions and land transport, for such operations as might bring the war to a speedy close. To secure the discomfiture of the British by famine, the retreating Birmese laid waste the country. Whatever the effect upon the convenience or comfort of the English, starvation was the result to a large portion of the population. The English contrived to obtain provisions by sea, but the pestilential atmosphere of Rangoon affected their health. In proportion as the troops were kept in activity, the malaria affected them less, even although in their operations they were obliged to travel rice swamps, and the marshy lands on the river's banks. Sir Thomas Munro, writing from Madras to Lord Amherst, strenuously urged the advance of General Campbell upon the capital of Ava by the Irrawaddy. But the councils of the English at Calcutta and Madras, as well as at Rangoon, were hampered by the questions of systematic supplies and well organized transport, questions which seem to have embarrassed the administrators, civil and military alike. When at last, by enormous trouble and expense, and after the failure of innumerable contrivances, Sir A. Campbell obtained such supplies and such amount of conveyance as enabled him to move, he left a garrison at Rangoon, composed of native troops with invalid Europeans, and forming the remainder of his force in three divisions, he advanced against the enemy. Previous to this movement, the British had various skirmishes with the enemy, who formed a cordon around Rangoon to hem in the British, and also to prevent the natives seeking any communication with them. In these skirmishes the Birmese fought with far more obstinacy than the sepoys, but their stockades and huts were generally forced and carried by the bayonet, the English soldiery mainly achieving these exploits, the sepoys swelling the numbers, thereby deterring the enemy, and sometimes directing an efficient musketry fire in answer to the ginjals and matchlocks of the Birmese.

When General Campbell commenced his advance, he headed the first division in person, which consisted of only twenty-four hundred men, and was called by way of distinction the land column. The troops composing it were his majesty's 38th, 41st, and 47th, three native battalions, the body-guard, a troop of Bengal horse artillery, and part of the rocket troop. The second division was under Brigadier-general Cotton, consisting of his majesty's 89th, 1st Madras European regiment, two hundred and fifty of the 18th Madras native infantry, foot artillery, and

part of the rocket troop, amounting to only twelve hundred men. The third division, his majesty's 13th and 12th Madras native infantry, with details of artillery, not numbering more than six hundred men. This detachment was under the command of Major Sale.

The plan of proceeding was for the first division to proceed by land to Prome, situated on the Irrawaddy. The division under General Cotton was to proceed by river, forming a junction with General Campbell at Prome, after carrying the enemy's intrenchments at Panlang and Donabew. The river division was to be accompanied by a flotilla of sixty-two gun-boats, under Captain Alexander, R.N. Major Sale's small detachment was to operate by sea, in pursuance of which order it proceeded to Cape Negrais.* Major Sale was directed to proceed against Bassein,† and after clearing the neighbourhood of Birmese troops, to cross the country and join the main body at Henzada, on the Irrawaddy. This little detachment was very successful, landing and destroying the enemy's works, and ascending the Bassein river to the town of that name, from which the enemy retreated, setting it on fire as they retired.

General Cotton's division advanced to Yogan-Chena, where the Rangoon branch separates from the Irrawaddy. The column reached Panlang on the Rangoon river on the 19th of February, and found both banks stockaded. The enemy were without much difficulty shelled out, and as they fled were galled by flights of rockets. A detachment of the Madras native infantry was left as a garrison, and the flotilla proceeded. On the 6th of March they took up a position before Donabew. The works were on the right bank of the river, of great strength, and commanding the whole breadth of the current. "The chief work, a parallelogram of one thousand by seven hundred yards, stood on a bank withdrawn from the bed of the river in the dry season, and rising above it. Two others, one a square of two hundred yards, with a pagoda in the centre, and the other, an irregular work, four hundred yards from it, stood lower down on the river, forming outworks to the principal stockade, commanded and supported by its batteries. All three were constructed of squared beams of timber, provided with platforms, and pierced for cannon; and each had an exterior ditch, the outer edge of which was guarded with sharp-pointed bamboos, and a thick abatis of felled trees and brushwood. One hundred and forty guns of

* Wilson, vol. ix. p. 119.

† Not to be confounded with a place of the same name near Bombay.

various calibre, and a greater number of ginjals, were mounted on the parapets, and the garrison consisted of twelve thousand men, commanded by the most celebrated general in the service of Ava. General Cotton had left his native regiment at Panlang, and part of the Europeans to guard the boats and stores. His whole available force did not, therefore, exceed six hundred bayonets, a force manifestly inadequate to the storming of Donabew.*

General Cotton having unconditional orders to attack, determined to obey them. On the 7th of March he formed two columns, composed together of five hundred men. They advanced against the smaller stockade, under cover of the fire of two field-pieces and a rocket battery. It was an easy conquest. The next attempt was directed against the second intrenchment; two hundred men were ordered against it, but they were overwhelmed with numbers and driven back. The disparity of force rendered the attempt absurd if not criminal. General Cotton was obliged to fall back, and, re-embarking, to drop down the river to Yung-Yung, and await orders from the commander-in-chief.

It was painfully evident that the whole force sent upon the expedition to Rangoon was too small. The government at Calcutta had formed no correct notions of the task to be accomplished, and it does not appear that Sir Thomas Munro, at Madras, had seen matters much more plainly than Lord Amherst. His high reputation gave favour to views which were inexperienced and impracticable.

While Cotton waited for orders, he heard that Sir Archibald Campbell also found himself too weak to advance against Prome, and was obliged to fall back. The commander-in-chief had laid his plan of campaign in ignorance of the resources of his enemies. The plan itself had in the main been recommended by Sir Thomas Munro, and in a tone more confident, if not imperative, than his knowledge of the subject warranted. Sir A. Campbell, by his retrograde movement, came before Donabew on the 25th of March. His army encamped near the river, *above* the works—the flotilla was below them. The flotilla advanced on the 27th, and landed heavy guns and mortars. Before batteries were erected, shells and rockets were thrown into the stockades and intrenchments, causing alarm and loss of life to the enemy, and slaying their commander-in-chief. On the 3rd of April the cannonade of the English opened; the Birmese retired without firing a shot. The post was garrisoned, and Sir

A. Campbell resumed his progress towards Prome. The total loss of the British at Donabew was thirty killed, and one hundred and thirty-four wounded. The wounded and slain of the enemy probably did not exceed that amount.

On the 8th of April, the commander-in-chief was joined at Tharawa by Brigadier M'Creaigh, with his majesty's 1st Royal Scots, and the 28th Madras native infantry, and a good supply of draught cattle and elephants. The Birman army, rallied by the Prince of Tharawaddi, fell back for the defence of Prome. The commander-in-chief appeared before Prome on the 25th of April. There, as at Donabew, the enemy retired, burning the stockades. At this place General Campbell lingered long without effecting anything, although his force was five thousand men, and fifteen hundred more at Rangoon had received orders to join him. An armistice was agreed upon, to extend from the 17th of September to the 17th of October, in order to enable the English agents and Birmese vakeels to come to terms of peace. In September, Sir James Brisbane, commander-in-chief of the British navy in the Indian seas, joined the army.

The Kyi Wungyi met the British general in October, to form definitive terms of a treaty on the plain of Narenzik. It soon became obvious that the demands of the English appeared to the Birmese negotiators as arrogant and unreasonable. They remonstrated, and endeavoured to dissuade the British from making such requisitions; but finding the English general inexorable, they demanded an extension of the armistice until the demands of the English were referred to the emperor. The conditions on which the English general insisted, were as follows:—“The court of Ava was expected to desist from all interference with Assam and Cachar, and to recognise their dependence of Manipore. Arracan, with its dependencies, was to be given up to the British, and an indemnity of two crores of rupees (£2,000,000) was to be paid for the expenses of the war; until the discharge of which sum, Rangoon, Martaban, and the Tenasserim provinces, were to be held in pledge. A resident was to be received at Ava, and a commercial treaty to be concluded, by which the trade with Rangoon should be relieved from the exactions by which it had hitherto been repressed.”*

The demands of the English were indignantly spurned by the Birmese court. A new army advanced upon Prome, and being very numerous, nearly invested the British lines, with the intention of intercepting their

* Deputy judge-advocate-general of the Bengal army.
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* Wilson, vol. ix. p. 130.

communications. A powerful detachment of the grand army of Birmah was thrown forward twenty miles from Prome. General Campbell saw that it was essential to the preservation of his communications to dislodge them. On the evening of the 15th of November, Brigadier-general M'Dowall, with five regiments of Madras native infantry, advanced in three columns. The ground was flooded and marshy, and did not admit of the use of field-pieces. The division brought no battering guns. Confusion and ignorance prevailed in the British columns. They were repulsed with heavy loss, the commander of the division was killed, an officer mortally wounded, and nine officers disabled. The total loss killed, wounded, and missing, was two hundred and sixteen. It was an experiment with a little army of sepoy infantry. The Birmese showed no apprehension of them, and after their victory, spoke of the sepoys with contempt.

The Birmese were now encouraged to attempt the English lines at Prome. They advanced and intrenched themselves within a few miles of that place. The English, under Campbell and Cotton, attacked them on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December, defeating them on every occasion, slaying many, with only a loss of three officers killed, two wounded, one mortally; twenty-five soldiers killed, and one hundred and twenty-one wounded. The Birmese army was completely routed.

The British reached Meaday on the 19th of December, accompanied by the flotilla. A flag of truce was borne by the enemy to the naval commander, offering to negotiate. Lieutenant-colonel Tidy, and Lieutenant Smith, R.N., had conducted the previous negotiations, and those officers were again employed to meet the Birmese negotiators. Nevertheless the British, resolved not to be obstructed by delays under the guise of negotiations, advanced, until army and flotilla arrived at Patanagoh, opposite to Melloon, on the 29th of December. On the 30th, the negotiators undertook to meet in a boat in the middle of the river. General Campbell, Admiral Brisbane, Mr. T. C. Robertson, the civil commissioner, and their suites, went on board, where four great officers of the imperial government waited to receive them. The demands of the English were repeated, and renewed expostulations and arguments against them were made by the Birmese. At last they gave way, consenting to surrender the territory, but declared their government unable to pay the indemnity. The British, therefore, reduced the demand to a crore of rupees (a million sterling). A definitive treaty was executed on the 3rd of January, 1826. An armistice was settled to extend to the 18th of that month,

to give time for the ratification of the treaty, the Birmese ministers not being plenipotentiaries. On the 17th, a deputation of Birmese requested an extension of the armistice. The British, perceiving that the object was to gain time, refused, and demanded the evacuation of the camp of Melloon by sunrise on the 20th, under menace of attack. The Birmese refused to abandon the camp; neither did the ratification of the treaty arrive by the 20th. Melloon was attacked, stormed, and captured.

By far the most interesting account of this action extant is that which is contained in General Sir Henry Havelock's account of this war. He was then a humble lieutenant, but had the genius of a general, and the pen of an accomplished and proficient military writer. The reader of this history will be deeply interested in the perusal of Havelock's most graphic and eloquent description of this battle, of which, in part, he was an eye-witness, and in part a participator. As the work written by the lamented historian and general (as he afterwards became) is not accessible to the public, the following extract will be read with the more interest:—

"When the day broke on the 19th (Jan. 1826), the left bank of the river was seen already lined with batteries. The engineers had accomplished so much of their task in the night, that the bustle in the British camp did not appear lively enough to indicate any extraordinary exertion. A battery of eighteen-pounders and heavy mortars confronted the centre of the grand stockade. Another of lighter pieces had been prepared to batter the pagoda work to the southward. The guns and howitzers of the horse brigade were in battery opposite to the left of the central work. By eleven o'clock, twenty-eight mouths of fire were ready to open on the Melloon. The whole strength of the rocket brigade was ranged near the right of the battery of the centre. At eleven, Sir Archibald Campbell, in person, gave the word. The roar of the first salvo shook the ground, rent the air, reverberated amongst the rocks and woods behind Melloon, and died away in sullen echoes from the more distant hills. In an instant it was repeated. The deafening peals succeeded with a rapidity which suggested the image of unchecked vengeance falling in thunder upon the heads of the deceitful barbarians. The British officers on the left bank, stooping and coming forward, bent the eye anxiously to discern the effect upon the hostile camp. It was evident that the artilleryists had hit the range at once. Balls were seen to strike the work, raising a cloud of dust and splinters, demolishing the defences, and ploughing up the area of the square. Shells

hit sometimes a few paces from the parapet, behind which the garrison was crouching, bursting among their ranks, sometimes upon the huts of the troops and marked points of the pagodas. The rockets flew in the truest path. Many fell upon the barbarians; many shaped their course direct into the pavilions of the chiefs. Partial fires were soon seen to break out at Melloon. Twice the line of the barbarians which manned the eastern face gave way under the dreadful fire; twice they were rallied by their chiefs. The storm of fire, of shells, and bullets, continued without intermission for an hour and a quarter. Fifteen minutes before one, the boats of the flotilla began to move from a point two hundred yards above the light battery. The first brigade had been embarked on board the leading vessels. The flank companies of the 87th, the 41st, and 89th British, and strong native detachments, found themselves afloat almost at the same moment on board the remainder of the flotilla. General Cotton directed the movements of the troops last mentioned. Lieutenant-colonels Godwin, Parlbey, and Hunter Blair, served under him as brigadiers. This force was to gain the right bank a little above the great work, and operate against its northern face, now cruelly enfiladed by the horse brigade. As one of its columns was intended to intercept the retreat of the Birmans, the whole body ought to have been put in motion antecedently to the first brigade, the movement of which should have been consecutive; but the attempt which was made to render the advance of both simultaneous, ended in inverting the order of their operations. The first brigade came too soon, and the turning columns too late in contact with the enemy.

"All eyes were now fixed upon the progress of the first brigade. Its boats began to fall rapidly down the stream. Colonel Sale was seen in the leading man-of-war's boat, far a-head of the heavier vessels. The brigade was to attack the south-eastern angle of the great work, the abattis of which was said to be defective. Thus it had to receive the fire of the whole eastern front of the fortification. The Birmans opened every musket and ginja upon it as soon as the first boat was on a line parallel to the stockade. The stream carried the British within half-musket shot of their numerous enemies, who, relieved from the severity of the cannonade, which the intervention of the boats necessarily caused to be suspended, had now full leisure to direct their fire. It caused a sensation of nervous tremor amongst the unoccupied spectators on the right bank, to see these two old tried corps thus silently enduring the storm of barbarian

vengeance. A dense cloud of smoke from the Birman musketry began to envelop the boats. Now and then, by the flash of a nine-pounder from one of the gun-vessels, she was seen to present her bows for an instant to the line, and direct a pairing shot against the works. But the moment of retribution was at hand. The headmost boat was seen to touch the sand. A body of troops sprang ashore. They formed themselves with the alacrity of practised *tirailleurs* under the slope of the bank. They were a part of the 38th. They began to answer and check the fire of the Birman bastion near them. The vessels followed as rapidly as possible; but all seemed too slow for the wishes of those who looked upon the animating scene. They felt the inexpressible desire to urge on, by the power, as it were, of imagination, to press forward, to impel to the point the headmost boats, which, though dropping quickly, yet seemed to the eyes of impatience to lag. More soldiers leaped upon dry land with a cheer; others followed. The spectators looked for the leader of the brigade. They did not yet know that a ball had struck him between the shoulder and the breast, and that he lay swooning, from the loss of blood, in the boat. The numbers of the column speedily increased; it quickly assumed shape, and was in motion. The advance ceased to fire; the mass of the 13th (this was Lieutenant Havelock's regiment) and the 38th, pressing on, was in a moment at the foot of the works. The soldiers began to spread and seek for a gap, or entrance, with the ready tact produced by experience in such affairs. There was a pause of three seconds, then a move again. The British were seen at once overlooking the works. The Birman fire ceased along the line; all was decided. The barbarians began to rush in headlong flight across the great area: the British column to direct its course full upon the pagodas, which marked the head-quarters of the chiefs. The second column had landed, and was manœuvring upon the north-western angle. The Birmans, warned by the priority of the attack in front, were already issuing from it in large bodies. This was the conflict at Melloon."

The generalship of the English in this battle was severely criticised by Havelock. It was his opinion that, by a different plan of action, a brilliant advantage might have been gained, which was not obtained. As this is not a military work, it would be inappropriate to quote the extended critique of Havelock. It is modestly and gracefully written, and is pervaded by clearness of view, precision of thought, and proves the writer to have been, even at that early period of his military his-

tory, profoundly read, and a deep thinker in military science.

On the 8th of February the army approached within five miles of Pagahm-mew. This place had once been the capital of the Birman empire, and was regarded as a holy city. It was solidly built, and capable of offering much resistance to an enemy, if governed and garrisoned with skill and valour. The Birmese appeared determined to make a stand there, and Sir Archibald Campbell resolved to lose no time in attacking, and, if necessary, storming the place. In the description of what occurred, we shall again gratify our readers by a passage from the narrative of the good and great Sir Henry Havelock:—"The British advanced along a narrow road, thickly hedged in on either side with the tree called by the inhabitants *ber*, by the English jujube, and by philosophers *zizyphus jujuba*. It bears a fruit resembling the plum, and varying equally in size. It is in some countries a dwarfish, but in this district of Birmah rises to the height of ten or twelve feet, and is commonly defended with thorns. The small force of the British raised clouds of dust in passing over the sandy soil. The Birmans fired the first shot. The advance of their right opened a random *fusilade*, out of distance, at the head of the column of the 43rd, and then retired. The vanguard of the British (in which Havelock was engaged) in a moment after became engaged with the advance of the barbarian centre, posted at the base of Loganunda. It drove it in. But as the column under the major-general reached the foot of the monument, the enemy showed considerable force in its front, and on its right. As the British moved on, the barbarians rushed forward to meet them. They presented themselves with wild, frantic gestures, and hideous shouts. The whole of the 13th were extended, *en tirailleur*, to resist this sudden onset. The horse artillery got into action. The body-guard supported at the centre. These three corps now formed the true vanguard of the British. The 13th dashed among the barbarians in extended files. They overthrew them. The thickets were soon strewn with their bodies. The barbarians were hotly pursued, thundered upon by the guns of the horse artillery, and cut down by the sowars wherever they could be overtaken. The rest of the force, in seconding this manœuvre, found it difficult to debouch. It was impossible to escape very rapidly from the narrow mouth of the single defile into which the troops were closely wedged together with the carriages of the foot artillery, their rockets and tumbrils. The heat was excessive, and two of the battalions

were harassed by the night march. All this was not sufficiently borne in mind in following up the first advantage. The companies of the 13th, spread along a considerable line, became engaged with formidable masses of the enemy before they could receive any support from the corps of the main body. The barbarian general took advantage of this with a laudable adroitness. He promptly moved up large bodies of horse and foot to the aid of his worsted advance; he caused a mass to debouch from his extreme left, menacing the right flank of the British, and another to press down from his centre to cut off their vanguard from the road. The ground was a succession of hillocks planted with the jujube. Many of the little summits were covered with the ruins of pagodas; others with monuments less worn by time. Thus, the adverse lines were hardly aware how closely they approached each other. A noisy fire was supported along either front. The 13th were very widely extended. The major-general, accompanied by the principal officers of his staff, was in the very centre of the attack of the vanguard. His person must have been distinctly seen by the barbarians. Large bodies advanced within a few yards of him. Their shouts seemed already to announce a victory. The situation of the major-general was for many minutes critical. He had with him only fourteen men of the 13th, sixteen sowars of the body-guard, and two field-pieces of the horse artillery; but their guns threw grape and round shot rapidly and truly amongst the enemy; their quick discharges disconcerted them, and the firm countenances of the troopers and infantry soldiers filled them with uncertainty. They could not in a moment make up their minds to one of those decisive movements by which battles are won. The opportunity which might have saved their capital escaped them. Their masses began to take up the ground from which they had first moved, but remained there steadily and in great force. A heavy firing was at this instant heard on the left. The major-general retired before the enemy's advance, which pressed after him. The Hindostanee troopers displayed a memorable coolness. They waved their sabres proudly to the shouting barbarians, turned their backs only for a moment, then rapidly fronted and resumed their attitude of defiance, riding down the boldest of the Birmans who ventured close to them. Constantly calling to the infantry, which they covered, to quicken their pace, but never quickening their own, thus retiring and fronting in succession, they finally gained a little pagoda mount, on which the major-general had taken his stand. Sir

Archibald Campbell then caused the 13th to be recalled and concentrated by sound of bugle. The guns and howitzers armed the plateau of the mount. Its ruinous brick-work supplied an irregular rampart. The enemy stood formed in immense force directly in front of the hill, their foot backed by squadrons of the Cassay horse. They still showed a disposition to turn the British by both flanks. The major-general surveyed them for a few minutes through his telescope. He then said calmly, as the troops re-formed, 'I have here the 13th, and the body-guard; the whole Birman army shall not drive me from this hill.' Nevertheless, some anxious moments had to be passed in this little position. There was yet no intelligence of the movements of the left. The enemy's detached parties of either arm yet inundated the valleys and thickets to the right and left. Some even penetrated to the rear; but, at length, the 89th arrived, and was seen to take up its position in support. All was secure in this quarter, which had been so seriously menaced. The British again prepared to attack the troops of 'The King of Hell';* but they perceived that he had already sensibly diminished his force in their front. A staff-officer, who had succeeded in communicating with General Cotton, brought news which accounted for this retrograde movement.

"The right flank of the Birmans, and their communications with Pagahm, were already in jeopardy. When General Cotton debouched beyond the Loganunda pagoda, he was opposed, as the major-general had been, by advanced bodies of the barbarians. The 38th routed them, and followed closely the line of their retreat. The Birmans at length threw themselves into a field-work near the bank of the river. Nearly the same thing happened which had before taken place at the outworks of Donabew. The 38th wheeled round the work, under the fire of its defenders, entered it by the rear-ward opening, and began to make a carnage of all within. The barbarians, thus screwed into their own places of defence, leaped in terror over the western parapet. Hundreds rushed headlong down the lofty and most vertical bank of the waters of the Irriwaddy. 'The King of Hell' was compelled to abandon his first position and retire on Pagahm. As soon as the success of the left was announced to General Campbell, he put his column in motion. The statements of prisoners indicated an obstinate

defence in Pagahm. It was thought that only half the day's work was achieved. In half an hour more the lines of manœuvre taken by all the columns of battalions, except the 43rd, converged upon a single point in the eastern wall of the city. The 13th was the most advanced. The main road descended into a ravine. Beyond this, a village and pagoda intervened, and screened the walls of Pagahm. The enemy were posted here in force. When the firing commenced, the horse artillery were dispatched at full speed to the right, to enfilade the village, and take every successive position of the enemy rapidly in flank; but the leading companies of the 13th had already descended into the valley. The enemy's balls began to strike the huts and trees around them. It was in vain to dally here, exposed to a fire from behind walls. The regiment formed in line quickly, but with the steadiness of a field-day. It advanced at the charge with a loud huzza, and in redoubled time. The levies of 'The King of Hell' had not a chance of remaining. They were driven before the onset of this regiment from position to position, from pagoda to pagoda, from eminence to eminence, back upon, over, within, and again beyond their walls; then from walled inclosure to inclosure, finally into their boats on the Irriwaddy, or along the route to the capital, as panic urged them. All their standards were captured. The major-general and his staff entered by the eastern gate of Pagahm.

"The sound of the last cannon shot had scarcely ceased to echo among the pagodas when the major-general thus conveyed his sentiments to his troops in general orders:— 'Providence has once more blessed with success the British arms in this country; and in the decisive defeat of the imposing force posted under and within the walls of Pagahm-mew, the major-general recognises a fresh display of the military virtues which have characterized his troops from the commencement of the war.'"

Having narrated the successful exploits of the British in their campaign from Rangoon, it is necessary, before stating the final results of the war, to relate the main incidents of the operations from eastern Bengal. Three brigades were stationed at Chittagong, Jumal-pore, and Goalpara; and a flotilla was placed on the Burrampooter river, towards Assam, and in the neighbourhood of Dacca. The English resolved to defend Cachar and Manipore, and carry the war in that direction into the territories of the enemy, if occasion offered. Colonel Innes quartered his brigade at Silhet, Colonel Shapland at Chittagong, Brigadier-general M'Morrice at Goalpara. One of the plans of the British was to penetrate from Cachar through Manipore into the valley of

* An army of the Birman Emperor, entitled "Retriever of the King's Glory," were commanded by a savage warrior styled *Nee Woon Breen*, which has been variously translated as "Prince of Darkness," "King of Hell," and "Prince of the Setting Sun."

the Ningti river, which falls into the Irrawaddy. Colonel Shuldham, at the head of 7000 men, attempted this route and failed. Another plan was to pass from Chittagong into Arracan, and across the mountains into Ava, and effect a junction with the army sent from Rangoon. General Morrison, at the head of 11,000 men, attempted this enterprise. His force consisted of his majesty's 44th and 54th regiments of the line; the 26th, 42nd, 49th, 62nd Bengal native infantry, and the 2nd light infantry battalion; the 10th and 16th Madras native infantry; a Mugh levy; a body of local horse; a strong party of native pioneers, and a fine detachment of the Bengal artillery. A flotilla of sloops and gun-brigs was to co-operate with this division of the army. Commodore Hay commanded the flotilla, and his especial work was to carry troops and supplies along shore. This little army began its progress in the beginning of January, 1825. A portion of the force remained at various stations on British territory, to be sent after the army if necessary. His majesty's 54th, 10th Madras native infantry, and left wing 16th native infantry, went by sea. The field-battery, his majesty's 44th, 1st light infantry battalion, four companies 42nd Bengal native infantry, five companies 62nd native infantry, right wing Madras 16th native infantry, and two troops of Gardner's local horse went by land. The 26th and 49th Bengal went by boats along the coast. There were 1,500 Europeans, and 8,000 native troops; total, 9,500 men. The approach to the town of Arracan lay across a narrow valley, skirted by hills of an average height of four hundred feet. Stockades were placed on these hills, in advantageous positions, garrisoned by 9,000 Birmans. On the 29th of March an unsuccessful attack was made on these stockades. On the evening of the 31st of March, Brigadier Richards (afterwards better known as Lieutenant-general Sir W. Richards), commanding a brigade, which consisted of six companies 44th foot, three of the 26th, three of the 49th, thirty seamen, and thirty Gardner's dismounted horse, ascended the hills, by a circuitous route, and established his troops on the summit before he was perceived by the enemy.* Next morning, the brigade took the Birmese in flank, while the commander-in-chief took them in front. The enemy were beaten out of all the stockades, and fled precipitately through the passes, leaving Arracan to the victors. The illness of General Morrison caused the command to devolve upon General Richards. The British troops continued to hold Arracan through the summer, but made

no effort to prosecute their way toward the heart of the Birmese empire. On the 31st of October, Brigadier Richards, while commanding "the south-eastern division of Arracan, reported the impracticability of passing through the mountains. This was an error, no survey of the roads and passes having been made by Richards, in consequence of the insufficiency as to numbers of his engineer staff, and the sickness which prevailed among that portion of his officers. The troops in Arracan suffered severely from miasma rising from the pestilential marshes which then covered so large a portion of the low country. He might, however, have wintered in Ava, as was proved by Captain Ross, who, with the 18th Madras native infantry, and a number of elephants, marched to Pakangyet, on the Irrawaddy, eight marches from Yandaboo, and thence, after crossing the river to Sembew Ghwen, quitted the low country in three days, and in eight more crossed the mountains, by a practicable route to Aeng, in Ava." The war was decided by the Rangoon army before anything was effected by the army of Arracan, except the conquest of that province. After the war was over, a portion of the sepoys were conducted through the mountain passes from Ava into Arracan, proving the practicability of that route on any future occasion of war.

The treaty concluded with the Birman emperor was one of great importance to the British. His Birman majesty agreed to renounce all claim to Assam, and the principalities of Jyntia and Cachar, and recognised the independence of Manipore. He consented to cede in perpetuity the four divisions of Arracan, namely, Arracan Proper, Ranri, Cheduba, and Sandoway, and also the three districts of Tenasserim, Ye, Tavoy, and Mergui, or the whole of the coast belonging to Ava south of the Sanluen river; to receive a resident at his capital, and sanction the conclusion of a commercial treaty; and, finally, he agreed to pay a crore of rupees (or about £1,000,000), in four instalments, the first immediately, the second within one hundred days from the date of the treaty, and the other two in the course of the two following years. The British engaged to retire at once to Rangoon, and to quit the Birmah territory upon the payment of the second instalment. The discharge of the promised indemnity was tardily and reluctantly complied with. On the receipt of the ratification of the treaty the army broke up from Yandaboo. Rangoon was held by the British until after payment of the second instalment of the indemnity.

The English suffered from a dreadful mortality, one-fourth of all who had not been

* Wilson, vol. ix. p. 106.

killed or wounded died of the diseases engendered by the unhealthy situations in which they were quartered; and before the English abandoned Rangoon, half of the troops left alive were in hospital. The mortality has been compared to that of the unfortunate expedition to Walcheren in 1809; but the latter was not so fatal as the expeditions in the Birmese war.

While the English were in occupation of the country, it was deemed important to gain as much intelligence as possible of its people, and to conciliate as far as might be the emperor and his court. In pursuance of this policy, Lieutenant Havelock was selected, with Captain Lumsden and Assistant-surgeon Knox, of the Madras army, to bear presents to the emperor from his conquerors. These officers went upon their interesting and peculiar mission, encountering many obstructions from the jealousy of the Birmese. The American missionaries, who had acquired considerable influence over many persons about the imperial court, rendered the English gentlemen many services. On their arrival at Ava, they learned that six prisoners were detained. They drew up a protest, declaring that this was an infraction of the treaty, and declining to wait upon his majesty without an order were issued for the release of these men. After a most vindictive resistance, this was at last conceded. The day after the reception, the prisoners were set free. The prudent and gentlemanly conduct of Lieutenant Havelock did much to smooth the difficulties of dealing with the Birmese court, and at the same time to maintain in full lustre the dignity of England, through that of her representatives. Indeed throughout the Birmese war the usefulness and devotion to duty of Mr. Havelock were an honour to his country, and attracted the notice of the whole army, particularly that of the commander-in-chief. The following is a striking specimen of the piety and earnest religious zeal of Mr. Havelock:—"In the temple of Rangoon, when the city was taken, he was seen in the temple—the idol temple—filled with the images and cross-legged infernals of that country. *He placed the lamps in the hands of the idols*, and by the light sat down to teach, to lead the devotions of the soldiers, and to open to them the Scriptures."* Another interesting incident in the life of Havelock occurred during this war. The gallant commander of the 13th, Major Sale, then holding the local rank of Lieutenant-colonel, required a detachment for some particular service, and directed the company of Captain —— to undertake it. The adjutant replied that the men were intoxicated. Sale immediately observed, "Turn out Havelock's men;

he is always ready, and his men are never drunk." Havelock was then a lieutenant, but was at the time in command of his company. He brought out his men, who were like himself "ready," and "never drunk," and the duty was accomplished. At this juncture, also, an event occurred in the life of that remarkable man, which bore upon his prospects, and at the same time illustrated his character. The incident is given as written in the interesting and able memoir of Havelock, by the Rev. William Owen, of London:—"On the adjutancy in his corps becoming vacant, an application was made to the governor-general to give it to Havelock. His lordship demurred, on account of what had been said to Havelock's disparagement as being an enthusiast and a fanatic. Bitter was the hostility which beset him on that occasion, and only in this manner it was overcome: a return was ordered of the offences committed by the men of the several companies throughout the regiment; and having examined the return, the governor-general said he found that the men in Havelock's company, who had joined in his religious exercises, were the most sober and best behaved men in the regiment. The complaint against the men, he said, was that they were Baptists, and he added that he wished that the whole regiment were Baptists, too. The result of the inquiry was, the bestowal of the adjutancy upon Havelock, and the entry in his memorandum-book simply mentions the fact, with the addition of the following words:—"Continue religious instruction to the soldiers, and do everything to promote temperate habits among them."*—This anecdote is as favourable to the character of Lord Amherst as to that of Havelock. His lordship never allowed his religious, political, or personal feelings or prejudices to interfere with the just administration of his high office, and what was due to his king and country.

The Birmese war had proved one of the most costly which we had waged in India. Various writers estimate it at fourteen millions sterling; and the loss from all causes, in the field and in garrison, along the Bengal frontier of Assam, in Arracan, and along the Irrawaddy, at twenty thousand men. The European soldiers, and especially the officers, perished in greater proportion than the sepoys, or Mugh auxiliaries; indeed the loss of life among the last was not great.

After the treaty was signed between the Governor-general of India and the Emperor of Birmah, Mr. Crawford was appointed envoy to the court of Ava, to arrange a commercial treaty. The mission returned to Rangoon in

* The Rev. Paxton Hood,

* *The Good Soldier.*

January, 1827, having accomplished its object. He was not gratified with his reception, and he dissuaded his government from enforcing the article of the treaty providing that a British agent should reside at the court of Ava. No further intercourse was held until 1829, when Lieutenant-colonel Burney was sent to Ava on a British mission. In 1824, the colonel, then Captain Burney, had been dispatched to the court of Siam, to congratulate the monarch of that country on his accession to the throne. His mission to that court it was supposed qualified him to proceed to that of Ava. His term of residence there was a long one. He remained until 1837, when he was obliged to quit, in connexion with events to be related when our narrative shall arrive at that period.

CHAPTER CVIII.

GOVERNMENT OF LORD AMHERST (*continued*)—SIEGE, STORM, AND CAPTURE OF BHURTPORE—DEATH OF SIR THOMAS MUNRO—TRANSFER OF THE CROWN OF DELHI AND EMPIRE OF HINDOSTAN TO THE EAST INDIA COMPANY—ARRIVAL OF LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK IN INDIA—HIS GOVERNMENT AND REFORMS—HIS DEPARTURE FROM INDIA AND RETURN TO ENGLAND.

DURING the progress of the Birmese war, the state of India was unsatisfactory. The deposed princes, especially the Peishwa at Benares, were as usual intriguing to foment disturbance and shake British power if possible. When at the beginning of the war the Birmese in Arracan made a successful entrance into Chittagong, the natives of eastern Bengal, and of all Lower Bengal, felt extreme alarm. Agents of the Peishwa circulated false intelligence, and represented the Birmese as invincible, and at last the native merchants of Calcutta were panic-struck, and could with difficulty be dissuaded from removing their property and withdrawing from Bengal.

At the end of 1824 disturbances broke out in an extremity of India precisely opposite to that endangered by the Birmese. In Cutch there was a revolt which appeared to assume political importance. It was discovered that the Ameers of Scinde had incited it.

The whole of India was swarming with military adventurers, the relics of defeated armies, or the mercenaries who had served the English in their various wars as irregular cavalry. There were numbers of men ready to join the English against any enemy, or to join any power, foreign or native, against the English. On the whole, they were more willing to serve against than for the prevailing power. Notwithstanding that Bengal and Central India had been subjected to them, the British were in the predicted condition of the Arabs,—their hand was against every man, and every man's hand was against them. While yet the Birmese war exhausted the exchequer and drained the garrisons of India of European troops, war was waged elsewhere.

The Bhurtpore territories which were independent passed through a series of violent

commotions and revolutions up to 1824, and in that year. The Jauts, who inhabited that principality, were disposed to regard the English as protectors against foreign enemies, but were not desirous to see them interfere with their home concerns. Sir David Ochterlony did interfere, and the governor-general, contrary to the advice of his council, revoked the proceedings of the resident, who resigned. Sir David died soon after, at Meerut, much regretted in India, where his talents, civil and military, had been a great advantage to his country. Sir David had assembled an army to besiege Bhurtpore, and by force of arms adjust the disputes there which menaced the peace of Hindostan. On the 19th of December, 1826, when a vote of thanks was passed to the army at Bhurtpore, Sir J. Malcolm observed, "If the siege had failed, it would, in all human probability, have added to the embarrassments of the Birmese war, that of hostilities with almost every state."

After much hesitation, and great reluctance to have another war on his hands, while that with the Birmans was raging, policy determined Lord Amherst to engage in a conflict with Bhurtpore, the strongest fortress in all India. Lord Combermere had arrived at Calcutta, the 2nd of October, 1825, as commander-in-chief of the forces in India. He went up the country, and fixed his headquarters at Muttra. According to Captain Creighton, of his majesty's 11th Light Dragoons, the forces at Lord Combermere's disposal consisted of upwards of twenty-five thousand men, and more than a hundred pieces of artillery, with abundance of material. The force of the enemy's garrison was estimated at twenty thousand men, chiefly Rajpoots and Jauts, with some Affghans. The

greatest security of the fortress however, according to Major Hough, was in the thickness and toughness of its walls, constructed of clay hardened in the sun.

SIEGE OF BHURTPORE.

The English now, for the second time in its history, besieged Bhurtpore, and this time with better fortune than had attended the siege conducted by Lord Lake. On the 10th of December, 1825, the army of Lord Combermere stood before the great fortress. During the siege conducted by Lord Lake, twenty years before, the great ditches which surrounded the place had been filled from the Mote Jhil, an extensive piece of water. To hinder the enemy from accomplishing a similar object, Lord Combermere placed detachments of troops, so as to render the opening of sluices or cutting of embankments exceedingly difficult operations. This proved of great importance in the progress of the siege, for the ditch continued dry. The extent of the fortress was so great that it could not be completely invested, but posts were appointed all around.

On the 24th of December, the breaching batteries were opened, but while they broke the material of the walls, they did not breach them, from the peculiar material of which these bulwarks were composed. Sometimes the round-shot entered the embankments, as the walls might be called, and remained there, rather adding to their strength. Shells crumbled some portion of the surface, which fell away, but no breach was effected. Thus it was not at Sebastopol that gigantic earthworks resisted, for the first time, a numerous and scientific army. The fortress of Bhurtpore was a series of vast earthworks, more solid and enduring than those thrown up before Sebastopol. Before the English army had collected before the place, discussions had been maintained as to the probable results of a cannonade and bombardment, the experience of Lord Lake, in 1805, having suggested these discussions: besides, British officers had become acquainted with all the peculiarities of the fortress. Mining was at last resorted to, under the auspices of Lieutenant-colonel Forbes, or, as some maintain, of Sir A. Galloway. Major Hough thus notices this controversy:—"Wilson (page 197, note 1) alludes to the claim of the late Major-general Sir A. Galloway, who was at the siege in 1805, and in 1825—but his memoir was given to Lord Combermere when before the fort,—Lieutenant (Colonel) Forbes, when in Calcutta, gave his plan to Lord C., and the credit is due to him. The latter was wounded and disabled

near Jhil. He had been instructed in mining under Sir C. Pasley, before he went to India. Sir A. Galloway published a pamphlet on the attack on mud forts; and was wounded in the pioneers at the first siege."*

On the 17th January, 1826, the largest mine, containing two thousand pounds of gunpowder, was exploded. The explosion formed breaches. The next day the assault was made. The columns which attacked the breaches were commanded by Major-general Reynell and Major-general Nicolls (afterwards Lieutenant-general Sir Jasper Nicolls, commander-in-chief of the forces in India). The Jangina gate was stormed by a column under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Delanaine. The whole of the assailing force amounted to eleven thousand. All the columns of attack were successful, although they met with an obstinate resistance, from the belief entertained by the garrison that the place was invulnerable. The artillerymen fell under the bayonets of our soldiers, defending their guns to the last extremity. No less than seven thousand of the garrison perished, including every chief of note. A very great number were wounded. The loss of the British was 103 men and officers killed, and 466 wounded.

The day after the capture, the young rajah, Bulwunt Singh, on whose behalf the war was undertaken, was reinstated on his throne, under the protection of the British.

The prize money amounted to forty-eight lacs of rupees (£480,000). Lord Combermere was created viscount when the intelligence of his victory reached England. No doubt the signal failure of Lord Lake, in the memorable siege of 1805, influenced the government and the country to exaggerate the exploit of the capture of Bhurtpore; still it was a great undertaking, and some idea of its magnitude may be formed by the prodigious expenditure of material—upwards of sixty-one thousand missiles of all kinds having been used.

The fall of Bhurtpore was the termination of this short war, and at its conclusion the condition of India, regarded from a British point of view was most striking, and calculated to afford a comparison with the past which greatly enhanced the glory and renown of England and of her East India Company. The following is a truthful and graphic description of the relation of the British to the states of India when affairs had settled down after the Birmese and Bhurtpore wars, before Lord Amherst resigned his government:—"The progress of the British had now

* Hough's *History of British Military Exploits in India*.

reached a point where campaigns could no longer be required within the limits of India. Powerful enemies they had none. In 1827, all the chiefs of Malwa, with the Mahratta princes, sent missions to the government which they had once dreamed of destroying. Holkar was dead, and Scindiah died in the following March, leaving no wreck of the dominion which had formerly spread over the largest provinces of Hindostan, and bearing no malice against the stately power which had deprived him of it. In the same year, also, the crown of Delhi was in name, as it had long been in reality, transferred to the company; while the title of the king, acknowledged until now, was extinguished. The English put an end to the vain folly of acknowledging themselves vassals to a man who had lost every attribute of power, except its rapacity and pride.*

The rapid termination of the siege of Bhurtpore restored the waning influence of Lord Amherst. A feeling adverse to his lordship had arisen in England, in consequence of the slow progress of the Birman war, and the disastrous loss of life in connection with it. His lordship, however, was really not to blame. The officials of the East India Company at Calcutta have been stigmatised, even by the most zealous advocates of that body, for their culpable ignorance of everything connected with the Birmese empire. Still it must be pleaded on their behalf, the vast empire of which they were in charge, and the rapid revolutions and terrible wars which they had to assist in directing and bringing to a fortunate close. Lord Amherst was a diligent governor, a just and a brave man. He dealt with good faith to native chiefs, with dignity and leniency to open enemies, with sagacity and caution to false friends. He watched over the prosperity of the army and rewarded merit. He served his king, his country, and the East India Company with fidelity, and ruled numerous nations with an honest, intelligent, and benevolent concern for their good. The government of this nobleman has never received its due meed of praise. Had his lordship followed the advice of those around him he would, on the first reverses in the Birmese war, have abandoned offensive tactics, defended Chittagong, and the north-east frontier, and have taken up a defensive position at Rangoon. His courage and wisdom resolved otherwise, and his perseverance and industry were crowned with success. He was very effectually aided by Sir T. Munro, the governor of Madras, whose exertions were extraordinary to provide troops, munitions of war, and supplies. It is certain that but for

the aid of the Madras presidency, Bengal could not have carried on the war on the eastern shores of the Bay and up the Irrawaddy with success, whatever power they might have wielded against Assam and the north-east frontier of Bengal to Birmah. There were many minor difficulties arising out of the hostile feeling prevailing throughout Hindostan against the British, which tested and proved the firmness and address of Lord Amherst, his adjustment of which was not noticed as he deserved. There were also some little wars, troublesome and irritating, the more so as the most trifling incident of open revolt or hostility on the part of any petty state, might have set all India in a blaze of conflict. These he settled with rapidity and decision, the only wise mode of dealing with refractory chiefs and rajahs. The Rajah of Colapore gave the Bombay presidency much trouble, and an appeal to arms was necessary to quell his fierce efforts to inflame that part of western India. Colapore was a small Mahratta state, and was pervaded by the predatory spirit of that uncertain, vindictive, and warlike race. Colonel Walsh, with the troops quartered at the station of Belgaun, very soon reduced his highness of Colapore to a quieter frame of mind, and left his soldiery and people no heart for further aggressions upon their neighbours. There was no state in India too small, no rajah too insignificant at that date to create the necessity for armed intervention. It is strange that a minute Mahratta territory, too small to be taken into account in the alliances and wars with the Mahrattas, should become aggressive and provoke a campaign, when Scindiah, and Holkar, and the Peishwa stooped to the conquering sword of England, and dared not to flaunt a hostile banner in the presence of a sepoy soldier of the company. Yet such was the eccentric and thoroughly oriental fickleness and presumption of the Mahratta race, and of all the races of India, that no statesman could foresee which chief would rise in hopeless insurrection, or in his independence proclaim hopeless war. No Indian statesman could say where in India a firebrand might not fall, spreading the flames of insurrection, of military revolt, or of declared war.

In 1827 Sir Thomas Munro ceased to live and labour for India, and for his country. A life of this remarkable man has been published by the Rev. Mr. Gleig, the author of a memoir of Clive, and another of Hastings. Like the latter works, it is full of panegyric of its hero; and his errors and weaknesses are passed over in a manner which would be unfaithful, were it not that the writer is so earnest and sincere in the excess of admira-

* Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. ii.

tion with which he regards his hero. This feeling may well be excused when exercised towards one who rendered India fiscally, judicially, and martially, such important services, and in whom the East India Company and the British government held the most entire confidence.

In 1827 Lord Amherst proceeded to the upper provinces. He had the honour of adjusting the relations in which the British government remained to the King of Delhi until the great revolt and rebellion, in 1857, swept away the dignity of that title for ever. Previous to 1827, the people of India regarded the East India Company as the vassals of the King of Delhi, whatever the power the English displayed. In that year, and by the hands of Lord Amherst, the crown of Delhi and of the empire of Hindostan was transferred to the East India Company. M. Auber beautifully and truly says:—"The event is said to have been viewed with deep melancholy by the royal family and their dependents. They felt, whatever privations they might have suffered from the Mahrattas, their title to the sovereignty of India had been invariably acknowledged. They were now, for the first time, divested of it. The feeling of the public, however, corroborated the opinion expressed by General Wellesley, that the natives were the most indifferent people, as to their governors, of any he had met with. They seemed on the present occasion to be unconcerned in the matter, and contemplated, without surprise, our assumption of a character, 'which had been purchased with the talents, treasure, and blood of our nation.' Lord Amherst having returned to the presidency, embarked in H.M.S. *Herald*, at the close of March, for England, resigning the provisional government into the hands of W. B. Bayley, Esq."

Although the administration of Lord Amherst was one of mingled military effort and social reform, the advent of the latter had arrived, and become stronger in the English mind than any desire for humiliating enemies, or enlarging territories. Miss Martineau represents the period of "comprehensive domestic amelioration" as beginning in 1823, and as predominating until 1855. This representation is partly correct, although the last years of the company's raj, terminating before this work was wholly published, eclipsed the glory of all former eras in the melioration of the condition of the people of India, and the initiation of public works. Miss Martineau gives the honour of the great change to the Marquis of Hastings, and does justice to the claims of Lord Amherst in having followed in the same direction;—"After long waiting,

and many discouragements, the time at length arrived when was ceased within the peninsula of India, and the energies of its rulers could be devoted to the improvement of the condition of the inhabitants, and the retrieval of the affairs of the company. There was war in Birmah, as has been seen; but long before Lord Moira's (henceforth to be called Lord Hastings) term of office was over, there was such a state of peace from the Himalaya to Ceylon as enabled him to give the crowning grace to his administration, by instituting social reforms as important as his military successes were brilliant, and his political scheme definitive and successful. The system which was conceived by Clive, professed by Warren Hastings, thoroughly wrought out and largely applied by Lord Wellesley, so as to be fairly called his own, and reversed for a time by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow, under orders from Leadenhall Street, was accomplished and firmly established by the Marquis of Hastings. British authority was supreme in India; and not only had it no antagonist for a long course of years, but it availed to prevent warfare among the states of the great peninsula. Reforms, political, social, and moral, at once ensued; and they were vigorously continued through three vice-regal terms. They may be most clearly apprehended by being surveyed as the harvest of twenty years of peaceful administration, beginning with the close of Lord Hastings' wars, and ending with the resignation of Lord William Bentinck, in 1835.

"Lord Hastings left the company's revenue increased by £6,000,000 a year; and a considerable part of the increase was from the land, indicating the improved condition of the people who held it. He was succeeded by Lord Amherst, who had the Birmese war to manage in the first instance; and the Mahratta and Pindarree wars had left behind them the difficulty dreaded by every pacific governor-general—an unsettled and unorganized population of soldiers, whom it was scarcely possible to deal with so as to satisfy at once themselves and their neighbours. The reforms already conceived, and even begun, had not yet checked abuses, or remedied grievances; and there were real causes of disaffection, in the new provinces especially, which gave a most mischievous power to a marauding soldiery at the moment of finding its occupation gone. A vigorous rule was therefore necessary, and almost as much military demonstration as in warlike times. The improved revenue did not meet these calls, and much less the cost of the Birmese war; and a new loan and an increased taxation marked the close of Lord Amherst's term. He left the

territory in a peaceable state, with not a single fort standing out, as Bhurtpore long did, against British authority, while the company's territories were largely increased by the Birmanese forfeitures. He won not a little European popularity by ascertaining the fate of the expedition of La Perouse, which had been as much a mystery as that of our Franklin expedition ever was; and he came home in 1828 full of confidence that the reforms inaugurated by his predecessor, and promoted by himself, would retrieve all financial difficulties, if they were but duly taken in hand by his successor. For such an object the very best choice was made. If our raj were really over, as the deluded sepoys now suppose, and the last Briton were to leave India for ever, tradition would preserve the memory of Lord William Bentinck, in the gratitude of the native population for centuries to come, though he overruled whatever was intolerably mischievous in their notions." Before, however, the great reform of Lord William Bentinck had begun, or his lordship assumed the office of governor-general, much had been done to adjust the judicial and revenue departments to the interests of the company and the desires of the Hindoos.

In 1827, before Lord Amherst quitted the country, nearly all civil suits instituted throughout the Bengal provinces were decided by native judges. In consequence of this, Lord William Bentinck extended the experiment which he has generally received the credit of having originated.

By law all British subjects were competent to serve on juries in India. Custom, however, had pronounced that half-castes were not British subjects, and law sanctioned this strange decision. It was for Lord Amherst to redress this grievance. In 1826 it was decreed that all "good and sufficient residents" were competent to serve on juries, with this restriction, that only Christian jurors should sit on the trial of Christians.

Thus when Lord W. Bentinck landed at Calcutta on July 4th, 1828, although he entered upon his arduous office under circumstances calculated to try his nerve and his judgment, he found the principle of reform established in the Indian government, and various improvements of the most important kind already initiated, which only required his helping hand to be confirmed in the customs of Indian administration.

Gradually the expenses of all the establishments in India had increased, whereas the revenue did not proportionately increase. The occupiers of land resorted to forgery and every species of fraud to cheat the officers of revenue; and the *native* officers, by ex-

tortion and plunder, rendered the occupiers still less able and less willing to pay. The zemindars were to a great extent bankrupt. The efforts of Lord Cornwallis to introduce the feudal system of Europe to India, and create a native aristocracy in Bengal, somewhat after the model of Britain, was a ridiculous failure and a cruel wrong. The finance of India from all these and other causes became embarrassed. In three years, previous to the arrival of Lord W. Bentinck, the public debt of India had increased £13,007,823.* The East India Company and the board of control had charged his lordship to effect, if possible and by all means allowable, a great financial, economical reform. On his arrival he at once invited the opinions of all classes, and left the press unfettered to discuss his measures. No man perhaps was ever less shackled by the prejudices of "his order" than Lord W. Bentinck. Class, caste, and creed were nothing in his eyes where justice and truth were concerned. He resolved, if it could be done by industry and the fearless discharge of duty, to place Indian finance on a solid and equitable basis.

His first practical procedure of a definite kind was the establishment of finance committees. He vigilantly superintended their inquiries, examining everything with herculean industry. He found it practicable and right to enforce reductions of expense in every direction, and incurred vast odium from "the departments" for so doing. In reply to many complaints and much abuse he observed, "I have done my duty; and this conviction, as I learn from dreadfully dear-bought experience, is the only consolation that defies all contingencies."

The committees of finance which excited so much displeasure in India were not devised as an original scheme by Lord William. The Marquises Cornwallis and Wellesley had appointed the like, but they did not personally look so closely into their investigations, and in those days there was not so much to look into. Lord William intended the investigations to bear fruits, and he resolved to carry out to their consequences all results flowing from these inquiries.

From the commander-in-chief of the army to the humblest ensign, and even to the most inane sepoy, there arose a murmur of dissatisfaction, followed by a cry of anger against the economic governor-general. *Batta*, half-batta, quarter-batta, were the words most frequently in the lips of the heroes of all the presidential armies. The privileges which these epithets expressed were revised, threatened, or reversed, as the facts brought to light by the

* Finance Report, 1832.

committees seemed, in the governor-general's opinion, to warrant. The company at the same time urged economy as essential to the future government of India. Arduous indeed was the office of governor-general in the hands of Lord W. Bentinck.

In 1829 his lordship actively employed himself in visiting the provinces of Eastern Bengal, and the whole of the provinces along the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. This resulted in abrogating the separate government of Prince of Wales's Island and its dependencies, and of annexing these territories to the government of Bengal. He also in this year invited native gentlemen of all degrees to meet him and make known their views on the condition of India, and the invitation was also extended to all European settlers. "A communication was likewise invited of all suggestions tending to promote any branch of the national industry; to improve the commercial intercourse by land and water; to amend any defects in the existing establishments; to encourage the diffusion of education and useful knowledge; and to advance the general prosperity of the British empire in India. The invitation was addressed to all native gentlemen, landholders, merchants, and others, and to all Europeans, both in and out of the service, including 'that useful and respectable body of men,' the indigo planters, who, from their uninterrupted residence in the Mofussil, had peculiar opportunities of forming an opinion upon the various subjects."

While these matters proceeded, extensive labours were imposed upon the governor-general in reference to "residencies, agents, collectors," &c., in every province of India, but especially in the provinces of Central India, newly acquired by the Pindarree and Mahratta wars.

This year was made memorable by the abolition of suttee. To the firmness and humanity of Lord W. Bentinck, in spite of the cowardice and political and religious indifference of many around him, this great reform is to be attributed. It must, however, be admitted that one of the sources of the revolt and insurrection of 1857 existed in the resentments which the abolition of suttee awakened in the minds of the heathen portion of the people of India. This interposition of the state on the side of humanity was never forgiven. The Brahminical women of India, in whose interest it was made, never forgave it. The women of *heathen* India believe that their condition is less honourable since the abolition of suttee, and they have inculcated bitter hostilities in consequence to their sons. The abolition of female infanticide, a later

reform, caused a still more intense animosity to the English on the part of the women of heathen India. The removal by murder of a portion of the female offspring of a family, left it possible to give a larger marriage portion to the survivors than can now be afforded. The women of India therefore, forgetting that they might have perished but for the abolition of the atrocious custom, regard the English as having by their philanthropic views deprived them of fortune, and by their religious interference decayed and impaired the social condition of the Hindoo people.

His lordship made a comprehensive tour to the upper provinces, inciting the higher classes of natives to exertion for the improvement of the country. The education of the natives was one of his lordship's favourite ideas, and he endeavoured, by such means as were at his disposal, to carry it out. The establishment of a legislative council, which entered into the charter of 1833 (see last chapter on home affairs), was originated by Lord Bentinck in 1830. A good understanding between the celebrated Runjeet Singh, the Sikh chief, and the governor-general, was established during the tour of the latter through the upper provinces. His lordship's patronage of Lieutenant Bruce, the justly celebrated Asiatic, and subsequently African traveller, was useful to the company, and a means of extending in Europe a better knowledge of the vast range of nations lying between the Indus and the Caspian Sea. Outrages perpetrated in Delhi, upon the court of the king and the people of that city by the English resident, and the English in his service, excited a spirit of revolt, and rendered the interposition of the governor-general necessary.

Colonel Pottinger was sent at the close of 1831 to negotiate a friendly treaty with the Ameer of Scinde. While Colonel Pottinger was rendering the Ameers of Scinde more amicable, Mohammedan fanatics were disturbing the whole face of the country near Calcutta, attacking the Hindoos and the government, plundering, murdering, and assassinating. Troops were at last dispatched against them; many of the offenders were slain, and the rest were imprisoned or dispersed. The glory of the Mohammedan religion was the object of their coarse outrages and sanguinary atrocities.

In 1831-32 the affairs of Cachar and Assam occupied the attention of the supreme council. Disputes with Birmah were originated, which led to new complications with that government. The judicial systems, the registered debt of India, steam navigation, and the state of commercial credit at Calcutta, occupied

incessantly his lordship's attention from 1831 to 1835. The government of the nizam required the interposition of Lord W. Bentinck. The state of Mysore was such that it became necessary to assume its government as an English province. It was not for his lordship to escape trouble with Oude, which had been more or less a thorn in the side of every governor-general from the days of Clive. M. Auber strikingly observes on this subject:—"The imbecility of the king had defeated the reforms that were effecting in his country, and its affairs were fast relapsing into their ancient condition of anarchy and confusion. The misgovernment of that kingdom has been a subject of frequent and earnest remonstrance on the part of the British government, during the whole of the thirty-two years which have elapsed since the conclusion of the subsidiary treaty. Lord W. Bentinck was fully empowered to take final and decided measures for assuming the government for a certain period. In consequence of the appearance of a real disposition on the part of the king, though at this late hour and probably under an impression of alarm, to reform his administration, the governor-general determined to suspend the

execution of this extreme measure, to which all the authorities both in India and in Europe, had always entertained so strong a repugnance: and thus to afford the king another opportunity of retrieving his character and that of his administration."

During the war with Mysore great services had been rendered (see chapters on that war) to the British government by the Rajah of Coorg. In 1833 the possessor of that dignity acted contumaciously and injuriously to the government of India, and after protracted efforts of negotiation an armed force was sent against him. This tyrant had murdered every legitimate descendant of the throne of the rajahlik, and perpetrated atrocities that rivalled those of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sahib. He was subdued by a force acting under Brigadier Lindsay, Lieutenant-colonel Stewart, Colonels Waugh, Miles, and Foulis. Coorg was "annexed."

When in March, 1835, his lordship prepared to depart from Calcutta, addresses were poured in upon him from every part of India and every class of the community; and upon his arrival in England, the court of directors and the board of control were lavish in their encomiums upon his government.

CHAPTER CIX.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF SIR CHARLES METCALFE—GOVERNMENT OF LORD AUCKLAND—RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN—PERSIAN INVASION OF HERAT—BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE PERSIAN GULF—TREATY OF LAHORE.

ON the retirement of Lord William Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe assumed, provisionally, the government of British India. His administration was too short to admit of many incidents. There was one measure which Lord William Bentinck had initiated, but which Sir Charles Metcalfe fully carried out, which was of a nature to influence India extensively for good or evil,—freedom of the press. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the mode in which Sir Charles carried out his favourite idea. It met with much opposition and much advocacy. A public address was presented to his excellency at Calcutta on the part of a numerous and influential portion of the inhabitants, highly eulogistic of his excellency's views, and the practical application of them. Unfortunately, the natives, who have since used the press, have had no sympathy with liberty, civil or religious; and almost the only use made of the freedom conceded has been to give expression to a furious fanaticism, and a bitter

hostility to the government. Military revolt and civil insurrection have been more promoted by the native press than by any other means, not excepting even the preaching of fakeers. The government has certainly obtained the advantage of knowing, by the columns of the native press, the state of feeling which the more educated classes of the natives have cherished. It is to be feared, however, that very little use has been made of the knowledge thus derived, and the advantage has been counterbalanced by the incitement to sedition which the native newspapers have supplied.

The fact that Sir Charles held the government merely as the *locum tenens* of some nobleman, to be selected by the English cabinet, deprived his acts of the authority they would otherwise have possessed. Had this enlightened man been allowed to remain, as the directors and the proprietary of the East India Company earnestly desired and urged, it had been well for England and India. It,

however, became an understood thing that the post of governor-general of India should be held by a nobleman, and by the direct nomination of the cabinet. Mr. Canning, during his presidency of the board of control, laid it down as a principle that no servant of the company should be permitted to occupy the high post of governor-general. He alleged that the office ought to be so held as to constitute a link between the imperial crown and the people of India as well as the company. This was more specious and popular than convincing, or sincerely urged. The real object of Canning and of all ministerial parties was, to grasp the patronage of India from the company. In carrying out such an object, India has been more than once endangered, the company exposed to loss, and England to obloquy.

On the 5th of March, 1836, Lord Auckland arrived as governor-general. The appointment of this nobleman was against the wishes of the court of directors, and led to much animadversion in England. It was regarded as a discreditable party nomination; and the whigs at that time having been unfortunate in several of their *élèves* of office, there was a disposition on the part of the English public to find fault with any one upon whom they conferred any post of an important nature, unless his claims were very manifest:—"His lordship was the son of one of the most steady adherents of the administration of Mr. Pitt, under which his services were rewarded by a peerage. He acquired distinction as a diplomatist, and also as a statistical and economical writer. His son forsook the politics of his family, and attached himself to the whig party."*

The general tone of the public, and of writers on Indian affairs, concerning this appointment is indicated by the following passages from an author who has written well on subjects connected with India, although his work is not extensively known:—"The advent of Lord Auckland as governor-general of India was destined to prove a momentous epoch in the Anglo-Indian annals. On this appointment being made known, the public were somewhat at a loss to guess what peculiar quality of his lordship had formed the justification of the act. None knew what his administrative ability might amount to; and all who took the trouble to form any opinion on the subject, were unanimous that the name of Auckland could by no human possibility become distinguished in connection with the government of the vast territories over which it was decided that he should hold an almost

uncontrolled sway. But these cavillers were mistaken; they knew not their man. Before these sceptics in the achievements of an Auckland were three years older, they had the strongest possible reasons for according to his lordship a distinction and a notoriety as world-wide and as indelible as any achieved by a Clive or a Wellington. It was Lord Auckland's destiny to place the British arms in a position they had never previously occupied on the continent of India; to carve out for the British forces a career as disastrous as its origin was unjustifiable and unworthy; to peril our position in the East; to sacrifice an army of brave men; and, finally, to clothe half the nation in mourning, and to overwhelm the other half with shame and indignation."*

The commencement of Lord Auckland's administration has been thus described by Edward Thornton:—"The first year of his administration of the government of India was completed without the occurrence of any event sufficiently remarkable to require notice, and the first half of the ensuing year passed with equal tranquillity. The calm was then interrupted by some violent proceedings in that perpetual seat of trouble and disquiet, Oude."

The disturbance thus alluded to was no less than a struggle for succession to the throne, of a nature, which, although attended by some bloodshed, and which might have caused still more serious loss of life, was, nevertheless, ridiculous. The King of Oude, as the prince previously called Nabob was then generally styled, died. The English recognised as successor the claimant who, according to Mohammedan law, was the rightful heir. This was very well known by the various branches of the royal family, who, professing the Mohammedan religion, and ready to sacrifice, if they dared, the life of any person who would oppose it, yet were willing to violate its institutions and precepts when their own corrupt or ambitious desires could be gratified in so doing. Scarcely had the British prepared to place the heir upon the musnid, than the begum, or queen-dowager, at the head of a numerous train of followers, appeared at the gate of the city to place upon the throne a very young candidate, whose cause she espoused. The English had but a small force. Reinforcements could soon be obtained, but the arrangements made for bringing them to the capital were bad. The gates of the city were, however, closed. The begum demanded, in the name of "the rightful sovereign," that they should be opened. The resident refused. The queen-dowager

* *History of the British Empire in India.* By Edward Thornton, vol. vi., chap. xxix., p. 73.

* *The Three Presidencies of India.* By John Capper, F.R.A.S.

ordered one of the gates to be forced by elephants, which command was successfully obeyed. Captain Paton was knocked down and made prisoner. The rabble of retainers proceeded with the begum, took possession of the palace, and placed the youthful aspirant to sovereignty upon the musnid. British troops arrived, forced an entrance to the city, slew thirty of the begum's retinue, wounded many others, and dispersed the rest. The legal candidate for the throne was then invested with the dignity of his office, and the begum and her *protégé* made prisoners. This, however, did not terminate the troubles of succession; for when did any difficulty arise in Oude without peculiar complications, such as could hardly occur elsewhere? Various royal personages made public declaration of their right to the sovereignty of Oude, but none dared to prosecute his claim by arms. After relating these facts, Mr. Thornton notices another competitor whose mode of prosecuting his claims was peculiar. The terms in which that historian denounces the advisers of this last on the list of claimants deserves quotation. The name of this prince was Akbul-ood-Dowlah:—"This personage, under European advice, proceeded to England, and there addressed the court of directors of the East India Company. The folly of undertaking a long voyage to assert a claim known to be absolutely and undoubtedly bad, and with a certainty of its being rejected, need not be dwelt upon. What profit the advisers of the claimant derived from the expedition cannot be known; but they were fully aware that none would accrue to the person on whose behalf they affected to act. Such occurrences are not now, indeed, uncommon in the history of British India, and they will probably never cease altogether until native powers shall acquire sufficient acquaintance with the principles of British policy to prevent their becoming the dupes of unprincipled adventurers."

Soon after the conclusion of the Oude disturbances, questions arose in connection with the Rajah of Sattara, destined to occupy a more prominent place in English interests. When the Mahratta empire was destroyed, the chief of that confederation, the Peishwa, became dependant upon the mercy and generosity of England. The Marquis of Hastings conceded to the prince the dignity and independence of a sovereignty, and he became known in India and to England as "the Rajah of Sattara." The previous position of the prince resembled that which for a long time was filled by the Mogul. It was one of titled humiliation. The Mogul had been no better than a prisoner to the various Indian princes

who ruled ostensibly in his name. The Peishwa was held in durance by his chief minister. The Mahratta chiefs, Scindiah and Holkar, ruled Peishwa and Mogul, and the people in their name. From this vassalage Lord Hastings took the Peishwa, and made him independent in fact as well as name, as Rajah of Sattara. This favour was conferred on him when he had violated treaties, and by the fortune of war lost everything. He was not grateful, but conspired against his benefactors, setting up claims to the sovereignty of Hindostan, and the Mahratta empire. To accomplish his absurd aims, he attempted to corrupt the sepoy soldiery, more especially the native officers, a plan which had at last become the hope of every plotter among the native chiefs. The English had ample proofs of his guilt, but treated his power with so much contempt that they took no pains for a considerable time to punish him. Sir James Cawar arriving in Bombay as governor of that presidency, it was deemed expedient by the higher authorities of the company to commit to his management this affair. Sir James was popular; the native princes esteemed him; there existed among men of all parties confidence in his judgment, the purity of his motives, and his moderation. Contemning the rajah's power, yet wishing to avert possible complications and disturbances, Sir James adopted the course of exposing to the rajah the evidences of his guilt, of which the English were in possession, and urging upon him to abandon his conspiracies and projects of ambition. After long and fruitless efforts to induce him to adopt the course which was alone compatible with the treaties he had signed with Lord Hastings, all hope of bringing him to reason was abandoned; he was deposed, and his brother placed upon the throne. The deposed rajah followed the same plan as that adopted by the unsuccessful applicant for the throne of Oude. He hired advocates in England, and sent over diplomatic agents, whose business was to accuse before the directors the conduct of their servants in India; failing in that, to arraign the directors themselves before the court of proprietary, and that proving fruitless, to impeach the East India Company before the parliament and the country. These agents denied all that had been alleged against the rajah, of which the company and the board of control had the most conclusive proofs. In public assemblies, where such statements might be safely made, the rajah's rights to an extensive sovereignty in Southern and Central India, were made the subject of declamation. Many benevolent persons who favoured the "Society for the Protection of

Aborigines," and many members of the "Society of Friends," who always sympathise with the aggrieved or oppressed, gave a willing ear to the advocates of the rajah, some of whom were men of surpassing eloquence. The result was, a long continued agitation in favour of the deposed prince, which issued in no advantage to himself, while his long hoarded treasures were dissipated in largesses and stipends to those whom he employed in his advocacy in England.

When Lord Auckland arrived in India, he found rumours of a projected Russian invasion prevailing at Calcutta, and, indeed, all over the peninsula. Political and philanthropic parties in England have ridiculed these rumours as foolish, or denounced them as created by the military to promote a war, and ensure distinction and promotion. Members of the "Peace Society," who seem to believe, by constantly endeavouring to make others believe, that England can never have a just war, were the foremost in pronouncing that these apprehensions of Russian intrigue were groundless. The British government was, however, in possession of conclusive evidence that Russia sought to create an influence in Central and Western Asia inimical to British interests in India, and calculated to spread the prestige of her own greatness, and prepare the way for the advancement of her own empire.* The chief instrument of Russia in her projects was Persia. Through the influence of the shah, it was believed that a way might be opened to British India. The czar determined to buy, or conquer, or cajole alliances to the very gates of Hindostan. Moreover, Persia was incited to encroach upon Afghanistan, so as to bring her boundary nearer to India; because, while the czar encroached from the Caspian upon Persian territory, Persia would complain less if indemnified on her Afghan frontier.

A most interesting correspondence was published, under the authority of government, entitled, "Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Persia and Afghanistan." It consisted of 117 official letters, diplomatic notes, and reports; besides the documents corroborating the important facts connected with the subject. Embracing a period of about four years and three-quarters, it begins with a despatch, dated St. Petersburg, 15th January, 1834, addressed to Lord Palmerston, announcing the probable settlement of the succession to the throne of Persia, and closes with a circular from the Foreign-office,

dated March 20th, 1839, assigning the motive which induced our government to withhold, for a time, all diplomatic intercourse with that country. In reference to these papers, Sir John McNeill observed—"The evidence with which these documents abound of a deep-rooted hatred of our prosperity cherished by that power, and of a settled and well-digested plan of progressive hostility, not the less dangerous from disguise, or the less effectual from the cautious and wary steps with which it is generally prosecuted, is so circumstantial and so palpable that any endeavours to set that evidence in a stronger or clearer light would weaken instead of confirm the effect."

Persia, incited by Russia, made war upon that portion of Afghanistan which she wished to seize. Colonel Borowski, the Russian ambassador at the court of Teheran, urged the invasion of Candahar and Herat.* Russian agents spread themselves all over Persia, urging the people to war. The czar's ambassador openly encouraged the Persian court to seize upon the coveted territories before the British could interfere for their defence.† Mr. McNeill (afterwards Sir John) succeeded Mr. Ellis as the envoy of England to the Persian court. Through him the English government offered its mediation‡ between Persia and Cabul. This was done in a manner exceedingly calculated to dissuade the young shah from his ambitious designs. Nevertheless, the Persians advanced against Herat, accompanied by Russian officers. The following abstract of the state papers published on this subject, is attributed to Sir John McNeill himself:—"Upon receiving the above intelligence, Lord Palmerston directed the Earl of Durham (Paper No. 34, January the 16th, 1837) to ask Count Nesselrode whether the extraordinary conduct held by Count Simonich in Persia was in accordance with the instructions he had received from his court. Lord Durham, in his answer,§ asserts most positively, in the name of Count Nesselrode, that Simonich had no instructions of the kind inferred by Mr. McNeill, and that the charges brought against the Russian minister arose no doubt in misapprehension. This assurance was still further confirmed by the next despatch of Lord Durham,|| wherein his

* Parliamentary paper, No. 11. Despatch of Mr. Ellis from Teheran, Nov. 13, 1835.

† Despatches of Mr. Ellis, from Teheran, from No. 12 to 28; beginning 24th Dec., 1835, ending Aug. 22nd, 1836.

‡ Despatch of Lord Palmerston, June 2nd, 1836. Paper No. 29.

§ No. 33, Feb. 16, 1837.

|| No. 36, Feb. 24, 1837.

* The author, in his *History of the War against Russia* (Virtue, Ivy Lane and City Road, London), has entered into this question, and afforded proof of the intrigues of Russia in the direction now noticed.

lordship states the substance of a conversation he had had with Mr. Rodofnikin, Russian under secretary of state, who protested most solemnly against any supposition injurious to the sincerity of his court, offering to exhibit to Lord Durham the original book, containing the instructions transmitted to Count Simonich. In the meantime the shah's army, harassed by numerous detachments of Turcoman horsemen hanging on his flanks and in his rear, abandoned the siege of Herat, and returned to his capital, where we find Count Simonich again urging, on the 30th December, 1836, the expediency of resuming the expedition against Herat in the spring, and offering, by way of further encouragement, the assistance of his own military services. Agents from Cabul and from Candahar, secretly instigated by Russian emissaries, made at this period their first appearance at Teheran, and endeavoured to conciliate the favour of Count Simonich and of the shah. They offered to co-operate with Persia against Herat, and sought protection against the Sikhs. Kumber Ali Khan was sent by the shah on an embassy to Dost Mohammed Khan, of Cabul, who was represented as having applied for the assistance of Russia and of Persia.

"Taj Mohammed Khan (despatch No. 40), agent from Candahar, at Teheran, accompanied by the Persian minister for foreign affairs, visits the Russian ambassador, and receives from him a letter and presents for his master. He is forbid to visit Mr. McNeill, whose influence is now in a rapid state of decline; while Russian intrigue is everywhere active and triumphant among the numerous nations or tribes of central Asia, according to the several inclosures contained in this despatch.

"On the 2nd of May, 1837 (No. 42), Mr. McNeill communicates to Lord Palmerston that he had renewed his offer of mediation between Persia and Afghanistan, and on the 1st of June, of the same year (No. 43), he justified himself against Count Nesselrode, renewed his charges against Count Simonich, and supplied various further most conclusive details in proof of the accuracy of his former statement, nor was it long before the progress of events removed whatever doubts might still attach to his unequivocal assertions; as on the 15th of July, 1837, Mr. Rodofnikin placed in the hands of Mr. Millbank a copy of a despatch, dated May 28, 1837, and addressed by Count Simonich to Count Nesselrode, conveying the intelligence of a renewal of the expedition against Herat. This was soon confirmed by Mr. McNeill himself (despatch No. 45, 3rd January, 1837), who at the same time informed Lord Palmerston that the preparations for war had been kept a profound secret

entirely on his account. It appears further that Mr. McNeill called upon Count Simonich (No. 47, June 30, 1837,) and the conversation which passed between them in the presence of Captain Sheil is a striking example of that solemn kind of mystification which the presumption of superior power ventures sometimes to put on the credulity of the weak, not in the hope that it will be believed, but merely to avoid the harshness of stating an unwelcome truth. Count Simonich acknowledged, in reference to the denial of Count Nesselrode, that in his official capacity he was bound, if not to dissuade, at least to abstain from encouraging the warlike mood of the shah; but he at the same time states that his own individual opinion was quite at variance with his public duty. Having to choose between two opposite lines of conduct, and to make his election whether in this matter he should advocate the wishes and intentions of his master the emperor, or his own, he preferred the latter." Mr. McNeill threatened to withdraw from the Persian court, and remove Colonel Sheil,* the English commissioner, from the Persian camp. This alarmed the shah, who endeavoured to dissuade so extreme a course on the part of the English minister, and Mr. McNeill consented to remain. The Russian minister, intensely desirous to effect the removal of both McNeill and Sheil, succeeded in influencing the Persian court to measures intolerably insulting to the English officials, so that after many efforts of a conciliatory nature, Mr. McNeill withdrew from the court,† sending however a letter of useless remonstrance. There was a want of firmness both in the despatches of Lord Palmerston and the tone of Mr. McNeill, which weakened the influence of the latter, both with the Russian envoy and the Persian court. The menaces of the English agent "wanted precision of means and limitation of time," which rendered them inoperative.

Mr. McNeill left the camp of the shah of Persia on the 7th of June, 1838, and at once proceeded towards the borders of Turkey. The departure of the English ambassador created alarm amongst the shah's advisers, and messengers were sent beseeching him not to cross the frontier, and means would be speedily adopted to bring about a reconciliation. This conciliatory conduct on the part of the shah was quickened by intelligence which reached his camp, that an English force had arrived in the Persian Gulf, and had taken possession of the Island of Karak. Lord Auckland also had issued a manifesto, and

* Brother of the Right Hon. Richard Lalor Sheil, celebrated in the agitations of Roman Catholic emancipation.

† Paper No. 85, June 25, 1838.

made a demonstration upon the Indus, which constrained his Persian majesty to adopt more moderation in his policy. The consternation which filled the people, also acted upon the court; the wildest ideas spread, not only in Teheran but the provinces, as to the powerful army with which the English were about to invade Persia. It was in vain that the czar's envoy ridiculed the idea of the English being able to send a large army anywhere, the credulous Persians believed the rumours of English power and purpose as readily as they before received the news circulated of Russian greatness and resolve. They were actuated, like all orientals, by display of force, or the conviction that it could and would be put forth,—diplomacy, resting upon international law and the faith of treaties, had no meaning for them. Even Count Simonich, the Russian envoy, and Captain Vicovich, the Russian military commissioner, became really alarmed, supposing that a sufficient substratum of truth lay beneath the reports which had been circulated to give just grounds for apprehending that the English were at last roused, and were about to put forth their might. The Persian monarch taunted the Russian diplomatist with having deceived him as to the relative power of the two great European countries, and demanded some practical proof that Russian assertions of capacity and resources, were something more than empty boastings. The only answer his excellency could make to such an appeal was his withdrawal from the Persian court and camp. He retired from Herat September 9, 1838.*

Uncertain as oriental courts proverbially are, there has been always a peculiar levity about that of Teheran. After the departure of the Muscovite envoy, the shah, as if from sheer folly or passion, refused to abandon his designs upon Herat. Simonich had left secret agents, Russian, Affghan, and Persian, well supplied with Russian gold, to effect what his presence would render more difficult of accomplishment as things stood. These men played their game well, and succeeded in inducing his majesty to order the resumption of hostilities, when the spring of 1839 rendered a campaign practicable.† Mr. McNeill also obtained precise information of a treaty between the chief of Candahar and the Shah of Persia, *under the guarantee of Russia*, hostile to the independence of Affghanistan and the safety of British interests in India. The promises made to induce Mr. McNeill to return to the court were evaded, and he reluctantly crossed the boundary into Turkey and returned to England.

* Government papers, Nos. 90, 92, 94, 95, 98.

† Government papers, No. 106. Nov. 28th, 1838.

While these transactions were passing in Asia, matters in connection with them assumed a serious aspect in Europe. Lord Palmerston, then holding the seals of the English Foreign-office, demanded from Russia a categorical explanation of the conduct in Persia of the accredited agents of the government of St. Petersburg. The Marquis of Clanricarde was then the British ambassador at St. Petersburg; he waited upon the Russian minister for foreign affairs, and presented the draft of a note from Lord Palmerston, worthy of the great diplomatic talents of that extraordinary man. The note concluded with the following passage, the firmness, force, and dignity of which produced a great effect upon the Russian minister and his master:—"The British government readily admits that Russia is free to pursue, with regard to the matters in question, whatever course may appear to the cabinet of St. Petersburg most conducive to the interests of Russia; and Great Britain is too conscious of her strength, and too conscious of the extent and sufficiency of the means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note relates. But the British government considers itself entitled to ask of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, whether the intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia, and towards Great Britain, are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and Mr. Rodofnikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Count Simonich and Mr. Vicovich."*

The Russian government disavowed its agents. The Russian foreign minister addressed a note to the ambassador from his court to the court of London, November 1st, 1838,† declaring that Count Simonich and Captain Vicovich were unauthorised in adopting the course which they pursued towards Persia, Affghanistan, and England. This despatch alleged that Captain Vicovich was not really a military commissioner with the shah's army before Herat, but a *commercial agent*, sent to secure for his country commercial advantages which the English sought to monopolise in Asia. Notwithstanding the disavowal of the offending agents, which the despatch contained, its tone was resentful and arrogant. The despatch assured the British minister that Count Simonich was recalled, and General Duhamel sent to Persia in his stead. Captain Vicovich was also recalled.

Lord Palmerston's replies to this and subsequent despatches of Count Nesselrode are

* Government Papers, No. 106. October 28, 1838.

† Government Papers, No. 110.

characterised by remarkable sagacity, adroitness, and firmness, tempered with courtesy. His lordship declared that the resumption of diplomatic intercourse with Persia would depend upon entire satisfaction being rendered to the English government for past insults and injuries, and the abandonment by the shah of all ambitious designs upon territory contiguous to British India. The active and ostensible interference of Russia was thus brought to a termination; the mischief it had effected remained, and furnished occasion for the Affghan war.

While this series of events was passing in Persia and on the Affghan frontier, another series not less important was going on elsewhere. Lord Auckland, on his arrival in India, directed his attention to the navigation of the Indus,* and formed commercial treaties with the Indian states bordering on that river. These proceedings excited jealousy on the part of the Affghan chiefs, the Persian shah, and the czar, and no doubt incited the hostile proceedings which they adopted. It is necessary here to glance at the state of Affghanistan at this period, and of the Sikh territory.

Runjeet Singh, whose reputation for courage and sagacity pervaded all north-western India, ruled over the country of the five rivers. He had a fine army, disciplined by French officers. His power and resources were great, and his ambition at least equalled them. He was desirous of enlarging the bounds of his dominions, whether from the British, the Ameers of Scinde, or the Affghans, he cared not, so as his acquisitions were valuable, and his means of conquering them safe. The English deemed it wise to stand well with Runjeet; he was a barrier to Affghan and Persian. The Sikh ruler appears to have been keenly alive to the process of absorption of native states by the English, although he felt it to be his policy to remain on friendly terms with so powerful a neighbour. It is related of him that in a conversation with a company's officer, he pointed to a large map of India before him, on which the British territories were defined by a narrow red band, and exclaimed, "When Runjeet dies, company's red line swallow up all Punjaub country."†

The various states or chieftainships of Affghanistan (as the reader will see by turning to the geographical portion of this work), lay beyond the Punjaub. The chiefs of Candahar and Cabul were the most important of these, and the latter was regarded as the supreme chief of Affghanistan. Shah Sujah, the imbecile ruler of Affghanistan, had been expelled

that country, in the ordinary Eastern style, to make room for one far better able to rule such a turbulent people as were his subjects; and the deposed chief appeared well satisfied to find himself with his head on his shoulders, eating the company's "salt" within the walls of the British fortress of Loodianah, one of the north-western frontier stations.*

The brother of Shah Sujah, named Mahmoud, was the successful competitor for the throne of Cabul. He was indebted for his fortunes to a chief named Futteh Khan. This chief was murdered by the man he raised to a throne; for what ingratitude is too base, or what sanguinary deed too cruel for an oriental Mohammedan prince? The relatives of the khan determined to avenge his injuries. They promoted a successful revolution, and Mahmoud fled to Herat, where he reigned over a limited territory. The brothers of the murdered khan divided the dominions of Mahmoud. Amongst these brothers the most energetic and sagacious was Dost Mohammed Khan, and he reigned in the seat of Affghan empire, Cabul. The other brothers resided at Candahar. Shah Sujah, the ejected monarch, twice attempted to recover the throne from which Mahmoud had expelled him, but his efforts were unsuccessful.

Amidst these turbulent proceedings, the vigilant and enterprising monarch of the Punjaub found opportunity to annex the rich Affghan province of Peshawur, "the gate of Hindostan." The Shah of Persia supposed it possible that he also might gain something by the turmoil, and the weakness which it created, and he began that course of intrigue and aggression, in which he was encouraged by Russia and resisted by England, chiefly because his success would give Russia a position of relative strength dangerous to English dominion in India. A memorandum drawn up in January, 1836, by Mr. Ellis, the predecessor of Mr. McNeill, as British envoy to the Persian court, sets the danger apprehended by England in its true light, with great perspicuity of statement and perspicacity of language.

"The Shah of Persia lays claim to the sovereignty of Affghanistan as far as Ghizni, and is fully determined to attempt the conquest of Herat in the spring. Unfortunately, the conduct of Kamram Meerza, in violating the engagements entered into with his royal highness the late Abbas Meerza, and in permitting his vizier, Yah-Mohammed Khan, to occupy part of Seistan, has given the shah a full justification for commencing hostilities. The success of the shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by Russia, and their

* Government Papers, No. 3. September 5, 1836.

† *The Three Presidencies.*

* *The Three Presidencies.*

minister here does not fail to press it on to early execution. The motive cannot be mistaken. Herat once annexed to Persia may become, according to the commercial treaty, the residence of a Russian consular agent, who would from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Afghanistan. Indeed, in the present state of the relations between Persia and Russia, it cannot be denied that the progress of the former in Afghanistan is tantamount to the advance of the latter, and ought to receive every opposition from the British government that the obligations of public faith will permit; but while the British government is free to assist Persia in the assertion of her sovereign pretensions in Afghanistan, Great Britain is precluded by the ninth article of the existing treaty from interfering between the Persians and the Affghans, unless called upon to do so by both parties; and, therefore, as long as the treaty remains in force, the British government must submit to the approach of Russian influence, through the instrumentality of Persian conquests, to the very frontier of our Indian empire."*

To thwart the projects of Russia, and make eastern Afghanistan the barrier for the defence of British India, became the objects of the British government. Lord Minto had previously conceived this idea, and Lord Auckland believed that the time had arrived for carrying it out. In order to ascertain whether it could be accomplished, a mission, ostensibly commercial, was sent from India in September, 1837. Captain, afterwards Sir Alexander Burnes, was selected for this purpose. He had travelled in Afghanistan, and knew the character of its chiefs. On his arrival at Cabul, he perceived that the agents of Russia and Persia were active there, as Captain (Colonel) Sheil found them at Herat, and Mr. Ellis and Mr. McNeill knew them to be at Teheran. The Candahar chiefs had solicited Russian aid to expel Runjeet Singh from Peshawur. They had previously desired to make a convention with the English for that purpose, whose connections with Runjeet did not allow of any interference with his ambition when not directed against themselves.

Captain Burnes, apprised of the proceedings, used every influence he could bring to bear with the Ameer of Cabul and his brothers at Candahar, to detach them from Russian and Persian alliance. Dost Mohammed pretended to concur in Captain Burnes's arguments and policy. It is probable that the ameer preferred British alliance, but he had no reliance

upon British faith. He averred that what Captain Burnes promised, Lord Auckland would probably disallow; that Lord Auckland's promises would be probably repudiated by his successor, or the company, or the Queen of England. He was so situated as to be obliged to come to terms with one side or the other, and the projects and promises of Russia and Persia were clear, distinct, and definite; those of Captain Burnes were vague and general, on the plea that his authority was limited. The Russian ambassador wrote from Herat to Cabul, and to Candahar, offering sufficient money to secure the conquest of Peshawur. The Russian government would send the specie to Bokhara, and the khans should procure the means of conveying it safely thence.

The determination of the Affghan chiefs to recover Peshawur from Runjeet Singh, and the inability of the English to offer any hopes of securing that object or assisting it in any way, weakened the power of English diplomacy. Finally, Captain Burnes withdrew from Afghanistan, the chiefs assuring him that they preferred English alliance, but that Russia was the greater power, and they found it necessary to place their country under its protection.

Lord Auckland was prepared for such an issue. He had determined upon preventing the conquest of Herat, or if conquered, to compel its restoration. Contemporaneous with the presence of an English squadron in the Persian Gulf, a treaty between Runjeet Singh, the ex-king of Cabul, and the governor-general, led to the formation of a plan for a military campaign against Afghanistan. India was tranquil, and secure on every frontier, so that his excellency was enabled to organize an army of twenty-five thousand men, and send them across the Indus.

Meanwhile Russia was moving troops in central Asia in a manner which caused great agitation from the Oxus to the Indus. The following extract of a despatch from Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston, strikingly exhibits the fact and the effect:—

Teheran, December 30, 1837.

I learn through native channels of information, which are not unworthy of credit, that a large body of horse, consisting of many thousands, had marched from Khiva two months ago to the aid of Kamran, and that, after long doubt and hesitation, the government of Bokhara had at length decided on sending a considerable body of horse to Kamran's assistance. This force, the number of which was not stated, had, it was said, been paid and mustered at Bokhara, preparatory to its setting out for Herat, when the letters containing this information were written. The same informant states, that all the principalities bordering on Persia to the eastward, having become alarmed for their own safety, had determined to send succours to Herat, believing that if that city fell they should have to defend themselves in their own territories. A general,

* Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan, presented to both houses of parliament by command of her Majesty.

indeed an universal, opinion prevails in all those countries, that Persia is pushed on and supported by Russia in her schemes of conquest; and I must confess that the demonstrations of joy which Count Simonich manifested on the fall of Ghorian, were well calculated to confirm that impression, for they far exceeded the expressions of gratification which might have been expected, even from the Persian government itself.

The Persian army before Herat amounted in the spring of 1838 to forty thousand men, and although the chief of Herat destroyed all means by which the enemy could procure supplies within a considerable distance of that city, ample provisions were obtained. This circumstance was much dwelt upon by Mr. McNeill in his communications to Lord Palmerston, as showing that Persia was well supplied with money, and that food and provender for a large army could with ease be ordinarily found, if operations against India were undertaken in that direction.

The importance of preserving Herat, the basis of Lord Auckland's policy in the emergency that arose, may be seen by the English reader from the perusal of two documents, one an extract of a despatch from Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston; the other a despatch from his lordship to the British envoy.

Camp before Herat, April 11, 1838.

In the meantime, Captain Vicovich continues to remain at Cabul, and I learn from Captain Burnes's communications, that the success of his negotiations there will in a great measure depend on the failure of the shah's enterprise against Herat. At Candahar our position is even more precarious; and I have the honour to inclose a translation of a draft of a treaty between the shah and the chief of Candahar, which it is proposed to conclude by the mediation and under the guarantee of Russia, and which has for its object to unite Herat and Candahar under a chief, who shall be nominally subject to Persia, but actually under the protection of Russia. I am unable to inform your lordship what progress has been made towards the conclusion of this treaty, or what view the shah may have taken of the position in respect to these countries, in which, by this arrangement, he would be placed; but the treaty is said to have been signed by Kohundil Khan, and I am not without very serious apprehensions, that even before the fall of Herat, Kohundil Khan may be induced to co-operate with the shah; while in the event of Herat's being reduced, I cannot doubt that the chief of Candahar will consider it to be for his advantage to connect himself with Persia and Russia rather than with England. I therefore continue to be of opinion that the fall of Herat would destroy our position in Afghanistan, and place all, or nearly all, that country under the influence or authority of Russia and Persia. I need not repeat to your lordship my opinion as to the effect which such a state of things would necessarily have on the internal tranquillity and security of British India; and I cannot conceive that any treaty can bind us to permit the prosecution of schemes which threaten the stability of the British empire in the East. The evidence of concert between Persia and Russia for purposes injurious to British interest is unequivocal, and the magnitude of the evil with which we are threatened is in my estimation immense, and such as no power in alliance with Great Britain can have a right to aid in producing. Our connection with Persia has for its real and avowed original

object to give additional security to India, and it has been maintained for the purpose of protecting us against designs of the only power that threatened to disturb us in that quarter; but if the proceedings of Persia, in concert with that very power, are directed to the destruction of the security and tranquillity which it was the sole object of the alliance with Persia to maintain; and if they obviously tend to promote and facilitate the designs which the alliance was intended to counteract; I confess I cannot believe that we are still bound to act up to the letter of the treaty, the spirit of which has been so flagrantly violated. I do not hesitate to repeat my conviction, that if our only object were to preserve as long as possible the alliance of Persia, that object could best be effected by preventing her from taking Herat.

Foreign Office, July 27, 1838.

SIR,—I have to instruct you to state to the Shah of Persia, that whereas the spirit and purport of the treaty between Persia and Great Britain is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier for the British possessions in India, and that the Persian government should co-operate with that of Great Britain in defending British India; it appears on the contrary, that the shah is occupied in subverting those intervening states between Persia and India, which might prove additional barriers of defence for the British possessions; and that in these operations he has openly connected himself with an European power, for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, to British interests; that under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter upon a course of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned treaty, Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that treaty, such measures as a due regard for her own interests and the security of her dominions may suggest.

Urged by the Russian agents the shah continued the siege of Herat, the defence of which was directed by a young subaltern of the East India Company's army, Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, brother to Sir Henry Pottinger, so distinguished as an officer and diplomatist in India.

In July, 1838, a breach was effected by the Persian cannon, and the troops of the shah gallantly attempted to storm it. The Affghans charged them sword in hand, drove them out, and pursued them across the ditch, making extraordinary havoc. The number of the killed and wounded amounted to between seventeen hundred and eighteen hundred men. The loss in officers was most serious, a number of Russian officers assisting in the direction of the shah's forces having perished; amongst them was Major-general Barowski. Two of the principal khans in the Persian army were killed, and four others wounded. Nearly all who fell received wounds from the Affghan scimitar. This event was most humiliating to the Russians, more especially as Count Simonich planned the attack. This dreadful repulse did not cause the shah to abandon the siege. He probably would have done so, but Russian obstinacy and perseverance prevented such a result. The shah's army, aided by the Khan of Candahar's, be-

came more active in the neighbourhood, and subjected the subsidiary forts and towns.

Colonel Stoddart, who was afterwards murdered by the King of Bokhara, was employed by Mr. McNeill to bear despatches to the shah, in the autumn of 1838. The colonel presented his majesty with the final demands of England, which were :—

"1st. That the Persian government shall conclude an equitable arrangement with the government of Herat, and shall cease to weaken and disturb these countries.

"2nd. That the Persian government, according to the stipulations of the general treaty, shall conclude a commercial treaty with Great Britain, and that it shall place the commercial agents of Great Britain on the same footing, with respect to privileges, &c., as the consuls of other powers.

"3rd. That the persons who seized and ill-treated Ali Mahommed Beg, a messenger of the British mission, shall be punished; and that a firman shall be issued, such as may prevent the recurrence of so flagrant a violation of the laws and customs of nations.

"4th. That the Persian government shall publicly abandon the pretension it has advanced, to a right to seize and punish the Persian servants of the British mission, without reference to the British minister.

"5th. That the governor of Bushire, who threatened the safety of the British resident there, shall be removed; that the other persons concerned in that transaction shall be punished; and that measures shall be taken to prevent the recurrence of such proceedings."

When this document was presented, a scene took place of a singular character, which, as being so recent a transaction, and depicting so strikingly the manners of the Persian court, cannot fail to interest the reader. Colonel Stoddart describes it in a despatch to Mr. McNeill.

Royal Camp, before Herat, August 12, 1838.

I have the honour to inform you, that I arrived yesterday, at 11 A. M., and proceeded direct to the Haje's tent. Omar Khan, the son of the Candahar chief, Kohundil Khan, with eight Affghans, were there. The minister himself was with the shah, and on his return received me in a friendly manner, ordered a tent for me in my old quarters, near my stable, made me his guest, and fixed to-day for my reception by the shah. He inquired what news there was, and I told him I should have been here two days before, had not Thamasp Meerza thought proper to send seven horsemen, with Mahommed Khan Jaleelawund, after me from Ghorian, who detained me by force, which indignity he excused by saying he considered it the interest of Persia to detain me, without having any orders to do so. This I should represent to you I said, as I was not at liberty to enter on any other subject than those with which I was specially charged.

To-day, at half-past 10 A. M., I received an official note from the deputy-minister for foreign affairs, Meerza Ali, requesting me to accompany him, agreeably to the shah's

directions, to the royal presence. I accordingly went, and was handsomely received. After delivering your letter, I delivered the message in Persian. On my coming to a pause, in the part requesting him to turn from ill-disposed advisers and refer to his own wisdom for the interests of Persia, his majesty said, "The fact is, if I don't leave Herat there will be war, is not that it?" I said, "It is war; all depends on your majesty's answer. God preserve your majesty," handing the original English written message. He said, "This was all I wished; I asked the minister plenipotentiary for it, and he would not give it, alleging that he was not authorised." I said, "He was not then, but now he is ordered to give it. No one could give such a message without especial authority from his sovereign." He declared again that such a paper was all he had wanted, and turned for assent to his chamberlains. He complained the paper was in English, which he could not read, and three times requested me to give him what I had read from in Persian, or to translate it for him, which I declined, referring him to the original. I said that was according to our custom, and requested his majesty would soon favour me with an answer, that I might forward it without delay. He said, "Immediately and without delay, they shall translate it for me. Meerza Baba and Meerza Sauleh shall translate it, and the answer shall be given immediately, it will not take long, to-day or to-morrow." His majesty then read your letter, and I took my leave. The shah's manner throughout was marked by more than his usual kindness, both towards myself and in inquiries after you. He was in a raised room, up six or seven steps, the room was small and full, and the deputy-minister did not take me into the room, but the shah made me come up close to him, and as his majesty spoke very kindly in welcoming me, I did not think it a fit occasion to stickle for ceremony; otherwise I would not have delivered the message without entering the room.

This interview with the shah was speedily followed by another, which Colonel Stoddart thus relates:—

Royal Camp, before Herat, August 14, 1838.

I have the honour to inform you that the shah summoned me to an audience this morning, at which his majesty formally gave an answer to the message I had the honour of delivering in writing on the 12th instant. His majesty stated, "We consent to the whole of the demands of the British government. We will not go to war. Were it not for the sake of their friendship, we should not return from before Herat. Had we known that our coming here might risk the loss of their friendship, we certainly would not have come at all." I replied, that I thanked God his majesty thus regarded the true interests of Persia. His majesty then said, "The British will, I trust, arrange for us this matter of Herat." I replied, I was commanded, in case of his majesty's desiring British mediation between Persia and Herat, to acquaint him, that I was empowered to conclude, on your part, the original arrangements that had been made; and drawing the paper of terms out of my pocket, I said, "Here are those terms, by which the envoy extraordinary is still ready to stand." His majesty read them, and said, those were his own terms, and added all we want is one thing, that they should not make incursions into Khorassan. There is a great Mollah come to camp from Herat, with whom we will arrange the matter." I replied, "It is most easy;" and assured him, that the British government was most anxious to put an end to this slave-taking. He wished to retain the paper of terms, but I told him I had not another copy, and would give him a copy of it, which in the afternoon I furnished to the deputy-minister for foreign affairs for his majesty. On coming from the shah's presence, I acquainted deputy-minister, that as far as it went, the answer of the shah was most satisfactory; but that we

now looked to the fulfilment of his majesty's words; and I hoped no delay would take place, as every hour was valuable, and I could not undertake to say the operations of our troops would be suspended by anything less than the shah's actually carrying into effect what he was called upon to do by the British government. The deputy-minister saw this in the light I desired, and on my returning his call in the evening, said the shah had given orders about returning hence; and that his majesty would probably place the arrangement with Herat in my hands, and that respecting the reparation for the treatment of the Gholam, his majesty was considering it, and would order it as soon as he had decided what to do with Hajee Khan. The deputy-minister assured me the whole would be carried into effect immediately.

Notwithstanding the assurances so positively, publicly, and formally given to the British agent, the very next day a heavy musketry fire was opened by the Persian infantry against the defences of the city. Colonel Stoddart at once adopted a tone so indignant and firm that the assurances were renewed, and the Persian foreign minister sent a formal declaration to Mr. McNeill of the acquiescence of his majesty in all the demands of Great Britain.

On the 6th of October, 1838, Mr. McNeill, in a despatch to Viscount Palmerston, informed him that the shah had raised the siege, and that Colonel Stoddart had dispatched a person who had accompanied the army fifty miles from Herat. In this despatch the British envoy bore the following honourable testimony to the wisdom and courage of Colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger:—

"In concluding this despatch, I hope I may be permitted to solicit the favourable consideration of her majesty's government for Lieutenant-colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, who have both, during this protracted siege, been exposed to all the hardships and privations, the one, of the besiegers' camp, the other, of the besieged city. Colonel Stoddart has brought to a

successful conclusion his duties in camp, and Lieutenant Pottinger has thwarted all the military efforts of the Russian officers of superior rank, who for some months conducted the siege, and all the intrigues by which the Russian mission sought to sow dissension and excite alarm amongst the defenders of Herat."

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the Persian army from before Herat, the shah was unwilling to give up several minor forts and districts which he occupied, and showed such reluctance to fulfil his agreements on various points, that Mr. McNeill was obliged to defer his return to the Persian court, and to carry on a voluminous correspondence with Colonels Stoddart and Sheil, and with his government. The shah addressed a diplomatic note to various European governments, reflecting upon the whole proceedings of the British government, and this opened new ground of contention between the envoy and the Persian court. Finally, the influence of Russia was brought to bear upon the Persian court to induce submission, in consequence of the firm and able conduct of Lord Palmerston, in London, and the Marquis of Clanricarde, in St. Petersburg.

The British government was determined, in order to its own security, to place Shah Sujah, the expelled ameer of Cabul, upon the throne, and to depose Dost Mohammed. As before noticed, Runjeet Singh joined in a convention for that object. This agreement was called "the treaty of Lahore." It has been also noticed, on a former page, that Lord Auckland advanced 25,000 men across the Indus. The alarm in Afghanistan and Persia created by this step, had much influence in deciding Persian policy. Another chapter will relate the conduct and results of the Afghan war.

CHAPTER CX.

THE AFFGHAN WAR—BOMBARDMENT OF KURRACHEE—SUFFERINGS OF THE TROOPS—STORMING AND CAPTURE OF GHIZNI—ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH ON CABUL—SHAH SUJAH PLACED UPON THE MUSNID—GENERAL WILSHIRE STORMS AND CAPTURES KHELAT.

The following was the arrangement as to the quality and amount of force in this expedition:—"Bengal and Bombay were each to furnish a portion of the British force, and the command of the whole was to be entrusted to Sir Henry Fane, commander-in-chief in India. From Bengal were provided two troops of horse and three companies of foot artillery, the whole under the command of Brigadier Graham. The Bengal cavalry brigade, under

Brigadier Arnold, was formed of the 16th lancers and the 2nd and 3rd light cavalry. One division of infantry, comprehending three brigades (1st, 2nd, and 3rd), were commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton; another, consisting of two brigades (4th and 5th), by Major-general Duncan. The first brigade was composed of her majesty's 13th light infantry, and also of the 16th and 48th native infantry; it was under Brigadier Sale. The second

brigade, commanded by Major-general Nott, contained the 2nd, 31st, 42nd, and 43rd regiments of native infantry. The third, under Brigadier Dennis, comprehended the Buffs, and the 2nd and 27th native infantry. The fourth brigade, composed of the Bengal European regiment and the 35th and 37th native infantry, was placed under Brigadier Roberts; and the fifth, comprising the 5th, 28th, and 53rd regiments of native infantry under Brigadier Worsley. An engineer department under Captain George Thomson, was provided, together with two companies of sappers and miners, native soldiers, with European non-commissioned officers. The equipment of this force was completed by a siege-train of four eighteen-pounders, two eight-inch and two five-and-a-half-inch mortars, with two spare howitzers, one a twenty-four, the other a twelve-pounder.

"The Bombay force under Sir John Keane, the commander-in-chief at that presidency, consisted of two troops of horse, and two companies of foot artillery, under Brigadier Stephenson; a brigade of cavalry, composed of two squadrons of her majesty's 4th light dragoons and 1st Bombay light cavalry, under Brigadier Scott; and a body of infantry, consisting of her majesty's 2nd and 17th, and of the 1st, 5th, 19th, and 23rd native regiments, under the command of Major-general Willshire. The Poonah auxiliary horse were to accompany this force, which also brought into the field an engineer department, a detachment of sappers and miners, and a siege-train, consisting of two eighteen-pounders, and four nine-pounders.

"Law has its fictions, and so has statesmanship. The force, of which a detailed account has been given, though, in fact, intended for the conquest and occupation of Afghanistan, was regarded only as an auxiliary force aiding the operations of the Shah Sujah-ool-Moolk, at the head of his own troops. Under the sanction of the British government, an army had, indeed, been raised ostensibly for the service of the shah; and this as a point of decorum, was to be regarded as the chief instrument by which he was to regain possession of his dominions. The shah's army consisted of a troop of native horse artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and five of infantry. Major-general Simpson, of the Bengal army, was appointed to the command of this force, for which a staff and commissariat were duly organized, a military chest established, and satisfactorily provided. The whole of the above force was to advance by Candahar on Cabul. Another force, assembled in Peshawur, was to advance on Cabul by way of the Khyber Pass. This

was called the Shazada's army, Timur, the son of Sujah, having the nominal command. It consisted of about four thousand eight hundred men, artillery, infantry, and cavalry, obtained from various sources—British sepoys and adventurers, raised for the occasion, partly regular and partly irregular, and armed with almost every conceivable variety of offensive and defensive weapon, sword, shield, match-lock, musket, and rifle. With this force acted the Sikh contingent of six thousand men, under General Ventura.* The whole of this combined force was under the command of Colonel Wade. Another Sikh force, under one of Runjeet's native officers, was posted on the frontier of Peshawur, as an army of observation."

On the 1st of October, 1838, the governor-general, by proclamation, dated Simlah, gave an *exposé* of his motives for this expedition, which have been already incidentally adverted to in the relation of the intricate, complicated, and varied transactions which the intrigues of Russia had brought about. The governor-general insisted in this document upon the necessity of the East India Company possessing a friendly and allied state or states upon the north-west boundaries of their dominions. At the same time his excellency appointed Mr. W. Hay Mac Naghten minister on the part of the government of India to the court of Sujah-ool-Moolk. The staff of agency nominated to assist Mr. Mac Naghten, were Captain Burnes, Lieutenant D. E. Todd, Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, Lieutenant B. Leech, and Mr. P. B. Lord, a surgeon in the company's service, who afterwards much distinguished himself. Lord Auckland designated the force by which the reinstatement of Sujah upon the throne of Cabul was to be effected, "the army of the Indus."

At the end of November, the Bengal army was encamped at Ferozepore. At this place a series of remarkable interviews occurred between the governor-general and the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, which were conducted with ostentatious magnificence.

While the Bengal army was quartered at Ferozepore, it was determined that a smaller force should be employed, as being equally efficient, and more easily subsisted. Sir Henry Fane, feeling the difficulty of selecting the troops to advance—all the Europeans among them being eager to proceed—determined it by lots. The following portions of the army had the fortune to win:—the 1st, 2nd, and 4th brigades of infantry; 2nd troop 2nd brigade horse artillery; and the camel battery of nine-pounders. Sir Henry Fane remained behind from ill health.

* One of Runjeet Singh's French officers.

Major Pew took the command of the artillery instead of Brigadier-general Graham. The command of the Bengal force, which advanced, devolved upon Sir Willoughby Cotton; and it was ordered that when a junction was formed with the Bombay army, the united divisions should be commanded by Sir John Keane.

Early in December, 1838, Shah Sujah's army marched. It was followed in a few days by the Bengal troops. Early in January the allies arrived on the banks of the Indus. The shah's troops then began to desert, but the desertion was not carried to any great extent. The Bengal sepoys were also exceedingly unwilling to enter Afghanistan. Those among them who were Mohammedans were reluctant to fight against their co-religionists. Those who were Brahminical feared to fight at all; they apprehended that in a strange country, beyond the boundaries of India Proper, they would of necessity be deprived of the means of preserving caste. This apprehension was well founded. When the Bombay sepoys joined, they were found far more willing for the performance of duty. This irritated their brethren of the Bengal army against them, so that frequently in performing work supposed to be somewhat beneath the dignity of caste, the Bengal sepoys jeered and taunted those of Bombay for doing what the Bengalees either neglected or refused to attempt. There was a disloyal spirit among the Bengal sepoys which does not appear to have extended to the native officers, nor even non-commissioned officers, and was concealed in the presence of Europeans. Indeed, something of enthusiasm appears to have been simulated; for Captain, afterwards Sir Henry Havelock, describes the whole Bengal army as animated by military ardour.

Captain Burnes had concluded a convention with the ameers of Scinde, by which the British were to take possession of the fortress of Bukkur, "situated on an island in the Indus, between the towns of Roree on the eastern bank, and Sukkur on the western; the eastern channel being that which separates it from Roree, and by which the British force approached, is about four hundred yards in width."

The services of Captain, afterwards Sir Henry Pottinger, were of great importance in Scinde at this juncture, as the tardiness of the government at Calcutta, and the want of direct dealing on the part of the Scinde ameers, rendered hostilities in Scinde not improbable. The Bombay army was accordingly delayed on its march, and the Bengal

army against Hyderabad, the capital of Scinde. Fresh intelligence having arrived of the success of Captain Pottinger's negotiations, the Bengal army halted, and after a short delay, to make sure of the good faith of the ameers, it returned to Bukkur. Captain Havelock gives a graphic description of those changes, and the emotions which they excited in the army:—"At this period the spirits of every soldier in the Bengal contingent were buoyant and high. Before us lay Hyderabad; it was known to contain the accumulated wealth of the most affluent as well as powerful of the branches of the Talpore family, amounting in specie, jewels, and other valuables, and ingots of gold, to eight crores of Scindian rupees well told, or not less than eight millions sterling. Such a prize is not often in a century, even in India, presented to the grasp of a British army."* A few pages afterwards he says, "In a moment all our visions of glory and booty were dispelled; it was announced to us that the ameers were at length brought to a sense of their impending danger, and that, compelled to comprehend that a few days would, according to every calculation of human prudence, deprive them at once of their independence, their capital, and the accumulated treasures of years, they had accepted unreservedly all the conditions of the treaty laid before them by Colonel Pottinger."† "Vainly repining, therefore, at the change in events which had given this small sum (ten lacs) to the state, instead of endowing the army with eight crores, its officers and men, with light purses and heavy hearts, turned their backs on Hyderabad, from which they had hoped never to recede until they had made its treasure their own, and put to a stern proof that Beloochee valour which had so loudly vaunted its power to arrest their further progress, and fix on the banks of the Indus the war which they had set out resolved to carry into the centre of Affghanistan."‡

The tone of these extracts is hardly in keeping with the softness of character attributed to the late Sir Henry Havelock. He was, however, a stern soldier, although a kind and pious man. He was ambitious of military distinction, as far as honour and principle allowed, and he had an intense desire to become a good military historian, and to make Xenophon his model in that respect.

On the 20th of February it was deemed expedient that the Bengal column should take the lead, and, accordingly, the irregular force of Shah Sujah fell behind. It was thought

* *Narrative of the Campaign in Affghanistan.* By Captain Havelock, vol. i. p. 151.

† P. 155.

‡ P. 157.

possible that in the neighbourhood of Shikarpore the ameers might offer some opposition, notwithstanding their recent treaties, and it was better to ensure a speedy chastisement, such as the Bengal force would inflict, whereas the Shah Sujah's army might be defeated, and occasion a general violation of the convention by the ameers.

The progress of the Bombay army was unsatisfactory, the Scinde ameers having violated those terms of the convention by which camels and supplies were to be provided. It was not until the end of December, 1838, that it arrived at Tatta, where it was met by Sir John Keane, and was detained for a considerable time. On the 4th of March, 1839, this army was "officially declared to have become part of the army of the Indus."

Previous to the arrival of the Bombay division at Tatta, other events occurred still further provocative of the ill-feeling existing among the ameers to the British. Brigadier Valiant was placed in command of a reserve, consisting of her majesty's 40th regiment of the line, two thousand two hundred Bombay native infantry, consisting of the 2nd grenadiers, the 22nd and 26th regiments, and detachments of pioneers and artillery. By the request of Captain Pottinger, Sir Frederick Maitland, commander of the naval forces on the Indian station, proceeded with the ship *Wellesley*, the 40th regiment, and the artillery, to Kurrachee. The *Berenice* and *Euphrates* steamers, with the native troops on board, arrived on the 1st of February before Kurrachee. Sir Frederick summoned the commandant of the fort to surrender it to the British forces. He refused. Five companies of the 40th were landed; they took up a position in the rear of the fortress. The *Wellesley* brought her broadside to bear within eight hundred yards. In an hour the face of the fortress exposed to its fire was a heap of ruins. The soldiers of the 44th charged through the open space, no enemy offering resistance. To the astonishment of the conquerors, the garrison only consisted of twenty men, who having hid under the cliffs, escaped injury. They were made prisoners by the 40th. On the 2nd of February, the British flag floated over the ruined walls of the fort of Kurrachee.

On the 16th of April the Bengal column was at Quettah, having marched through the Bolan Pass without encountering any resistance. On that day Sir John Keane arrived with the advances of the Bombay army; the main body was several marches in the rear. Both columns were harassed by bands of robbers, who seemed to condemn death where there was a prospect of plunder. It was

generally believed in the army, that in the Kojuk Pass advantage of its precipitous and varied formation would be taken by the enemy. There were difficulties in getting through this pass, irrespective of the dangers. Dacoits, and other predatory wanderers, appeared at intervals, but no attack was made by an Affghan force. On the 20th of April the Bengal army reached Candahar; the Bombay force did not arrive until seventeen days later. The sirdars fled. Shah Sujah advanced through a line of his own troops, occupied a temporary musnid, and was proclaimed sovereign of Affghanistan. The commissariat of the army was execrable, no proper forethought had in this particular been exercised. The march to Candahar was in consequence attended by great suffering and great loss. "It must be confessed," says Captain Havelock, "that hitherto our task has been escorting, not campaigning, but this pacific duty has been performed under arduous circumstances; and the exposure to the vicissitudes of climate, the fatigue, and the deficiency of food and water, which tried the strength and resolution of our troops between Quetta and Candahar, as well as the active hostility of the predatory tribes, ought never to be despised as military difficulties. How gladly would our army have exchanged them for the most determined opposition of the Affghans in the field! How often did our officers long for a battle to raise the sinking spirits of the soldier, and make him feel that he was not labouring and suffering in vain." * Captain Havelock also thus wrote concerning the sufferings of this army:—"The plain on which our camp is now pitched is not, like the level of Siriab, watered by deep and well-supplied kahreezes,† carrying coolness and the promise of fertility down their slopes. A small cut through which we found water flowing from a spring-head in the mountains, has alone supplied us with the useful element since first we advanced to this point. This little channel the Candahar sirdars have caused to be dammed up near its source in the hills, and behold two bold brigades and the levy of the shah reduced to the greatest straits. Horses, already half-starved for want of grain and good grass, were throughout the day panting in all the agonies of thirst; and in the evening a few drops of water could not be obtained even to mix the medicines of the sick in our hospitals, or to supply them with the refreshment and comfort of a few spoonfuls of tea. All ranks have been taught to understand to-day how little prized when plentiful, how outrageously demanded when scarce, is that

* *Narrative*, vol. i. pp. 332, 333.

† Subterranean aqueducts.

bounteous provision for the wants of God's creatures, water! Weary of the delays which had kept us so long at Dundee Goolae, we moved forward on the 21st* into the plains which we had surveyed from the summit of the Kojuk Pass, recognising all the distinctive peaks of the scattered hills which we had observed from that commanding height. We saw them now magnified as we approached them, and casting a dark shade over the plains which they overhung. Anxious looks were from time to time cast towards these green eminences, and their bases were carefully searched for any small streams which might supply the urgent wants of a thirsting force. It was not very pleasant to discover that this day, too, we must depend for a supply of the indispensable element on the stream of a small and imperfect kahreez. Its water was brackish, and flowed scantily and sluggishly. Thousands of brass *lotas* and leathern buckets were soon dipped into the little channel; and though proper regulations were promptly established, one-half of the force had not been watered before the scarcity commenced. Soon diluted mud alone could be obtained, and whole regiments, under a burning sun, with parched lips, sighed for night to cool them, and then for morning, that they might move on to a happier spot. The troops were buoyed up towards evening with fallacious hopes of the waters of a spring, actually discovered in the hills, being brought down to their relief into the plains; but up to the hour of early march no stream had begun to flow into the dry bed of a nullah,† on which many were gazing in hope. The sufferings of the soldiers, both European and native, were for some hours so great as nearly to tempt some for a moment to forget the restraints of discipline; and never do its principles achieve a greater triumph than when troops are seen obedient and respectful, and trying to be cheerful under this form of privation. At Killa Puttoollah, officers of the highest rank were brought to acknowledge the value of this simple element. This was no time for the luxurious ablutions which, under the sun of Central Asia, preserve health and restore strength; no time to waste a single drop of the precious fluid on any bodily comfort, or for any purpose but preparing food, or slaking a raging thirst; and thousands felt this day that all the gifts of that God whose public praise and ordinances were forgotten on this Sabbath of unwilling penance, would have been worthless to man, if in his anger he had withheld the often-despised blessing of water. The kindness and consi-

deration with which some officers of no low rank shared the little portion of the much-coveted fluid which they could obtain with the privates around them, was creditable to their humanity, and ought to have won the confidence and affections of those whom they commanded."*

On the following day, the army, unable to find water, was compelled to advance:—"Forward the brigade moved, to finish a second march of ten miles, their horses dropping from drought and exhaustion as they toiled on, and leaving in the mountain passes melancholy traces of this day's sufferings and perseverance. When the cavalry had thus got over five miles, in the course of which British dragoons and native troopers were seen eagerly sharing with their chargers muddy and foetid water drawn from puddles at the side of the road, the very sight of which would, in Hindostan, have equally sickened all to whom it was offered, they struck into a by-road on their left, and winding their way by a narrow path through an opening in the undulating eminences, found themselves towards evening on the banks of a plentiful stream. The rush of unbridled indulgence of the troops and their horses into its waters, after all the privations of the morning, may fairly be described as uncontrollable. What moderation was to be expected from man or beast breaking forth from the restraints of a two days' unwilling abstinence?"†

Well acquainted with this distress, the Affghan banditti hovered about the camp at Candahar, presuming that the men on outpost duty would be too weak to be on the alert, or to avenge such robberies as might be perpetrated upon the convoys and material. The British chiefs in command seemed incapable of making provision for the commissariat of an army, and even in Candahar no adequate arrangements existed to supply the troops.

Shah Sujah spent money freely in attempting to enlist under his standard the Affghan chiefs. They accepted his gold and cheated him. He had neither power nor popularity, and indications were already numerous that the British would have to establish him on the throne of Cabul, in spite of the tribes. The army was obliged to remain in Candahar until the 27th June, unable to procure provisions. During the time the shah and his British auxiliaries were marching to Candahar and occupying that place, "the Lion of the Punjaub," as old Runjeet Singh was termed, was operating by way of Peshawur. His martial career in connection with the

* April, 1839.

† Artificial watercourse.

* *Narrative*, vol. i. pp. 319—322.

† *Captain Havelock's Narrative*, vol. i., pp. 323, 324.

tri-partite alliance was not destined long to continue, for before the forces of the other two parties to the alliance left Candahar, he died. Shah Sujah, and the British commanders acting with him, were happily ignorant of the event, or it would have probably deterred them from marching to Cabul, as it was apprehended in India that the death of the Maharajah would be followed by great changes, and perhaps violent revolutions, the consequences of which to the alliance might be of the most serious kind.

At last the march for Cabul began, the soldiers being put upon half rations, although a most difficult task lay before them. There was plenty of provisions left behind in Candahar, the army having no means of conveyance. While the troops were encamped they were half starved, because provisions could not be procured by the ill-managed commissariat. When about to march, abundance of food was at their command, but the mis-managed transport service could not bring it with the army. There was force in the mingled sneer and compliment which a native prince had made long before, that "the English ought to be carried in palanquins to the field of battle, and then set down to fight." His highness considered them more adapted to fighting than campaigning.

The army reached Ghizni on the 22nd of July. The English generals were without intelligence as to the strength of the fortress. Worse still, they were under impressions on the subject positively false. The battering train had been left in Candahar, *under the impression that it would not be required.* The English officers were even informed that no defence would be made at Ghizni, cowardice and treason combining to place the fortress, without a struggle, in the hands of Shah Sujah. Captain Thomson, chief engineer of the army of the Indus, thus describes the first impressions of the scientific department of the army on approaching the place:—"We were very much surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about thirty feet high, flanked by numerous towers and surrounded by a *fausse braye* and a wet ditch. The irregular figure of the *enceinte* gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles had been enlarged; screen walls had been built before the gates; the ditch cleared out and filled with water (stated to be unfordable), and an outwork built on the right bank of the river, so as to command the bed of it." Such was the impression made by the first near

view of the fortress of Ghizni. "The works," Captain Thomson adds, "were evidently much stronger than we had been led to anticipate, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner with the means at our disposal. We had no battering train, and to attack Ghizni in form a much larger train would be required than the army ever possessed. The great height of the parapet above the plain (sixty or seventy feet), with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack merely by mining or escalading."*

The allies met with an unexpected advantage, by which their task was facilitated. A nephew of Dost Mohammed deserted to the English, and afforded valuable information. Upon a careful reconnoissance the intelligence thus derived was found to be correct, as far as such means of confirmation could be of service. The fortifications showed no weak part. The gates had all been built up with strong masonry, except the Cabul gate. The engineers reported that there was no feasible mode of attack but by blowing open that gate with powder, and charging through the smoke and fire, over the *débris*, into the place.†

This plan having been resolved upon, it was necessary for the army to change ground, an extremely difficult operation under the circumstances of the case. The troops were without proper rations; they had endured excessive fatigue, and the weather, as is usual at that time of year in the elevated districts of Afghanistan, was cold, and would be especially felt by hungry and harassed men. The army had not been encamped three hours when it was ordered to march in two columns. The men murmured, but not disloyally, at this movement, the necessity of which they did not perceive. It was necessary, however, for as Captain Outram (afterwards General Outram, and one of the heroes of Lucknow) relates—"It was confidently stated that Dost Mohammed Khan himself marched on the 16th (of July).‡ The distance is eighty-eight miles (we made seven marches), and by regular marches he would have reached Ghizni on the 22nd (next day), and as this day (21st) he would have been within one march, and would have heard the firing, he would, it was to be supposed, push on; so that there

* Memoranda of the engineers' operations before Ghizni in July, 1839.

† In his *Narrative of the Afghan Campaign*, Major Hough asserted that none of the gates were built up, and that therefore all the gates were accessible to the same means of assault as the Cabul gate. In a later work describing the same campaign the major omits the statement. He was with the army.

‡ From Cabul.

was a great object in not delaying in changing ground. As in 1834 Dost Mohammed had moved from Cabul to defend Candahar against the shah, the presumptions were in favour of his march to Ghizni. We knew from Dost Mohammed's own nephew that two of the three gates were blocked up; and it was argued by some that the sudden movement to the Cabul gate, which was said not to be built up, would put the enemy on their guard, and cause that gate also to be secured; whereas, by a march in the morning, it would not appear so suspicious. The movement was a delicate one, being a march in two columns by two different routes; for it involved a night march for the rear and much of the baggage, if not for the troops, as we were not to march till four in the afternoon, and the route for both columns could not be well known. The march in two columns would, it was concluded, expedite the movements, but then there were two columns of baggage to protect, and we could not protect that of the column on the right. The march of the baggage at all that night was inconvenient, and we gained no time by it."

The necessity of making the change so promptly, and of executing it so rapidly, caused much suffering on the part of the troops. Captain Havelock describes their sensations on the night when their march was executed, as they took up their miserable quarters:—"A son of the Ameer of Cabul had marched down from the capital with the view of deblocking Ghizni, and was now close to us. The forces of the Ghiljies, Abdoolruhman and Gool Moohummud, were in the field at no great distance. A party, also, of fanatics from the Sooluman Kheils, who had taken arms when a religious war had, as a last resource, been proclaimed by the tottering Barukzyes, now occupied the heights to the eastward of the valley in which the fortress stands. Reflections on these circumstances and on our want of a battering train, the glimmering of the lights on the hostile battlements and in the plains, and the chill of the night air, effectually chased away slumber until day broke on the 22nd."*

When day dawned, many of the sick were still pursuing the tedious march, and it was necessary to send out parties to bring them in. Many of the camp followers had lost the track of the columns, and parties of cavalry had to scour the country for their protection. These miserable camp followers had suffered horribly. The author of *The Three Presidencies* affirms that 100,000 persons of this description left the banks of the Indus with the grand army, and that of these not 20,000 returned, the rest perishing by sword, famine,

* *Havelock*, vol. ii. p. 65.

or cold. With considerable difficulty the sick and the stragglers were rescued before the appearance of any of the forces intended to raise the siege. Scarcely was the safety of these helpless persons secured, when crowds of ferocious irregulars descended from the hills to attack the head-quarters of Shah Sujah. The shah's cavalry charged and defeated them. Captain Ontram led a portion of his Afghan majesty's irregular infantry into the fastnesses of the neighbouring hills, to beat up the nests of the fanatics. This raid was attended with success, having been accomplished with the gallantry and judgment which are so characteristic of that resolute and talented officer. He made many prisoners, and captured the banner of green and white, a standard of fanaticism under which they had been gathered to wage a holy war against the English infidels. When the prisoners were brought in, a terrible event followed. They cursed the shah in his presence, and some of them drew weapons and stabbed the shah's officers. He ordered them to be put to death, an order which was executed upon sixty most formidable and fanatical ruffians.

In the evening the officers received their orders for the assault, which were soon communicated to the soldiers, when a display of that heroic emulation characteristic of the English soldier took place. The whole of the European troops were ready to volunteer for the assault. Dr. Kennedy, in his narrative of the campaign, relates:—"On visiting the hospital tents of her majesty's 2nd and 17th regiments, I was surprised to find them clear of sick; the gallant fellows had all but risen in mutiny on their surgeons, and insisted upon joining their comrades." The sick were employed as sentinels, and some of the more convalescent on outpost duty. The night was spent in preparations for the attack. Storms prevailed throughout, so as to render the movements of the English inaudible in the city. Ghizni seemed to sleep in perfect stillness; not a signal-light gleamed through the gloom which overhung it, nor a sound from its garrison reached the parties preparing to assail it. It was necessary to make a feint in order to conceal the real plan of attack. Three companies of the 35th regiment of native infantry, under Captain Hay, marched round to the north side of the fortress and opened an unremitting fire of musketry, which could scarcely be heard amidst the bellowing of the storm. The balls, however, telling upon men stationed on the parapets, and at the loop-holes, the fire was returned. The field artillery and camel battery of nine-pounders

* *Narrative*, vol. ii., p. 46.

opened, the former from heights which commanded the citadel, the latter from the low grounds directed a fire against the walls. Even the fire of the nine-pounders could hardly be heard, except in the lulls which occurred in the storm. The enemy employed all the guns they could direct against this cannonade. Previous to the dispatch of Captain Hay's detachment against the north face of the defence, four companies of the 16th native infantry, and two of the 48th, succeeded in occupying a position on the outskirts of the town. Within an hour of dawn, the officers of engineers had stealthily advanced near to the gate against which the assault was to be made. The party consisted of Captain Peat, of the Bombay engineers; Lieutenants Durand and M'Leod, of the Bengal engineers; three sergeants, and eighteen men, of the sappers.* Captain Havelock represents Captain Thompson, the chief officer of engineers, as having himself undertaken this task, which is an error; the service was committed to the officers named. The enemy, suspecting that some hostile plan was in progress without divining what, burned blue lights. These were, however, burned upon the top of the walls, instead of being cast below. Captain Peat believed that had the latter course been adopted, the plan of attack would have been discovered and frustrated. Captain Havelock has fallen into another error in representing the engineer party as conveying nine hundred pounds of powder for the purpose of blowing open the gate. The charge was three hundred only, and this was far above the amount usually deemed necessary for blowing open gates, which was from sixty to one hundred pounds. The bore was placed, and the train laid without the plan being detected, or any serious casualties occurring.

Behind the engineer party a fine column of infantry was placed on the Cabul road, ready to rush forward when the train should be fired. This column was constituted as follows:—"The advance was composed of the light companies of the Queen's, the 17th, and the Bengal European regiment, and of Captain Vigor's company of the 13th light infantry. It was led by Colonel Dennie. The main column, under the immediate command of Brigadier Sale, was made up of the remainder of the Queen's and Bengal Europeans, whilst, as an auxiliary to its efforts, the whole of the 13th, excepting its storming company, extended as skirmishers along the whole of the assailed point of the fortress. The support was, her majesty's 17th regiment, led by

Colonel Croker. The reserve, commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton, was composed of the remaining companies of the 16th, 35th, and 48th."

Before dawn approached the signalled moment arrived; the train was about to be fired. At that instant a brilliant blue light burnt up above the gateway, and a crowd of the enemy's staff was seen pouring down, if possible, to discover the cause of the movements of men, which were again indistinctly heard by the sentinels. The match was touched by the British engineers, a rumbling noise rolled along the earth where the assaulting column stood, and beneath the city a dense compact column of smoke shot up where the glare of blue light had been illuminating all around; a crash followed, the gate was shivered to atoms, the huge masonry above it fell in ruins, burying the chiefs and soldiers who had an instant previously looked forth so wistfully from its battlements. High above the din of the cannonade, the rattle of musketry, and even the rushing of the tempest, the British bugle rang out shrill and clear, and, as if in a single bound, the column of the assailants leaped forward and pierced the opening of the chasm which now yawned to receive them. The Affghans recovered from their surprise with creditable promptitude, and, sword in hand, pressed towards the fatal breach. The English had no sooner set foot within the entrance, than the concussion of large bodies of men, hand to hand in deadly strife, swelled above the tumult of the night. The clashing of arms, the shout of the combatants, the scattered and desultory fire of such as used their musketry, went forth over the hosts within and without, creating intense excitement and suspense. The principal fighting devolved upon the advance, which at last made good its entrance, took up a position which covered the entrance of the main column, and by their triumphant cheers encouraged their followers forward. Yet, at this moment, all was nearly lost, and those who had gained an entrance were exposed to danger of destruction. This event has been better told in Havelock's narrative than elsewhere:—

"Brigadier Sale, whilst his skirmishers were closing by sound of bugle, had steadily and promptly pressed forward to support the forlorn hope. As he moved on, he met an engineer officer suffering from the effects of the recent explosion, and anxiously inquired of him how the matter went. This gallant person had been thrown to the ground by the bursting of the powder; and though he had not received any distinct wound, fracture, or contusion, was shaken in every limb by the concussion. His reply was, that the gate was

* *History of the British Empire in India.* By Edward Thornton.

blown in, but that the passage was choked up, and the forlorn hope could not force an entrance. Brigadier Sale was too cool and self-possessed not to be able at once to draw the inference, that to move on under such circumstances was to expose his troops to certain destruction. He ordered the retreat to be sounded. The tempestuous character of the weather, and the noise of the fire of all arms, did not prevent this signal from being heard, even by the reserve; but it conveyed the order which British soldiers are always slowest in obeying. The column, however, made a full halt in the path of victory; but the check was not of long duration. The brigadier, perfectly calm at this moment of supposed difficulty, addressed himself to another engineer officer, with whom he happily fell in at this interesting moment. He assured him that though the passage of the gateway was much impeded, the advanced stormers, under Colonel Dennie, had already won their way through it. The brigadier promptly gave the signal to move on.

"But the delay, short as it had been, was productive of mischief. It had left a considerable interval between the forlorn hope and Brigadier Sale's column, and just as the latter, in which the Queen's regiment was leading, had pressed into the gateway, a large body of Affghans, driven headlong from the ramparts by the assault and fire of Colonel Dennie's force, rushed down towards the opening, in the hope of that way effecting their escape. Their attack was made upon the rear company of the Queen's, and the leading files of the Bengal European regiment. The encounter with these desperate men was terrific. They fiercely assaulted, and for a moment drove back the troops opposed to them. One of their number, rushing over the fallen timbers, brought down Brigadier Sale by a cut in the face with his sharp shumsheer.* The Affghan repeated his blow as his opponent was falling, but the pommel, not the edge of his sword, this time took effect, though with stunning violence. He lost his footing, however, in the effort, and Briton and Affghan rolled together amongst the fractured timbers. Thus situated, the first care of the brigadier was to master the weapon of his adversary. He snatched at it, but one of his fingers met the edge of his trenchant blade. He quickly withdrew his wounded hand, and adroitly replaced it over that of his adversary, so as to keep fast the hilt of his shumsheer; but he had an active and powerful opponent, and was himself faint from loss of blood. Captain Kershaw, of the 13th, aide-de-camp to Brigadier Baumgardt, happened, in the *mêlée*, to

approach the scene of conflict; the wounded leader recognised, and called to him for aid. Kershaw passed his drawn sword through the body of the Affghan,* but still the desperado continued to struggle with frantic violence. At length, in the fierce grapple, the brigadier, for a moment, got uppermost. Still retaining the weapon of his enemy in his left hand, he dealt him with his right a cut from his own sabre, which cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows. The Mohammedan once more shouted, 'Uo Ullah!' † and never spake again." Sale regained his feet, and persisted in directing the efforts of his soldiers, who were still fighting, and had yet to make sure their way. At last the walls were everywhere conquered, and there was street-firing and close conflicts where scattered groups of British and Affghans met. The commander-in-chief, perceiving the entrance was open, ordered the cannonade to be directed against the citadel, against which also Sale, who seemed to regain strength under the excitement, directed the soldiers of the 13th.

Colonel Croker and the support came on slowly, being obstructed by the *débris* of the gateway and masonry, and by the wounded, whom the surgeons were bringing beyond the walls. The reserve came up with the retarded supports, and entered in one body. The Affghans, however, gaining courage by the slow progress of the supports, mounted the walls and skirmished; some, finding concealments, picked off the English soldiers. When the last of the reserves had entered, the anxiety of the British was not over. The citadel was strong, and might offer considerable and even dangerous resistance. Events relieved their anxiety in an unexpected manner. The commander of the place, Mohammed Hyder, was paralysed by the suddenness of the onset, and the astonishing manner, as it appeared to him, by which the British effected an entrance. He abandoned the defence in despair. The 13th and 17th English regiments forced the gates and entered the citadel, scarcely any resistance being offered. They at once planted their colours, and as these flaunted in the breeze, and displayed their unmistakeable symbols in the morning light, the whole army, within and beyond the walls, raised a prolonged cheer of victory.

Sir J. Keane was conqueror of Ghizni. Desultory efforts were still, however, made by the enemy. A fire was poured from the ramparts upon the reserve, heavier than that which galled the support. On entering the place, the reserve ascended that rampart. The Affghans,

* Kershaw went on into the battle.

† "Oh God."

* Asiatic sabre.

finding that every shelter was penetrated by their persistent enemy, made a gallant charge, sword in hand, to cut a passage to the gateway, in the hope of escape. The track over which they rushed was studded with groups of wearied soldiers, doolies containing wounded men, and the horses of the Affghans running wildly about. As the fugitives pressed forward, they cut, indiscriminately, at everything, even the horses, but their chief desire was to destroy the wounded and helpless. This enraged the British soldiery; the scattered groups gathered along the route, and not one Affghan passed the gateway,—they were shot down or bayoneted to a man. In the streets groups of Affghans still remained, who kept up a dropping fire, and then, retiring to the houses, reserved their shots for the officers, who especially suffered from this cause. These desperate men refused quarter, so that the houses had to be stormed and the defenders put to the bayonet. Sir John Keane entered the city escorting Shah Sujah to his fortress, won for him by the dauntless valour of his allies.

During the storming of Ghizni, a son of the ruler of Cabul remained with 5000 horse in observation. He saw the result of the struggle—the British flag floating near the citadel. He fled to Cabul to report the disaster. The cavalry of Sir John Keane instituted a hot pursuit, inflicting some loss upon the enemy.

The army advanced upon Cabul, where it met with no resistance, and Shah Sujah was elevated to the musnid, without any manifestation of joy or regret. Thus the conquest of the throne of Dost Mohammed was achieved with little loss by arms, though with enormous sacrifice of life, arising from the defective organization of the British army in the transport and commissary departments. The loss of the English in killed and wounded in Ghizni was not more than two hundred men, amongst whom not one officer was slain,

although a large proportion fell wounded by the fire from the houses.

Colonel Wade, who was at Peshawur, as soon as he heard that the commander-in-chief had marched from Candahar for Cabul, also set out for the same direction, penetrating the celebrated Khyber Pass. The chief obstacle to the progress of Wade's brigade was the fort of Ali Musjed. It was stormed with a loss within ten men of that sustained by the British at Ghizni, and a greater proportion of killed. Wade entered Jellalabad unopposed, and marched thence, without meeting an antagonist, to Cabul.

While the British remained in full force at Cabul, various minor expeditions were undertaken against villages, fortified rocks, and country forts; the Affghans generally refusing quarter, and dying with the utmost enthusiasm, indicating the most vindictive animosity, believing that they perished for the faith of Islam, and gained Paradise. The most important of these lesser enterprises was the reduction of Khelat. That fort and territory was governed by a Beloochee robber-chief. He had inflicted many mischiefs upon the British, and manifested to them an intense resentment. The conquest of this stronghold was committed to General Willshire, an officer who proved his competency for the trust reposed in him. The robber khan defended his fortress with more valour than skill. The English with surpassing courage took by storm the surrounding heights, battered in the principal gate of the fortress by cannon, and took the place by assault. The slaughter was great, the Beloochees and Affghans fighting with furious valour, and desperate self-sacrifice. The chief himself died, sword in hand, at the head of his devoted adherents. Captain Outram represents the prisoners as 2200, including the wounded; the slain he computes at nearly one-fourth that number. Thus ended the first stage of the great Affghan war.

CHAPTER CXI.

AFFGHAN WAR (Continued)—MARCH OF SIR ROBERT SALE FROM CABUL TO JELLALABAD—DEFEAT OF AKBAR KHAN—MAINTENANCE OF THE POSITION UNTIL RELIEVED BY GENERAL POLLOCK.

WHEN the British had, as they thought, established the throne of Shah Sujah, the whole Affghan races were plotting the destruction of the invaders and their *protégé*. The robber tribes in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass succeeded in plundering and rout-

ing the Sikhs, by whom they were guarded. Mr. Mackinson, Colonel Wheeler, and other officers, civil and military, made agreements with the Khyber chiefs, and even subsidized them, but the Mussulman chieftains kept faith with none.

Under circumstances of such general hostility, it is strange that Lord Auckland should deem it expedient to remove a great part of the force which should have remained to protect the newly elevated monarch until he had succeeded in strengthening his party, and securing the prospect of a tolerably undisturbed reign. Such, however, was the decision of the government of Calcutta; Sir John Keane was ordered to return with a large portion of the troops.

The author of *The Three Presidencies*, a good writer, but a warm partizan, and who assails all the measures of Lord Auckland, because he owed his appointment to a whig government, thus remarks upon the return of Sir John Keane:—"The commander-in-chief hastened from the scene of his hollow exploits; and scarcely resting at the seat of government, took his way home, to show himself to the British public as the conqueror of Afghanistan, receiving, as the fruit of his splendid achievement, a title and a pension; the greatest exploit of the entire campaign having been the blowing open of a wooden door with a few bags of gunpowder." This was the tone of that portion of the press in India and in England, which discussed public affairs, and the conduct of public men, in the spirit of party. "Blowing open a wooden door with a few bags of gunpowder," was not a faithful description of a work of great military skill, which Captain Thompson devised, and other engineer officers executed. The conquest of Ghizni by Keane, and that of Khelat by General Willshire, were achievements of skill and valour, and entitled the officers and men who effected them to honourable distinction. These distinctions were ultimately conferred. "In addition to the thanks of parliament and of the East India Company, the governor-general, Lord Auckland, received an advanced step in the peerage, being created Earl of Auckland. Sir John Keane was created a peer, and parliament added a grant of a pension of two thousand pounds a year to the general and his two next heirs male. Mr. Mac Naghten and Colonel Henry Pottinger were created baronets; Colonel Wade obtained the honour of knighthood; Sir Willoughby Cotton received the Grand Cross of the Bath; General Willshire, Colonel Thackwell, and Colonel Sale were made knight-commanders; and Colonels J. Scott, Persse, Croker, and R. Macdonald, companions of that order. There was also an extensive grant of brevet rank." One officer, who had served not many years short of half a century, Colonel Dennie, was passed over unrewarded, while his inferiors in service and seniority, received high honours. It is to be deeply regretted that just com-

plaints are so often heard in connection with the unrequited services of distinguished military men, and that promotion is so frequently distributed with a partial hand. Few cases have been more flagrant than that of the heroic Colonel Dennie, even although such abuses are numerous, disheartening to the service, and dishonouring to the country.

On the 2nd of January, 1840, "a general order" announced the dissolution of the army of the Indus. Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir W. Mac Naghten were left in Cabul as political agents. Major-general Elphinstone was placed in command of the troops in garrison, and as commander-in-chief of the army of occupation. The state of the commissariat was desperate; it was only by paying an extraordinary price that any provisions could be obtained. Seldom has a garrison been left in such a condition as that at Cabul under General Elphinstone. The worst part of the army was the general himself. He was utterly incompetent to command it, and that incompetency brought ruin upon the army and to the cause for which the occupation was intended. The following description of General Elphinstone, and of the circumstances of his nomination to command, is as just as it is moderate in its tone:—"The officers who served under General Elphinstone throughout this unhappy crisis have invariably spoken of him with tenderness and respect. He was an honourable gentleman, a kind-hearted man, and he had once been a good soldier. His personal courage has never been questioned. Regardless of danger, and patient under trial, he exposed himself without reserve, and bore his sufferings without complaining. But disease had broken down his physical strength, and enfeebled his understanding. He had almost lost the use of his limbs. He could not walk; he could hardly ride. The gout had crippled him in a manner that it was painful to contemplate. You could not see him engaged in the most ordinary concerns of peaceful life without an emotion of lively compassion. He was fit only for the invalid establishment on the day of his arrival in India. It was a mockery to talk of his commanding a division of the army in the quietest district of Hindostan. But he was selected by Lord Auckland, against the advice of the commander-in-chief, and the remonstrances of the Agra governor, to assume the command of that division of the army which of all others was most likely to be actively employed, and which demanded, therefore, the greatest amount of energy and activity in its commander. Among the general officers of the Indian army were many able and energetic men, with active limbs and clear understanding. There was one—a cripple,

whose mental vigour much suffering had enfeebled; and he was selected by the governor-general to command the army in Afghanistan.* The secret of this disgraceful conduct on the part of Lord Auckland, is the spirit of policy which pervades all our public offices, and from which few of our public functionaries keep clear. Lord Auckland was made governor-general of India because it was "a good thing," and the party he supported desired to find a good thing for him. He in turn gave the command of the army in Afghanistan to a friend and supporter, because such ought to be provided for, and the command itself was one of honour and emolument. If the public welfare was left out of sight by the government which appointed Lord Auckland, it cannot be matter of surprise if he in his turn thought nothing of the commonwealth when nominating others to office.

Scarcely was General Elphinstone left in command when indications were given that Shah Sujah would have a hard struggle to maintain his crown. Still, the first winter was got over without revolt; but the spring and hostilities opened together. Dost Mohammed was riding about among the tribes, swearing them on the Koran to do battle with the Feringhies. Akbar Khan, the Dost's most warlike son, raised large forces, and displayed great activity, as well as some military enterprise and capacity. The English authorities, both civil and military, at Cabul, were utterly incapable of discharging the duties which devolved upon them. Sir Alexander Burnes, and Sir W. Mac Naghten, however high their reputation for diplomatic talent and knowledge of Indian affairs, were unequal to the position they then occupied. Their incredulity and credulity were alike astonishing. They refused to believe the most credible testimony as to the state of Afghanistan generally, and believed the professions of the chiefs in and around Cabul, in spite of ocular demonstration of their rebellion.

During the summer of 1841 there were contests everywhere, the wild chieftains cutting off the supplies of the British, and harassing the garrisons with fatiguing vigilance. The turning point in the fortunes of Shah Sujah was the attempt to cut down the expenses of his government. An author† of distinguished merit has thus depicted the event:—"In October, 1841, Kohistan became the seat of an extensive conspiracy against British authority, and the Eastern Ghiljies, one of the largest of the clans into which the Afghans are divided, were trying to break a yoke they never wished to wear. At the same time it

was found that the million and a quarter, the cost of maintaining the authority of Shah Sujah, was more than the dignity was worth to us, certainly more than it was proper to appropriate from the revenues of India, especially as a loan had to be raised, and money came in very slowly. It was then found necessary to cut down the expenses occasioned by this sacrifice in favour of legitimacy, and the retrenchment began with the stipends and the subsidies furnished to the wild Ghiljie chieftains."

The effect of this has been thus described by Mr. Kaye:—"The blow fell upon all the chiefs about the capital—upon the Ghiljies, upon the Kohistanes, upon the Canhulees, upon the Momunds, even upon the Kuzzilbashies. Peaceful remonstrance was in vain. So they held secret meetings, and entered into a confederacy to overawe the existing government, and to recover what they had lost. Foremost in this movement were the eastern Ghiljies. Affected by the general retrenchments, they had also particular grievances of their own. They were the first, therefore, to throw off the mask. So they quitted Cabul—occupied the passes on the road to Jellalabad—plundered a valuable *cafila* (caravan)—and entirely cut off our communications with the provinces of Hindostan."

In the month of October, 1841, Sir Robert Sale's brigade was ordered from Cabul. The infatuation of the British agents still continued; the incapacity of the Hon. Major-general Elphinstone, left the commander-in-chief of the forces in India ignorant of the true state of the case. Besides that exalted person had remonstrated against General Elphinstone's appointment, and the general had no desire to communicate with him more frequently than he deemed absolutely necessary. Of what really was absolutely necessary he was quite incapable of judging. Sir Robert Sale marched with his brigade, and had not gone far beyond Cabul when he was attacked by hordes of Afghans, who hung upon his flanks. They had to do with a brave man and skilful soldier, and paid dearly for their temerity. In penetrating the Khyber Pass, the attacks of the enemy were more frequent and dangerous. They made every crag a breast-work, and being good marksmen, picked off many of the brigade. The way in which Sir Robert met these assaults, is thus described by Mr. Gleig, in his memoir of *Sale's Brigade*; it is a thrillingly interesting story:—"The bugles sounded for the leading companies to extend, and away among the precipices ran the skirmishers; scaling corries with a steady foot, and returning the fire of the Afghans with great alacrity. Meanwhile the column slackened not its pace for a moment. Onward

* Kaye's *Afghanistan*.

† Rev. W. Owen.

it pressed, detaching two or three companies as flankers, which mounted the hills on the right and left, and soon became warmly engaged, till by-and-by the stockade or breast-work of huge stones, wherewith the enemy had endeavoured to block up the pass, became conspicuous. A gallant rush was made at this work, which, however, the Affghans did not venture to defend, and then Lieutenant Davis, hastening his horses, went on with his guns at a gallop, and at a gallop passed through. From that time the fire of the enemy began to slacken. Their skirmishers, indeed, had already yielded to the impetuous attack of the leading companies, and the whole now fleeing to the crests of the mountains, whither our men could not follow, gradually melted away, and at last disappeared. The loss sustained in the course of this affair was less severe than might have been expected. Sir Robert Sale himself received a musket ball in the ankle just as he entered the pass; and almost at the same moment his aid-de-camp, who rode by his side, had his horse shot under him. Captain Younghusband, of the 35th native infantry, likewise, and Lieutenant Miers, of the 13th, were wounded seriously; and among the rank and file in all the corps engaged casualties occurred. But the total amount of men put *hors-de-combat* was wonderfully small, considering the great advantage of position which the enemy possessed; and of horses four were struck. Of those attached to the guns, happily not one received damage. The result of this successful encounter was to carry the 35th native infantry, with all their baggage and followers, over one important stage on their homeward journey. The narrowest and most intricate portion of the pass was threaded; and in a sort of punch-bowl, or circular valley, offering a position comparatively secure from night attacks, they made preparations for encamping. Not so the 13th. To have left the Bootkak gorge in the hands of the enemy would have been not only to isolate the 35th, but to give up the communication between Cabul and the frontiers altogether; and hence the gallant 13th had received instructions, so soon as the barricade should be forced, to return to the camp whence they had set out in the morning. They now proceeded to obey these instructions; and, carrying the wounded with them, marched back into the defile. Again they were assailed, both from the right hand and the left, with a desultory, but warm skirmishing fire; and again they ran the gauntlet through it, fighting for every inch of ground, and winning it too, though not without some loss and considerable inconvenience. They then returned to the tents

and to the force, mounted and dismounted, which they had left to protect them; and slept that night as soundly as soldiers are accustomed to do who have gone through a sharp day's work, with honour to themselves."*

Our space allows not to give the detail of this terrible march. General Sale had to contest every step of the road, and every step was contested with heroic fortitude and surpassing judgment. Colonel Dennie was the right hand of Sale, displaying a like intrepidity and judgment. The enemy succeeded, however, in bearing away tents and ammunition in great abundance.

Sale led on his brave men, inspired by his genius and fortitude. There was much suffering, and some loss of life, but the punishment inflicted upon the Affghans was severe. At last the gallant brigade reached Jellalabad, on the 13th of November, 1841. Sale immediately occupied this place, from which the people fled. He gave some little strength to its miserable defences. Colonels Dennie and Monteith, and Major Broadfoot, who commanded the sappers, were as towers of strength to the general. He had also the good fortune to have Captain Havelock upon his staff. That officer had been on the staff of General Elphinstone, but was appointed to serve in a similar capacity with General Sale, on his departure from Cabul. It was a letter of Havelock's, sent in a quill, which was the means of making known to the English agent in Peshawur the condition of the garrison.

It became necessary for Sale to fight a battle in order to impose respect upon the hordes by which he was surrounded. Accordingly, on the 16th of November, Colonel Monteith, at the head of eleven hundred men, sallied out against five thousand of the enemy, who suffered a signal defeat, which secured the garrison from further molestation for some time. Meanwhile, the indefatigable Broadfoot toiled with unflagging ardour in building up the defences, and devising expedients for rendering the attack of such enemies abortive. Food became scarce; the men were put on half rations, and thus a new cause of anxiety arose among the heroic band of officers who commanded. Abbot and McGregor, two very gallant and skilful officers, made successful efforts to keep up some supplies. It became, however, necessary to make another attack on the enemy. This was also successful, the Affghan hosts, however superior in numbers and sturdy in resistance, fading away before the superior skill and discipline of the British.

The brave garrison continued to skirmish

* Gleig's *Sale's Brigade*, pp. 80, 81.

with the enemy until the 13th of January, 1842, when a sentry on duty perceived a traveller advancing on a miserable pony, faint and apparently wounded. The traveller approached, and proved to be Dr. Brydon of General Elphinstone's corps. The doctor then supposed himself to be the only survivor of that army. Sale had previously heard of the discomfiture of Elphinstone, and therefore resolved to hold Jellalabad in case the general made good his retreat so far. The story which Dr. Brydon related, disclosed the fact of the destruction of the troops with which he had left Cabul. This showed the garrison of Jellalabad that nothing under providence could save them but their own gallantry and wisdom. The narrative of Dr. Brydon, and the events which occurred at Cabul after Sale's departure from that garrison, must be deferred until the story of the "illustrious garrison of Jellalabad" is told. The position was maintained with fluctuating hopes until the 7th of April, 1842, when it became necessary to fight a battle beyond the defences to clear the neighbourhood of the enemy.

Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mohammed, and the hope of the Affghan chiefs, occupied an intrenched camp, with the intention of blockading the little garrison and of making a dash upon it, when, as Akbar hoped, want and disease should have exhausted it before help was at hand. Between the intrenched camp and the town there were several forts, all of which Akbar had garrisoned. It was resolved by Sir Robert Sale to attack both the camp and the forts. His plan was to move out in three columns, one commanded by Colonel Monteith, another by Colonel Dennie, and the third by Captain Havelock. The forts were to be passed by and the camp attacked, Sir Robert concluding that if the main body of the enemy was defeated the forts would be surrendered. If not, they could be more advantageously attacked after the conquest of the intrenched camp. In the execution of the plan Sir Robert Sale's column was exposed to a flanking fire from one of the forts, when he ordered the 13th light infantry to bring left shoulder forward and storm a small breach, which the quick eye of the general saw to be practicable. Colonel Dennie led the assault, and received a mortal wound before the breach was entered. The soldiers on penetrating it found a second line of defence which could not be scaled, nor breached without cannon. Here they were exposed to a murderous fire from matchlocks and wall pieces. As this "keep" could not be escalated or forced, the 13th were ordered to leave the place and pursue the original plan. At double quick pace they rushed forward,

driving in the skirmishers, and dashed through the intrenchment. The victory of this column was complete. The progress of the other portions of the attack has been thus described by the Rev. Mr. Gleig:—"Meanwhile, both Colonel Monteith's and Captain Havelock's columns had trodden down all opposition. The former maintained, without a check, the pace at which their advance began. The latter, sweeping round by the river, in order to turn the flank of the position, became exposed to the attack of the enemy's cavalry, and were more than once obliged to form a square, which they did with the precision of an ordinary field day. But they, too, gained their point, and now the three divisions uniting, poured such a fire upon the enemy's masses, as dissolved them quite. Their guns, which had been served with much boldness, were in consequence deserted. One they endeavoured to carry away with them, but a well directed round-shot from Abbott's battery killed both the horses which had just been harnessed to the limber, after which the rout became universal. Had the force of British cavalry been such as could have been launched, without support, in pursuit, few would have escaped to tell of that day's overthrow. As it was, the fugitives being chased towards the river, rushed madly in, and perished, almost as many amid the deep water as by the bayonets and shot of the pursuers. Never was victory more complete. Camp, baggage, artillery, ammunition, standards, horses, arms of every kind fell into the hands of the conquerors. The camp they committed to the flames; of the baggage, as well as of animals to transport it, they conveyed back to Jellalabad as much as they cared to preserve; and they were specially gratified by discovering in one of the forts that flanked the line an important magazine of powder, shells, and shot."

The effect of this battle was disheartening to the confederated chiefs. Provisions were brought into the town, and many persons of note made submission. Akbar Khan continued his flight to Cabul, justifying his fugitive movements by the wildest stories of the numbers, bravery, and physical force of the English, and the powers of magic and enchantment possessed by their general. The moral effect of that day's triumph for the English spread over all Affghanistan, and showed how little English interests had to apprehend when confided to officers of capacity and spirit, such as Sale, Dennie, Monteith, Broadfoot, and Havelock. The Rev. W. Owen, in his interesting memoirs of Havelock, makes the following remarkable statement:—"In the midst of all these harassing scenes there were faithful

servants of Christ who were not forgetful of his claims, and were endeavouring to promote his cause. During the whole siege of Jellalabad a Jew from Bokhara was engaged in writing a transcript in Hebrew of Martin's Persian Testament, under the superintendence of a pious officer, a work that proved instrumental to his own conversion to Christianity.*

The despatch of Sir Robert Sale, recounting the history of the defence of Jellalabad, and the battle of the 7th of April, is a most interesting and remarkable document. The Rev. W. Owen states, upon authority that is beyond question, that this despatch was not written by Sir Robert, but by Captain Havelock, who was then upon his personal staff.* It is one of those remarkable productions for which this scholarly soldier was distinguished, and was spoken of by the late Sir George Murray in advantageous comparison with Cæsar's *Commentaries*. It will perhaps, satisfy the wish of the intelligent reader, and do some justice to the memory of Havelock, to give this remarkable document *in extenso* :—

From Major-general Sir Robert Sale to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Jellalabad, 16th April, 1842.

SIR,—The relief of this place having been at length effected by the victorious advance through the passes of the Khyber of the army under Major-general Pollock, C.B., I conceive that I owe it to the troops who have so long formed the garrison here, to address to you a report which may convey some notion of their conflicts, and the severity of their duties, labours, and privations. It has before been made known to government that I reached Gundamuck on the 30th of October, 1841, under instructions from the authorities at Cabul, and there received intelligence of the breaking out of a terrible insurrection at the Affghan capital, on the 2nd of November. My retracing my steps on that city was, in a military sense, impracticable, since the first inevitable sacrifice would have been of the lives of three hundred sick and wounded, whom I could not have left in dépôt with the treasonable irregulars at Gundamuck, whilst my cattle was unequal to the transport of my camp equipage, and my ammunition insufficient for protracted operations. In the position which I occupied I could not absolutely command a day's provisions, or even water, and should have been hemmed in on every side by hostile tribes, amounting to thirty or forty thousand men, part of whom might have seized Jellalabad and reduced it to ashes, or, holding it, have left me no alternative but a disastrous retreat towards Peshawur. I therefore came to the resolution of anticipating any movement of this kind, and, by possessing myself of this city, establishing a point upon which the force at Cabul might retire if hardly pressed. Two marches brought me, after a successful contest at Futeh-abad, to Jellalabad. My breaking up from Gundamuck was followed by the immediate defection of the irregulars there, the destruction of the cantonment, and a general rising of the tribes. I found the walls of Jellalabad in a state which might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them; the *enceinte* was far too extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of two thousand three hundred yards. Its tracing was

vicious in the extreme: it had no parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, which there was not more than two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of four hundred yards together, on which none of the garrison could show themselves, excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and the whole *enceinte* was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened upon the defenders, at twenty or thirty yards.

The garrison took full possession of the town, in such a state, on the morning of the 12th of November, and, in the course of the day, the place and detached hills, by which on one side it is commanded, were surrounded and surmounted by a force of not fewer than five thousand insurgents. A general attack, on the 14th of November, riddled us of these enemies, and a similar array, brought against us a fortnight afterwards, was dissipated by a second sally, on the 1st of December. But we had seized the town, having in our possession not quite two days' provisions and corn for our men and horses, and beheld the arduous task before us of striving to render the works defensible, and collecting supplies for our magazine from the midst of a fanatical and infuriated people, with very narrow means, in the way of treasure, to purchase them. I appointed Captain Broadfoot, of Shah Sujah's Sappers, Garrison Engineer, and Captain Abbot, of the Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance. Captain M'Gregor, Political Agent, gave me the aid of his local experience, and, through his influence and measures, our Dak communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of grain collected; whilst the unremitting and almost incredible labours of the troops, aided by the zeal and science of Captain Broadfoot, put the town in an efficient state of defence. Captain Abbot made the artillery dispositions in the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to, and economise, our resources in the way of gun and musket ammunition, in both of which we were deficient for the purposes of a siege. Lead and powder were procured in and about Jellalabad, and a quantity of cartridges discovered in an old magazine, and thus the troops completed to two hundred rounds per man. It is to be remarked that I might, in the second week of November, have marched upon Pesh Bolak, relieved from investment the corps of Juzailchees under Captain Ferris, and with it operated a doubtful retreat upon Peshawur. But I felt it to be my duty to give support to the last moment to our troops, struggling against their numerous enemies at Cabul, and maintain for them a point on which to retreat and rally, if they met with reverse.

On the 9th of January I was summoned by the leaders of the Affghan rebellion to give up the place, in fulfilment of a convention entered into by the political and military authorities at Cabul; but as I was fully assured of the bad faith of our enemies, I refused to do this; and on the 3th received the melancholy intelligence of the disastrous retreat of our troops from the capital and their annihilation in the Ghilzie defiles by the rigours of the climate, and the basest treachery on the part of those in whose promises they had confided. Almost at the same time it became known to us that the brigade of four regiments, marched to my succour from Hindostan, had been beaten in detail, and forced to fall back upon Peshawur: my position was most critical, and I might, whilst our enemies were engaged in plundering the force from Cabul, have attempted, and perhaps effected, though with heavy loss, a retreat across Khyber, but I resolved, at all hazards, not relinquishing my grasp on the chief town of the valley of Ningrahar, and the key of Eastern Afghanistan, so long as I had reason to consider that our government desired to retain it. The discouragements of my garrison at this moment were very great, their duties most severe,

* Owen's *Havelock*.

their labours unceasing, and the most insidious endeavours made by the enemy to seduce the native portion of them from their allegiance. But their fidelity was unshaken, and their serenity amidst labours and privations unclouded. With reference, however, to the state of fanatical excitement and national antipathy which prevailed around us, I had been compelled, as a measure of prudence, to get rid, first of the corps of Khyber rangers, and next of the detachment of Juzailchees, and a few of the Affghan Sappers, and a body of Hindostanee gunners, who had formerly been in the employment of Dost Mohammed Khan. Works had in the meantime been completed, of which the annexed reports and plans of Captain Broadfoot contain ample details. Generally, I may state, they consisted in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition of forts and old walls, filling up ravines, and destroying gardens and cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch, ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width, round the whole of the walls: the place was thus secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy not provided with siege artillery.

But it pleased Providence on the 19th February, to remove in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Cabul gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature.

The troops turned with indefatigable industry to the reparation of their walls, but at the moment of the great convulsion, Sirdar Mohammed Akbar Khan, Barukzye, the assassin of the late envoy, and treacherous destroyer of the Cabul force, having collected a body of troops, flushed with a success consummated by the vilest means, had advanced to Murkhail, within seven miles of our gates. He attacked our foraging parties with a large body of horse on the 21st and 22nd of February, and soon after—establishing his head-quarters to the westward, two miles from the place, and a secondary camp to the eastward, about one mile distant—invested the town, and established a rigorous blockade. From that time up to the 7th of April, the reduced garrison was engaged in a succession of skirmishes with the enemy, who, greatly superior in horse, perpetually insulted our walls by attacks and alerts, and compelled us daily to fight at disadvantage for forage for our cattle. The most remarkable of these affairs were those of the cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne, commanding a detachment of Shah Sujah's 2nd cavalry, and Jemadar Deena Sing, 5th cavalry, already reported; a sally under Colonel Dennie, C.B., to defeat a suspected attempt of the enemy to drive a mine, on the 11th of March; the repulse of an assault upon the transverse walls to the northward of the place, on the 24th of the same month, by detachments under Captain Broadfoot, who was severely wounded, and Captain Fenwick, her majesty's 13th light infantry; the capture of bullocks and sheep by Lieutenant Mayne, on the 30th and 31st of January; and the seizure of large flocks of the latter, in the face of Mohammed Akbar's army, by a force of infantry under Captain Patisson, her majesty's 13th light infantry, and of cavalry under Captain Oldfield, on the 1st instant. These successes were crowned by Providence by the issue of the brilliant and decisive attack on the camp of the Sirdar on the 7th instant.

I have to notice as a measure of defence, my having enrolled as a provisional battalion a large body of our

camp followers, and armed them with pikes and other weapons. On all occasions of assault and sally, these men were available to make a show upon our curtains, and I have pledged myself to them to recommend to Government, that they should enjoy all the pecuniary advantages of native soldiers beyond the Indus. I at the same time held forth to the troops of Shah Sujah's force, the expectation that they would be put, during the especial service, on the same footing with their comrades of the Bengal army.

From the time that the brigade threw itself into Jellalabad, the native troops have been on half, and the followers on quarter rations, and for many weeks they have been able to obtain little or nothing in the bazaars, to eke out this scanty provision. I will not mention, as a privation, the European troops from the same period, having been without their allowance of spirits, because I verily believe this circumstance and their constant employment have contributed to keep them in the highest health and the most remarkable state of discipline. Crime has been almost unknown among them; but they have felt severely, although they have never murmured, the diminution of their quantity of animal food, and the total want of rice, flour, tea, coffee, and sugar; these may seem small matters to those who read of them at a distance, but they are serious reductions in the scale of comfort of the hard-working and fighting soldier in Asia. The troops have also been greatly in arrears of pay, besides their severe duties in heat and cold, wind and rain, on the guards of the gates and bastions. The troops, officers, and men, British and Hindostanee, of every arm, remained fully accounted on their alarm posts every night, from the 1st of March to the 7th of April. The losses of officers and men, in carriage and cattle, camp equipage and baggage, between Cabul and Jellalabad, were heavy; and their expenditure, during the siege and blockade, in obtaining articles of mere subsistence and necessity, has been exorbitant.

I feel assured that Major-general Pollock will consider it a most pleasing duty, to bring the series of labours, privations, and conflicts, imperfectly sketched in the foregoing details, to the notice of the head of the supreme government of India, and through his lordship to that of the court of directors and of our sovereign, as a claim for public acknowledgment and substantial reimbursement and reward.

The report of Captain Broadfoot, in his capacity of garrison engineer, will meet with attentive perusal: I have already stated how much I have been indebted to his scientific attainments, as well as his distinguished activity and resolution, during the siege. His fertility in resource obviated great difficulties in procuring iron, timber, and charcoal; and to the foresight of his arrangements we owe our having had a very ample supply of tools. The corps under his command performed, from Bootkhak, the duties equally of good sappers and bold light infantry soldiers, and the Affghan Huzaree and Eusifzye portion of it have been singularly faithful in time of general defection. The two infantry regiments under the late Colonel Dennie and Lieutenant-colonel Monteith, have vied with each other in the steady performance of the duties of that arm; and it would be impossible for me to discriminate in favour of either, in awarding praise to the squadron 5th light cavalry, under Captain Oldfield, and the Rissalla 2nd Shah Sujah's cavalry, under Lieutenant Mayne: Lieutenant Plowden, of the former, has been distinguished on several occasions. The artillery practice of No. 6 light field battery has ever been excellent, and has been equalled by that of the Mountain Train. Captains Abbott and Backhouse and Lieutenant Dawes have proved themselves excellent officers of ordnance. I have more than once brought it to notice that Captain M'Gregor, political agent, has cheerfully rendered very valuable assistance in serving the guns in every crisis of pressing

danger. Of his labours in his own department, I ought not, perhaps, to attempt to constitute myself a judge; but I know they have been unremitting; and their result, in obtaining for my force supplies and information, and keeping up our communication with India and with Cabul, and securing for us Affghan co-operation, I may be allowed to appreciate, and am bound to point out to Government.

The medical duties of the garrison have been ably fulfilled by Surgeon Forsyth, Superintending Surgeon Shah Sujah's force, and Assistant-surgeons Robertson and Barnes, her majesty's 13th light infantry; Hare, 35th regiment, and Brown, late in charge of the Irregulars.

Captain Mainwaring, commissariat officer to the force, has been indefatigable in his efforts to keep the garrison well supplied, and his arrangements in very difficult times have merited my highest praise. Captain Moorhouse, 35th regiment, native infantry, has satisfactorily discharged his duties as Brigade Quarter-master; he was severely wounded on the 7th instant.

It is gratifying to me to forward the opinion of my second in command, Lieutenant-colonel Monteith, C.B., placed on record without solicitation, of the merits of the 13th light infantry, of which corps I am proud of being a member: I fully concur in the sentiments which he expresses, and hope the distinctions which he recommends for the officers of his own corps will be accorded. The cheerful and persevering manner in which the native soldiers laboured with the shovel, mattock, and handbarrow, was as surprising as their steadiness and courage in the field were conspicuous.

I have to acknowledge the zealous manner in which Brevet-major Fraser, light cavalry, Brevet-captain Gerard, of the corps of Juzailchees, Captain Burn, and Lieutenant Hillersdon, of the Khyber Rangers, and Lieutenant Dowson, of the Jambazes, when their services could no longer be available with their corps, volunteered to do duty with any regiment in which they could be useful.

I must finally express my gratitude to Providence for having placed so gallant and devoted a force under my command; in every way it has exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I beg leave, in the strongest manner, to solicit the interposition of Major-general Pollock, C.B., who has nobly laboured and fought to relieve it from its critical position in the midst of a hostile empire, in now committing it to the protection and favour of the Right

Honourable the Governor-General in Council, and through him of the Court of Directors, and of our Sovereign.

"I ask permission especially to recommend the following officers for honorary distinction, or brevet rank, or both, viz., Lieutenant-colonel Monteith, C.B., commanding 35th regiment native infantry, now second in command; Brevet-major Fraser, light cavalry, who acted as my aid-de-camp on the 7th instant; Captain Abbott, Commandant of Artillery, and Commissary of Ordnance; Captain Backhouse, commanding the Mountain Train, and senior officer of the shah's troops with my force; Captain Broadfoot, commanding Sappers, and Garrison Engineer; Captain Oldfield, 5th light cavalry, senior officer of that arm; Captain Seaton, 35th regiment native infantry, particularly recommended for his conduct on the 7th instant, by Lieutenant-colonel Monteith; Captain Younghusband of the same regiment, who was distinguished with the advanced guard in the Khoord Cabul Pass, and there severely wounded; Captain Burn, late commandant of the Khyber Rangers, and doing duty with the 35th regiment, N. I.; Captain Wilkinson, on whom the command of the 13th light infantry devolved in the field on the fall of Colonel Dennie, C.B.; Captain Fenwick, her majesty's 13th light infantry, whose highly deserving conduct in the Pass of Jugdulluck was noticed then in my despatch; Captain Havelock, her majesty's 13th light infantry, Persian interpreter to Major-generals Elphinstone and Pollock, and attached to me as staff, and who commanded the right column in the final attack on Mohammed Akbar's camp; and Captain Hamlet Wade, her majesty's 13th light infantry, my Brigade-major, whose exertions in the action of the 7th I have elsewhere highly commended. Both these latter officers rendered most valuable services throughout the investment and siege. The officers of all ranks, and soldiers of all arms, European and native, I have likewise to represent as generally and individually deserving of reward and encouragement, and I hope that Government will sanction my calling upon commandants of corps and detachments to send in rolls of such native officers as they may deem worthy of the insignia of the order of "Merit" and of "British India."

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. SALE,

Major-General Commanding, Jelalabad.

CHAPTER CXII.

TRANSACTIONS AND BATTLES OF THE BRITISH ARMY AT CABUL, FROM THE DEPARTURE OF SIR ROBERT SALE TO THE RETREAT OF THE HON. GENERAL ELPHINSTONE.

LEAVING Sir Robert Sale and his gallant brigade at Jelalabad, it is necessary to recall the reader's attention to Cabul. The withdrawal of Sale's force left the garrison of Cabul so much weakened, that the disaffected chiefs became sanguine that they should be able to effect its destruction. After the brigade of Sale left, the forces remaining consisted of the 44th British regiment of the line, the 5th and 54th Bengal native infantry, the 5th Bengal light cavalry, with the exception of a squadron, which left with Sir Robert. A company of foot artillery, and a troop of horse artillery. The shah's own force was

two regiments of infantry, a mountain train of artillery, and several squadrons of Hindostanee and Affghan cavalry. The 37th Bengal native infantry accompanied Sale part of his way.

The arrangement of the forces at Cabul were such as it might be supposed no officer of tolerable information would adopt. Part of it was quartered at the Balla-Hissar, the royal residence which overlooked the town, and the remainder was established in cantonments three miles distant. The force was divided when the most ordinary prudence would have united it, after the disasters which

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